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This study focuses upon the many and varied problems encountered by
the British in planning and preparing to resist invasion on land. between
the outbreak of World War Two in September 1939 and the reduction of the
German threat to invade during the autumn of 1940. It does not under-
estimate the decisive influence of the Royal Navy, or of the R.A.F.'s
heroic stand in the 'Battle of Britain', in deterring a potential invasion
threat, but rather attempts to examine in some detail a major aspect that
has hitherto been given very much a second place in most published works.
The subject is examined through an analysis of the periods of tenure
of the three men who successively held the post of Commander-in-Chief,
Home Forces, Generals Kirke, Ironside and. Brooke. The first period saw
the early invasion scares and the subsequent adoption of General Kirke's
'Julius Caesar' Plan, a plan which, with minor changes, continued in force
throughout the 'Phoriey War' winter until Nay 1940, when the rapid pace of
events following the opening of the German offensive in the West quickly
proved it to be inadequate to meet the increased threat. The second
period saw General Ironside embark upon a comprehensive reorganisation of
Home Forces following the Dunkirk evacuation, but rapidly coming to grief
when he attempted to replace 'Julius Caesar' with his own highly contro-
versial plan of defence. Finally came the period when General Brooke,
more fortunate to command at a time when the equipment situation was at
last improving, 'began to implement his own ideas. With the Germans seen
to be actively preparing to invade Britain, the time of maximum danger for
Home Forces now occurred, culminating in the tensions of the 'Cromwell'
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INTRODDTI0N
Invaaion Throughout history the threat, real or imagined., of an
invasion or raid. on the British Isles from foreign shores has been the
almost constant concern and. worry of the tnh&bitants of this island
nation. Prom the days of ring Alfred it was realised that the first line
of defence against such a threat must be at sea - a navy of fighting
ships that could intercept and. destroy, or at least deter, any enemy sea-
borne invasion force which attempted to cross the narrow seas, before it
could set foot on. British soil.
In more recent times the presence of a strong British navy in times
of stress to mount guard over the waters of the Chnrie1 and North Sea has
been the decisive factor in defeating or deterring invasion by a success-
ion of powerful and aggressive foreign rulers. The sagas of the defeat
of the Spanish Armada in 1588, or of Napoleon's invasion barges lying at
Boulogne from 1803 to 1805, penned in by a watch.ful Royal Navy waiting on
the horizon, need no telling here. It was that great Elizabethan sea
captain and adventurer, Sir Walter Raleigh, who, commenting on the ques-
tion of the defence of Rngland against invasion, in the time of King
James, wrote:
"I hope that this question shall never come to triall, his Majesties
many moveable Ports will forbid the experience. And although the English
will no lesse disd.aine, than any Nation under heaven can doe, to be beat-
en upon their owne ground or elsewhere by a forraigne enemie; yet to
entertaine those that shall assaile us, with their owne beef in their
bellies, and before they eate of our Kentish Capone, I take to be the
wisest way. To doe which, his Majestie, after God, will imploy his good
ships on the Sea, aM not trust to any intrenchznent upon the shore." 1.
Yet at any time when the haunting spectre of invasion threatened to
become a reality, the importance of land defences and preparations could
not be neglcted. There was always the very real danger that an enemy
seaborne expedition might slip through the traditional naval cordon to
spew heavily armed men in great numbers at any place along our miles of
open beaches, estuaries and ports, and from there to spread quickly in-
land to wreak havoc and mayhem upon our peaceful English towns and
countryside and impose their will upon a frightened government. Alterna-
tively, smaller enemy forces might enter by a 'back door' by landing in
Scotland, Wales, the West Country or Ireland, perhaps to join with an
1. Raleigh, Sir Walter: The Kistory of the World, Bk. V, ch. i, ix.
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active 'Fifth Column' that would. willingly help them to carry out their
political or territorial ambitions in exch 'nge for a settling of their
grievances. The abortive landing by the French at Pishguard. in Wales in
February 1797 and the attempted. French invasion of Ireland. in August and.
September 1798 may be quoted as examples of the latter type of threat.
In the final reckoning, therefore, an invasion had always to be met,
contained and defeated on land. Traditionally this was attempted by
build.ing static fortifications such as the stone Napoleonic Nartello
Towers of 1798-1809, the Thames and. Medway fortifications, or the London
for-ta of the 1890's, to cover strategically important points and. to gain
time to allow a relatively mobile regular field. ax to concentrate to
'throw the invaders back into the sea'. The civilian soldiers of the
local Militia, the Volunteers, Yeomriry or Fencibles, fore-runners
perhaps of the Home Guardsmen of the Second World War, have also played
a vital role in any scheme of home defence. In the latter half of the
nineteenth century, and indeed up to the end of the Great War, recurring
international crises meant that much attention was given to planning and.
preparations on land to resist a possible enemy invasion, but, even so,
these took very much a second. place to the vital and. decisive role of an
immensely strong Royal Navy.
By the late 1930's, however, a new factor had come into the picture,
that of airpower, which was to displace seapower as Britain's first line
of defence and so bring to an end a long strategical era. Enemy aircraft
now had the ability to sink or disable British ships by bombing or mine-
laying, especially in the narrow waters of the Chmel, where the larger
ships lacked room to manoeuvre, and also to fly parachute or air landing
troops over the sea to land. at virtually any point inland in the British
Isles. Control of the air was now necessary to tnintain British cominnd
of the sea and. great efforts were made at this time to build up an effec-
tive air defence. With the erosion of the traditional British reliance
on the Royal Navy to defeat or deter invasion, there was also to come,
though not until after the outbreak of war, a corresponding increase in
the importance of anti-invasion and anti-raid plrnring and. preparations
on land to a scale never before own, for in the last resort it was on
land. that an invasion, or a seaborne or airborne raid, must be defeated.
if the Nation were to survive. 	 -
This study aims to concentrate upon a consideration of British plan-
ning and preparations to resist invasion and raids on land during the
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Second World War. It does not underestimate the decisive influence
of the Royal Navy or of the R.A.F.'s heroic stand in the Battle of
Britain in deterring a potential invasion threat, but rather attempts to
cover in some detail a major aspect that has hitherto been given very
much a second place in most published works.
British planning and preparations to resist invasion on land can
best be examined through an analysis of the periods of tenure of the
various Commanders-in-Chief, Home Forces. Each of the successive
Commanders-in-Chief, Home Forces, took up the post in very different cir-
cumstances and. each adopted a very dissimilar approach to the problem.
Their plans and dispositions had to be adapted according to the changing
factors of the general war situation, of equipment, manpower, training,
mobility and the strength and resources at the disposal of Home Forces;
the type, degree and direction of the anticipated threat that existed at
the time; and the thinking, not only of the Commander-in-Chief himself,
but also that of the politicians and. Service chiefs, as well as the
attitude of mind of the country as a whole.
Yet, each Commander-in--Chief, Home Forces, had similar problems to
deal with. Common to all was the problem of where the Germans would land,
in what strength and with what equipment. Was a raid or a full-scale in-
vasion likely at any given point? Would the Germans be able to land
tanks and transport, reinforcements and supplies? Would. they stage a
coup-de-main to seize a port, or land on open beaches, or descend. from
the sky? What would be their objectives? Were, indeed, the Germans
likely to come at all? The Commander-in-Chief had to consider not only
the threat, but also the plans and dispositions of Home Forces to meet it.
Given the limited amount of manpower and equipment at his disposal, how
best could his often meagre resources be disposed to deal promptly with
the expected threat? Was it better to place divisions well forward in
force as a 'crust' to cover the expected. landing places, or to rely on a
thin warning screen backed by mobile local reserves, or to trust in inland
'stoplines' to contain an enemy advance inland? Where were the mobile
reserves, if there were any worth speaking of, to be placed - far forward
near the danger points, or held back inland far from the coast so as to
allow deployment against the greatest threat once it had been positively
identified? Were the reserves sufficiently mobile and equipped to carry
out their crucial task? How could the Commander-in-Chief cope with the
loss of so much vital trained manpower, tanks, guns and equipment of all
descriptions to overseas theatres, first to France and Norway, and later
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to the Middle East, where they were as urgently needed as at home, and.
still render Britain secure against a possible invasion? What was he to
do about the civil population in exposed. coastal areas, about the secur-
ity of a myriad of vulnerable points against sabotage or raids by fifth
columnists or parachutists, about how to train, equip and employ the Home
Guard, or about co-operation not only with the other Services, but also
with the various civil authorities as well? How best could the lessons
gained from bitter experience in the Norwegian campaign, in Holland,
Belgium and Prance, and later from the fall of Greece and. Crete, be in-
corporated into his plans and preparations? How could he balance the
deployment of units for anti-invasion duties against the all-important
necessity for send.ing theni to the best trning areas, often far away
from the most threatened parts of the country, so they could. improve
their standard of tririin to a level which would allow them to cope
better with the conditions of modern warfare? And how best could he
m,ntain a state of readiness and alertness after the invasion threat had
receded, but could rear its ugly head again at any time, if the course of
the war were to turn dramatically once more in favour of the Axis powers?
All these factors had to be taken into account in the plans, prepara-
tions and dispositions of the Commnder- .in-Chief, Home Forces, to resist
invasion. It was on this one man that the greatest burden of the land
defence of the British Isles lay, and it was an immense responsibility
indeed, for not only the security of the nation, but that of the Free
World, depended on its successful accomplishment. General Brooke, on
tcang over the post from General Ironside in the desperate days of July
1940, was to write:
"The idea of failure was .... enough to render the load of responsi-
bility almost unbearable. Perhaps the hardest part of it all was the
absolute necessity to submerge all one's innermost feelings and apprehen-
sions, and maintain a confident exterior. To find oneself daily surroun-
ded by one' a countrymen, who may at any moment be entirely dependent for
their security on one's ability to defend them, to come into contact with
all the weaiesses of the defensive machinery at one's disposal, to be
periodically racked with doubts as to the soundness of one's dispositions,
and with it all to in-4ntam a calm and confident exterior, is a test of
character, the bitterness of which must be experienced to be believed." 2.
Fin1ly, this study aims to consider briefly the hypothetical ques-
tion of how effective the plans, preparations and dispositions of the
2. Bryant, Arthur: The Turn of the Tide 1939-1943, p. 195, Collins,
London. 1957.
- 10 -
Connder-in-Cb.tef, Kome Forces, would have been if the threat envisaged
at the time had. actually mat erialised, and. how the Germms might have
been expected to have attempted to overcome the varioua aspects of the
land defence of the British Isles, and whether these could have stood the
test of battle and served their purpose in repelling the invader.
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PA1P I: THE	 PERIOD: 3 September 1939 - 27 May 1940
CHAPTER 1: TEE A1T SCABES
In the years of inteational tension cnlinirting in the Great War,
the possibility of an invasion of the United Kingdom had loomed large in
the minds of the military, the statesmen, planners and. civilian experts,
and, via the novelists and journalists, in the minds of the public. In
1900 the disasters of 'Black Week', the departure of large forces to
South Africa, leaving only the Royal Navy effectively to protect our
shores, and open hostility from the Continental Powers, led. to a sense of
insecurity at home and. a realisation of Britain's vulnerability to an in-
vasion from either Prance or Germany. The heightening tension between
Prance and Germsy over the Casablanca Incident and the prospect of poss-
ible British involvement in a war, combined with the Bosnian Crisis of
1908-09 and the 'Dreadnought' aims race with Genny, which threatened
British supremacy at sea, served to add. to British agitation about the
likelihood of invasion, this time from Gerniy. Piblicity for the need
for home d.efence was further emphasised when, on March 17th, 1909, the
War Office staged. its first-ever mechn{sed anti-invasion exercise, in
which a battalion of 1,000 Guardsmen, led by a Colonel in the best car at
the head of the procession, were rushed 54 miles in 3 hours in 286 motor
cars, borrowed. especially for the purpose through the Automobile Associa-
tion, to repel an imagina.ry attack at Hastings. 1. 	 - -
The reality of war came in August 1914. The Army and. the Fleet were
mobilised, suspected spies were arrested, the home defence a.rniy was alerted,
coast defences were activated. and strategic points were placed under guard..
Following the departure of the first five Regular Infantry Divisions of
the Britisir Expeditionary Force to Prance, the Committee of Imperial De-
fence proclaimed. that the situation, with the Territorial and New Army
Divisions still at a low level of efficiency, presented optimnn conditions
for a Gennn raid to delay reinforcement of the B.E.F., or even an invar-
sion on a grand. scale. As a result, Kitchener temporarily held. back the
6th and 7th Regular Divisions of the B.E.P. to guard against this possi-
bility, while the Fleet took up its dispositions. The most vulnerable
area of Britain was seen at first to be the East Coast, especially Harwich
1. Beckles, Gordon: Tanks Advance!, p.32, Casaell,Lond.on. 1942.
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and the ports of Tyneside and Runbereide, because of the danger of a
possible German expedition from the North German ports, but, with the
fall of Antwerp on October 10th and the threat to the Continental Chnnel
ports, the threatened. area was extended. to include the Thames Estuary and
Dover. East Anglia was felt to be particularly vulnerable, and here many
trenches were dug, beaches were wired and. troops were stationed as a pre-
cautionary measure. The Germans never intended. to invade, since they
were fully committed. to fighting the war on the Continent and, in any
case, were limited by lack of shipping, but the raiser's armies did. occu-
py part of the Belgian coast, the German Navy was an ever present threat,
and the newly discovered offensive power of the sutinarine in the North
Sea posed. a challenge to British supremacy at sea, so precautions had to
be taken. On 2nd. November, 1914, a German battle-cruiser squadron raided
the Norfolk coast, and. on 16th December, 1914, the German cruisers
steamed out of the mist to shell Scarborough, Whitby and. West Hartlepool
on the North-East Coast, hitting harbours, barracks and killing many
civilians in the towns. 2. German Naval movements in November caused
Kitchener to collect 300,000 troops, including some 94 Territorial Divi-
sions in England, although these still lacked tr-ining and had a weak
command. structure. These were spread along the coast to repel a possible
landing. These incidents also further encouraged. the installation of
coastal batteries all along the East Coast, these nia4n1y being sited to
cover ports. Pillboxes too were built, especially around the Humber, and.
Thames and Medway estuaries. Some of these were of a rectangular design,
but others were of a hexagonal pattern, a design feature to be repeated
in 1940. In November, 1914, the Government, realising the necessity for
making every provision to meet a possible invasion of England while the
country was relatively dmided of troops, owing to the despatch of
further reinforcements to the B.E.F., granted recognition tothe volun-
tary formations that had grown up all over the country since August as
unofficial, privately-backed, local guards for home defence, under the
title of the Volunteer Training Corps. Made up primarily of those ineli-
gible to serve in the Regular or Territorial Armies through age or dis-
ability, and. later reorganised and formed. into battalions and other units
which were affiliated to local Regular garrisons, the Force "was to be
called. out for actual military service only in the event of imminent
invasion, as notified by Royal Proclamation, although at other times
voluntary offers of temporary service either by Corps or individuals
2. Liddell Hart, B. H.: History of the First World War, p. 74, Cassell,
London. 1970.
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could. be accepted. by G.O.C.'s." 3 ' By the Armtstice of November 1918,
the Volunteer Force was to total 254,826, all ranks, and. over a million
men had passed. through it to the regular &zay, having received. valuable
preli m4n y tr' i . F411y disbanded in October 1920, the Volunteer
Force was the direct forerunner of the Rome Guard of the Second World
War.
By Janry 19 1 5, with the winter having Bet in, the Germm armies
halted and locked in trench warfare, with plentiful troops of the New
krmies and. the Territorials stationed in Britain in their final stages of
trin1ng, and with the German battle-cruiser squadron being defeated off
the Dogger Bank on 24th Jarviy, the invasion threat was recognised as
being remote. The question was considered again in the spring of 1915,
but by then the home army was strong and. the position of the coastal def-
ences and the Royal Navy was much improved.. The invasion controversy for
the rest of the war was something of an anti_cli TnsT, again becoming pri-
niarily an inter-Service question and it engaged the attention of the
supreme coiwnd only incidentally. Even so, the Government of the tine
took the threat of invasion seriously and, throughout the rest of the
War, strong forces were retained in Britain for home defence. Indeed, in
October 1918, for the first time ever, there was a scheme to use 48 tanks
against possible German invaders in East Anglia and Kent, with an offen-
sive counter-attacking role. 4'
Kowever, with the ending of hostilities in 1918, Britain was beset
by a natural revulsion against the horrors of "the War to end. War" and,
with the defeat of Germany and the resulting removal of the Germn Naval
threat, an. ostrich-like attitude to defence quickly developed, the ancient
British fear of invasion dying away entirely. By 1920 the Great War def-
ences had. been rapidly d.icmntled. On the South and East coasts, the
barbed wire yas removed in the space of a few months and miles of trenches
were filled in. One hundred thousand Territorials,- designated for coastal
defence were directed to other duties or disbanded. Coastal artillery was
allowed to run down and. as little money as possible was spent on the al-
ready outdated guns and. equipment. The decline continued into the early
3. c.A3 106/1188 Xemornñzi- by Col. Golightly on the Origins of the L.D.V.
and Rome Guard. 1945.
4. WO 33/899 Scheme 'T' nergency Arrangements for the Nobiisation of
Tank Companies .... A2161. Oct. 1918.
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1930's, and. in 1932 a Xin.isteria.]. Committee reported. that, "the whole of
the coast defences of the Thxpire at home and abroad are obsolete and out-
ranged by the guns of a modern cruiser arned with six-inch ortnnce." 5
The rise of Nazi Germiriy during the 1930's, however, caused attention
to be drawn once again to Britain's unpreparedness for war, but subsequent
re-p mment we.a focussed on countering the threat from the growing German
Air Force, which, it was envisaged, might launch a direct attack on the
country by means of an aerial bombardment in the form of a "knock-out
blow" on London and other cities. Therefore, the emphasis was on the ex-
pansion of the R.A.F. and. the means of air defence, leaving the Army to
come low in the order of priority for re-armament.
Thus, the efforts of the planners in Britain in the late 1930's were
concentrated against the possibility of a German bomber offensive from the
air, and they virtually discounted the possibility of an enemy landing
from the sea. Indeed, before the Second. World War, no anti-invasion plans
appear to have been made. If war came, it was assumed that it would be
fought, like the last War, on the Continent and. reliance was placed,
therefore, on the Naginot Line in France. In February, 1937, the Chiefs
of Staff Committee, then a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Def-
ence, believed. that the advent of airpower meant that any preparations to
invade would be unable to escape the watch of air reconri'-tssance patrols
and that any expedition could. be bombed and shelled to destruction before
reaching these shores. In their Report of 15th February, 1937, it was
stated that, "no danger of invasion would exist" and. if a seaborne invas-
ion on a large scale were attempted "we are confident that our naval and.
air forces would. defeat it without the help of our land. forces. The
strength and dispositions of our home defence garrisons should, therefore,
be decided. without any consideration of danger from this scale of attack."
They conceded that raids by troops carried in one or two unescorted. ships
on the East Coast were possible, but unlikely, and.that, "our home defence
shoiild. be prepared to deal with parties landed to demolish any important
point which could not more easily be demolished. by air bombardment. They
should. also be prepared to deal within reasonable time with raiding
parties landed. on more remote parts of the coast with the object of creat-
ing a diversion and. holding troops in Great Britain. On all other parts
of our coast, the tnrimnm scale of landing which need. be considered is
the strength that could. be put ashore from submarines." The Chiefs of
5. Collier, Basil: Kistory of the Second World War: The Defence of the
United Kingdom, pp. 4-5, 21, 49. KJL.S.0., London. 1957.
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Staff Committee had also considered. airborne land. attack and reasoned
that "if war occurred at the present time, the danger that the Germ'ns
would attempt an airborne land attack on any considerable scale would be
negligible" since the Germn had not yet carried out extensive parachute
troop training, but "miIl-scale raids landing demolition parties to des-
troy selected vulnerable points would be feasible and not improbable."
It was concluded that the home forces' strength and dispositions "while
designed to deal with sabotage parties landed from the air, need not,
therefore, at present be detevmftied with a view to meeting serious air-
borne land attack." 6.
Two years later, in February 1939, the planners still believed that
the land forces to be retained in the United Kingdom need to be adequate
only "to man the anti-aircraft defences and to mp-intain order and essen-
tial services in the event of major and. sustained air attacks." 7 in
March, 1939, the Germ	 occupied the remnder of Czechoslovakia, show-
ing that they clearly had. no intention of keeping to the Munich Agreement
of the previous autumn. The British Government responded by joining the
French in guarantees to Poland and at last began taking serious measures
to reazm. These measures included bringing the 12 Territorial Divisions
up to strength and then doubling them to 24 in March 1939, the introduc-
tion of conscription and the setting up of the Ministry of Supply to find
weapons for the expanding Army. 8. In accordance with the assurances of
the Chiefs of Staff, all the five Regular Divisions were to be sent to
France, as soon as they were mobilised, if war broke out, to be followed
by the Territorial Divisions as they became fit for service. 9 - Not only
was the Rome Army to be reduced to a token force of semi-trained tieops,
but priority was also given to the Field Force in France for trained
officers and the full output of equipment, artillery and transport from
production. This meant that the troops of Home Forces would reiiiain
seriously short of equipment, even for training purposes. 10.
6. CD) 248A, 15 Feb. 1937; and. CAB 80/5 COS(39)125, 18 November 1939.
7. IIP(P)44, Para. 253, 22 February 1939.
8. Collier, Basil: op. cit., p. 73.
9. DP(P) 56, 26 Apr. 1939.
10. Butler, J. K. H. (ed.): History- of the Second. World War: Grand
Strate, Vol. II: Sept. 1939 - June 1941. p. 29. LM.S.0., London.
1957.
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The Army at home also had to provide and man the fixed coastal artil-
lery. They were backed by Territorial units which were available locally
as mobile reserves, but in numbers enough only to oppose small sea or air-
borne raids.	 The coastal defences themselves, for the same reason -
the belief that anti-invasion preparations were unnecessary - had come a
very low priority in defence measures. The Defence Requirements Committee
had prepared a new series of schemes for the seaward defence of the major
Naval bases and the most important ports and estuaries, as early as 1934,
but financial limitations had mutilated their proposals, so that by autumn
1939, of the 28 ports listed that it was felt necessary to provide def-
ences for, the most important 19 (Category 'A') had their defences planned
in theory, but were still far below the approved requirements in armament;
while at the other 9 Category 'C' ports, the defences were not to be in-
stalled until after the outbreak of war. Thus, when war was declared, the
fixed defences were still very weak, with the 6 pdr. designed for close
defence against light surface craft not yet being ready, while the 9.2"
and 6t1 batteries still possessed old types of ammunition. 12.
*	 *	 *
On the 3rd September 1939, following the German invasion of Poland,
the United Kingdom found. itself at war with Hitler's Germany. The British
Expeditionary Force, consisting of four out of the five Regular Divisions,
practically all the properly trained and equipped troops in the United
Kingdom, sailed for France within a few weeks, leaving the country bereft
of virtually any form of ground defence and leaving only weak forces under
the command of General Kirke. Sir Aukland Geddea, Regional Commissioner
for South-East England, commented, "Never was this Nation so unready,
materially, mentally and. morally. But fight we must until we have won." 13
General ir Walter Mervyn St. George Kirke was appointed Commander-
in-Chief, Home Forces, on 3rd September 1939, at the age of 62. A com-
paratively little-known figure to historians, he was an ex-gunner and had
been a first-class sportsman in his younger days, having excelled at
tennis, polo and. golf. He had served throughout the Great War in Europe,
and had. also seen active campaigning in the Far East. He was a great
11. CID 1425A, 22 April 1938.
12. Collier, Basil: op. cit., p. 61.
13. BHLR Collection 1/311/116: Lord Geddes Papers: A Private Eve of the
War Memo. 2 Sept. 1939.
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friend of the Finns and a persona]. friend of Marshal Mannerheim, having,
as Major General, headed a British Naval, Military and Air Force mission
to Finland in the 1920's, during which he had advised the Finns on the
construction of the Mannerheim Line across the Karelin Isthmus - a source
of so much trouble to the invading Russians in the coming Winter War of
1939-40. He had held high commands in Britain since 1929, having been
commander of the 5th Division and. the Catterick Area from 1929 to 1931,
General Officer C.-in-C., Western Command, until 1936, then Inspector-
General of the Territorial Army until 1939, and. finally Inspector-General
of Home Defence since May 1939. He was, therefore, very well qualified
to take the post of Commander-in-Chief, having had much experience with,
and. a good lcnowled,ge of, both Regular and Territorial Forces in the
United Kingdom.
General Kirke was "very much a professional soldier" who put the
needs of the Army first and. "saw things very much from a soldier's point
of view." He had a "friendly, outgoing and likeable personality". He
generally got on well with his contemporaries arid, unlike Ironside, he
often saw eye to eye with Hore-Belisha, who tended. to be "very much the
arch-politician", always having an eye to his personal image. General
Kirke was not an altogether conservative general, having, in the 1930's,
produced. the 'Kirke Reports on Army reform, which was suppressed because
its suggestions were too radical. He was no desk general, preferring to
spend most of his time out visiting troops rather than at G.H.Q.. In
this task he always appeared to be "full of fire, energy and enthusiasm"
and he "could. chivvy people along", instantly saying so, if he thought
things were wrong. Opinions vary as to whether he was a good. public
speaker, but it seems that, while he came across well to his subordinates,
he did not put his arguments forward strongly enough to his superiors, a
failing that was to have important implications in the sphere of home
defence, when it came to arguing his case during the coming invasion
scare. General Kirke was a "bon general ordinaire", a good all-round
soldier and. leader, but not an outstandingly brilliant commander. A much
respected. figure, he was held. in high regard by his superiors and was
thought by them to be the best man for the job as Commander-in-Chief,
Home Forces. He was, on the face of it, a good choice. 14.
14. Interviews with Colonel Richard Kirke, son of Sir Walter, 27 July 1981;
Lt.Col. J. Nigel St. G. Kirke, son of Sir Walter and formerly G.S.O. 3
(ops.) on his staff, 11 August 1981; and Lt.Gen. Sir William G. H.
Pike, formerly G.S.O. 2 (ops.) on General Kirke's staff, 18 August 1981.
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General Sir William Edmund 'Tiny' Ironside, recently returned from
Cibraltar, and. currently Inspector General of Overseas Forces, became,
somewhat reluctantly, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Ironside, who
had been hankering after a fighting post and. who had expected to become
Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F., was much more ill-suited and unhappy in
his appointment. Ironside was cleverer than General Kirke, uho used to
refer jokingly to himself as "the stupid one", though General Kirke was a
much cleverer man than Lord. Gort, the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief of
the B.E.F.. 15. Like General ICirke, Ironside was an ex-gunner and was,
perhaps, slightly past his prime. Nr. Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of
State for War, "recognised that both Kirke and Ironside were on the old.
side - but they still had. drive, and he could see no others who had. it." 16.
United Kingdom Home Forces had already been organised into five
major Commands:- Western, Southern, Eastern, Northern and Scottish
Commands. These were later given the status of.Army headquarters and
were, where appropriate, to have Corps headquarters under them. There
was also Aldershot Command, which provided drafts and reserve formations,
though this Command was abolished in February 1941, when it became an area
in the newly formed South Eastern Command, and London Area, which became
a separate District at the same time. In addition, there was Northern
Ireland. District, which was directly under the War Office and over which
the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, had no control. Each Command was
divided into Areas, Sub-Areas, Districts and. Sub-Districts, but these were
purely for administrative purposes and would. not affect operational con-
trol of units. 17.
The Commands were all responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, Home
Forces, this post replacing the previous one of Inspector-Genera], of Home
Defence, on the outbreak of war. General Kirke had a small staff and
relatively limited powers, since, at the onset of war, invasion was not
expected, and the main task for his Headquarters and those of the Commands
was to absorb the recruits created by conscription, to train them and to
provide units when required for despatch abroad. Because his General
15. Interviews with Co10 Richard Kirke, 27 July 1981; Lt.Col. J. Nigel
St. G. Kirke, 11 August 1981; and Lt.Gen. Sir William C. H. Pike,
18 August 1981.
16. Liddell Hart, Captain B. H.: Nemoirs, Vol. II, p. 240. Cassell,
London. 1965.
17. Army Lists, Oct. 1939.
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Headquarters was not yet of vast importance, it was reduced to the status
of a Headquarters, Home Forces, in December 1939. It was only in May
1940, when it appeared likely that the Coimnnder-in-Cbief would have to
asse control of operations, that the ComTnnder-in-Chief' s Headquarters
again became a General Headquarters, Home Forces. The Commnder-in-C1:aef,
Home Forces, was then given operational control of all the military forces
in the United Kingdom, except for Anti-Aircraft Coami'nd, which came under
Fighter Comirnuid, LA.F., though the War Office was still responsible for
supervising the trainirig of these troops and. for administrative functions.
The G.H.Q. organisation was on conventional lines with, for example
in June 1941, a Chief of General Staff in charge of Operations, Staff
Duties and Tra.ining, and. Intelligence branches; a Lieutenant-General of
Adun ni stration in charge of the Adjutant-General, quartermaster-General
(Maintenance and Movements), Supplies and Transport, and Ordnance branches;
a Chief Civil Staff Officer, who had duties in connection with the Home
Defence Executive, of which the C.-in--C. was chairman; and specialist
branches for the Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers,
Fortresses, Chemical Warfare, Signals, Aerodxome Defence and Camouflage.
On policy and technical questions, the specialist branches dealt with the
parallel War Office Directorates, but for operations they were solely
responsible to the C.-in-C., Home Forces. 18.
The defence of the United Kingdom was an enormous combined operation
in which the C.-in-C., Home Forces, with his responsibility for carrying
out exercises and. trials, as well as preparing and eTiminfng plans, needed
to maintain the closest liaison both with the other Services and. also with
the Civil Authorities. Thus, the C.-in-C. had. a Naval staff and an R.A.F.
staff to provide liaison and information on their respective dispositions,
while the Air branch, part of the Operations branch, provided advice on
airborne questions. There were also Liaison Officers at Area Combined
K.Q. around the country to enable the Army to co-ordinate its activities
with the other Services on a local level. Liaison Officers from G.H.(.
also attended the Home Security War Room to collect information of mili-
tary value to pass onto G.H.Q. and the Civil Staff Officer in the Cabinet
War Room. Contact was also miintained with the Regional Commissioners
both at G.H.Q. and at Com'nmd level. In May 1942, when a new expedition-.
ary force was created with its own H.Q., these troops were still available
18. Guide to Documents of the Second World War: P.R.O. Handbook No. 15.
- 20 -
for Rome Forces in the event of invasion and drew for their alministrative
services on the static units of the home commuid.. Later still, in March
1 943, p1_nrI for the invasion of Europe began and when LQ. 21st Army
Group was Bet up in June 1943, these forces rnained available for U.Z.
defence, but otherwise were independent of G.H.., Home Forces, and dealt
directly with the War Office. 19.
Something must be said briefly about the higher bodies that were to
piay an important part in influencing the policies and decisions of the
Commanders-in-Chief, Home Forces. (See Appendix i.) The C.-in-C., Home
Forces, was responsible to the War Office, whose military head was the Chief
of the Imperial General Staff. The C.I.G.S. regularly attended meetings
of the Chief of Staff Committee, which had previously been a sub-committee
of the Committee of Imperial Defence. However, on the outbreak of war,
both the peace-time Cabinet and the C.I.D. were superseded by the War
Cabinet, which was formed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain. The War
Cabinet met first on 3rd. September 1939, and consisted of the Prime Minis-
ter and a small number of selected Ministers, including the three Service
Ministers. Other Ministers, officials and experts were invited to attend
meetings of the War Cabinet from time to time, while the Chiefs of Staff
attended regularly for military business. The Chiefs of Staff Committee
itself henceforward consisted of the C.I.C.S., General Sir W. Edmund
Ironside (General Sir John Dill, from 27 Nay 1940); the Chief of the
Naval Staff, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thzdley Pound; and the Chief of the
Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril Newall (Air Chief Marshal Sir
Charles Portal, from 10 October 1940). Major General Hastings Ismay,
hitherto Secretary of the C.I.D., was appointed Secretary to the C.O.S.
Committee, later becoming a member on 2 Nay 1940, and also Deputy Secretary
on the military side to the War Cabinet. The official functio of the
C.0.S. Committee was to hear reports and consider the situation, to decide
on day to day problems concernirig operations and to consider any matters
specially referred to them by the War Cabinet, and they were, in fact,
joint advisers to the Cabinet on military policy. The Committee's influence
was to continue to ow steadily on all matters of military policy and. in




The Chiefs of Staff were backed up by the resources of their respec-
tive departments and the Committee was also served by two inter-Service
bodies, the Joint Planning and. the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. As
the War progressed, the increasing pressure on the time and. energy of the
already overburdened Chiefs of Staff prompted the Government to appoint,
on 22 April 1940, three Vice Chiefs of Staff, who acted as subordinates
for their Chiefs and whose meetings counted equally as meetings of the
C.0.S. Committee. Thus, the Vice Chief of Staff Committee dealt with the
more routine departmental work, leaving the C.0.S. Committee to deal with
the urgent immediate matters and broad future policy.
On the formation of the National Coalition Government on 10 May 1940,
Winston Churchill, the new Prime Minister, made a key change when he also
became Minister of Defence with undefined powers, so as to supervise and
direct the Chiefs of Staff by means of a Defence Committee. This provided
a further link between the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet, and meant
that the C.0.S. Committee was now, for the first time, in direct daily
contact with the executive head of the Government and in accord with him
had full control over the conduct of the Wax and Armed Forces. The
Defence Committee was divided into two parts, Operations and Supply, and,
though its composition varied, it was always attended by the three Chiefs
of Staff and. by the Prime Minister in his new capacity as Minister of
Defence. The Defence Committee replaced the Standing Ministerial Committee
on Military Co-ordination, that had been set up in late October 1939 under
the chairmanship of Lord Chatfield and which had included the Chiefs of
Staff and the three Service Ministers, and whose function had been "to
keep under constant review on behalf of the War Cabinet the main factors
in the strategical situation and. the progress of operations, and to make
recommendations from time to time to the War Cabinet as to the general con-
duct of the war." All these bodies, and many others, were served by the
single secretariat, with the result that duplication and misunderstanding
were minimised and that the utmost flexibility in organisation was secured. 20
The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, were entrusted with enormous power in
a very wide variety of matters, one of the most important being in the
formulation of policies for Home Defence and their decisions, together
with those of the War Cabinet, consequently were to guide strongly and to
influence the C.-in-C., Home Forces, in his planning and. preparations to
meet invasion.
20. Butler, J. R. N. (ed.): op. cit., pp. 247-249.
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*	 *	 *
General Kirke saw his main duty for the coming months as being,
firstly, to complete the training of the formations earmarked for early
departure overseas and, secondly, to convert the masses of men in uniform
into soldiers as soon as possible. To achieve both these purposes, it
was necessary to keep units and formations concentrated so that training
could be carried out with the maximum speed and efficiency. 21.
tasks that would require units to be dispersed, for example to aid the
Civil Authorities in duties in connection with civil defence in the cities,
to provide gnards for vulnerable points, or to undertake an anti-invasion
role, were to be most unwelcome to General Kirke.
From the time of his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces,
General Kirke was handicapped by having only somewhat limited powers and.
he was to be continually frustrated in his primary tasks by the War Office.
On the 7th September, General ICirke, following instructions from the
C.I.G.S., closed his G.H.Q. at the Horse Guards and moved it to Kneller
Hall, Twickenham. He did this:
".... with great reluctance, as I foresaw that the War Office would
continue to try to command my troops, as in fact occurred. It was only
as a result of constant struggling that my existence was recognised by my
branch of the War Office. Attempts to obtain an adequate staff were met
by Finance with every possible objection and obstruction."
This state of affairs was to continue throughout the winter:
"I was ordered to reduce my H.Q. from G.H.Q., Home Forces, to H.Q.,
Home Forces, and since there were no active operations overseas to occupy
their attention, the War Office constantly interfered in my functions." 22.
General Kirke also had. to fight to gain a larger responsibility on
training matters from the Director of Military Training at the War Office,
General Kirke's argument being, "that one cannot command troops in opera-
tions if one has no knowledge of their standard of efficiency." After
long discussions, the C.I.G.S. at length gave him responsibility for the
higher training of formations, with the D.M.T. placed at his disposal for
this limited purpose. However:
21. Graves, C.: The Home Guard of Britain, p. 10. Hutchinson, London.
1943.
22. General Kirke Papers: Notes left by General Sir Walter Kirke, 1939-
1940.
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".... in practice the DJ'l.T. did everything possible to assert his
complete independence. All divisions as they became at all ready for
operations were entirely removed from my command, as were the training
establishments. I was thus left with a certain number of divisions with-
out equipment and much hampered by having to provide guards. In fact, I
had access to only about half the troops commanded by my own G.O. C.-ln-
C. 'a, and the latter were themselves debarred from visiting field army
formations, which they had to maintain, and which they would command if
active operations started in this country." 23.
Prom the outset of the War, the Government had been much obsessed
with danger of sabotage, either from fifth columnists or from small parties
of the enemy dropped by parachute, and it made constant demands for guards
of every description. Guards had to be provided for R.A.F. establishments
such as R.D.F. stations, fighter and bomber stations, balloon centres,
maintenance units, fuel depots, non-operative H.Q.'s, training establish-
ments and schools; for railway vulnerable points such as tunnels, bridges
and viaducts; for waterworks, power stations, pumping stations and reser-
voirs; for Naval docks and harbours, embarkation ports, Naval wireless
stations, Admiralty oil fuel installations, fixed defences, other ports,
piers, Naval stores, etc., ammunition depots and. forts; for military
factories, stores, magazines, ordnance depots, etc., cable huts, transport
fitting establishments, military WIT. and D.F. stations; and for B.B.C.
stations, commercial oil installations, private factories, internment
camps and P.O.W. camps. 24. The list of places to be protected seemed to
be endless and was to grow at an alarming rate, consuming vast quantities
of manpower that could be far more usefully employed elsewhere. General
Kirke was to have a running battle to keep the numbers employed on this
task down to within reasonable limits. Already by October:
"The provision of guards was a constant trouble. My view was that
everything possible should be done to enable the Field Army to concentrate
and. train and that that should have priority over static guards. Govern-
ment Departments all took a parochial view, particularly the R.A.F. (with
the exception of Dowd.ing).
The Adjutant General failed in his arrangements to get the Home Def-
ence battalions up to establishment, and. in fact changed his mind every
few days as to whether they, or the labour in Prance, were the most
important.
The Government would do nothing he asked, either to call up an older
class or to enlist under-age lads for labour or guard duty. The P.U.S.
Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War] blocked expansion .... in
every possible way.
23. General Kirke Papers: op. cit.
24. WO 166/i: War of 1 939-1945 War Diaries, G.H.Q. Home Forces, Feb.
1940: Appendix B: The Provision of Military Protection for
Vulnerable Points, 7 Feb. 1940.
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A Committee formed as the result of my constant agitation to reduce
guards effected some temporary relief, but this was quickly swallowed up
in guards for neutral shipping.
Throughout, there has been the curious situation that I, who had no
responsibility for the B.E.F., was straining every nerve to get divisions
trained at the expense of home defence, whereas the War Office has taken
very little interest." 25.
General Kirke was now to be further frustrated in his desire to pro-
vide trained men and units for overseas by an invasion scare, which arose
in late October 1939. Hitherto, the only Germans expected to land. on
British soil had been small parties landed by parachute to attempt to
sabotage vulnerable points, but the October scare was to be on a far more
serious level. The Invasion scare was caused by a combination of Cabinet
alarm over a series of somewhat suspect reports emanating from the Contin-
ent, and. the dominating and persuasive personality of Winston Churchill,
First Lord of the Admiralty, who seized on them, to expound his own worries
about the security of the British homeland.
As early as 21 October 1939, Winston Churchill, worried by the reduc-
tion of British light Naval forces in the North Sea to provide escorts for
trade protection, had raised the possibility of a German landing during
the dark winter nights, at a meeting of the War Cabinet, and the Chiefs of
Staff were invited to "consider whether there was any risk of a seaborne
invasion or raid. and, if so, what steps should be taken to meet j•1 26.
Churchill further outlined. his worries in a letter to the First Sea Lord
on the same day:
"I should be the last to raise those 'invasion scares', which I corn-
batted so constantly during the early days of 1914-15. Still, it might be
well for the Chiefs of Staff to consider what would happen if, for instance,
20,000 men were run across and landed, say, at Harwich, or at Webburn Hook,
where there is deep water close inshore .... I do not think it is likely,
but it is physically possible." 27.
He followed this up with a further letter to the First Sea Lord two days
later, in which he said:
25. General ICirke Papers: op. cit.
26. CAB 65/1 WM 55th(39):2, 21 Oct. 1939.
27. Churchill, W. S.: Vol. I, The Gathering Storm, p. 462. Cassell,
London. 1948.
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".... it seems to me there ought to be a certain number of mobile
columns or organised. forces that could be thrown rapidly against any
descent. Of course it may be that the air service will be able to assume
full responsibility." 28.
The Chiefs of Staff merely requested the Joint Planning Committee to re-
examine its Report of January 1937 on the prospects of invasion, in the
light of the present situation. 29.
However, just a few days later, at 1.40 a.m. on Friday, 27 October,
a telegram arrived from Sir Ronald H. Campbell in Belgrade which was to
be seized on by Churchill to support his point of view and which was to
have great implications for home defence. This telegram stated
that the French Military Attach in Yugoslavia had reported the receipt of
information "which he received from the} Head of Intelligence Branch of
[the] Yugoslav General Staff who said he had obtained it from a reliable
source in touch with officers of the German General Staff," to the effect
that an enormous invasion was being planned by the Germans on Britain by
land, sea and air, which would take place at any moment. The telegram
said that the attack would be in the form of a landing by two divisions
of parachutists (12,000 men) on the East Coast, backed up by a total of
80,000 troops transported over just two nights by small merchant vessels
protected by motor torpedo boats, submarines and destroyers. The whole
project would be covered by four German airfleets estimated in the tele-
gram at no less than 5,200 aircraft, which would not only transport the
parachutists, neutralise British aerodromes, aircraft factories and rail-
ways by bombing, but also neutralise the Royal Navy, protect the sea
transports and cover their disembarkation on the East Coast! This vast
number of aircraft, many more than the Germans in fact possessed, would
have to carry out this long list of tasks over Britain from bases at least
200 miles away in North Germany, while the Germans were only known to have
4,000 trained parachutists! While these operations were in progress, a
diversion, according to the telegram, would be made in France by an attack
on the Maginot Line "under the cover of 280 mm. and 300.5 mm. guns, 60 ton
tanks, new types of flame throwers and 800 kg. armour-piercing aerial
torpedoes launched from aircraft"! 30.
28. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., pp. 666-667.
29. CAB 79/1, COB 56th(39):4, 25 Oct. 1939; and CAB 80/4, C0S(39) 93,
21 Oct. 1939.
30. CAB 63/1, 19/10/163: 5th Meeting of the N.C. Committee, 27 Oct. 1939,
Annex: Telegram No. 305 from Yugoslavia.
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The whole thing sounded somewhat improbable and Sir Ronald Campbell
assessed it as such:
"I have telegraphed it because it seems possible that the German
Government, realising their inability to conduct a long war, may stake
every-tthing on a wild venture." 31.
General Kirke was not impressed. by this report, which he felt was
"obviously put about by the enemy":
"Hore-Belisha asked me to dinner to discuss the question prior to a
co-ordination meeting, and. I told him what had happened in the last war
was as a result of similar enemy propaganda. Troops were being kept away
from France in '17 and. '18 which nearly lost us the war." 32.
Although the General Staff "did not attach much credence" to the
telegram, 33 Winston Churchill "raised a great scare in the Cabinet" 34
and. at 9.30 p.m. the same day, the Military Co-ordination Committee,
chaired. by Lord. Chatfield, the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, and
consisting of the Service Ministers and their military advisers, met at
Churchill's request to consider the telegram.
Winston Churchill opened with his customary verve by delivering "an
impassioned address, the tenor of which was that troops should be kept
back from France to meet this imminent danger." 35 Churchill "felt that
the Fleet could not get advance information of the project and. that the
invasion would be upon us before we knew where we were, and he felt that
the Navy could not stave it off." 36. He drew a comparism between the
present day and the situation in 1914 and. pointed out that:
31. CAB 83/1, 19/10/163: 5th Meeting of the N.C. Committee, 27 Oct. 1939,
Annexe: Telegram No. 305 from Yugoslavia.
32. General Kirke Papers: op. cit.
33. Minney, R. J.: The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, p. 253 . Collins,
London. 1960.
34. General Kirke Papers: op. cit.
35. ibid.
36. Ninney, R. ].: op. cit., p. 253.
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".... early in the last war, at a time when we possessed a great Fleet
at Scapa Flow, and had strong forces of cruisers and destroyers at various
points on the East Coast, we had still been nervous of the possibility of
invasion, and had taken considerable precautions against it. At the pres-.
ant time, the Naval situation was in no way comparable to that. The East
Coaat was bare. Many of our great ships were away hunting the 'Admiral
Scheer' and the 'Deutschland.', while the majority of our destroyers were
engaged on hunting U-boats and on convoy work.
If the Germans decided to undertake a desperate venture of the kind
suggested in the Telegram, they might embark the expedition in a large
number of merchant ships which could be escorted by 25 to 30 good destroy-
ers, and they might reckon on bursting their way into a port, say, Harwich
or the Huinber. They might count on the way being prepared for them by the
operations of their parachute troops."
Churchill concluded by arguing that:
"The Germans were faced with the necessity of undertaking some great
operation either against ourselves or against the French. They might
shrink from sacrificing vast numbers in an. attack on the Maginot Line,
whereas they might well gamble on a hazardous venture against Great
Britain, which, if it succeeded, would. cause us great loss and confusion,
and. if it failed, would only entail the loss of 80,000 men. Re thought,
therefore, that we should treat the possibility seriously and. take due
precautions." 37.
A consideration of the Chiefs of Staff's memoranda of 1937 followed
in which the technical possibilities of a seaborne land attack had. been
fully investigated. In this it had been thought that the enemy might
embark a force of one division (say 17,000 men) in 20 ships of 4,000 or
5,000 tons. At 15 Iaiots such a force would require 20 hours to reach the
nearest point on the East Coast of Great Britain, i.e. East Anglia, and,
since it had to make part of its voyage in daylight, it should be detected
if reconrtissance was mintaj.ned.. 38.
The meeting then went on. to consider what action might be taken to
meet the risk of invasion. Both Sir Dudley Pound. for the Navy, and. Sir
Cyril Newell for the Air Force, sounded equally uncomfortable and. pessi-
mistic. Pound proposed a submarine screen across the route from Germany
to Great Britain and the reinforcement of light Naval forces on the East
Coast, but said. that Naval recormissance would. not be so easy to arrange
as in the last war and was reluctant to move heavy ships into the North Sea
because of their vulnerability to air attack. Newell proposed frequent
37. CAB 83/1, 19/10/163: 5th Meeting of the M.C. Committee, 27 Oct. 1939.
38. ibid.; and CID Pager No. 248-A, 15 Feb. 1937.
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reconnaissance over the German ports and. North Sea to try and gain infor-
mation of any preparations and said that the Bomber and Fighter Commands
would be alerted, but admitted the danger of a large paratrooper landing,
following a preliminary air attack "on the largest scale". This, he said,
would be facilitated if the Germans seized Holland, so they "would then be
able to support the operations of their bombers over this country with
their short-range as well as their long-range fighters. It was only on
some such assumption that the figure of 5,200 aircraft could be made up." 39
It was therefore assumed that the Army would have to deal with a
formidable foe. General ICirke, representing the Army at the meeting, was
next asked for his views. He recalled:
"Pound, to my great regret, would not promise any Naval interference,
as the Fleet was withdrawn from Scapa, and. Newall was equally defeatist.
When asked, I said that:
a) It was most unlikely that the enemy would carry out operations until
the air factor was more favourable, i.e. until lus fighters could
support his bombers.
b) Therefore he must first take Holland and. possibly Belgium, and that
the (German] Naval preparations were much more likely to be for that
purpose.
c) That the best safeguard was to prevent him getting Holland or Belgium
by pressing on with the B.E.P., and not by diverting its energies to
Home Defence at the expense of training.
d) Better provision for guarding V.P.'s should be made or the number
reduced, so as to free the Field Army for training.
e) The Field Army should be made mobile.
Mr. Churchill, however, took charge of the meeting over Lord Chatfield's
head, and was most insistent.
It was obvious that I should have to do something to calm him or the
Cabinet down, and. I therefore suggested:
a) Moving the Armoured Division to East Anglia.
b) Hiring transport to make the Field Army mobile.
The former would. do no harm, as the Division was going to move some-
where anyway, and the latter was a great gain for normal training." 40.
39. CAB 83/1, 19/10/163: 5th Meeting of the M.C. Committee, 27 Oct. 1939.
40. General Kirke Papers: op. cit.
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Mr. Hore-Belisha, who, unlike Churchill, held General Kirke's opinions
in high regard, tried to back General Kirke's arguments by attempting to
pour cold water on the rumours. He emphasised the unreliability of the
source and drew attention to the possibilities that "the report might have
been deliberately put out by the Germans to confuse us" or that "it might
be a 'red. herring', designed to draw US off the track of a real operation
being planned elsewhere. This was a technique favoured by the Germans, as
we had experienced in the past. It was on the cards that the activity in
North-West Germany might presage an attack, not on Great Britain, but on
Holland." 41.
However, neither General Kirke nor Hore-Belisha succeeded in dissuad-
ing the Cabinet from succumbing to Churchill's powerful argument. Hore-
Belisha wrote to Lord Gort a few days later that "we tried to riddle the
arguments, but nevertheless we were instructed to prepare plans for meeting
the invasion and even for bringing back divisions, if necessary, from
prance." 42.
As a result of the meeting, General Kirke was called. upon "to prepare
immediate plans to meet an invasion on a large scale, based on a source of
enemy action winch had previously been ruled out as unlikely". These plans,
to be produced on the spur of the moment, were to emerge as the 'Julius
Caesar' plan within the next few days. 43
General Kirke tended to see things very much from the point of view
of a professional soldier, who kept the needs of the military uppermost in
his mind. He reluctantly accepted the necessity to deploy forces for home
defence. He was not the man to raise a great fuss about the situation, but
was content to get on with his job, even if privately he did not totally
agree with everything he was instructed to do. To General Kirke, home def-
ence was "a job to be done". 	 His purely military attitude contrasted.
with the attitude of Churchill, who took a much wider view of the invasion
threat and had foremost in his mind the morale of the country as a whole,
not merely the requirements of military strategy.
41. CAB 83/1, 19/10/163: 5th Meeting of the M.C. Committee, 27 Oct. 1939.
42. Minney, R. J.: op. cit., p. 253.
43. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 7: The Julius Caesar
Plan, 15 November 1939.
44. Interview with Colonel Richard Kirke, 27 July 1981.
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Churchill was also very much the amateur strategist. General 1C2.rke
recollected that after the meeting:
"Mr. Churchill came up and expressed regret if he had upset my show,
and. I ventured to remind him of the German propaganda put out through
neutral military attachs in 1918, which had kept Ptain's General Reserve
towards Switzerland, when it ought to have been moving to help us."
General Kirke, like succeeding Commanders-in-Chief, Home Forces, had
a very low opinion of Churchill's military ideas. Deploying forces for
home defence contradicted what he saw as the correct military strategy -
that all the efforts of Home Forces should be devoted to training troops
and despatching formations to Prance, so that the war could be fought on
the Continent. To Kirke, Churchill's strategy:
".... seemed. to me to be designed to prevent our sending troops over-
seas to help our Allies or friends, and I have no doubt it was in prepara-
tion for his Scandinavian adventures, and generally to retain the morale
initiative by worrying our amateur strategists. I believe at a Cabinet
meeting to consider the recommendations of the Co-ordination Committee,
Mr. Chamberlain took rather my view." 45
The following day, 28th October, Lord Chatfield., reported. to the War
Cabinet that the telegram had been considered by the Military Co-ordination
Committee and, although they thought the plan somewhat fantastic, they
admitted the possibility existed, especially in view of the fact that the
development of aerial warfare had changed the position in the North Sea.
He outlined. the Committee's conclusions as to the practicalities of such
an operation, which were very similar to Churchill's analysis, that the
most likely proceeding would. be
 a heavy and sustained air offensive against
the British Fleet and R.A.F., followed by a parachute landing to seize a
port to enable the comparatively easy disembarkation of a seaborne expedi-
tion. It was not thought likely that the Germans would land on an open
beach, because of the unpredictable weather conditions at this time of
year. The Germans were expected to rely on surprise for their success
and to make full use of the lengthening nights.
The three Service Ministers then went on to outline the precautionary
measures to be taken by their respective Services, that were approved by
the Military Co-ordination Committee meeting. The Secretary of State for
War, Hore-Belisha, after briefly outlining the Army's preparations, took
45. General Kirke Papers: op. cit.
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the opportunity to emphasise again the improbability of an enemy expedi-
tion, pointing out how complicated and hazardous an opposed landing would
be and. that the Germm troops could be landed with very little in the way
of transport, food, reserves of amunmitioti, or artillery. Re also again
drew attention to the fact that alarmist reports like this were very like-
ly put out by Germany to conceal their real intentions, for example, a
possible seaborne attack on the Netherlands. The I'linister for Home Secur-
ity, Sir John Anderson, added that the police might be able to play some
role if they were armed, and undertook to confer with General Kirke ixnme-
d.iately on this subject. - The War Cabinet approved the action taken, or
about to be taken, azid also invited the Secretary of State for Air, Sir
Kingsley Wood, to furnish the War Cabinet each morTu.ng with the weather
forecast for the next 24 hours. 46.
The next day saw discussions at the War Cabinet meeting continued to
include the danger of parachute landings in places such as aerodromes and.
the London Parks, and Churchill urged a review of the dispositions of
troops in London, so as to safeguard vulnerable objectives like the
Government offices. 47
Tension began to mount on 30th October, when the Secretary of State
for War reported that the projected invasion of Great Britain was being
well advertised, in a number of reports arriving from the Continent, though
Hore-Belisha himself felt that the receipt of so many reports "therefore
tended to discredit the possibility of invasion". However, Government
offices in Berlin were said to have moved to their war stations, which
"might be consistent with some intention, which would be likely to invite
retaliation". The Chief of the Imperial General Staff added, to the effect
that, the German intention could well be an invasion of the Netherlands,
not Great Britain, since "as fax as could. be ascertained, the report of an
alleged assembly of flat-bottomed boats, which might be used for an attack
on Holland, was true. Prom the military point of view, such an attack
would be perfectly feasible." Hore-Belisha said that all troops had been
issued with full-scale war ammunition and that plans had been made to
enable the 48th and. 51st Divisions to be moved rspidly to the East Coast,
if necessary, while the 1st Armoured Division was also prepared to move at
short notice. 48.
46. CAB 65/1 and CAB 65/3: WM 63rd.(39):5, 28 Oct. 1939.
47. CAB 65/1 and CAB 65/3: WM 64th(39):4, 29 Oct. 1939.
48. CAB 65/3: WM 65th(39):3, 30 Oct. 1939.
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That night a sierI il reached the War Office suggesting that a German
raiding force was on its way to East Anglia. As a result, and without
waiting to cal]. a meeting of the Army Council, which the Secretary of
State for War attended, the C.I.G.S., General Ironsid.e, considering the
matter to be urgent, had warned Genera]. Kirke and. ordered the 51st Division
in reserve at Aldershot to move to East Anglia. The raid was a false
alarm, but his action led to a disagreement the next day with Hore-Belisha,
who claimed, that the C.I.G.S. was not authorised. to send. orders to the
Co'mnnder-in-Chief and. that this was the prerogative of the Army Council.
This dispute over who should give orders to whom should have been resolved
by the Committee of Imperial Defence before the War, for it was to lead to
further friction between Ironside and. the sometimes rather high-handed
Hore-Belisha in the coming months. 49
The 31st October saw further discussions about the invasion scare at
the meeting of the War Cabinet. Again, the Secretary of State for War
tried to belittle the reports, stating that although "rumours of an impend-
ing German attack on Great Britain, either by sea or air, were now being
received from sources as widely diverse as The Hague and Peking", there now
"seemed. little doubt those rumours were being spread by Germany. The moral
was that we should. not allow ourselves to be deflected from our tnin
strategy." 50.
By the 31st October, too, the War Cabinet was begftu'ftig to recover
from its alarm over the immThence of invasion and it even considered some
modification of the action agreed on over the last few days. The Minister
without Portfolio, Lord. nkey, said he had not been greatly disturbed by
the original, report which had on the 27th October led. to an. urgent review
of our home defence requirements, but that he "was not at all sure that
these arrangements as a whole had received sufficient consideration",
especially since the review "had disclosed the weakness of our Naval forces
operating off the East Coast, and. the absence of mobile artillery with the
land forces in the East of England. t' He pointed. out that "noth'ing would do
more to upset our programme for the d.espatch of forces overseas, than an
attempted raid, even though this might prove unsuccessful. However, provi-
ded our home defence organisation was on a sound basis, there was no reason
49. Macleod., H. and eUy, D. (eds.): The Ironsid.e Diaries 1937-1940,
pp. 160-161. Constable, London. 1962
50. CAB 65/1: WM 66th(39):5, 31 Oct. 1939.
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why we should be alarmed by these sudden reports." The War Cabinet ex-
pressed general agreement with this view and "the suggestion that it might
be possible to take adequate steps to deal with the threat of a seaborne
raid at a smaller cost in requisitioned transport, with less disturbance
to civil industry, was cordially welcomed." It was recalled that "the
Germans had never yet carried out a combined operation involving land and
sea forces working in conjunction except at Libau, when their arrangements
had broken down badly. Such an operation was an extremely complicated
matter, requiring great experience and very careful preparation." How-
ever, it would "not be safe to assume that the negative results of air
reconnaissance over North-West Germany necessarily showed that the danger
of an expedition had passed altogether." The Cabinet concluded that it
would not therefore be wise to cancel on this account all the arrangements
agreed upon on the 27th October and they asked the War Office to report
their plans for dealing with invasion to the War Cabinet as soon as
possible. 51.
Throughout the invasion scare, Hore-Belisha had constantly and quite
rightly tried to play down the alarmist reports from the Continent. He,
like General Kirke who shared his views, was strongly opposed to any Divi-
sions of the B.E.F. being brought back from France and both felt that the
rumours were no more than a German ruse to disrupt our plans and to dis-
courage the B.E.F.. That night, Hore-Belisha wrote to Lord Gort,
Commander-in-Chief of the B.E.F., about the reinforcement programme:
"We have nearly had all our plans jiggered up by the reports of an
intended 'invasion'.' .... Winston took it very seriously."
And on the next day, 1st November, he followed this up:
".... the same rumour came from various other 'reliable sources' and
I pleaded throughout that our main strategy should not be deflected.
I hope that my colleagues will all agree that we need not do anything
which would upset our training or programme." 52.
What was the true origin of this series of alarmist reports that
caused so much apprehension amongst the War Cabinet and the Service Chiefs,
and which nearly caused a major change in British strategy? There is now
51. CAB 65/1 and CAB 65/3: WM 66th(39):5, 31 Oct. 1939.
52. Ninney, R. J.: op. cit., pp. 252-253.
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little doubt that the rumours were being put about by German agents, so
as to reach the ears of the intelligence networks of sympathetic neutral
countries who would in.form the British or Allied miii
 tary attaches
present there, who would in turn commute the reports to the United ring-
dam. The German aim was doubtless to do just what Genera]. lirke and.
Hore-Belisha feared most, to throw the reinforcement programme for the
B.E.F. out of gear by spreading alarm and despondency in Britain, which
would lead to valuable troops being deployed in Britain for home defence
which might otherwise be sent to Prance. The War Cabinet fully realised
this probability at the time, but could. never be absolutely certain of
Germany's true intentions. The necessary counter-measures, therefore,




CRAPTER 2: TH 'JULIUS CAESAR' PLAN
All the invasion rumours were quickly found to be false, but they had
led. to a sudden awareness that there was some possibility of at least a
raid and that precautions must be improved.. Although there were no less
than 280,000 men under arms in Great Britain, not including trpining estab-
lishments, the Azxiy's dispositions at the end of October were geared to
two tasks other than their primary function of tr-inirig troops and. forxna-
tions for overseas. These were, firstly, to assist the civil population
in a variety of ways in case of heavy air attack and, secondly, to deal
with sabotage raids by parachutists. There had been up to this time no
plans made to counter an invasion, because none was expected. Genera].
Kirke's initial preparations to resist a possible enemy landing, therefore,
had to be improvised on the spur of the moment and. were at first an adap-
tion of the existing dispositions of formations in the country. (See
Map 1.)
General Kirke's problem was to make adequate provision against inva-
sion without interfering unduly with training for overseas. There were
six Territorial Divisions in England north of the Thames, within easy
reach of the East Coast. On 27th October, General Kirke had reported to
the Militay Co-ordination Committee that:
".... each of these had a mobile column organised, consisting of one
or more battalions, which would be transported in hired buses, which were
standing by .... apart from the mobile columns, the Army at home was much
handicapped by lack of equipment, particularly as such equipment as the
Army possessed was spread round for the purpose of training. If, there-
fore, it was desired to form a Force to withstand invasion, equipment
would have to be concentrated in the hands of the units of that Force, to
the detriment of the train ing of the whole." 1.
Additionally, there were another two Territorial Divisions near the
coast south of the Thames, a further three Territorial Divisions in Scot-
land, and the 5th Regular and the 1st Cavalry Division training in York-
shire, while 40,000 National Defence Company or Territorial Army personnel
were tied up in protecting vulnerable points, including aerodromes which
each had a guard of not less than two platoons (about 60 men).
1. CAB 83/1, 19/10/163: 5th Meeting of the M.C. Committee, 27 Oct. 1939.
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Most of the Territorial Divisions were in a comparatively early stage
of tr-ining, especially the twelve 'duplicate' Territorial Divisions that
had. been created virtually overnight shortly before the outbreak of War
from cadres supplied by each of the original twelve Territorial Divisions.
In the case of each pair of divisions, both of which bad. strong local con-
nections and were based on a similar recruiting area, from which they both
took their names, the original division was the better trained and equipped
whereas its duplicate, lacking a].]. but the barest minimum of equipment
required for tra'ning and virtually consisting only of semi-trained rifle-
men, had. "literally come straight off the streets". 2.
General irke had, however, the 48th (S. Midland) and. 51st (Highland)
Territorial Divisions at Salisbury and Ald.ershot, respectively, which were
getting ready to go to Prance and which were in the most advanced state of
tr-irting. He also had the 1st (Regular) .Armoured Division at Salisbury,
which could move to East Anglia if necessary. Prom what he heard at the
meeting on 27th October, he thought "that sufficient notice of a landing
would be obtained to allow of units from Aldershot and Salisbury reinforc-
ing the mobile columns on the East Coast within six hours of a landing"
and. had assured the Military Co-ordination Committee that "as the enemy
would be without transport, artillery and supplies, he was confident that
he would be able to deal with them with the forces available". He had,
therefore, recommended that "the Army should carry out the necessary recon-
naissances and. formulate the necessary plans, so that units from Ald.ershot
and Salisbury could move at very short notice to reinforce the mobile
columns on the East Coast", while "the mobile columns would be directed to
prepare specifically for the task of meeting such an invasion". He also
proposed to reinforce the garrison at the defended ports of Harwich and. the
Humber, at which 9.2" and. 6" guns were emplaced., with mobile artillery. 3
However, the lack of efficiency of these initial preparations was
illustrated by the fact that the 48th and 51st Divisions, the two Terri-
torial Divisions most ready to take the field, would still have had to
requisition their transport in order to be able to move to the coast. At
the War Cabinet meeting on 31st October, Hore-Belisha, reluctant as ever to
see formations deployed for anti-invasion duties that should be training in
preparation to be shipped overseas, drew attention to "the great expense
2. Interview with Lt.Co].. J. Nigel St. G. Kirke, son of Sir Walter and
formerly G.S.0. 3 (ops.) on his staff, 11 August 1981.
3. CAB 83/1, 19/10/163: 5th Meeting of the LC. Committee, 27 Oct. 1939.
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and. inconvenience to the civil population which could be caused if steps
were now taken to requisition the motor transport required to place the
two divisions on a mobile basis. Investigation had shown that measures
on the proposed scale were altogether unnecessary in present circumstances."
The War Cabinet were inforaed that "there were in this country many times
more troops than were necessary to meet the contingency of a possible raid.
from Germany" and that "a more detailed ey m,natjon of the problem would.
almost certainly show that full security would be given against this
threat at a much smaller cost". The War Cabinet therefore decided that
"the motor transport needed. to place two divisions on a mobile basis
should not for the present be requisitioned". 4
General Kirke took advantage of the invasion scare to secure much
needed. transpoit, which could be used. not merely for anti-invasion purposes
but for the far more serious sob, as he saw it, of training the troops.
As a result of the meetings held during the invasion scare, General Kirke
was to recollect that:
"Apart from the transport, I got a few other th,ns through, which the
War Office had been holding up, but it was only a week or so before the
pendulum swung back again and. I was heavily pressed to discharge all the
transport. This I declined to do unless, or until, the Cabinet modified
the scale of attack. But, as considerable sums of money were being wasted
in reti'rring transport to meet a sea invasion, which I did. not consider a
feasible operation until the Dutch coastline was in enemy hands, I cut down
transport which could not be used for tr-1ning purposes."
Over the next few months:
"Pressure to reduce transport continued as the hiring bill was a large
one, but I caxried on on the principle that anything that h4ped. tr-inirig
was worth while, but that anti-invasion transport was a waste of public
money and should be discharged." 5
p
Besides the problems connected with repelling a seaborne invasion, the
War Cabinet was still worried about the possibility of airborne raids and.
it discussed. this problem on the 31st October. The Germans were known to
possess 4,000 parachutists. The existence of German airborne forces had
added a fresh dimension to the defence of Britain. If these forces were
4. CAB 65/1 and. CAB 65/3: WI'! 66th(39):5, 31 Oct. 1939.
5. General Kirke Papers: No-tea left by General Sir Walter Kirke, 1 939-
1940.
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used. in conjunction with a heavy and sustained air attack on Great
Britain, they might be able to cause serious damage to vital munition
industries. The War Cabinet was worried. that:
"Such damage might slow up the production of the equipment for the
new divisions, and might delay their ultimate readiness for war far more
than the interruption to the training of these formations which would
result from their re-disposition to meet the threat of a raid. There
were also certain areas of Britain in which the numbers of tioops avail-
able to deal with such a threat were very small."
On the other hand, it was argued that the technical difficulties of
landing parachutists were very great and "in any case the danger was a
purely local one, and, provided there were small mobile forces available
within reasonable distance, these, in conjunction with the guards on
aerodromes and other vital points, would probably be sufficient." The
Commander-in-Chief, it was reported, was examining the problem in detail
and the War Cabinet concluded reassuringly that "there seemed to be no
reason to believe that its solution would present any great difficulty." 6.
The War Cabinet, at its meeting on 31st October, had also invited.
the War Office ".... to report to the War Cabinet as early as possible
their plan for insuring the necessary degree of mobility of troops sta-
tioned in this country, without undue disturbance to the training of the
Army or to civil industry." 7' Consequently, at the War Cabinet meeting
on 8th November, a Memoranda by the Secretary of State for War, covering
a paper by General Kirke on his proposed plans, was duly circulated,
while the C.I.G.S., General Ironside, explained the defence arrangements
to the assembled War Cabinet with the aid of a map. 6.
General Kirke had been called upon to prepare immediate plans to
meet invasion on a large scale as early as 27th October. The following
day he directed the Commands to commence preparing plans and, on the 30th
October, General Kirke held a conference of the G.O. C.-in-C. 's at the
Horse Guards to hammer out the details of the general plan. General
Kirke believed strongly that the planning and preparations to resist
invasion must not in any circumstances be allowed to interfere unduly
6. CAB 65/1 and CAB 65/3: WM 66th(39):5, 31 Oct. 1939.
7. ibid.
8. CAB 65/1: WM 75th(39):9, 8 Nov. 1939. CAB 66/3: WP(39):113,
4 Nov. 1939.
- 39 -
with the main strategy. At the conference he emphasised that in making
these proposals, he "was naturally anxious to avoid taking any steps
which would in any way interfere with the existing plan for methodical
preparation of troops for employment overseas" and considered that this
condition could be met by "increasing the state of preparedness of the
various troops already located on the East Coast and by studying before-
hand the moves which might be required to reinforce these troops by the
divisions elsewhere which were in a higher state of readiness, owing to
their preparation for service overseas." Furthermore, "it would be all
to the good to accelerate the provision of equipment to these divisions
there was to be no intention of interfering with their training
unless and until the actual emergency should arise."
The details of the plan were worked out over the next few days and,
in the meantime, some important redispositions of formations were made.
On the 5th and 6th November, the 1st Armoured Division, in G.H.Q.
Reserve, was moved from Salisbury Plain to the area of Newmarket -
Saffron Walden - Bishops Stortford. - Luton - Shefford, within Eastern
Command, so as to be within easy reach of the area felt to be most vul-
nerable, the East Anglian coast, while on the 6th November, the 1st
Light Arinoured Brigade, the core of which was shortly to become the 2nd
Annoured Division, was moved from Southern Command to the Yorkshire-
Lincolnehire border area near Selby and. placed under Northern Command.
(See Map 1.) The 1st knnoured Division, consisting of the 2nd. Light
Armoured Brigade and the Heavy Armoured Brigade, was inspected immedia-
tely on its arrival by General Kirke's G.S.O. 1, Colonel W. Carden-Roe.
General Kirke, who was most worried about its poor state of training,
noted that:
"The general feeling seemed to be that in many ways the move has
been a good thing; one Tank Battalion, for instance, has been inside
barracks for six years. At the same time, the new area is most unsuit-
able for collective training and reconnaissances have produced no
suitable ground, except small patches near Newmarket. It is hoped,
therefore, that some arrangement will be made to relieve by Christmas10
time, otherwise the Division will never be fit to proceed overseas."
9. WO 166/i: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, G.H.Q. Home Forces, October
1939. Appendix E: Minutes of C.-in-C. 's Conference, 30 Oct. 1939.
10. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 3: Notes on Visit to
1st Armoured Division, 7 Nov. 1939.
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By mid November, General ICirke's first hastily produced plans had
been modified and clarified, and were now essentially complete, though
he fully realised that details would have to be constantly amended to
meet changing circumstances and varying resources. On the 15th November
the plan for home defence was issued to all Commands, the War Office and
the Air Ministry.
General Kirke's plan to resist invasion was, rather inappropriately
since it took it name from the commander of one of the most successful
invasions of this country, code-named 'Julius
	 The codeword
'Julius' signified that there were indications that an invasion was con-
templated and was to bring the home defence forces to a state of readi-
ness at eight hours' notice, while the codeword
	 meant that
invasion was imminent, that all transport would be collected, ammunition
would be distributed and all units would be warned for immediate action. 12.
The 'Julius Caesar' Plan, or the 'J.C. Plan', as it was always
referred to by General
	 staff, mainly for reasons of security,
was based on the assumption that the maximum possible scale of attack
would be a landing by 4,000 trained parachutists, followed by a maximum
of 15,000 troops carried in 1,000 civil aircraft. Although the civil
aircraft were capable of carrying 15 men each, Germany was only known to
possess 6,000 airlanding troops, trained as such. The maximum seaborne
force was estimated at one or more divisions of 15,000 fully equipped
troops, each carried in twenty 4,000-5,000 ton transports, escorted by
25 to 30 modern destroyers. Any attempt at a major landing would prob-
ably be accompanied by a heavy air offensive against the Fleet, ILA.P.
and "other objectives in the country". This would be carried out by
1,750 long-range bombers operating from Germany, but could be made easier
if Dutch aerodromes were captured, since then both dive-bombers and
short-range fighters could be employed.
The possible form of the enemy plan was expected to be for the para-
chutists to drop and seize an aerodrome or aerodromes, so permitting the
landing of troop-carrying civil aircraft. Part of this force would then
proceed to capture a port from the vulnerable landward. side, so as to
allow the disembarkation of the divisions arriving by sea. A beach
11. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939.
12. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 7: The 'Julius Caesar'
Plan, 15 lTov. 1939.
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landing in force was thought impossible during winter weather conditions.
The most likely objective was felt to be an aerodrome or landing
ground near a port of considerable size, Harwich or the Humber being re-
garded as the most suitable places. A large port was necessary, because
the disembarkation of a field force would be "a very slow and formidable
undertaking, even if entirely unopposed, and. the rate at which it can be
carried out depends largely on the number of ships which can be handled
simultaneously, and consequently on the number of quays, wharves and
cranes available". For example, it would take several days to land a
division at ilarwich, complete with transport. Other ports that might
possibly be seized as landing places included Aberdeen, Dundee, Yarmouth,
Lowestoft and Ramsgate, and defence precautions were therefore to be taken
at all ports between Peterhead. and. Newhaven, where ships could come along-
side, to protect agathet a coup de main.
The early capture of a port would also be necessary, since "it is
axiomatic that men landed from the air can bring little with them but
rifles, light machine guns and a limited amount of ammunition. They would
therefore have little staying power, nor power of manoeuvre, unless
quickly supported and. maintained from the sea." If the capture of a port
were carried out by troops landed from the air, they would have to be
dropped in an unenclosed area, otherwise they could not collect again
quickly, which would mean some delay in actually getting control of the
port. Added to this, would be the time necessary to drive the defence
from all ground covering the docks, anchorage or entrance to the port
before the transports could enter to unload. Not only this, but once the
landing from the air had begun, the point of attack would have been dis-
closed and could not again be changed. The whole issue, therefore,
depended on the early capture of a port for German success.
General Kirke believed that the answer lay in the rapid defeat of
the airborne force, so that the seaborne force would be deprived of its
support and its landing facilities, and would fail. He saw that it would
be "supremely dangerous to attempt seaborne operations until the success
of the airlanding operations have been confirmed, so, if the initial air-




General Kirke envisaged the general plan of operations on land. as
depending upon the ability of local forces to pin down the German air-
borne troops so as to give time for the mobile reserves to reach the area
of operations. Troops in the area attacked were to inflict the maximum
amount of casualties as the enemy were actually landing and collecting
from their parachutes or transport aircraft. These troops were to be
assisted. by A.D.G.B. and any R.A.P. personnel on the spot and there was
to be no falling back in the face of superior numbers, except under
orders. Quick action was largely dependent on early warning of airborne
descent to the formations concerned by Observer Corps units of the R.A.F.
and. A.D.G.B., which completely covered. the East Coast area, and. by the
Civil Authorities, with whom the military were in close touch. Then, if
any landing in force were actually effected, a cordon would be drawn
round the area by troops in the vicinity, using either the first-line
transport now being provided or all means of mobility capable of improvi-
sation, "the object being to immobilise the invader until further troops
could be brought up to finish him off". 14.
If the landing occurred in Yorkshire, Lincolnshire or East Anglia,
the horsed. cavalry of 1 st Cavalry Division in Northern Command or the
armoured units under the command of the G.O. C.-in-C.'s Northern or
Eastern Command "would at once be despatched to break up the enemy for-
mations whilst they were still endeavouring to concentrate" and before
they could. effectively seize any port. Whilst the Heavy Armoured. Brigade
of the 1st Armoured Division stationed. in East Iinglia was in G.H.Q.
Reserve, the G.O. C.-in-C. Eastern Command was to regard. it at his imme-
diate disposal, if it were confirmed that the enemy invasion was confined
to East Anglia. There were also ample troops south of the Thames to deal
with any attempt in Kent.
If necessary, the next stage would be for the larger formations of
Scottish, Northern and. Eastern Commands to concentrate towards the threat-
ened. area, moving by road, using the first-line transport already provided,
transport earmarked to be ready at six to eight hours' notice or, in a few
cases, to be requisitioned as needed. It was not felt to be practicable
to place troops at shorter notice than six hours, without stopping all
training and thus adding very greatly to boredom and monotony during the
14. CAB 66/3: WP(39) 1 13, 4 Nov. 1939; and WO 166/1: op. cit.,
November 1939. Appendix 7: The 1Julius Caesar'Plan, 15 Nov. 1939.
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winter, and without permanently hiring transport, which would be costly
and. interfere with civil transport facilities, since a high degree of
security could be obtained in any case without incurring these disadvan-
t ages.
Finally, the G.H.Q. Reserves of the 51st, 48th, and. shortly the 55th,
Divisions, together with further motorised infantry and artillery, and. the
Heavy Armoureci Brigade, if not already committed, would be moved forward
by road as circumstances demanded, using both newly provided Army first
line transport and civilian road transport previously earmarked for the
purpose. Second. line transport, the administrative and supply vehicles
run by the R.A.S.C. mostly at divisional level, was, in the case of all
formations, to be hired as needed only when the emergency arose. 15.
(See Map i.)
The major weaknesses in the 'Julius Caesar' Plan were not in General
Kirke's assumptions nor in his general plan of operations, but in the
fact that, although he had in November an adequate number of troops to
carry out his Plan, these were often very short of training, equipment,
support weapons and mobility.
The lack of training, especially in mobile warfare and often in the
basic rudiments of modern warfare, was an acute and continuing problem at
this early stage of the War, and was not helped by the large number of
field troops that were still tied up throughout the country on static
tasks. The provision of men for the guarding of vulnerable points was a
problem "which had a direct bearing on plans for dealing with invasion".
There was a total of no less than 34,380 rifle-armed soldiers guarding
various vulnerable points, including aerodromes, which also had a number
of men belonging to A.D.G.B. or the R.A.F. who were armed or being armed
with small arms. This total included some 14,000 men of the National
Defence Companies, but General Kirke reported to the Permanent Under
Secretary of State for War on 6th November that, "at present about 20,000
men of field units are employed on these duties. This weakens very seri-
ously many of the units that would have to be used for mobile operations.
Incidently, of course, training is much hampered." 16. Discussions with
15. ibid.
16. WO 166/1: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 2: Weekly Report of the
0.-in-C. Home Forces, 6 Nov. 1939.
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the other Services and Departments involved failed to have any marked
success in reducing this commitment. On the 18th November, General Kirke
reported that these discussions "were commenced primarily with the Air
Ninistry with a view to reducing the number of personnel so employed, but
owing to the expansion of the R.A.F., it now appears that the number will
tend to increase rather than decrease." 17.
By December the situation had not improved much, due to slow recruit-
ing for the Home Defence Battalions which were to gradually replace the
Field Forces in this task. General Kirke wrote on 16th December:
"I am most reluctant to provide a single soldier more than is necess-
ary for these static duties, which I calculate are already costing the
State over £5 million p.a.. It is particularly important that units of
the Field Force should be relieved of their present commitments in this
respect by Home Defence Battalions as soon as possible. Certain divisions
are feeling the benefit of the incoming strength of the Home Defence
Battalions." 18.
There were also bodies of troops distributed over the country, total-
ing some 158,625 in all, close to all important centres of population, who
were earmarked as reserves in support of the civil authorities in case of
air raids. Training was the primary activity of these troops and no divi-
sions were specifically allotted to this task and nothing else, but their
local availability meant they could be used if necessary to aid the civil
power, primarily to restore law and. order following the breakdown of
civilian morale expected after heavy air attack, "by preventing looting,
protecting lives and property, controlling crowds, and generally reinforc-
ing the police, and also aiding in the distribution of essential supplies."
In fact, "any division or unit, whether allocated to the 'Julius Caesar'
Plan or not, might be called upon to perform these roles in an emergency",
such was the somewhat exaggerated fear of the chaos and terror caused by
bombing attacks on built-up areas at this early stage in the War, when
heavy air raids on cities had yet to be experienced. 19.
17. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 9: Weekly Report of the
C.-in-C. Home Forces, 18 Nov. 1939.
18. WO 166/1: op. cit., December 1939. Appendix 9: Weekly Report of the
C.-in-C. Home Forces, 16 Dec. 1939.
19. Interviews with Lt.Col. J. Nigel St. G. Kirke, 11 August 1981; and.
with Lt.Gen. Sir William G. H. Pike, formerly G.S.O. 2 (ops.) on
General Kirke's staff, 18 August 1981.
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However, both the troops guarding vulnerable points and those ear-
marked for a civil defence role were given an important function in the
'Julius Caesar' Plan by General Kirke. This was to deal with any enemy
parachutists whenever they descended near the localities occupied by these
troops. Fighting units could also be organised to deal with parachutists
from the 160,000 men in various stages of training in training centres all
over the country, while some elements of the 114,000 personnel of A.D.G.B.
who manned a total of 770 heavy and 247 light anti-aircraft guns together
with 3,720 Lewis light machine guns, might also be used in an anti-
paratrooper role in an emergency. Any of these categories of troops might
also be of some help locally against invaders by sea. 20.
These local forces were supported by the remainder of the Field Army
which was concentrated for training purposes according to the state of
their training. (See Map i.) The second line Territorial Divisions were
mostly very dispersed, due to the fact that their primary function was
training, and. these only had the barest minimum of transport and equipment
needed for training purposes. Most of these were situated well away from
the East Coast and. were not allotted anything other than a local anti-
parachutist role in the 'Julius Caesar' Plan. The infantry divisions
employed for the 'Julius Caesar' Plan consisted of six Territorial Divi-
sions on the East Coast in Northern and Eastern Command, elements of three
more in Scottish Command, plus the three Territorial Divisions allotted to
G.H.Q. Reserve. These were in various states of concentration for train-
ing purposes, but tended to include the better trained and equipped forma-
tions. These divisions were all being prepared for active operations by
the gradual provision of first line transport up to War Establishment,
including the provision of towing vehicles for the few available guns, and
by the issue of annnunition. All these divisions had mobile detachments,
which included carriers ready to move at various degrees of warning, and
they were not tied. to static tasks. 21.
However, all the 'Julius	 divisions lacked a great deal of
their transport and equipment in November, and much of the little they had
was virtually obsolete and suitable only for a training role, yet these
20. CAB 66/3: WP(39)1 1 3, 4 Nov. 1939; and WO 166/i: op. cit., November
1939. Appendix 7: 'Julius Caesar'Plan, 15 Nov. 1939.
21. ibid.
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divisions were supposed to be "prepared for active operations"! The
years of neglect in Britain before the '.Iar meant she possessed a totally
inadequate armaments industry and. what little modern equipment that could
be manufactured. had largely been sent with the British Expeditionary
Force to France. The little artillery that was available for the 'Julius
Caesar' divisions, consisted almost entirely of obsolete 18 pdr. field
guns and 4.5" howitzers, the modern 25 pdrs. and. converted 18/25 pdrs.
having nearly all been sent overseas. There were only a handful of 2 pdr.
anti-tank guns available and these had only half their War Establishment
quota of ammunition. In most cases, much of the divisions' first line
transport had. not yet been provided and only the guns and the divisional
reconnaissance regiments were fully mobile. The divisions were short of
Bren or Lewis light machine guns arid Vickers .303" heavy machine guns,
while the few 3" mortars available had only 259 of their proper issue of
ammunition. 22. (See Appendix 2.)
In General Sir Charles J. C. Grant's Scottish Command, part of the
15th (Scottish) Division was being prepared for active operations for use,
if required, to reinforce the Edinburgh and Forth area, while elements of
the 9th (Scottish) in the Highlands and the 52nd. (Lowland) Division in
the Glasgow area were to be employed if necessary. However, there was
only enough transport in Scottish Command to equip the equivalent of one
division, artillery was minimal and there was not a single 2 pdr. anti-
tank gun in the whole of Scotland! 23.
The situation was little better in General Sir William H. 'Barty'
Bartholomew's Northern Command, where the 42nd (East Lancashire) and the
49th (West Riding) Divisions had been prepared for active operations in
Northumberland and Yorkshire, respectively. However, this Command had
been reinforced by the 1st Light Armoured. Brigade with its 77 light tanks
situated. near Selby, and it also had the rather dubious benefit of the
6,000 horsed cavalry of the let (Yeomanry) Cavalry Division, although
this was removed from General ICirke's operative command on 1st December,
preparatory to being shipped to the Middle East. General ICirke was prob-
ably not too sorry to see it go, since its horses - polo horses, riding
22. ibid.
23. WO 166/i: op. cit., October 1939. Appendix E: Minutes of C.-in-C.'s
Conference, 30 Oct. 1939.
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horses, police horses, circus horses - had had to be requisitioned from
everywhere arid he had received "a torrent of letters from animal lovers
protesting about the Army's alleged cruel treatment of hoi'ces, because
horses accustomed to the comforts of stables were being tethered krmy style
in lines in the open airs" 24.
In the Eastern Command, under Lieutenant General Sir Guy C. Williams,
four Territorial Divisions and the newly arrived 1st Armoured Division
were allotted to the 'Julius Caesar' Plan. These, however, only had enough
vehicles to provide first line transport for the equivalent of three divi-
sions. In the vulnerable East Anglian area the 18th (East Anglian) and the
51 th (East Anglian) Divisions were being prepared for active operations
concentrating eastwards, the 18th to cover the long Norfolk coast and the
vital ports of Yarmouth and. Lowestoft, and the 5Llth to cover the Suffolk
and Essex coastline, including Felixstowe and, the port felt to be most
vulnerable of all, Harwich. South of the Thames the 1st London (56th)
Division was being prepared for active operations along the Sussex and.
South Kent coastline together, while the 12th (Eastern) Division guarded
North Kent. The East Kent coastline was not yet felt to be particularly
exposed, since it mainly consisted of cliffs and it was a difficult journey
for any expedition coming from North Germany in any case. Neither Division
south of the Thames had. any anti-tank guns and the only artillery in this
area were 24 obsolete field guns with 1st London Division. 25.
The equipment situation was little better in the exposed East Anglian
area, where the 18th and 54th Divisions had a total of only six 2 pdr.
anti-tank guns between them out of a theoretical War Establishment of 48
each, and only 26 and 18 field guns respectively, all obsolete 18 pdrs. or
4.5" howitzers, out of a theoretical 72 apiece. The successful defence of
East Ariglia rested largely, therefore, on the 1st Armoured. Division, which
was held at short notice ready to move to the coast. Its 2nd Light Armour-
ed Brigade, comprising 126 light tanks and the supporting divisional infan-
try and artillery elements, were placed under the control of Lieutenant
General Williams in Vest Suffolk and North-West Essex, whereas the 3rd Heavy
24. Interview with Lt.Col. J0 Nigel St. G. Kirke, 11 August 1981.
25. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 7: The'Julius Caesar'
Plan, 15 Nov. 1939.
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Armoured Brigade of 64 light tanks and a mere 25 Cruiser tanks was held
back in Hertfordshire in G.H.Q. Reserve. This gave a total of 215 tanks
with which to guard East Anglia, but only the 25 Cruisers had 2 pdr. anti-
tank guns. All the rest were Vickers light tanks armed only with machine
guns and with armour that was hardly capable of stopping a bullets How-
ever, they were not expected to have to deal with enemy armour. 26. This
Division also maintained an improvised column formed "to deal with any
local parachutists who might be dropped in the area, in order that the
division proper may not be diverted from its main operative role". This
column included a company of the Rifle Brigade, spare teams of tanks and
also boasted obsolete Vickers medium tanks "which, on account of their
slow speed, are not Included in the Heavy Brigade for operative purposes". 27.
There were no heavy Infantry tanks with 1st Armoured Division, these being
allocated solely to let Army Tank Brigade, which, being earmarked for
France, was under War Office control and was not given a role in the
'Julius Caesar' Plan.
Lieutenant General Sir Guy C. Williams was very much aware of the
vulnerability of his Command and. especially of East .Ariglia. In December
he confided his worries to Major General R. Pakenham Walsh, who was on
leave from the B.E.F. over Christmas, and who afterwards recalled:
"He had a ration strength of a quarter million in the Command, inclu-
dine, the .ármoured Division sent up for a scare some weeks ago. He thinks
the Boche next effort may be against the East Coast ports to try and
throttle our minesweeper-minelayers etc., which are crowded into Yarmouth
and Lowestoft and Harwich. Paget now commands 18th Division and has
become obsessed with the defence of East Anglia." 28.
As a last resort, General ICirke could order the G.H.Q. ieserve Divi-
sions to the aid of either Northern or Eastern Command. The 51st (High-
land) and the 40th (s. Midland) Divisions, situated at present at
Aldershot and Hungerford. respectively, were closely concentrated and were
in a comparatively advanced state of training, since they were earmarked
to be the first to go abroad. They were by early November prepared for
active operations as a G.H.Q. Reserve and were shortly to be 3olned by
26. ibid.
27. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 3: Notes on Visit to
let Armoured Division, 7 Nov. 1939.
28. Diary of Major Genera]. R. Pakenham-Walsh, 25 Dec. 1939.
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the 55th (w. Lancashire) Division, which was to move in late November
from Chester in Western Command to the Charnwood Forest training area,
near Leicester, so as to cover the emptiness of the Humber-Iash area in
Northern Command. (See Map 1.) Eastern Command was ordered to recon-
noitre suitable concentration areas for two divisions in East Anglia and.
for one division in the Home Counties area, while Northern Command was
similarly responsible for reconnoitring a concentration area for the 55th
Division in the Northern Command area. In the event of an emergency, the
G.H.Q. Reserve Divisions would be ordered. to concentrate forward by road.
and to enable them to do this these three divisions, plus three independ-
ent infantry battalions and three artillery field regiments, were being
provided with first line transport. 29.
In the case of both the G.H.Q. Reserve and. the East Coast divisions
much of the first line transport had to be obtained from civilians by
provisional arrangements, which caused. some serious problems. This was
often obtained on a voluntary hiring basis, which was not only costly,
but led to the difficulty that "the owners of transport are very reluct-
ant to allow their vehicles to be driven by soldiers, who may do the
vehicles considerable damage". 30. Alternatively, civilian transport,
especially for second. line transport and. for troop carrying, 'uas often
earmarked ready for hiring at short notice on payment of a retaining fee.
However, in mid November, instructions were issued. that "the hiring or
earmarking by payment of a retaining fee of transport in connection with
the Defence Plan against invasion should cease forthwith". 31. This
meant that transport not already taken by the Army would have to be hired
or requisitioned when the emergency arose. General Kirke realised that,
although this was less costly, it was an unsatisfactory arrangement which
could jeopardise the early movement of the vital reserves to counter-
attack any landing. On 13th November, he reported to the 1ar Office:
"It has become apparent that any scheme for the provision of troop
carrying transport, which relies on the requisitioning of transport when
an emergency arises, is doomed to failure. There can be no security that
adequate transport with drivers would. be forthcoming without great delay.
29. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 7: The'Julius Caesar'
Plan, 15 Nov. 1939.
30. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 2: Weekly Report by the
C.-in-C. Home Forces, 6 Nov. 1939.
31. WO 166/i: op. c$a, No





Detailed arrangements must be made beforehand, even if some cost is
involved." 32.
In the case of collecting buses for troop carrying in an emergency, not
only would the buses and. drivers be scattered in the daytime, but:
"It has been pointed out that if warning of an emergency were received
late in the evening, it would be impossible to begin to collect the buses
until the next morning, as the drivers would. be scattered in their homes
and. unobtainable until they came to work." 33
The War Office, however, was unmoved and the present makeshift arrange-
ments had. to continue in spite of the obvious disadvantages. General.
Kirke had to accept that the solution would. only come slowly:
"Adequate security can only be provided if Troop Carrying Companies,
R.A.S.C. are organised. The formation of these companies will doubtless
take some time and, until further instructions are received from the War
Office, the rovisional arrangements which had been made by Commands must
continue." 34
The chronic shortage of equipment, too, was a macor problem even for
these divisions in the G.LQ,. Reserve, which represented the final and
decisive line of defence against an. invasion. The three G.K.(. divisions
should each have had. an establishment of 72 field guns. In fact, the
51st only had. 36 field guns, the 48th. was better off with 52, while the
55th had. a mere 14. All the field. guns were the obsolete 18 pdrs. or
4.5" howitzers, though the unattached. 12th Field. Regiment with 24 x
25 pdrs. was also in G.E.Q. Reserve at Larkhill in Southern Commmd,
though this only had transport for half its guns. The anti-tank gun
situation was even worse, since there was a desperate shortage of 2 pdrs.
and most of the few available had. gone to France. Out of a theoretical
establishment of 64 anti-tank guns per division, the 51st had 26, the
48th only , and. the 55th none at all!
	 (See Appendix 2.) in fact,
32. WO 166/1: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 5: Weekly Report of the
C.-in--C. Home Porcea, Appendix A: Provision of Transport, 13 Nov.
1939.
33. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 2: Weekly Report of the
C.-in-C. Home Forces, 6 Nov. 1939.
34. WO i66/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 5: Weekly Report of the
C.-in-C. Home Forces, Appendix A: Provision of Transport, 13 Nov.
1939.
35. WO 166/1: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 7: The'Julius Caesar'
Plan, 15 Nov. 1939.
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so acute was the shortage of anti-tank guns in Home Forces in both the
G.H.Q. Reserve and the divisions allotted to the Ju1u Caesar' Plan on
the East Coast, that the crews of the 18 pdr. field guns were provided
with anti-tank gun ammunition and trained to fire over open sights, while
the crews of Bofors light anti-aircraft guns were also trained in an anti-
tanic role. 36.
It was expected, in the 'Julius Caesar' Plan, that a landing at any
point protected by the fixed coastal defences would be impractical unless
those defences had been eliminated or neutralised. Since this would take
come time if carried out by gunfire or bombing, it was anticipated that
these might be captured by parachute or II.T.B. landed infantry from the
vulnerable landward side, landward. defences for ports being virtually
non-existent at this time. Therefore, as an additional precaution,
Scottish, Northern and. Eastern Commands were ordered to provide efficient
local infantry protection for the ports and fixd defences in their
respective areas, with particular emphasis on those at the llumber and
Harwich, while 18 pdrs. were to be sited to provide local artillery pro-
tection for Aberdeen, Dundee, Lowestoft and Ramsgate.
	 Theoretically,
there was no possibility of a "coup de main" against a port from the sea
since the whole coast was under constant observation by the Observer
Corps and. units of A.D.G.B. and, in any case, the most vulnerable ports
had already been mined out to sea, leaving only narrow entrance passages. 30.
Close liaison with the other Services was also provided for in the
'Julius Caesar' Plan. In the event of an enemy landing, home Forces was
to have the direct support of two bomber squadrons, No. 16 Army Co-
Operation Squadron and three communication aircraft. The other Services
were to provide air reconnaissance and naval patrols by day and. on moon-
lit nights to detect shipping concentrations or convoys in the German
coastal or North Sea areas; bomber squadrons were to be kept in
36. Interview with Lt.Col. J. Nigel St. G. ICirke, ii August 1981.
37. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 7: The'Julius Caesar'
Plan, 15 Nov. 1939.
38. Interviews with Lt.Col. J. Nigel St. G. ICirke, ii August 1981; and
with Lt.Gen. Sir William G. H. Pike, 18 August 1981.
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nmnediate readiness to bomb these before departure or in passage; light
naval forces to cover the North Sea, and fighter and anti-aircraft def-
ences to counter the expected German troop carrying planes and. covering
aerial offensive.
The general public were kept entirely in ignorance of the measures
affecting the civilian population winch were outlined in the 'Julius
Caesar' Plan, and. were indeed unaware of the existence of the 'Julius
Caesar' Plan, in any case, for obvious security reasons. The Plan repre-
sented very secret contingency planning, and, since the chances of an
invasion occurring were felt to be very small, to inform the public of
any anti-invasion measures which concerned the civilian population might
alarm the population unnecessarily and cause an outcry that would be
detrimental to the morale of the country as a whole. 40.
Little provision had been made for the ciii1 population in the
'Julius Caesar' Plan anyway. No evacuation of any portion of the civil-
ian population on the threatened East Coast was made at this time and,
in fact, no such plans existed in the winter of 1939-40. In the event
of an invasion, the population not in any immediate danger uould. be  "en-
couraged to stay in their homes by broadcast or other means". However,
it was realised there would be a movement of refugees from the area of
operations itself which would hamper the execution of the military plan
unless it was kept under control. The Plan stated:
"It is not considered. practical or desirable to endeavour to hold
up the exodus of the civil population whose lives are in danger, but such
movements should be controlled and diverted so that military two-way
roads into the theatre of operations are kept clear of all civil traffic."
Close liaison was to be maintained with the police and Regional Commiss-
loners on this and other civil matters, and military considerations were
to predominate in cases where troops were earmarked to aid the civil
powers. Since it was expected that both the seaborne and airborne land-
ing forces would be eliminated within a short space of time, it was not
regarded as being either desirable or practicable to destroy motor trans-
port, petrol stores, public utilities, communications or food stocks, and
39. WO 166/1: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 7: The'Julius Caesar
Plan, 15 Nov. 1939.
40. Interview with Lt.Col. J. Nigel St. G. Kirke, 11 August 1981.
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the short term immobilisation of cranes and docking facilities at ports
and temporary denial of telephone and telegraph communications was all
that was envisaged.
General Kirke's whole plan was based on the not unreasonable assurnp-
tion that it would be possible to give a minimum of eight houis' notice
of any attempted large-scale invasion or raid, and the plans of the G.O.
C.-in-C.'s of Commands were to be framed accordingly. For the purpose of
repelling invasion, all troops in Britain, except A.D.G.B., were to be
under the command or operational control of the C.-in-C. Home Forces, but,
to prevent delay through waiting for orders, immediate action was to be
taken by the nearest formation to repel the invader, and G.O. C.-in-C.'s
of the Command or Commands were to be responsible for the conduct of the
battle in their Command area. 41.
At the same time as General K.irke was comp'iling his plans in November
the Chief of Staff Committee too was considering the problems posed by the
threat of airborne or seaborne raids. On the 4th November, they set up
the Port Defence Committee "to advise the Chiefs of Staff on all matters
connected with coast defence at home" as well as on coast and anti-
aircraft defences of ports abroad. 42. One of the new Committee's first
tasks was to consider guarding the Orkney and Shetland Islands against the
possibility of seaborne or airborne raids or sabotage parties landed
during the long winter nights to capture the secret R.D.F. or C.D. sta-
tions there or to wreck the seaplane base at Sullom Voe, and the garrison
and anti-aircraft defences there were consequently strengthened towards
the end of the month.	 Another problem the Chiefs of Staff felt should
be further examined in General ICirke's plans was the protection of aero-
diomes, and they suggested arming a proportion of the R.A.F. personnel
with rifles, making use of light automatics for ground defence, and gener-
ally co-ordinating the defence schemes "as the military guards were not
numerous and could not be materially reinforced".
41. WO 166/i: op. cit., November 1939. Appendix 7: The'Juliue Caesar'
Plan, 15 Nov. 1939.
42. CAB 79/1: COO 68th(39):4, 4 Nov. 1939; and CAB 00/4, 000(39) 110,
3 Nov. 1939.
43. CAB 00/5: PDc(39) 8 (also 000(39) 131), 25 Nov. 1939.
44. CAB 79/1: COO 67th(39):2, 3 Nov. 1939; and COO 8Oth(39):2, 15 Nov.
1939.
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ITo German threat was envisaged to neutral Southern Ireland at all at
this stage of the War, nor indeed until after Dunkirk. The 'Julius
Caesar' Plan looked east and not west, and it took no defens]ve posture
against Ireland. A brigade of the 53rd (Welsh) Division had been sent to
Ulster in October, but these troops were for internal security purposes
only, especially to maintain peace in the industrially important city of
Belfast. (See Map i.) The Irish Army posed no threat and the Irish were
unlikely to be openly hostile anyway, for fear of annoying the Aiuericans.
On the 18th November, the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the
Joint Planning Sub-Committee's long awaited report on seaborne and air-
borne attack on the United Kingdom, which had been asked for as long ago
as the 21st October, and which had now been overtaken by events. The
report's outline of the possible course of events had already been antici-
pated and its recommendations put in hand. in the 'Julius Caesar' Plan.
The Chiefs of Staff appeared satisfied with the anti-invasion measures
now being implemented and felt that they were adequate. Regarding inva-
sion by means of a combined air and seaborne expedition, the report con-
cluded that:
"So long as our naval arid air forces remain in being and provided
the necessary precautions are maintained effectively, such attacks do not
constitute a serious threat to our security."
The Chiefs of Staff also approved the report's reassuring conclusion that:
"The risk of such attacks does not justify Interference with the
training of the Field Force in its proper role, or the retention in this
country of field formations destined for employment elsewhere. When the
bulk of the Field Force had. been despatched overseas, it should pot be
difficult to devise some special provision against this risk." 40.
General	 'Julius Caesar' Plan sounded very reasonable to the
Jar Cabinet and. the Chiefs of Staff, who both remained satisfied until the
spring and, though certain weaknesses in it are apparent, the plan was
basically sound and fitted the threat envisaged at the time. In any case,
45. Interview with Lt.Col. J. Migel St. G. Kirke, 11 August 1981.
46. CAB 79/1: COS 82nd(39):5, 18 Nov. 1939; and CAB 80/5, COS(39) 125,
18 Nov. 1939.
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the Germans were very unlikely to attempt such a risky operation across
the North Sea and. there was only a very remote chance that the plan would
have to be put into operation. In view of the fact that the Germans
vould have had. to make a long sea crossing to reach East Anglia from the
North German ports, let alone Scotland, Yorkshire, Lincoinshire or Kent,
in a large convoy with little naval or long-range air protection, which
would be vulnerable not only to the Royal Navy and the R.A.F., but also
to the hazards of the tides and weather in the winter months, with the
prospect of an opposed landing, heavy counter-attacks on land by superior
numbers and long and dangerous sea communications, then the possibility
that the Germans would try anything of this nature was almost fanciful.
For example, it would have taken 50-60 transports, not 20, to carry even
one division to our coasts and the crossing from North Germany would have
taken at least 36 hours, not 20 as General Kirke envisaged. 47'
The 'Julius Caesar' Plan, therefore, represented "good contingency
planning" - contingency planning being the normal role of armies every-
where. There was always the possibility, however remote, that the
Germans would take a wild gamble on an invasion and this possibility
could not be ignored. General Kirke, though he believed personally that
invasion was impossible until Holland fell, made every effort to do the
planning properly. There was "never any question of merely producing
something to keep the politicians happy". General Kirke was always ready
to listen to the opposing views and "realised he could not be right about
everything". So it was, when it came to the matter of invasion. The
'Julius Caesar' Plan was therefore taken very seriously at G.H.Q. Home
Forces. 48.
The major weaknesses of the 'Julius Caesar' Plan lay in the fact
that, even though General Kirke had put his miniuiuni requirements at seven
divisions, consisting of not less than one division each in Northern and
Scottish Commands, two in Eastern Command and three in G.II.Q. Reserve,
and there were the equivalent of no less thdn 14 available, these forma-
tions were generally as yet inadequately trained and equipped for mobile
47. Collier, Basil: History of the Second 1Jorld !Jar: The Defence of
the United Kingdom, p. 84. H.LS.0., London. 1957.
48. Interview with Lt.Col. J. Nigel St. G. ICirke, 11 August 1981.
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warfare, the lack of transport being especially evident, and that the
best of them could be expected to be ordered abroad as soon as they were
ready for despatch.
	 Even so, the 'Julius Caesar' Plan was to form
the basis of the plans for Home Defence throughout the first winter of
the War and., indeed, right up to the dark days of Nay 19i10.
49. H.F. Bundle '17/9, Paper 13A, 15 Dec. 1939; and Collier, Basil:
op. cit., p. 85.
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CHAPTER. 3: A Qui.rJ 'i.TER
Throughout the 'Thoney War' of 1939-40 the emphasis in Home Forces was
on tr4n1ng and. equipping divisions for service on the Continent with the
British Expeditionary Force, and sending them abroad. The B.E.P. itself
spent much of this time of the 'bore war' digging anti-tank ditches, string-
ing barbed. wire and. constructing piliboxes along the French frontier with
Belgium in an attempt to extend the Maginot Line to the sea. Official doc-
trine at this time was still obsessed with the overriding power of defensive
lines and. with the belief that static firepower was the answer to modern
warfare. In spite of the awful demonstration of the Blitzkrieg combination
of tanks and dive-bombers in Poland in September 1939, the Allies were st.11
preparing to meet the expected onslaught in terms of the 1914-18 war. The
only difference seemed to be to the British senior commanders that "such
defensive positions now no longer consist of continuous lines of trenches
with communication trenches from rear to front", but of "lines of anti-tank
obstacles with strong points cointnnding them and small works in between".
Tljherever possible, these new works were to be carefully concealed, and they
partly made use of a river line. The use of mobile a.rmoured forces in an
offensive or even in a counter-attack role was largely ignored. 1.
Between October 1939 and. Nay 1940 the B.E.P. constructed. over 400
concrete piliboxes in a system of defence in. depth in the 66 kilometre Lille
sector that they had been allotted. to defend, and. by May 1940 the density of
piliboxes had been raised. to six per kilometre in the front-line positions.
To enable speed of construction, five standard. types were approved, with
special types for unusual sites. This standard.isation of design aided the
builders, who made use of steel shuttering that could. be used. again repeat-
edly so as to assist mass production. Major General Pakenhm-Walsh, Chief
Engineer to the B.E.F., recalled that:
p
"The Commmd.er-in-Chief d.ecid.ed to build. pillbxes by mass production
methods in lines to give depth to the position..... I got out five standard
types of piliboxes, for which King (my D.E. in C.) and. French worked. out
d.etails and. standard steel shuttering. The types were given to Corps, who
were told. to use them in the layout of the position." 2.
1. Ironsid.e Papers: Notes of C.I.C.S.'s Visit to the B.E.F., 29 Nov. -
2 Dec. 1939.
2. Diary of Major General Pakerthm-Walsh, 19 Nov. 1939.
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The B.E.P. were soon to leave these defences untested and move forward. to
fight the enemy in open country, but the experience gained in construction
works and their siting and. overall layout were to have a strong influence
later on plans to defend the United ngdotn.
These preparations contrasted with the situation at home, where no
attempt was made at the tine to prepare static defences and. where the defence
planners became obsessed with the new problem posed by parachutists, often to
the exclusion of a.nthing else. Although the threat of a German invasion by
sea, especially during the winter months, was now thought to be very unlikely,
this unease about the threat of parachutists d.esoend.ing from the skies, coii-
bined. with a mistaken belief that a strong fifth column existed in Britain,
continued throughout the winter and spring of 1939-40. This feeling of
insecurity in Britain was skilfully exploited by the Germans, who continued
to see that alarmist reports filtered. through to the United Kingdom, most
likely in a not altogether unsuccessful attempt to delay the reinforcement of
the B.E.F. by keeping British troops at home tied up in anti-sabotage duties.
The reports were received amid a background of persistent small-scale bonbing
attacks on coastal shipping or actions by minelaying aircraft along the East
Coast or on Scapa Flow, which tended perhaps to add to their credibility. On
22nd December, Home Forces received notification from the War Office "from an
informant of some reliance", that "volunteers have been called for in Kiel to
act as saboteurs in England", and two days later Coands were informed that
"German saboteurs may be landed in England", though no additional security
measures were considered necessary.	 A few days later, on 2nd. January, the
War Office informed Home Forces that "the German Intelligence Service is con-
templating sabotage in England, to destroy (i) aimunition factories, (ii)
dock areas, (iii) water supplies in principal cities." 4.
By February, however, Headquarters, Home Forces, were becoming increas-
ingly sceptical about the risks of sabotage. In a suary prepared for the
Deputy Chiefs of Staff Comm.ittee on 7th February, it was stated that:
"In the opinion of Headquarters, Home Forces, the risks of sabotage have
in no way increased as a result of five months of war; in fact, there is
reason to thftik that possible dangers may have been overestimated. No cases
of sabotage conclusively caused by aliens, I.L.L or other organised bodies
have been brought to notice; and it would be interesting to iow if other
3. WO 166/1: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, G.H.Q. Home Forces, December
1939.
4. WO 166/1: op. cit., Jarni-"y 1940,
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Government departments have any reason to think there has been any sabotage
other than the doubtful cases which occur from time to time in industry as
the handiwork of discontented. workmen." 5.
General Kirke, himself, continued to have a low opinion of any alarmist
reports, since they were often based on the slenderest of evidence and. almost
invariably turned out to be untrue, and he strongly opposed their wide circu-
lation. In his weekly report to the Permanent Under Secretary of State for
War on 10th February, he complained:
"On the night of 6th/7th February, a scare message was given the widest
circulation throughout the country, to the effect that the enemy was strewing
the East Coast with balloons cont.1ning a dangerous gas which exploded on
touch. and which should be hand.Ied with great care. I am end.eavouring to
trace the originator of this report, which is now 1iown to be without found.a-
tion, but a deplorable feature of the whole affair is the way in which this
message was broadcast by Civil and Service Authorities without due investiga-
tion of its authenticity." 6.
Even so, however obviously alarmist the rumours, the dangers of sabotage
or raids by fifth column or parachutists could not be safely ignored, and. the
necessity for providing guards for vulnerable points continued to be an irr-
tating thorn in the side of Home Forces all through the winter and spring of
1940, tying up thousands of troops in a profitless static role, who should
have been undergoing intensive tr-fning for modern warfare. The question of
reducing the number of guards was, therefore, of paramount importance, since
so many of these troops were being supplied by the Field Army. The guarding
of vulnerable points was also a boring job for the young and active soldiers
of the Field Force, and Headquarters, Rome Forces, regarded this commitment
as "a terrible drain, which greatly interfered with trning' t and as "a
tremendous eater-up of troops".
General irke fought a continuous battle to try and reduce the numbers
of Field troops employed in this task. On 13th January, he reported to the
Permanent Under Secretary that:
5. WO 166/1: op. cit., February 1940. Appendix B: The Provision of
Military Protection for Vulnerable Points, 7 Feb. 1940.
6, WO 166/1: op. cit., February 1940. Appendix C: Weekly Report of the
0.-in-C. Rome Forces, 10 Feb. 1940.
7. Interviews with Lt.Col. J. Nigel St. G. Kirke, son of Sir Walter and
formerly G.S.O. 3(ops.) on his staff, 11 Aug. 1981; and with Lt. Gen.
Sir William C. K. Pike, formerly G.S.0. 2(ops.) on General Kirke's staff,
18 Aug. 1981.
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"Demands from various d.epartments for guards for so—called vulnerable
points are stead.ily increasing - whereas the strength of the troops intended
to provide these guards, i.e. the Home Defence Battalions, is still a long
way short of the numbers needed for existing requirements.
A large number of guards are still being found by men of the Field irmy,
thereby interfering with their tr2ining for their proper role. Allowing for
rest and relief, the numbers of men required to meet existing commitments is
estimated at over 50,000, and this number will soon increase to over 60,000.
I, therefore, propose to allot the troops which are available to carry
out only the tasks which I consider to be the most important." 8.
By 25th January 1940, the total number of troops employed in the task
of guarding vulnerable points had risen from 33,900 on 30th September 1939
to 38,400, an increase of approximately 4,500 in four months. Of the January
total, no less than 15,600 troops were still being found from the Field Force
and the other 2,800 were from the Home Defence Battalions, compared with
about 20,000 and 14,000, respectively, on 6th November 1939.
Even so, the number of Field troops employed in guarding vulnerable
points rm-1ned much too high and. by early February the problem was becoming
an increasingly serious one for Home Forces and was actually affecting the
moves of formations, both within the United ingdom and, indirectly, to
France. Headquarters, Home Forces, was to report on 7th February:
ttNow that a number of divisions have gone overseas and. certain divisions
are being moved at home, either for training purposes or for Home Defence
reasons, it is becoming increasingly difficult to allot personnel for the
protection of vulnerable points. Cases are about to occur in which there
will be no Field Force troops available in. certain areas after the middle of
March..... Our future war effort is, therefore, already being affected." 9
General Kirke emphasised the seriousness of the problem in. his weekly
report three days later:
"Cases 're now occuring where projected moves of Field Army formations,
in the normal course of training for service overseas, are being interfered
with by vulnerable point commitments.
For example, the 61st Division, which it was intended should move to
East Anglia in March, is unable to do so, because it has over 2,000 men on
vulnerable points with no Home Defence troops available in relief. This
difficulty can be bridged by sending the 55th Division instead.
8. WO 166/1: op. cit., January 1940. Appendix C: Weekly Report of the
C.—in—C. Home Forces, 13 Jan. 1940.
9. WO 166/1: op. cit., February 1940. Appendix B: The Provision of
Military Protection for Vulnerable Points, 7 Feb. 1940.
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The 45th Division, which it is proposed to include in the 4th Conting-
ent, must concentrate for triifig, but this Division has some 2,600 men on
vulnerable points. I hope to be able to cover this by moving two brigades
of the 38th DivisIon from the Western Coinmimd, which Is not altogether a
satisfactory arrangement.
The 66th Division, which is due to move to Northern Commrid when the
49th Division goes, has also a large number of men on vulnerable points.
Here I may be able to find, a solution by Tnkng use of Eold.ing Battalions
and. a general decision that Holding Battalions may be used for guarding
vulnerable points up to a third of their strength at a tine has been promul-
gated.
In the meantime, a Vulnerable Point Sub Committee of the Deputy Chiefs
of Staff Coittee is reviewing the vulnerable point situation and on this
Committee my staff represent my views. In due course, this may lead to
reduction of some of the existing guards, though it would appear possible
that before these results have been achieved. I n.11 'be obliged. to remove all
guards found by the Field. Army in certain areas, regardless of whether these
vulnerable points are of primary importance or not, because unless this is
done our m'n war effort will be seriously hampered.." 10.
By 9th March, there were still 13,500 men of the Field. Army or Holding
Battalions employed as guards out of a total of 37,000 on vulnerable points.
General Kirke, who had. just received news of the War Office decision to send.
portions of three low category divisions (the 12th, 23rd and 46th Divisions)
to Prance for labour duties, again emphasised in his weekly report that
"such projects .... tend to enxphasise the necessity for an imxned.iate reduc-
tion of vulnerable points, as with each move the burden of the Field Army
divisions which remin is correspondingly increased."	 The rem.fning
23,500 guards represented. only a small increase, due to the slowness of re-
cruiting for the Home Defence Battalions, which were still being afforded a
relatively low priority, despite the Adjutant General some months ago urging
that "all possible steps to enlist personnel for the Home Defence Battalions"
12.
must be taken.
However, General Kirke's fears of an increase in the total numbers
employed onguarding vulnerable points and its serious implications on Home
Defence and on reinforcement to the B.E.F. proved unfounded, since the
10. Wa 166/i: op. cit., February 1940. .ppendJ.x C: Weekly Report of the
C.-in-C. Home Forces, 10 Feb. 1940.
ii. WO 166/i: op. cit., March 1940. Appendix C: Weekly Report of the
C. -in-C. Home Forces, 9 March 1940.
12. WO 166/i: op. cit., March 1940. Appendix I: Agenda of C.-in-C.'s
Conference, 29 March 1940.
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savings in manpower eventually effected by the Vu].nerable Points Sub-
Committee proved greater than he forecast, though a proportion of this
saving was constantly swallowed up in fresh vulnerable point commitments,
such as the Neutral European Port scheme, the relief of Royal Naval and
Royal Marine guards and. in supplying guards for new R.A.F. establisiwients.
Further net savings of 6,500 men during March and April succeeded in reduc-
ing the total commitment to 30,500 by 20th April. Of these, 24,000 men
were from the Home Defence Battalions, leaving only 4,500 to be supplied by
the Field Force, and 2,000 by Holding units. A considerable reduction of
the Field Force's commitment, made doubly necessary because of the number
of Field Force formations being sent to France and Norway at this time, was
at last being achieved, and not before time. 13.
There was little pressure from the French over the winter and spring
of 1939-40 for the B.E.F. to be built up at the expense of Home Forces.
Only on 19th December 1939, at a meeting of the Supreme War Council, had
Monsieur Daladier, then President du Conseil, urged an acceleration of the
rate of despatch of British effectives to France, though he hastened to add
that "France was unanimous in recognising that Great Britain had fulfilled
her undertakings up to the hilt". Mr. Chamberlain, the British Prime
Minister, had pointed out in reply that:
"The innense difficulty of transporting, equipping and maintaining a
large Expeditionary Force made it extremely unlikely, however, that Britain
could go beyond her present commitments. The problem of equipping the Force
was, of course, the determining factor. Re felt certain that the promised
total of ten fully equipped divisions by the let March represented the abso-
lute limit of what the British side could contribute up to that date."
M. Dalad.ier, recognizing that the existing British effort was considerable
and that the problem of equipment was a very serious one, had to accept
this. 14. There was no further pressure for the Supreme War Council on this
matter until the end of May, by which time practically all the best trained
and equipped British forces were fully engaged in France, in any case, and
Home Forces were at their barest minimum. Indeed, in February 1940, the
fully trained 42nd and 44th Divisions, due for immediate despatch to the
B.E.F., were actually held back until early April, with full French
13. WO 166/i: op. cit., April 194 0, Appendix D: Minutes of C.-in-C.'s
Conference, 24 April 1940.
14. CAB 99/3: swC(39/40 )4th: 6 , 19 Dec. 1939.
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agreement, for possible intervention in Finland, though, in the event,
Finland surrendered to the Russians before help could be sent; and in April
the 15th Brigade of the 5th (Regular) Division was, in fact, sent to Norway
from the B.EJ., again with full French agreement, since it was hoped that
the Allied forces sent to Norway would draw off substantial German forces
from the Western Front. 15. General Kirke, therefore, was at no time under
severe pressure to accelerate the training and equipping of formations for
despatch overseas beyond the programme already laid down.
On the 6th January 1940, General Kirke lost an ally when Hore-Belisha
was sacked as Secretary of State for War. Hore-Belisha, in spite of his
sometimes rather high-handed approach, had done a lot for the British Army
during his period of office. General ICirke, unlike General Ironside, had
often seen eye to eye with Rore-Belisha and he lamented his going:
"Hore-Beliaha was sacked, to my regret .... Hore-Belisha's great
contribution was to put the Civil Service into their rightly subordinate
place, which no other Secretary of State had ever achieved." 16.
General Kirke was less happy dealing with Hore-Belisha's successor as
Secretary of State for War, Oliver Stanley, who, unlike Hore-Belisha,
allowed himself to be unduly influenced by the Civil Service:
"This was now changed by the opposition of the Permanent Under Secre-
tary to NacDougall being appointed as Major General of the General Staff, to
succeed Anderson [on 5th Februarjj, and he [the P.U.S.j was supported by the
Secretary of State against the military members of the Army Council and the
Selection Board - a scandalous affair, which marred an otherwise conscien-
tious performance of his duties." 17.
General Kirke considered that the chances of an invasion during the
winter months were very remote, if indeed they ever existed, and he accord-
ingly relaxed the anti-invasion preparations to some degree at the end of
January, by moving the 1st Armoured Division in H. Q. Reserve back to its
training area in Dorset. Lieutenant-General Sir William G. H. Pike, then a
Major, who was appointed G.S.0. 2 (Ops.) on General ICirke's staff on 15th
15. CAB 99/3: SWC(39/40 ) 5th:1 , 5 Feb. 1940.




January, recalled of the spring of 1940 that "there was no thought of inva-
sion at this time". 18. General Kirke steadfastly held to his belief that
it was impossible for the Germans to mount an invasion until they captured
the Dutch coastline and. could base their air force in that country. He
firmly believed that the war should be fought on the Continent by the B.E.F.
and that only an adequate force was necessary in the United Kingdom to deter
invasion. Following Oliver Stanley's appointment, he recalled that:
"Nothing whatsoever could be got for Home Defence from now on until
Holland was attacked, I had one interview on the subject with Oliver
Stanley shortly before the Cabinet was reconstituted Lon 10th Najj and he
went out, I said that until Holland was taken the rumours of invasion of
England cUd not worry me, and that the Cabinet should concentrate on prepar-
ing and strengthening the Expeditionary Force. This was equally useful for
supporting the French or resisting invasion, should conditions in the future
make that possible." 19.
General Kirke continued, therefore, to see the primary task of Home
Forces as being to train and equip the British Army for service overseas and
this activity remained his top priority throughout the winter and spring of
1939-40, right up until the fall of Holland in Nay. General Kirke threw
himself into supervising the forces under his command in this vital task of
training. Never a desk general, he spent most of his time away from Head-
quarters, visiting troops and formations all over the country, observing or
conducting exercises of all types and. making his comments known afterwards,
and attending conferences on questions relating to Home Defence. At the end
of February, he also paid a two-day visit to the B.EJ. in France to discuss
matters with Lord Gort. 20.
However, in spite of General Kirke's efforts, the process of turning
the thousands of civilians in uniform into proper soldiers remained a slow
one. The consequences of years of neglect before the war were now being
felt most acutely. Progress in training the forces in Britain was continu-
ally being hampered by lack of equipment to practise on, especially since
almost all the most modern equipment, now coming slowly from the factories,
was shipped straight out to the B.E.P.. At a conference of the G.O. C.-in-
C. 'a on 29th Narch, it was pointed out that:
18. Interview with Lt.-Gen. Sir William G. H. Pike, 18 August 1981.
19. Kirke Papers: op. cit.
20. WO 166/i: op. cit., Jan.-April 1940.
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"The majority of officers and men in mobile artillery units have never
seen a gun fired, and until they do so, do not know what they are working
to produce.... It is intended that all mobile artillery unite shall attend
practice camps this summer. However, arms and equipment may affect
matters." 21.
Sir Aukland Geddes was far more critical of the progress of training, though
he was perhaps unfairly harsh on General Kirke. In February, he wrote:
"This army business is worse than could have been believed. These
second line T.F. divisions are more than a menace. The rubbish we have got
here is appalling, and the officers 1 N.y Godi But the really frightening
thing is the way the conscripts are being rotted. No discipline, no train-
ing, apparently no equipment. I had no idea Walter Kirke was so bad and the
C.I.G.S.	 seem to be much better.
The spirit of the conscripts is deplorable. 'They have called us up -
now what are they going to do with us?' So different from 1914-15, with
everybody a volunteer trying to make himself efficient."
He ended his memoranda on an ominously prophetic note:
"This phoney war stuff is likely to end with the spring and then look
out for squalls...." 22.
*	 *	 *
General	 'Julius Caesar' Plan for dealing with invasion or raids
by sea and air, remained basically unchanged throughout the spring of 1940
up to the end of Nay, and while frequent amendments were made to it during
this period, these were mainly to clarify or alter details and did not alter
the principles of the plan. An Amendment in December 1939, further emph&-
sized the unlikelihood of the Germans making an attempt at invasion and
pointed out the many difficulties that the enemy would have to overcome. It
continued to be believed that an invasion of the United Kingdom would be
"one of the most hazardous operations of war that can be attempted". All
hinged on the question of whether the Germans could gain air superiority,
this being thought most unlikely unless the Low Countries were seized first.
It was expected that any invasion would be preceded by an attempt to
neutralise the R.A.F., either by "extended operations against our first line
21. WO 166/i: op. cit., March 1940, Appendix I Minutes of C.-in-C.'s
Conference, 29 March 1940.
22. Lord Geddes Papers: Bff1.IT Collection 1/311/116: Memoranda, Feb. 1940.
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aircraft, operational aerodromea, reserves and aircraft industry" or by "a
sudden and concentrated offensive against our first line fighter and bomber
stations, immediately prior to the invasion". However, in the first case,
the operation:
1,••• is one of great magnitude and our air forces have been deployed
to meet it. It is probable that the enemy's losses would be so heavy that
the intensity of his attacks would be reduced to negligible proportions
before he came within reach of neutralising our air forces,"
while, in the second case, aiming at the complete temporary immobilisation
of the R.A.F's fighter and bomber force:
".... the enemy could. not attain a total success, and even a reduced
bomber force could inflict heavy losses on so vulnerable a target as a sea-
borne expedition." 23.
It was also thought that German air action, over a prolonged period,
would be unsuccessful in completely eliminating the Royal Navy from the
North Sea, since "whatever success such air operations might achieve, we
could still harry the German sea communications by light surface forces,
mines and submarines", while the chances of a German convoy escaping detec-
tion and subsequent attack during its long passage was considered to be
very low. Even though the combination of winter nights and low visibility
might help the enemy:
".... it is difficult to envisage circumstances in which the enemy
expedition would not be vulnerable to attack at sea at some stage of the
operation, either by naval or air action. Unless our fighter strength had
been drastically reduced by preliminary air attack, the enemy escorts would
be liable to severe losses in the vicinity of our coast."
The success of the actual landings, too, would be dependent on the
Germans' achieving air superiority. The use of paratroopers to seize aero-
dromes, ports or other landing places:
".... would, be difficult without air superiority or complete surprise,
and the organisation of such a project would be an immense undertaking. By
day, such an operation would be hazardous in the extreme, by night, object-
ives would be difficult to identify.... Even if a success, few of the air
landed troops could hope to survive."
23. WO 166/i: op. cit., Dec. 1939, Appendix 5: 'Julius Caesar' Plan,
Amendment No. 2, 12 Dec. 1940.
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Most difficult of all would be the disembarkation of the enemy seaborne
force, a process that would occupy not less than seven hours, during which
time the transports would be vulnerable to air attack as well as to land
forces. It was considered that "complete surprise or air superiority is
most improbable" and that "whatever local successes might be attained, the
enemys line of retreat would be threatened both from the air and sea." 24.
General Kirke continued to believe that only a landing on the coastline
of Suffolk and East Norfolk, with its exposed ports and beaches, would give
the Germans any real chance of success. His Amendment in December stated
that:
"Navigational difficulties, the position of our own ininefields and.
fixed defences indicate that the most practicable coast for attack lies
between Yarmouth and Harwich, an area in which the port of Harwich only is
accessible for transport. The direction of an expedition to an unexpected
place cannot, however, be entirely ruled out, but distance eliminates any
area north of the Tyne or south of Harwich."
All in all, there seemed little reason to alter the conclusion that
invasion across the North Sea from North Germany would be bound to result in
a costly German failure and would be "a desperate undertaking, which is un-
likely to achieve success so long as our land and air forces remain in being
and provided the necessary precautions are maintained effectively." 25.
Indeed, by February 1940, General Kirke was sufficiently confident of the
remoteness of the possibility of invasion to relax the minimum time of eight
hours' notice required in the 'Julius Caesar' Plan to 24 hours. 26.
By the 3rd Nay, the response to an attempted German invasion or raid
was still to be a mobile one, as set out in the 'Julius Caesar' Plan, but
the means to carry it out had by now been substantially reduced. The 1st
(Yeomanry) Cavalry Division had left for the Middle East in December and the
5th (Regular) Division had been sent to France in the same month to join the
four other Regular Divisions already there. By early May, these five Regular
infantry divisions in France had been joined by no less than five of the
24. ibid.
25. ibid.
26. WO 166/1: op. cit., Feb. 1940, Appendix F: 'Julius Caesar' Plan,
Amendment No. 10, 17 Feb. 1940.
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beat trained and equipped first line Territorial infantry divisions from
Home Forces, the 48th (s. Midland), 50th (Northumbrian) and 51st (Highland)
Divisions in January, and the 42nd (E. Lance.) and 44th (Home Counties)
Divisions early in April. The infantry and Royal Engineers of three of the
second line Territorial divisions, the 12th (Eastern), 23rd (Northumbrian)
and 46th (N. Midland and W. Riding) left in mid April for pioneer duties
with the B.E.P.. What little artillery and heavy equipment they possessed
was left in Britain at the disposal of Home Forces, but their departure
meant that the divisions remaining in Britain were further stretched to
provide adequate troops to guard vulnerable points and, if necessary, for
internal security duties in co-operation with the Civil Authorities. April
also saw the departure of two further first line Territorial divisions, the
49th (w. Riding) to Norway and. the 53rd (Welsh) to Ulster, which was outside
the C.-in-C., Home	 control, and of two regiments of the 1st Army
Taiik Brigade, with its 77 Matilda I and 23 invaluable new Matilda II heavy
Infantry tanks, and 17 Vickera light tanks, to France. 27.
These departures severely weakened. Home Forces, though the arrival of
the 1st Canadian Division in December 1939, bringing its own light equipment,
was a very welcome addition. The relatively strong 1st Armoured. Division,
consisting of the 2nd (Light) and. 3rd. (Heavy) Armoured Brigades, had 121 A9,
MO and A13 Cruisers, 203 Vickers light tanks and eight 25 pdr. field guns,
and, though earmarked for France, still remained available for the 'Julius
Caesar' Plan on 3rd Nay. The 2nd Armoured Division had, up to January 1940,
consisted of only the 1st Light Armoured Brigade, but In that month it
received the addition of the 22nd Heavy Armoured Brigade. Each armoured
brigade, theoretically, consisted of three regiments, with light and. Cruiser
tanks respectively, though the distinction between 'Light' arid 'Heavy'
armoured brigades was abolished in March 1940. However, by 3rd May, the
1st (Light) Arinoured Brigade had. a mere 31 machine-gun armed Vickers light
tanks, compared with 77 in January, whereas 22nd (Heavy) Armoured Brigade
"have no serviceable tanks, but have been issued with 525 rifles per
regiment". 28. There were also 12 armoured cars with let Derby Yeomanry,
but the 2nd Armoured Division Support Group could only muster a mixed bag of
10 field guns and two 2 pdr. anti-tank guns and most of these had been left
27. WO 166/i: op. cit., Dec. 1939 - April 1940.
28. WO 166/i: op. cit., January 1940, Appendix J: 'Julius Caesar' Plan,
Amendment No. 8, 24 Jan. 1940; and WO 166/i: op. cit., Nay 1940,
Appendix A: 'Julius Caesar' Plan, Amendment No. 14, 3 May 1940.
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by the 12th Division, which had been sent to Prance without any of its
artillery. (See Appendices 3 and 4.) Indeed, so slow was the production
of tanks in Britain during the winter and spring of 1939-40, that the H.Q.
of the 3rd Armoured DiviBion, Bet up in September 1939, was disbanded in
December of that year, while the 21st, 23rd and 24th Army Tank Brigades,
also formed in September 1939, had still not received any serviceable tanks
by the beginning of Mayi
Thus, by the 3rd Nay, General Kirke had only eight weak or inexperi-
enced divisions, plus elements of two more, available to carry out the
'Julius Caesar' Plan. (See Appendix 4 and Nap 4.) Of these divisions, one
was earmarked for despatch overseas at short notice, while four others were
second line Territorial divisions. Six divisions, and part of two others,
were spread along the East Coast rea&y to deal immediately with any landing
in their area. In Scottish Command two second line Territorial divisions
were deployed, the 9th (Scottish) north of the Forth, and. elements of the
15th (Scottish) near the Border. In Northern Command the first line Terri-
torial 54th (East Anglian) Division on Tyneside and Teeside had been placed
temporarily in H.Q. Reserve, so as to be able to go to the aid of either
Scottish Command or Northern Command, until the second line 66th (Lanca.
and Border) Division could be moved from the Manchester area into Yorkshire
to fill the gap left by 49th Division's departure in April. The partly
trained and equipped 2nd Armoured Division still covered the East Riding of
Yorkshire and Linco].nshire. In the vulnerable Eastern Command, the coa8t-
line in early Nay was covered by only three Territorial divisions, the
second. line 18th (East Anglian) and the first line 55th (w. Lancs.) Divi-
sions guarding East Anglia, and the 1st London Division (first line) which
was situated in Kent and Sussex. Eastern Command had also been strength-
ened by a brigade group of the 2nd London Division, extra artillery, and
the 20th Infantry Brigade, which was placed in Eastern Command Reserve at
Aldershot. The H.Q. Reserve, besides the 54th Division in Northern Command,
now consisted of the 1st Canadian Division at Aldershot and, until its
departure to France in mid May, the relatively powerful 1 at Armoured
Division in Dorset. These two divisions were placed so as to go to the aid
of Eastern Command if required. 29. Not involved in the 'Julius Caesar'
Plan were a further three Territorial divisions training in the West
Country, of which two were first line and one second line, and another four
second line divisions and part of a fifth, which were situated near main
29. WO 166/1: op. cit., Nay 194 0, Appendix A: 'Julius Caesar' Plan,
Amendment No. 14, 3 May 1940.
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population centres. These last were partly engaged in training, but were so
placed so as to provide aid to the civil powers in an emergency, to provide
guards for a myriad of vulnerable points and to perform other kindred tasks.
General Kirke's dispositions to meet what he believed were the unlikely
circumstances of invasion from North Germany, were sound enough and they
reflected his view that East Anglia was the most vulnerable area. However,
the weakness of the 'Julius Caesar' Plan lay in the fact that the forces
under his command at the beginning of May had been severely weakened by
departures overseas and his troops were consequently spread very thinly on
the ground. They were also largely semi-trained, relatively immobile and
lacking in all types of heavy equipment, especially artillery and anti-tank
guns. Home FOrces continued to be starved of troops arid equipment, as the
main effort was directed to reinforcing the B.E.F. and to bringing it up to
establishment. There simply were not enough trained troops or equipment
available to provide both a strong force at home and a strong B.E.P., even
after no less than eight months of war. The chickens of the period of dis-
armament arid unpreparedness during the inter-war years were truly coming
home to roost.
The provision of enough transport for the formations and units employed
in the 'Julius Caesar' Plan continued to give much cause for concern and
remained a major problem throughout the spring of 1940. Most transport
still had to be provided by voluntary hiring as late as May 1940 and even
this measure still left formations well short of their war establishment.
An amendment to the 'Julius Caesar' Plan in March gave instructions that:
".... sufficient first line transport will be hired to bring units up
to 50% of their War Establishment, except that:-
(i) Gun-towing vehicles will be provided on a scale of one gun-towing
vehicle per serviceable 18 pdr., 25 pdr. or 4.5" howitzer in possession,
up to a limit of 24 guns per division.
(ii) Before hiring is resorted to, every use will be made of War Department
tranBport in possession of units of formations in the J.C. Plan (if any)
who are not earmarked for any anti-invasion role."
Both second line transport and troop-carrying transport were to be earmarked,
but only hired when the emergency arose. 30.
30. WO 166/1: op. cit., March 1940, Appendix D: 'Julius Caesar' Plan,
Amendment No • 11, 19 March 1940.
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The transport situation was little better in May. At a meeting of the
Chiefs of Staff on 7th May, General Kirke pointed out that "sufficient first
line transport was held by all units concerned in home defence for the con-
veyance of one company per battalion" only, and though "transport for the
remainder was earmarked, and could be assembled fairly quickly", this was
leading to costly hiring problems for exercises, and without hiring trans-
port the vital exercises to practise the movements required under the
defence schemes could. not be carried out. Not only this, but the fact that
exercises were actually taking place was given away and civilian drivers
might have to be compelled, "by physical force, if necessary," to stay with
their vehicles in an emergency. 31.
Even more worrying was the lack of heavy equipment among the 'Julius
Caesar' divisions. (See Appendices 3 and 4.) The artillery of the 9th,
15th, 54th and 66th Divisions, for example, consisted of only 24 guns apiece,
on 3rd May, out of a theoretical War Establishment of 72; while the 18th,
55th, 1st London and 2nd London Divisions in the vital Eastern Command area
had a mere 16 guns each. The let Canadian Division had a mere 12 guns and
the two armoured divi8ions even less. The artillery shortage would have
been even worse had the artillery of the three Territorial divisions, which
had departed to France for works service, not been left in Britain at the
disposal of Home Forces. Of the divisional totals generally 50% were 4.5"
howitzers, 25% the equally obsolete 18 pdrs., and only 25% were the modern
25 pdr. field-gun howitzers or the stop-gap 18/25 pdrs.. Even so, the
supply of 25 pdrs. or 18/25 pdrs. to Home Forces was gradually coming
forward, since the 'Julius
	 divisions now disposed of a grand total
of 82 25 pdrs., compared with a mere 25 on 24th January 1940. 32.
Ammunition, too, was in very short supply for Home Forces. As late as
25th May, instructions were given that:
"With regard to the provision of artillery ammunition, Commands are
requested to note that the position is that ammunition cannot be allotted
except for such guns as are inoluded in .... the 'Julius Caesar' Plan." 33.
31. CAB 79/4: COS li4th(40):3, 7 May 1940.
32. WO 166/i: op. cit., January 1940, Appendix J: 'Julius Caesar' Plan,
Amendment No. 8, 24 Jan. 1940; and. WO 166/i: op. cit., Nay 1940,
Appendix A: 'Julius Caesar' Plan, Amendment No. 14, 3 May 1940.
33. WO 166/i: op. cit., May 1940, Appendix C: 'Julius Caesar' Plan,
Amendment No. 19, 25 May 1940.
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The Chronic shortage of anti-tank guns was more worrying still. (See
Appendices 3 and 4.) On 3rd May, the grand total of 2 pdr. anti-tank guns
with the 'Julius Caesar' formations had risen from 22 on 24th January to
only 30. This represented. an alarming deficiency for Home Forces, if it i
considered that the War Establishment should have been 48 for each division,
more than all the 'Julius Caesar' Plan formations combined could put to-
gether
The fixed defences, too, at the nineteen ports classified as Category A
were still inadequate by early May and, in spite of some small improvements
since the autumn, they generally still fell short of the approved scales,
the Authorities taking confidence only in the fact that they were there arid
would, with luck, never be used. Most fixed defences were armed with the
standard pre-First World War medium range 9.2" and 6" guns emplaced in open
pits. There was little modern accommodation, they were manned by Tern-
torials, they were all sited to fire out to sea, they mainly lacked any form
of landward defences against land attack from the rear, and there was a
grave shortage of short-range weapons to deal with fast surface raiders and
of vital searcifliglit and communications equipment.
Another problem General ICirke had to cope with during the winter and
spring of 1939-40 was the constant loss of the best trained and equipped
formations that formed the H.Q. Reserve for the 'Julius Caesar' Plan.
General Kirke still had only relatively limited powers over the troops arid
formations in the United Kingdom, which were placed under his command pri-
marily for the purposes of training. However, as formations were trained,
they were removed, from his command and placed under the War Office's direct
operational command as a norma]. step in moving them abroad. These forma-
tions were usually those that formed General Kirke'8 H. Q. Reserve, and he,
therefore, had. a continuous struggle to find adequate formations to plug the
gaps in the 'Julius Caesar' Plan. Since he did not expect to have to
command Home Forces in battle, General Kirke accepted the removals by the
War Office of his H.Q. Reserve. He was, however, often privately frustrated
by the sometimes rather high-handed actions of the War Office.
34. WO 166/i: op. cit., May 1940, Appendix A: 'Julius Caesar' Plan,
Amendment No. 14, 3 May 1940,,
35. Collier, Basil: op. cit., pp. 97-98.
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General Kirke's original G.H.Q. Reserve for 'Julius Caesar' in November
1939 had consisted of the let Armoured. Division in East Anglia, the 48th
(S. Midland) Division in the Hungerford area and the 51st (Highland) Divi-
sion at Alderahot. Both these latter divisions left for France in January
1940 and were replaced in the Plan from 24th January by two more first line
Territorial divisions, the 55th (w. Lance.) in the Charnwood Forest area of
Lelcestershire and the 42nd (E. Lance.), which was brought down to the
Swindon area from Northumberland. (See Appendix 3 and Map 2.) These two
divisions, together with let Armoured Division, which was moved to the
Bland.ford area of Dorset late in January, remained in H.Q. Reserve until the
end of March. (See Map 3.) However, the 42nd was ordered to depart over-
seas early in April, and Genera]. lirke had to make further adjustments. At
first, he planned to bring 49th (w. Riding) Division from Northern Command
to the Swindon area to replace the 42nd Division, but this could not be done
until the end of April. General Kirke allowed for this delay by making use
of the recently arrived let Canadian Division at Aldershot:
"This will produce a period of some weeks when no division in the
Swindon area will be available for the 'J.C.' Plan. As let Canadian Divi-
sion, which was not previously included in the 'J.C.' Plan, has now been
incorporated as a further H.Q. Reserve division with effect from 1st April,
this position is accepted." 36.
However, just three days later, H.Q. Home Forces received a rather terse
preparatory order from the War Office that 49th Division "may be required to
proceed overseas early" and. was "placed under War Office control forthwith".
1st Canadian Division had, therefore, to remain in H.Q. Reserve.
In the middle of April, 55th Division ceased to be in H.Q. Reserve when
it was moved to the Essex coastline and three 'labour' divisions departed
overseas. General Kirke, therefore, designated the 54th (East Anglian)
Division, now in the Ainwick area of Northumberland, as a H.Q. Reserve until
another division could be suitably positioned in the Midlands. The 54th was
also well situated to guard against a possible threat from the Germans now
in Norway. 38. (See Map 4.) Then, on 28th April, H.Q. Home Forces received
36. WO 166/i: op. cit., March 1940, Appendix H: 'Julius Caesar' Plan;
H.Q. Reserves, 29 March 1940.
37. WO 166/i: op. cit., April 1940.
38. WO 166/i: op. cit., April 1940, Appendix C: Weekly Report of the
C.-in-C., Home Forces, 20 April 1940.
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preparatory orders from the War Office that 15th (Scottish) Division may be
required to move from the Borders to the Swindon/Newbury area. This move,
however, would leave only a single division in Scotland for Home Defence.
General ICirke was by now becoming understandably annoyed. at the constant
interference in his dispositions by the War Office and was especially
peeved at their high-handed attitude. On 4th May, the same day that pre-
paratory orders were received by Home Forces for let Armoured Division to
move overseas "about 12th May", General ICirke complained to the Permanent
Under Secretary of State for War:
".... although I received a warning order that the 15th Division
should be prepared to move to the Swindon area at 48 hours' notice, it
appears that this move is now taking place without any further intimation
being given to me, in spite of the fact that this Division has hitherto had
an important defence role.
It is essential I should be kept fully informed of all War Office
decisions affecting divisions included in the Anti-Invasion plan." 39.
General ICirke was to have further trouble with the War Office on thiB
subject later in the month.
All in all, therefore, there were many loopholes in the Plan. The
military historian, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart commented on 6th May:
".... the military authoritiea say that they cannot oppose the actual
landing, and will need time to concentrate trooe to meet it. They do not
seem to have grasped the tempo of modern war." 40.
*	 *	 *
Despite the weakness of Home Forces in April and early Nay, the
principles of the 'Julius Caesar' Plan were still expected to give adequate
defence against German land-based forces, provided that the Channel coast
remained in friendly or neutral hands. It was believed that even the weak
divisions at home would suffice to mop up airborne landings and defeat any
elements of a large raiding force that survived the long sea crossing.
39. WO 166/i: op. cit., May 1940, Appendix B: Weekly Report of the
C.-in-C., Home Forces, 4 Nay 1940.
40. Liddell Hart Papers: 11/1940/31: Notes for History, 6 May 1940.
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However, the other major assumption that, despite the doubts raised in
October 1939, the Royal Navy and R.A.F., backed up by the coastal defences,
would virtually preclude a landing by seaborne troops alone, was severely
jolted by the German invasion of Norway which began on 9th April. The
British had for many years taken the control of the North Sea for granted
and had presumed that the might of British Naval power would present almost
insuperable problems to an aggressor, but in their invasion of Norway the
Germans showed they could transport and land large numbers of troops by sea
in the teeth of the Royal Navy and. R.A.F. successfully and regardless of
losses to shipping and their surface fleet. 41. This moral victory, which
made the North Sea and. the Navy seem far less formidable barriers, came as
a rude shock to Britain, though it seemed to take several weeks more for
its full implications to become generally realized.
In the initial assault and the subsequent Norwegian campaign, the
British also noted the German use of airlandin troops, combined with sea-
borne landings, to capture ports, the use of a large fjf column', the
Germans' speed in exploiting confusion, the efficient air cover provided by
the Luftwaffe which often operated from newly captured airfields, and the
enemy's readiness to use surprise, run immense risks and to flout all the
sound laws of strategy as taught at Greenwich and Camberley. Not only this,
but the increased length of the enemy-occupied coastline northwards provided
an excellent base for heavy air attack by bombers on both the Royal Navy in
the North Sea and on its naval bases on the East Coast or at Scapa Flow, as
well as an improved starting point for seaborne invasion or raids. 42.
Consequently, on 15th April, General Kirke reconnended revision of the scale
of attack on the United Kingdom "in the light of our Norwegian experi-
ences."
Even so, the importance of the lessons learned from the fall of Norway
and their influence on British anti-invasion thinking, though important,
must not be over-emphasized, since it was realized that the invasion of the
United Kingdom would be an entirely different kettle of fish. Norway's vast
and broken coastline, small population and armed forces, well organised
41. Collier, Basil: op. cit., pp. 97-100, H.N.S.O., London, 1957.
42. CAB 80/10: COS(40)332: Annexe 1, 10 Nay 1940.
43. Kirke Papers: op. cit.
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'fifth column' and almost total German command of both the short sea
approaches and of the air, meant the country was especially vulnerable to
invasion and it was quite impossible to prevent the landings. The main
lesson for the British was "not being ready".
Captain B. H. Liddell Hart considered that, even with the fall of
Denmark and. Norway, an invasion of the United. Kingdom by sea, preceded or
accompanied by an air offensive on the Fleet and R.A.F., was moat unlikely:
"As regards an invasion of this country .... it seemed. rather an
extreme assumption that, even if the Fleet could be temporarily paralysed,
a large enough proportion of our air force could be caught napping, in view
of our warning system. Unless such an air surprise was a complete success,
the landing forces would be in a similar position to that of our landing
forces in Norway - dominated by the advantage which a shore-based. air force
enjoys." 45.
The topic of invasion of the United Kingdoth was absent from the agenda
of the War Cabinet until 30th April, even though the Germans had moved into
Norway as early as the 9th April. On the previous day, the 29th April, the
Military Co-ordination Committee, meeting at No. 10 Downing Street under
the chairmanship of Neville Chamberlain, had touched on the question of
invasion, which had arisen out of discussion on operations in Norway. The
Committee had generally agreed that:
".... although large-scale invasion in the face of powerful air forces
was a very difficult operation, the putting ashore by the Germans of a
small and well organised party, perhaps preceded by troops landed from the
air, might be carried out in this country. .... our aerodromes were very
lightly defended and there was a shortage of trained and equipped troops in
this country. On the other hand, there were excellent roads in every part
of the country and there was much artillery, all of which was mechanised."
The Committee had instructed the Chiefs of Staff to "re-exmIne the existing
plans for the defence of the United Kingdom against invasion" and, in view
of the shortage of trained troops, Oliver Stanley, Secretary of State for
War, had been invited to consider the advisability of bringing the remainder
the 5th Division back from France and whether any changes should be made in
44. Interviews with Lt.Col. J. Nigel St. G. Kirke, 11 August 1981; and
with Lt.Gen. Sir William C. H. Pike, 18 August 1981.
45. Liddell Hart Papers: 11/1940/31: Notes for History, 6 May 1940.
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present arrangements for deapatching the IV Corps (consisting of 43rd
(Weosex), 52nd (Lowland) and 1st Canadian Divisions) to France early in
46.June.
At the War Cabinet meeting on 30th April, Oliver Stanley explained
that the small number of fully-trained troops in the United Kingdom was due
to the fact that the War Cabinet had decided that the newly formed divi-
sions should be sent to France as early as possible. Winston Churchill,
First Lord of the Admiralty, who at the Co-ordination meeting had pressed
for the reinforcement and retention of troops to guard the United Kingdom,
took the opportunity to raise another of his pet proposals, that the weak
forces in Britain should be supplemented by regular battalions withdrawn
from India, to be replaced by Territorial battalions sent out from the
homeland. At the same meeting, Lord Kankey, Minister Without Portfolio,
drew attention to the lessons to be learned from the ruses adopted by
Germany in their attack on Norway, such as the sending of false messages,
the cutting of telephone wires and the sending of transport ships quite
openly into ports, and the importance of devising suitable safeguards to
these strategies. The Chiefs of Staff were invited to take all these
47.factors into account in their re-appraisal of the defence plans.
On the same day, there arrived a telegram from the British Ambassador
in Ankara, Sir Hughe ICnatchbull-Hugessen, the contents of which appeared
somewhat suspicious. The Ambassador reported that:
".... at a recent meeting in Budapest of Hungarian Military Attacha,
a statement had been made that the Germans were preparing a vast number of
aircraft for dive-bombing and ground attack, and a large number of small
submarines..,. With these the Germans intended to make a great combined
attack on the Home Fleet; after this attack they intended to land 25,000
men in England." 48.
Intelligence, meanwhile, reported that a number of unidentified ships had
been observed off the coast of the Netherlands. During discussion of these
reports at the War Cabinet meeting on 1st Nay, Churchill again pressed for
the reinforcement of Home Forces, if necessary from the B.E.F. in France.
46. CAB 83/3: MC 36th(40):2, 29 April 1940.
47. CAB 65/6: WM lO8th(40):4, 30 April 1940.
48. Telegram No. 341 D.I.P.P., from Ankara, 30 April 1940.
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More than ever, he felt that "we should have at least one highly trained
division in this country available to meet a German landing". Oliver
Stanley, agreeing with Churchill's view, said that he had already taken
preliminary steps to recall the rest of the 5th DiviBion (its 15th Brigade
was currently being extracted from Norway) and. that final orders would be
issued on the following day.
However, at the Chiefs of Staff meeting on the morning of 3rd Nay,
General Sir Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, said that
for the moment the 5th Division, presently in War Office reserve in the
Amiens area, was to remain in France "where it was, well situated strategi-
cally for meeting an attack on the Western Front or against the United
Kingdom". 50. The reason for the change of plan had been outraged objec-
tions from the Headquarters of the B.E.P., where it was believed that the
German assault on the West would shortly begin. Lieutenant-General Sir
Henry R. Pownall, Chief of the General Staff to the B.EJ., recalled, with
some relief, the next day:
"I succeeded in getting the removal of 5th Division from France
stopped or at least postponed.... But at present there is a Home Defence
flap on, started by Winston, and. the Secretary of State, who is not too
courageous a man, is being criticised at the alleged lack of trained troopsin this country." 51.
At the same meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on 3rd May, the Air Staff
emphasized the danger, especially to East Anglia, of parachute landings,
possibly in considerable numbers rather than the small parties hitherto
expected. Plans in some detail were being worked out to cover possible
German landings at Harwich and Yarmouth, and, while the police in East
Anglia would not be armed, there was to be close liaison between them and
the military authorities, Regional Commissioner for Cambridge and the
Observer Corps, while local arrangements were felt necessary to prevent, by
removal or destruction, supplies falling into the hands of enemy raiding
parties. The Committee noted that the C.-in-C., Home Forces, was overhaul-
ing his defence scheme and also that the Joint Planning Committee was
49. CAB 65/7: WM lO9th(40):9; and CAB 65/13: WM lO9th(40):9, 1 Nay 1940.
50. CAB 79/4: COS l O8th(40)z4, 3 Nay 1940.
51. Diaries of Lt.Gen. Sir Henry R. Pownall, 4 Nay 1940.
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revising the Chiefs of Staff's November 1939 appreciation of seaborne and
airborne attack on the United Kingdom, in the light of recent experience. 52.
On 3rd May, General Ironside had reassured the Chiefs of Staff that,
although the 5th Division would remain in France, the let Armoured Division
in Dorset, now consisting of the 2nd and 20th Light Armoured. Brigades, and
the 3rd Heavy Armoured Brigade, could be moved very rapidly to any threatened
point to aid the troops in Eastern or Northern Command. 	 i'wo days later,
Ironside announced to the C.O.S. Committee that orders had been issued on
the 4th Nay for the despatch of let Armoured Division to France, though the
move overseas was not to be until "about 12th May". In the event, this was
to be too late to play an effective role in the May operations. This
departure would severely weaken Home Forces, since the Division had. been
earmarked for a very important anti-invasion role. However, General Iron-
aide put the minds of the Committee at rest by assuring them that its place
would be taken by certain elements of IV Corps and that General Kirke had
been informed of the impending move and would make the necessary alterations
in his defence scheme.
General Kirke himself accepted, and indeed supported, the move of 1st
Armoured. Division to France. He continued to believe, in early May, that
the emphasis of British military effort should be on building up the B.E.F..
He maintained his view that the stronger the Allied forces were on the
Continent the stronger the forces the Germane would have to deploy against
them and, consequently, the smaller would be the force that the Germans
could. possibly bring to bear against the weakened formations in the United
Kingdom. On the 2nd May he had. been warned that the Cabinet was anxious
about invasion, and four days later he went to see the Secretary of State
about Home Defence. He later recalled of their talks
"I opposed keeping back the Armoured Division on the grounds that the
decisive point was in the defence of Holland, Belgium and France, and that,
so long as we maintained our position there, the invasion of Great Britain
would not arise." 55'
52. CAB 79/4: COS lO8th(40):4, 3 May 1940.
53. ibid.
54. CAB 79/4: COS lllth(40):6, 5 May 1940.
55. Kirke Papers: Home Defence Pile: Notes left by General Sir Walter
Kirke, 1939-1940.
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On 7th Nay the Chiefs of Staff Committee, with General Kirke and
General Sir Hugh Elles, from the Ministry of Home Security, present, met to
discuss the dangers of invasion. General ICirke was first invited to outline
his measures to guard against the three expected forms of attack. In the
case of widespread air bombardment, some troops were still to be held near
to large centres of population, so as "something would be immediately avail-
able to support the civil power in preventing confusion and. restoring the
local situation". In the case of the second form of attack, airborne attack
on aerodromes, General ICirke said that on the more likely aerodromes there
were military guards, composed of two platoons of Home Defence troops, to
prevent sabotage and also to repel the enemy's first landing until re-
inforced. These would be backed up by anti-aircraft troops with light
automatics and those R.A.F. personnel who were armed with rifles. Mobile
detachments of the Field Army were organised "to provide a first reinforce-
ment to axiy aerodrome attacked, their duty being to picket the area occupied
by the enemy until the arrival of stronger forces". To guard against the
third possibility, that of airborne attack combined with seaborne attack,
General Kirke explained that the principles of the 'Julius Caesar' Plan,
centring round the premise that the enemy would try to capture an East
Coast port so as to enable the landing of heavy stores, were still to stand
essentially unchanged. The first line of defence were the fixed defences,
and troops of the field army were held in the vicinity of each port. 56.
Explaining the dispositions of the various divisions available for Home
Defence to the Committee, he stressed that the Plan "depended on quick
counter-attack and therefore on mobility", though to achieve this it
"required the organisation of the Divisional R.A.S.C. and Signals for
certain second-line divisions".
Sir Hugh Elles, explaining the main features of the regional organisar-
tion of civil defence, pointed out that, whereas previously it had been
thought that only raids might occur between the Tyne and the Thames, now
through the loss of the Norwegian coast, the Chiefs of Staff's latest
appreciation had extended the possibility of raids to the North of Scotland
and the new idea of invasion, rather than raids, between The Wash and as
56. CAB 79/4: COS ll4th(40 ):3, 7 May 1940.
57. Kirke Papers: op. cit.
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far as Newhaven had been added to the picture. This would mean a revision
of the evacuation policy and. the arrangements thought out to deal with
evacuees from East Coast ports. 58.
The Chiefs of Staff then went on to discuss a wide range of pressing
matters of home defence, that would be urgently considered by the War Office.
These included the strengthening of General ICirke's staff, the importance of
a good warning system and. duplicated methods of communication to counter
confusion created by air bombing and 'fifth column' activity, the continuing
transport problem, the necessity of not tying up troops of the Field Army in
the guarding of vulnerable points, the grouping of holding battalions formed
to take the place of divisionB ordered abroad, the vulnerability of coast
defence batteries to landward attack and machine gunning from the air, the
strengthening of the Shetland garrison, the carrying out of anti-invasion
exercises and the preparation of demolition schemes in suitable areas,
especially at ports. General Kirke said that, while some consideration had
now been given to the demolition of cranes and other facilities at a port
which the enemy was attempting to seize, there were as yet no plans for
schemes to isolate enemy detachments that might land, since he was confident
that his troops "could prevent the advance of any enemy force which could
land on an open beach".	 Two days later, Commands were ordered "to
consider preparing bridges for demolition, road blocks, etc.", however,
even on the eve of the opening of the German offensive on the West, there
was no real sense of urgency, since Headquarters, Home Forces, instructed
that "reports are required with estimates of cost". 60.
The Chiefs of Staff Committee's re-e y mnation of the problems posed
by seaborne and airborne attack on the United Kingdom, to incorporate the
lessons and consequences of the fall of Norway, was continued in discussion
over the next few days and resulted in the final approval, on 10th Nay, of
their report on the subject. 61. The Chiefs of Staff concluded that the
possibility of seaborne or airborne raids had extended northwards to the
Shetlands, though they were "more likely to be carried out as diversions,
58. CAB 79/4: COS li4th(40):3, 7 May 1940.
59. ibid.
60. WO 166/i: op. cit., May 1940.
61. CAB 79/4: COS l2Oth(40):1, 10 Nay 1940.
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simultaneously with an intensive air attack or invasion, rather than as
isolated operations in themselves". They might be aimed at destroying
isolated points of particular military importance, such as R.D.F. stations
or vital communications centres, and would porbably be aided by a 'fifth
column'. As for invasion, the Chiefs of Staff considered that there was
no reason to revise their November 1939 conclusion that invasion was not a
serious danger "so long as our naval and air forces remain in being and
provided the necessary precautions are mantained effectively' t . They
believed that:
"The possibility of invasion is conditional upon the Germans having
gained a high degree of air superiority. For this reason the first stage
is likely to be an attack upon our air forces and their maintenance
organisation."
Air superiority was regarded as:
".... the crux of the problem since, if the Germans succeeded in
neutralizing our air forces, it might be impossible for our naval forces
to prevent the establishment and maintenance of considerable German forces
in this country."
It was also thought that Germany could not achieve this air superiority
without the preliminary occupation of Holland. 62.
The Chiefs of Staff believed that aeaboxne invasion was likely to be
preceded by a heavy scale of air attack on our naval forces, porte and
R.A.F. stations, first line air strength, reserves, maintenance organisa-
tion and air industry. Only when he had largely achieved these aims,
would the enemy be expected to proceed to the subsequent stages of a plan
of invasion.
If the Germans were to decide to attempt a landing, "they are likely
to choose those places at which the full weight of their short-range
bombers and fighters could be brought to bear". These same places incor-
porated the shortest sea routes and were "within striking distance of the
most vital area in the country - London". 63. The area most vulnerable to
62. CAB 80/10: COS 332(40); also WP 153(40), 10 Nay 1940.
63. ibid.
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a landing was, therefore, between The Wash and Yolkestone, not merely East
Anglia, as previously thought. The Thames estuary was difficult to approach
and. was strongly defended, while a landing appeared much lees likely on the
South than on the East Coast, because of the longer sea passage from the
German or Dutch ports and the fact that "the passage of the Strait of Dover
with an expedition of any size would be a most hazardous undertaking and
appeared to be an unlikely operation". 64. Initial landings at the defended
ports of Yarmouth, Harwich and Dover were unlikely, but "there are numerous
beaches on the east and south-east coasts which are suitable for landings".
It was felt possible that the enemy might make a landing in Scotland,
possibly in the Shetlanda, or even on the north-east coast, before the main
attack, as a diversion. 65.
Air action was also expected to be used in direct support of both the
enemy's airborne and seaborne expeditions "to cover their approach, assist
the landings, isolate the areas where footholds had been obtained and. to
attempt to block the movements of defending forces". The estimated. total
of German parachute troops had by now risen to 5,000, though their expected.
method of employment, to seize landing grounds adjacent to ports, so that
perhaps 11,000 more troops in transport aircraft might land, remained the
same. However, now the initial seaborne landings were believed to be on
beaches on which vehicles could be put ashore in the vicinity of ports,
rather than directly at ports. The forces so landed, supported by air
bombardment and. helped by 'fifth column' activities, would then "try to
establish and maintain enough forces to extend. their control over sufficient
ports and. harboura to ensure adequate communications for their mi1n invading
forces". 66.
Although a warning of possible enemy intentions might be provided by
the inception of the enemy's air offensive, the only positive indication of
an attempt to invade was expected. to be the concentration of ships and
troops. The actual date of sailing and the point or points of attack would.
remain in doubt until the last moment. German minelaying and. minesweeping
64. CAB 79/4: COS ll5th( 40 ) : 4, 7 Nay 1940.
65. CAB 80/10: COS 332(40); and. WP 153(40), 10 Nay 1940.
66. ibid.
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might provide some indication of events to come, while there is "no doubt
that 'fifth column' activities will play a very dangerous and important
part in any operation the enemy may undertake against this country". All
in all, the Chiefs of Staff remained firm in their view that:
"The dispatch of a large-scale expedition against this country while
our naval and air forces are in being, is not, in our opinion, a practi-
cable operation of war and would not be attempted." 67.
This was the Chiefs of Staff's line of thinking as regards the German
invasion of the United Kingdom on the eve of the opening of the long
awaited enemy offensive on the Western Pront. The rapid pace of events
over the next few weeks was to lead to a transformation of the thinking
behind their appreciation, which would render it quickly obsolete and. would




CHAPTER 4: TEE NAY PA1IC
On the 10th May the German assault on the Low Countries and Prance
began. Airborne forces, some in disguise, helped effectively to overwhelm
Holland in 18 hours and subdue the Belgian frontier defences. On 13th May
the full force of the Blitzkrieg struck when the Germans crossed the Meuse
and punched an enormous breach through the front of the French 9th Army.
On the 16th, the Allied armies in Belgium began their long withdrawal and
four days later the spearhead of the German armour had reached the coast
at Abbeville. By the morning of the 28th May the Belgian forces, fought
to exhaustion on the left flank of the British army, had surrendered and.
the B.E.F., together with the French 1st Army and parts of the French 7th
Army, was trapped in a rapidly shrinking pocket around Durikirk. Operation
'Dynamo', full-scale evacuation by sea, had. already begun.
It was against this fast moving background of the triumph of a new
dynamic form of warfare, using tanks, aircraft, mechanised infantry and
airborne troops in combination, over the outmoded defensive principles
that produced the Maginot Line, that the re-exminatiori of the plans for
the defence of the United Kingdom on land, set in motion by the invasion
of Norway, reached the proportions of a drastic re-assessment. During the
next few weeks the War Cabinet met every day, and sometimes twice a day,
to consider the deteriorating situation in the Low Countries and France,
and. emergency measures to guard against invasion were discussed at almost
every meeting from this time onwards. The belief in the lmmThence of an
invasion attempt was only temporarily interrupted by events on the Continent
which in their turn suggested ingenious new methods which the Germans might
use - parachute landings, aircraft landing in open spaces, 'fifth column'
activities, raids by motor-boats and amphibious tanks. All these received
the attention of the War Cabinet, as well as that of the Chiefs of Staff's
Committee.
The opening of the German offensive on the West on 10th May happened
to coincide with long overdue changes in the political direction of the
country, which had been caused by the political debate following the
Norwegian debacle. Neville Chamberlain and his Cabinet submitted. their
resiguations late that afternoon and a Coalition Government under Winston
Churchill was formed, heralding a more positive and dynamic attitude to the
invasion question, as well as to the whole conduct of the war in general.
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Churchill set up the Defence Committee, headed by himself as Minister
of Defence, while the Chiefs of Staff formed the Home Defence Executive to
supervise the drastic overhaul of measures for defence. Consisting of
representatives of the Admiralty, Air Ministry, operational staff of the
Ministry of Home Security and. the chief Home Commands of the LA.F., under
the chairmanship of the C.-iri-C. Home Forces, it allowed General Kirke to
ensure that planB and actions to deal with airborne and. seaborne attacks
were fully co-or&inated.
The Executive, while remaining individually responsible to their own
ministries, would be jointly responsible to the Chiefs of Staff's Conmiittee
and its province was extended to almost every aspect of defence against
invasion or raids, including civil defence, so as to prepare the population
of the country for the expected shock. Among the many aspects of the
problem the Executive was shortly to consider was the obtainit and. issuing
of information to all authorities; air and. naval reconnaissance of the
areas in greatest danger of attack; mine-laying policy; an effective
warning system; protection of aerodromes; naval, air, anti-aircraft and
troop dispositions; defence at ports and. landing places; security of
communications; preparation of demolition plans; evacuation plans for
casualities and. the civil population; countering 'fifth column' activities;
and. how best to educate the civilian population to co-operate with the civil
and. military defence plans both before and during operations. 1,
General Kirke now at last had a measure of control over all of the
aspects of anti-invasion planning and preparations, not just the military,
and he could make his influence felt on Civil Defence and the other
services. He regarded the formation of the Home Defence Executive as "a
great advance". 2.
A cloud of rumour and exaggerated or false reports, stirred up by the
swift German advance, flowed into the United ingdom over the next few days,
causing consternation in all high places, not least at Headquarters, Home
Forces, May 10th saw a flurry of activity take place at this Headquarters.
1. CA 66/7: WP 153(40); and. COS 332(40), Annex D, 10 May 1940.
2. Kirke Papers: Home Defence File. Notes left by General Sir Walter
Ki.rke, 1939-1940.
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The day's activities, however, provide an illustration of just how unprepared
Home Forces were. At 8.56 a.m. the codeword 'Julius', signifying that "there
are indications that an attack is contemplated", was issued by General Kirke
to Home Forces, and. the coastal defences were put at immediate readiness, as
was the Civil Defence organisation later in the day, following instructions
from the Minister for Home Security. Transport, previously earmarked for
hiring at short notice for the 'Julius Caesar' Plan, was to be taken up
forthwith, so as to complete the first and second line transport up to estab-
lishment. These vehicles, however, consisted of a hotch-potch of civilian
vehicles - bakers' vans, grocers vans, meat merchants' vans, builders'
lorries, coal carriers, buses, coaches - at first often used in their
civilian livery and. with the name of the business or company still painted
on. Aldershot Command, complaining that the "taking up of transport would
mean the cessation of omnibus services", were tersely instructed to "proceed
with impressment". At 11.05 a.m. Headquarters, Home Forces, issued orders
to Eastern Command for "road blocks at ports to be completed immediately";
and. at 2.15 p.m. a request to the War Office to move the second-line 45th
(West Country) Division from Exeter to cover the virtually unguarded. Sussex
Coast was approved and. the necessary movement orders were issued.
The chief fear prevalent during the chaotic May days, however, was that
of German parachutists and air landing troops, a fear initiated by their use
in Norway and now redoubled by their spectacular successes in Holland and
Belgium. About noon on the 10th, an urgent message from the Air Ministry
was circulated to all Commands and repeated to the Admiralty, War Office and
Ministry of Home Security, stating that:
"Information from Norway shows that German parachute troops, when
descending, hold their arms above their heads as if surrendering. The para-
chutist, however, holds a grenade in each hand. To counter this strategy,
parachutists, if they exceed six in number, are to be treated. as hostile and
if possible shot in the air. The largest crew carried in any British bomber
is six persons." 4.
The message naturally turned attention to the possibility that volun-
teers might be enrolled to help deal with this danger. Home Forces had
already given instructions at 7.23 p.m. on the 10th May that "Germans
(parachutists), clad in British uniform, will be dealt with ruthlessly".
3. WO 166/i: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, G.H.Q. Home Forces, Nay 1940.
4. Graves, Charles: The Home Guard of Britain, p. 10. Hutchinson, London,
1943.
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Rumours of parachute landings abounded over the next few days, some of them
sounding almost farcical in retrospect. At 1.20 a.m. on 11th May, there
came a telephone message from the War Office to Headquarters, Home Forces,
saying that:
"Admiralty considers attack on Southend Pier a possibility. Informa-
tion had been received from an anonymous Nazi agent, who displayed strong
anti-Nazi feelings."
Headquarters, Home Forces, recorded in their War Diary the following day:
"Numerous reports of parachutists dropping have been received; orders
issued that no d.espatch of troops to be undertaken until verification
obtained from Fighter Command through Conirnmd H.(. concerned." 5.
On 11th May, General Kirke attended a meeting at the War Office under
the outgoing Secretary of State for War, Oliver Stanley, at which General
Sir John Dill, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir
Robert Gordon-Finlayson, the Adjutant General, and. Sir Hugh Elles for the
Ministry of Home Security, were present, to discuss the possibility of
forming some kind of local defence organisation. The idea was not new and.
had its origins in the Volunteer Training Corps of the Great War. As early
in the present war as 7th October 1939, Winston Churchill, as First Lord of
the Admiralty, pressing for the orgamsation of the Home Front in support
of the war effort, had written to the Home Secretary:
"Then what about all these people of middle age, many of whom served
in the last war, who are full of vigour and experience, and who are being
told by tens of thousands that they are not wanted, and that there is
nothing for them except to register at the local Labour Exchange? Surely
this is very foolish. Why do we not form a Home Guard of half a million
men over forty (if they like to volunteer), and put all our elderly stars
at the head and. in the structure of these new formations? Let these five
hundred thousand men come along and push the young and active out of all
the home billets. If uniforms are lacking, a brassard would suffice, and
I am assured there are plenty of rifles at any rate. I thought from what
you said. to me the other day that you liked this idea. If so, let us make
it work." 6.
No attempt, however, was made to develop this idea, let alone put it
into practice, until the following month, when the raising of unofficial
5. WO 166/1: op. cit., May 1940.
6. Churchill, W. S.: Vol. I, The Gathering Storm, p. 439. Cassell,
London, 1948.
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local civilian volunteer units during the first invasion scare caused
attention to be drawn towards the idea in official circles. It was only
then that the foundations of what was eventually to become the Local Defence
Volunteers, or Rome Guard, were truly laid.. Lord. Cobham, of the Council of
County Territorial Associations, recalled its humble beginnings:
t?] the present war, the first move in the formation [of the Local
Defence Volunteers] was made in November 1939, when Colonel Sir Francis
Whitmore, Lord. Lieutenant of Essex, came to see me .... on a matter that was
giving him some concern. It appeared. that an odd. formation, known as the
'Legion of Frontiersmen', was carrying out rapid. recruiting from men in
Essex who were not liable to be called. up for the Services. Sir Francis
wanted. the War Office to know all about this quite unofficial undertaking.
The following morning, I had. a talk with the Ad.jutant General, Sir R.
Gordon-Finlayson, about this, and he agreed that, if encouragement were
given to the creation of a volunteer force of this nature, it was likely to
meet with a very ready response all over the United Kingdom.
I told. hi.m that in the last war there was a similar body raised., at the
start wholly unauthorised., under the title of 'Voluntary Training Corps',
and. that we in the office of the C.C.T.A. had. a Memoranda on this force
drawn up in 1919 by Colonel Golightly, who was then Secretary of the Council
of County Territorial Associations. He asked. for this Memoranda, and in due
course I took it to him at Hobart House, where we had. a discussion on it
with Major General L.K.H. Finch and. Brigadier General G.E. Sin, belonging to
the Adjutant General's department. It was decided. then that these two
officers should. draw up the outline of a scheme for the formation of battal-
ions of Local Defence Volunteers all over the country." 7.
The groundwork, then, had already been laid long before the dramatic
events of May 1940 brought the scheme to the forefront. General Kirke, him-.
self, had been considering the problem of how to channel civilian enterprise
and. enthusiasm for defence into a constructive organisation for some tine.
His greatest fear was still that the meagre numbers of formations left to
Home Forces would have to be spread in penny packets all over the country on
anti-parachute or similar duties. He recalled of the meeting on 11th May:
"A proposal was put forward to attach parties of the British Legion on
a shift system to Searchlight Detachments to attack parachutists. This was
opposed. by me. I want local forces to defend. their own localities and pin
the enemy or localise his operations until the Regular Army can arrive.
There is reat pressure from all sides to disperse troops on static
guards." b.
7. CA.B 106/1188: Memoranda by Lord. Cobham and. Colonel Golightly on the
Origins of the L.D.V. and Home Guard.: Memoranda by Lord Cobhain, 9 March
1945.
8. Kirke Papers: op. cit.
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The outcome of the meeting on the 11th Nay was that General Kirke and.
the Adjutant General together compiled a draft message to the public, which
they intended. General Kirke should broadcast the nert day. The hope was to
attach the units of local volunteers thus raised to the small armed search-.
light detachments which already existed and were spaced at intervals all
over the country. A further meeting to discuss details followed on the
12th, at which it was agreed that, to give special weight to the appeal for
volunteers, the newly appointed Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden,
should himself deliver the broadcast. On the next day, the War Cabinet
gave its approval to the project and that evening Anthony Eden drafted his
broadcast from the notes already prepared by General Kirke and General
Gordon-Finlayson. At a meeting at 10.00 a.m. at the Horse Guards on the
14th, further aspects of the L.D.V. were discussed.
On the evening of 14th May, immediately after news of a turn for the
worse in the war situation in France had been announced, Anthony Eden
delivered his historic broadcast to the British people:
"I want to speak to you tonight about a form of warfare which the
Germans have been employing so extensively against Holland and Belgium.....
We are going to ask you to help in a manner which I know will be welcome to
thousands of you. The Government has received enquiries from all over the
Kingdom from men who wish to do something for the defence of the country.
Now is your opportunity. We want large numbers of such men in Great
Britain, who are British subjects between the ages of 17 and 65, to come
forward now and offer their services. In order to volunteer, what you have
to do is to give in your name at your local police station....."
The force was to be known as the 'Local Defence Volunteers', the name
describing its duties. It was to be voluntary and unpaid, but when on duty
it would form part of the Armed Forces of the Crown. The duties of the
force could be undertaken, except in an emergency, in a 	 spare
time, and Volunteers, who should be of reasonable fitness and with a know-
ledge of firearms, would, if accepted, be armed and provided with uniforms,
and were expected to serve for the duration of the war. Anthony Eden's
broadcast ended on a rousing note:
"The appeal is directed chiefly to those who live in country parishes
and small villages. Here then is tour opportunity. Your loyal help will
make and keep your country safe •" Y
9. B.B.C. Broadcast by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, LP., 14 Nay 1940.
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The response was immediate and astonishing. Within a few hours, police
stations all over the country were thronged with volunteers waiting to be
enrolled. Thousands of ordi.nary citizens could now feel that at last they
could do someththg to help their country in her hour of need:
"Ex soldiers, now considered too old for fighting, could. show that they
were not too old.. Lads of seventeen and middle-aged. civilians could. show
that they were as good as the old soldiers. Civilians of military age who
had been prevented from joining the Services by reason of the value of their
civilian work could now give their scanty leisure to trining as part-time
soldiers. Civilians, arid there were many, who had never before shouldered a
Service rifle arid who hated. the Army and all its works, could now row in
with the others arid, in so doing, forget some of their prejudices arid many
of their fears." 10.
The German propaganda machine, however, reacted by announcing that members
of this "mob of amateurs, armed with broomsticks and darts", an accusation
at first not too wide of the mark, would, if captured with arms in their
hands, be treated as 'franc-tireurs' and be shot outright.
By 20th Nay, just six days later, no less than 250,000 volunteers had
come forward and the figure rose to 300,000 by the end. of the month. Over a
million volunteers were to be enrolled. in less than eight weeks. The prob-
lems of organisirig and equipping such a vast number of men, however, almost
overwhelmed the authorities and was doubly accentuated by a combination of
reverses in France and the German threat to shoot L.D.V. members outright,
which meant that proper uniforms would have to be provided instead of the
detachable white L.D.V. armbands. To administer, train and equip this huge
force required a well tried organisation, and the existing military one was
already strained to brek,ri point by the rapidly worsening position of the
B.E.?. overseas. The local County Territorial Army and Air Force Associa-
tions throughout the country were, therefore, selected to organise and
administer the force and to supervise training on a local level, while the
central direction was placed with the Army Council on 17th Nay. Operational
control was vested in the C.-in-C., Home Forces. These bodies decided that
the role of the new force was to be, in order of importance, the observation
and prompt reporting of information by means of observation posts; the
delay, obstruction and. harassment of the enemy by every possible means; the
10. Street, A. G.: From Dawn to Dusk, p. 10. Earrop, London, 1942.
11. CAB 106/1189: Home Guard: Siwtinvy Report prepared by J. K. Howard and
H. Wendell End.icott, p. 14, June 1941.
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protection of specific vulnerable points; a continuous check on subversive
activities; and a close co-operation at all times with the Civil Defence
12.
services.
The greatest problem, however, was to be the vital one of arming the
new force. There were only enough military rifles for a third of the volun-
teers, and the rest had to be supplied with hastily gathered shotguns or
sporting rifles, or improvised weapons such as golf clubs, bayonets tied to
broomsticks, pitchforks or bludgeons. To supplement this hotch-potch of
improvised arms, thousands of 'Nolotov Cocktails' - ordinry wine bottles
filled with petrol and tar, with twisted tow soaked in paraffin round the
neck, which was lit with a match before throwing - were mass-produced locally
utilising the resources of the local public house and. petrol station.
The 20th (Railsham) Battalion, Sussex Home Guard, situated near the
vulnerable Pevensey beaches in East Sussex on the increasingly threatened
South Coast, may be taken as a typical example of the state of the Local
Defence Volunteers late in May. Originally named 'B' Battalion, Sussex
L.D.V., and one of 26 similar units raised in Sussex, it was formed at a
meeting at Railsham Police Station in Nay 1940. Lieutenant Colonel R. H.
Johnson, D.S.0. was appointed Commanding Officer and the platoon commanders
were selected from the volunteers attending the meeting:
".... each platoon commander was given a list of volunteers in his
district and ordered to formally nerol them, commence inimed.iate training and
mount a night Observation Post on the highest point in his locality, or
guard a Post Office or Telephone Exchange. One rifle, ten rounds of ammuni-
tion, a khaki cap and a white arm-band were issued for the use of each 15
men. These were passed from man to man as they went on night duty. Wher-
ever possible, Observation Posts were linked by runner to the nearest Search-
light Post Mobile Column, which consisted of 4-6 men in a taxi-cab. Other
than the ten rounds of ammunition, the Battalion were loaned a very limited
number of shot guns and .22 rifles. Their only other weapon was the home-
made 'Nolotov Socktail'...." 13.
The Local Defence Volunteers by the end of Nay were very much it their
infancy, and at this early stage they provided a very dubious adjunct to the
scanty divisions of Home Forces. Even those of its number equipped with
12. Street, A. G.: op. cit., pp. 13-14.
13. Brigadier G. W. Sutton Papers (GSO I Home Guard, Sussex District),
72/59/5: Farewell of the 20th Sussex Battalion, Home Guard (Strange,
Eastbourne, 1944).
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military .303 rifles were no match for the superbly armed, trained and
experienced German paratroopers, which they were expected to have to deal
with at any moment. At worst, the Volunteers might usefully supplement the
work of Home Forces by giving the alarm. However, the presence of these
eager amateur 'parashooters' in every town and village did. much to boost
civilian morale at a time when defeat followed defeat on the Continent,
since it showed the new Government's determination to resist.
As the deteriorating situation on the Continent brought the Germans
ever closer to our shores, a host of other improvised measures were hastily
being put in hand. At the same time as the L.D.V. were being raised to deal
with parachutists, the authorities were considering additional measures to
counter the expected threat from enemy airlandin.g troops. On 12th May the
War Cabinet, discussing reports of the German success in laxidJ.ng aeroplanes
on "open spaces such as car parks and football grounds in Holland",
instructed that a reconnaissance should be made of "all open spaces in the
United Kingdom .... which might be used as landing grounds by enemy troop—
carrying aircraft" and that "the necessary steps to ensure they are rendered
unusable" should be taicen. 14. Headquarters, Home Forces, however, realiz-
ing the immensity of the task of planning obstructions for "all" open
spaces, took a more practical approach. The War Diary of Headquarters, Home
Forces, records that on 15th Nay reconnaissances were undertaken:
".... of open spaces in the Metropolitan District which might be suit-
able for enemy landing places; similar reconnaissance is being carried out
by R.A.P. over areas within 5 miles of aerodromes on the East Coast....
Orders issued to Eastern Command, Northern Command and. Scottish Command to
carry out reconnaissances of areas within 5 miles of Eastern ports with a
view to preventing enemy aircraft landing." 15.
Anthony Eden reported to the War Cabinet on the 18th May that:
"It was impossible to deal with all possible open spaces, but it was
proposed to take the necessary action in the neighbourhood of specially
important objectives, such as aerodromes, R.D.F. stations, power stations,
etc.." lb.
14. CAB 65/7: WM 119th (40):3, 12 May 1940.
15. WO 166/i: op. cit., Nay 1940.
16. CA3 65/7: WM 127th (40):16, 18 May 1940.
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General Kirke recalled that the Cabinet soon moderated their initial enthu-
siasm for obstructing all open spaces:
"The Cabinet, whilst anxious about landings, is also anxious that
Eäigland should not be torn up to prevent aircraft alighting." 17.
Over the next few weeks, efforts were made to obstruct the most obvious
landing sites by blocking open spaces with baulks of timber or derelict cars
or by the use of criss-cross lines of trenches or ditches and hunocks of
earth spaced in an alternating pattern, carefully desied to tip over aero-
planes or gliders attempting to alight. Later, huge steel hoops, like huge
rose pergolas, were constructed over arterial roads in the South, such as
the A3, to deter the pilots of JU 52 transports. However, even the scheme
for obstructing all potential landing grounds within a given distance of
vital objectives was found, in practice, to be somewhat overambitious,
especially since the various obstacles often interfered with the farming of
vital food-producing arable land., thus conflicting with the 'Dig for Victory'
campai and, consequently, large areas of open space, which might be
considered to be vulnerable to landings, remained entirely unobstructed
throughout the War.
Many of the imzned.iate measures, being put in hand during Nay 1940, were
extremely haphazard. Towards the end of Nay, as the evacuation from Dunkirk
began and rumours of spies abounded, a multitude of road blocks sprang up
all over the country - on roads entering towns and villages, on roads
leading inland from ports or beaches, on the seafront itself, on road or
railway bridges, and on the approaches to vulnerable points such as aero-
dromes. These roadblocks at first consisted of any material that was lying
near to hand.. Farm carts, scrap cars, oil drums, tar barrels, tree trunks,
flimsy wooden trestles supporting horizontal poles wrapped in barbed wire,
plain concertina wire and even beach-huts in seaside towns were used, though
soon cast concrete blocks of various shapes and iron rails, that could be
dropped into ready-made slots set into the road, made their appearance.
Many of the first efforts were thrown up by over-enthusiastic newly enrolled
Local Defence Volunteers, who were being formed into squads or sections
under their local leaders to defend each barricade and into platoons to
defend each village or group of streets. Identity papers were carefully
17.	 irke Papers, op. cit.
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checked at every barricade by the men manning them, the idea be.rxg to
detect and intercept immediately any enemy in disguise or any fifth column-
ist, and. to provide a local rallying point for defence against parachutists.
A motorist might be stopped several times at makeshift barricades in as
many miles, especially near the East Coast, and. asked to show his papers at
each one. To refuse or to be unable to produce identification would mean
certain arrest and. if he drove on he might well be shot, as indeed several
people were in the precarious weeks immediately following the Dunkirk
evacuation. 18. All this, however, had. the effect of seriously hampering
the movements of the troops and stores of Home Forces, movements which
would. be
 vitally important in the event of the 'Julius Caesar' Plan having
to be put into operation.
Preparations, too, to render useless all ports on the East and South-
East Coasts from The Wash to Newhaven, to deny to the enemy the use of the
railways and to prepare bridges for demolition, were rapidly being made for
the first time in May, on the advice of the Home Defence Executive. The
actual orders were issued by Headquarters, Rome Forces, to Commands on the
20th Nay, the same day as the spearhead of the German armour had reached.
the Channel coast, and just three days later it was judged that the threat
had extended even further westwards, since on 23rd May Southern Command was
ordered "to prepare plans for the inmiobilisation of Portsmouth and. South-
ampton on the same lines as ordered for other ports". 19. Two degrees of
destruction had already been envisaged by the Home Defence Executive. If
recapture within seven days were likely, the temporary removal or immobili-
sation of transport or facilities and destruction of minor obstacles, with
the aim of causing delay to the enemy, would suffice. In the last resort,
systematic total destruction, to prevent capture, would be undertaken. In
the latter case, ports might be rendered unusable by the destruction of
power supplies, cranes, dock gates and caissons, the obstruction of harbour
entrances by blockships and the mining of approaches; railways immobilised
by the derailment of engines in tunnels, the removel, derailment or
destruction of rolling stock and. the destruction of power houses on
electric lines; and both railways and roads by the destruction of viaducts,
bridges and culverts, and by cratering at suitable places such as embank-
ments. It was realized, sensibly, that decisions as to the actual choice
18. Street, A. G.: op. cit., pp. 31-32, 34.
19. WO 166/i: op. cit., Nay 1940.
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of points for destruction would have to be made locally and each individual
case would be considered on its merits. 20.
As early as 10th May, the Chiefs of Staff had determined that the most
vulnerable stretch of coastline to a German land.ing was between The Wash
and Sussex, and the Home Defence Executive shared their view. The German
capture of the Netherlands redoubled the vulnerability of this area, since
the Dutch, and very soon the Belgian, ports and. estuaries could now be used
to assemble enemy shipping rapidly and secretly, being relatively free from
British aerial reconnaissance, while the previously long sea route was much
shortened. General Kirke warned, in a memoranda written on 15th May, that:
tt] view of the German capture of Holland, a seaborne attack on the
East Anglian and north and east Kent coast carried out in a fleet of fast
shallow draught motor vessels appears to be a possibility. I have no
information as to whether Germany has any such boats or is in the process
of building them, arid. request I may be kept informed of any developments of
this nature." 21.
Such an attack might well be accompanied by a massive air offensive in
order to achieve air superiority over a stretch of coastline, using the
newly captured Durch airfields. Due to the heavy engagement of German
forces in Belgium and France, however, and the time needed. to assemble
enough shipping, it was felt that a full-scale invasion was not imm,nent,
but that enough dmage could be caused by even a small-scale seabornie raid
on this stretch of coastline, especially if it were combined. with airborne
operations, as to make its subsequent defence, and. therefore the defence of
the entire United Kingdom, very difficult indeed..
Preventative measures were, therefore, iizunediately put in hand. to
guard. this vulnerable coastline. The strengthening of the air defences, as
always, took top priority and., on the 19th, Churchill ruled that no more
fighter squadrons were to be sent to France. By the next day, the bulk of
the air component had been returned. to bases in England, from which they
20. CAB 80/10: COS (40) 349: Report by the C.-in-C., Home Forces, 13 Nay
1940. Appendix B: Record. of Meeting of Sub-Committee, Home Defence
Executive Committee, on Demolition of Ports, Roads arid Railways,
11 May 1940.
21. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 361: Seaborne and. Airborne Attack of the United.
Kingdom: Memoranda by 0.-in-C., Home Forces, 15 May 1940.
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were to patrol the Channel and. cover the evacuation of the B.E.F.. At sea,
light Naval forces were ordered to positions from which they might intercept
an enemy seaborne expedition from the captured Dutch or Belgian ports and
estuaries, while the niinefield.s off the East Coast would be extended and
strengthened. On the exposed coastline itself the priority was to set up
some form of seaward. defence that would. fill the gaps between the defended
ports and. estuaries, such as the Huinber, Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Harwich,
Thames-Medway, Dover, Newhaven and Southampton-Portsmouth, and here the Navy
came to the rescue. It was Admiralty policy to remove the large calibre
gulls from warships about to be scrapped. and store them in warehouses to
await the time when they might once again come in useful. Many of these
had only ever been fired. a few times during tririing or general practice and
had often been removed from ships after only a small proportion of their
expected life had expired. These ex-Navy guns were, therefore, removed from
store and. renovated, and within the next few months over 600 assorted guns
were emplaced. in what was iQiown as the 'Emergency Battery Programme 3 . Most
of these were to be placed in 'beach batteries' which were eventually to run
in an unbroken chain from The Wash, along the East Anglian coast, down to
the Thames estuary and Kent, and. westwards past the Channel Narrows to the
Portsmouth-Southampton area, so as to provide a front-line of coastal de-
fences for the United Kingdom. Other guns were used to strengthen the fixed
defences at the major or minor defended. ports and fleet bases, or to cover
estuaries, and about 50 ex-Naval 4" guns were later to be mounted on commer-
cial lorry chassis so as to provide mobile batteries for beach defence. The
'beach battery' guns, usually of 6" calibre, were to be placed. in concrete-
lined pits complete with concrete magazines, crew accommodation, fire control,
searchlights and command posts. Work was begun immediately and. was carried
out in great haste, using contract labour assisted. by parties from the Royal
Navy, Coast Artillery and the Royal Engineers. However, by the end of May,
there was still an immense amount of work to be done on the scheme and pro-
gress was not helped by a realization that guns mounted in open pits, under
the previously held assumption that a gun was a very small target for a war-
ship to hit, were in fact highly vulnerable to attack by dive bombers. This
meant that both existing and new gunsites needed brick or concrete rear and
side walls to support a reinforced. roof, an addition which took up further
invaluable time, labour and materials, and severely restricted. the angle of
fire. Even then, the concrete roof was rarely thick enough to withstand a
direct hit, and. great emphasis had therefore to be placed. on camouflage. 22.
22. WO 199: Military LQ. Papers, Home Forces: Box Nos. 523-53 0 and. 1110-
1148 on Coast Artillery, May 1940 - Sept. 1944.
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Following detailed discussions at the frequent meetings of the War
Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee and. the Home Defence Committee during the
hectic Nay days, a host of other emergency measures were now hastily put in
hand. Besides ports, railways and roads, preparations were also made to
deny the enemy the use of telephone and radio communications systems, public
utilities and bulk stocks of essential foods, petrol and. other commodities.
Aerodromes, too, would be blocked by obstacles pushed out onto the runways
and, if necessary, by cratering, while proposals were made on how to increase
the number of static giards.	 emy aliens and members of subversive organ-
sations or undesirable political groups, such as Fascists or Communists, who
might pose a threat as a 'fifth column', were instructed to be interned, in
spite of the fact that many were strongly anti-Nazi, though this action was
taken partly for their own protection against civilian reprisals should the
Germans start bombing cities heavily. Towards the end of the month, sign-
posts carrying place-names were removed from road junctions arid place-names
on shopfronts, tradesmen's vans, railway stations, advertisement hoardings
and even church notice boards were erased. Even milestones were removed.
Nany of these were buried only a few yards from where they once stood and
have never been dug up since. Civilians were instructed to hide their food
and. immobilise their vehicles, including bicycles, when not in use. Even
vessels on inland waterways were ordered to be immobilised. Restrictions
were placed on the sale and. possession of maps, plans and guidebooks, especi-
ally on the East Coast. On the 22nd May, the Government extended the extra
powers, conferred on it at the opening of the War, to almost complete control
over persons and property by the United Kingdom Emergency Powers (Defence)
Act, while the Regional Commissioners were also given important powers.
Churchill, meanwhile, began to deliver his famous fighting speeches, that
were so to uplift the nation's morale during the dark days of 1940 and turn
doubt and confusion into determination to resist to the last. 23.
It was at this time, too, that orders were given that church bells were
only to be rung to warn of an enemy parachutist or airborne landing. Lord.
Geddes, then Regional Commissioner for the South East, later recalled the
origin of that order:
"It was at Tunbrid.ge Wells. Lord Ironside, who was then C.I.G.S., was
in my room, and there were also present General Thorne and, I think I am
right in saying, my noble friend Lord Knollys. We had just got the first
23. Collier, Basil: History of the Second World War: The Defence of the
United. Kingdom, p. 105. R.M.S.O., London, 1957.
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detachments of the Local Defence Volunteers formed, and the only part of the
L.D.V. who had arms at that time were the Kentish and some of the Sussex
Companies. The whole thing was very nebulous, and it was thought at any
time we might see parachutists dropping from heaven. I th.irik it was the
C.I.G.S. who said: 'How axe you going to get these L.D.V.'s together if
parachutists suddenly appear?' And. somebody in the room - not I, but I
could not be sure of the others - said: 'Why, we will ring the church bells
until we can think of something better.' That was early in Nay 1940, and
the War Office has been thinking of something better ever since. The signal
at that time was supposed to be used only in the counties of Kent and Sussex
and in the rural areas, but somehow or other the order became more or less
sacrosanct, and spread all over the country. It was trimmed and pruned, and
sprouted new legs and. arms, and it became one of the essential pillars of
the defence of the country. It is a complete mystery to me why that should
seem to be so, but I am assured by War Office representatives that it is.
••• t, 24.
The Cabinet intended that even the Police, being an organised and
disciplined body with a presence in every locality throughout the country,
should be armed. However, the Police themselves were opposed to this; the
Coxnrnissioner of Metropolitan Police, after full discussion with his Chief
Superintendents, objecting that:
"Only a small proportion of the Police had. been trained in the use of
fire-arms, and .... provided that there was no shortage of personnel who
could be armed, the Police should be kept for civil police work, of which 2
there would be plenty, while available arms were issued to other personnel."
The Prime Minister was characteristically reluctant to accept this view.
General Kirke noted that:
"The Police are very obstructive about arming themselves. At the Chiefs
of	 meeting, Winston backed me up saying that the civil measures
required by me were to be carried out." 26.
In the event, except for certain special tasks proposed by the Minister for
Home Security, Sir John Anderson, it was the acute shortage of weapons that
effectively prevented the arming of the Police and, in any case, the Local
Defence Volunteers were soon to undertake many of the proposed special tasks
such as guarding police stations and vulnerable points against raiders or
24. CAB 118/28: The Ringing of Church Bells as a Warning of Impending
Invasion: Parliamentary Debates: House of Lords Official Report
Vol. 126, No. 45, 31 March 1943.
25. CAB 65/7: WM 132nd (40):12, 21 Nay 1940.
26. Kirke Papers, op. cit.
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sabotage, patrolling rural districts and mannthg posts at key points such as
bridges, so as to control and protect road movement. 27.
Other anti-invasion measures discussed by the War Cabinet in Nay
included the possibility of evacuating children, pregnant women, invalids
and old people from the East and South Coast towns, and Churchill's proposals
for bringing back eight regular battalions from India to strengthen Home
Forces. As the turn of events in France and Norway grew daily more and. more
desperate, the Government and the Chiefs of Staff became incresingly anxious,
not only about the protection of the vulnerable East and. South Coasts, but
also about the security of the remoter extremities of the British Isles.
The question of possible German action against Hire, by means of para-
chute troops acting in consort with a strongly anti-British 'fifth column'
including the I.R.A., was raised for the first time at a War Cabinet meeting
on 14th May and it was decided that, although there was a British division,
the 53rd (Welsh), available in Ulster, which could co-operate against the
Germans in Eire if necessary, we should:
".... at all costs avoid swinging Irish opinion against us by taking
the initiative in the infringement of their neutrality, for example by the
seizure of ports."
The meeting decided that the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs should
draw the attention of the Irish Government to the possibility of a German
airborne invasion. 28. The War Cabinet was, however, aware that the Germans
might be spreading rumours with the idea of tempting the British into the
infringement of Hire's neutrality and this possibility was reinforced on the
20th May when a telegram for His Na3esty's Ambassador in Lisbon was read to
it, which stated that:
".... an anonymous source had reported that the Germans contemplated
extensive parachute operations in Eire, which would then become their base
for land and sea operations against the United Kingdom." 29.
27. CAB 65/7: WM 137th (40):12, 24 Nay 1940; and CAB 67/6 wP(G) (40) 134,
23 Nay 1940.
28. CAB 65/7: WM 121st (40):6, 14 Nay 1940.
29. CAB 65/7: M 131st (40):3, 20 Nay 1940: Telegram No. 187 from His
Majesty's Ambassador in Lisbon, 18 May 1940.
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At a further meeting on the 27th May, at which the Cabinet decided,
".... to make immediate approach to Mr. De Valera in order to bring
home to him the danger facing Eire and. the need, in order to combat it, for
early and full co-operation with this country."
Viscount Caldecote, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, said that
although De Valera seemed to be moving in the right direction and had said
that he would even be prepared to accept assistance from Ulster, the Irish
Prime Minister remained immovable on one particularly vital point that was
to cause the British Government and the Services a great deal of frastration
and worry in the context of the security of the United Kingdom against
invasion over the next few months. This point was that De Valera:
tt•• did not want any assistance whatever until Eire had actually
been attacked. This would probably be too late. t' 3°.
The safety of the Shetland.s, too, was a constant source of worry in
high places, since if they were seized by a German expedition from Norway
"it would mean a difficult combined operation to turn them out". Airbases
might be established there to threaten the vital fleet base of Scapa Flow
and indeed the whole mainland of Scotland, which was now weakly defended by
only a single division, the 9th (Scottish). At a Chiefs of Staff meeting
on 16th May, it was reported that "accumulated evidence pointed to the
possible German intention of moving airborne troops from Norway" and the
C.-in-C., Home Forces, was instructed to "re-ennne the question of the
strength of the forces available for Home Defence in the Shetland.s and in
Scotland, in view of the possible scale of attack that could. be
 developed
from the Norwegian Coast". 31. General Kirke was not happy about further
commitments for his already over-stretched Home Forces. He considered that:
".... the Admiralty is panicking about the Shetland.s, which have been
strongly reinforced, and. preparations have been made to destroy the aero-
d.rome. I issued definite instructions as to the priority of defence
measures." 32.
30. CAB 65/7 & CAB 65/13: WM 141st (40):9, 27 Nay 1940.
31. CAB 79/4: COS 131st (40):2, 14 Nay 1940; and COS 135th (40):5,
16 May 1940.
32. General Kirke Papers: op. cit.
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As the situation rapidly deteriorated in Belgium and france, alarmist
rumours continued to abound. One of the greatest fears at this time was
that the Germans might attempt to stage a "coup de main" against the King
and the Government in London. A note from the Admiralty, which reached the
Deputy Prime Minister, Clement R. Attlee, on 23rd May, outlined this rather
unlikely possibility in detail:
"The Germans have always made a desperate attempt to capture the
reigning sovereign and the Government. Why should ours be exempt?
The enemy may think it quite a feasible proposition to attack and
isolate London, and this attempt would presumably follow the usual procedure
of attacking and occupying key points outside London, such as Croydon,
Weybrid,ge, Slough.
So we may imagine that at or about 3 a.m. on the given day, the
selected areas, without much warning, will be heavily bombed, followed, in
the dust and confusion, by parachutists and troop carriers, Prom experience
abroad, there seems little doubt that for a time at least they might well be
successful.
London would be wholly or partially isolated; rail, road, telephone
and telegraph communications cut, and. chaos reign. We cannot imagine the
enemy would be content with this. On the contrary, it may be expected that
bombers flying high will appear over London and drop bombs quite indiscritni-
nately, followed by shooting down balloons and. diving attacks on Government
Offices. In the confusion that this would cause, they might at some time or
other, and. possibly pretty early, drop parachutists in the parks and Horse-
Guards Parade in an endeavour to seize the King, Government and Department
Chiefs, destroy the War Office, Admiralty and so on...."
This might be followed by a seaborrie landing on the East Coast, covered by
the German airforce:
"All the heads are now isolated from their bodies, the members of the
Government may be prisoners or fleeing, fighting will be going on continu-
ously all round London, the coast ports and finally London will be under
bombing attack hour after hour, until it surrenders like Rotterd.azn. This
may be the enemy's plan. It would admittedly be a costly and desperate
effort by the enemy, but does anyone suggest he is not desperate? Only one
man may know the day arid how, but it is not difficult to anticipate. The
action to take is clear, before it is TOO LATE. WE HAVE 	 WAED." 33
33 . CAB 118/55: Correspondence on Home Defence: 1940-42. Note covering
Paper on Seizure of London from P. J. C. Allen, Esq. of the Admiralty
to Deputy P.M. Mr. C. R. Attlee, 23 May 1940.
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Since the Germans still had the great bulk of their forces very heavily
conEnitted on the Western Front, there was little immediate danger of such an
attempt occurring. Reports of German parachute landings, however, continued
to come in. Many of these were exaggerated rumours caused. by harmless,
though unusual, occurrances. On 15th May, the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir
Cyril Newall, told the War Cabinet that:
".... there had been several reports, none substantiated, regarding
parachute 'descents' in the United Kingdom on the previous night. In some
cases, these were traced to balloons struck during a thunderstorm over North
London. These rumours were indicative of the nervous state of the public.' t 34.
Despite the climate of rumour, the War Cabinet continued to take such reports
seriously. On the 24th, it discussed the contents of a telegram from the
British Ambassador in Rome, which alleged that, "talk was current in German
circles that Herr Hitler was determined on the invasion of the United King-
dom." Various dates and plans were mentioned and the report suggested that
the British authorities were "asleep and unduly confident in British comnd
of the sea".
Indeed, this last accusation had been very close to the mark until only
two weeks previously and it was only now that the British authorities were
beginning to really wake up to the possibility of an invasion attempt in the
near future. Major General Hastings Ismay, advising the Prime Minister on
the 22nd that full powers should be given forthwith to the military authori-
ties to enable them to carry out defensive measures of all kinds, "without
reference to any other authority and without the hampering forms of pro-
cedure", wrote:
"It has hitherto been thought that a seaborne invasion of this country
was an enterprise which the Germans could not hope to launch with any
prospect of success for some considerable time. Moreover, it has been
assumed that the sequence of events would be first a sustained attack to
destroy our Air Force, then an airborne invasion to seize a port, after
which the seaborne invasion would take place. Hence our Home Defence
preparations at the present time are mti-n1y directed towards dealing with
the problem of parachute troops and with the protection of ports from the
landward side. I think the events of the last few days and the grim
possibilities of the next must cause us to modify our views."
34. CAB 65/7: WM 1 23rd. (40 ):15, 15 May 1940.
35. CAB 65/7: WM 137th (40):9, 24 Nay 1940: Telegram No. 630 from His
Majesty's Ambassador in Rome, 22 Nay 1940.
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He continued:
"In view of past experience in Norway, Holland and France, it can be
taken for granted that the Germans have the plan for the invasion of this
country worked out to the last detail and have provided all necessary
special equipment.... We can be sure that Hitler would. be prepared to
sacrifice 90% of the whole expedition if he could get a firm bridgehead on
British soil with the remivining 10%.... Recent events have shown the
terrible results winch can be achieved by armoured force9 operating through
a country which has not been prepared to oppose them. tt 3o.
With the crisis worsening day by day on the Continent, the Chiefs of
Staff were now beginning to face up to the fact that the Germans might
attempt a full-scale invasion in the near future, after minimal preparation
and. possibly following hard. on the heels of the evacuation of the B.E.F.,
'Operation Dynamo', which began on 26th Nay. On 22nd May, two days after
General Guderiazi's 'panzers' had reached the Channel coast, the Chiefs of
Staff reported on the threat of seaborne and. airborne attack on the United
Kingdom, a danger that had alrea&y been much increased by the fall of
Holland. The Chiefs of Staff had by now reviewed the threat, taking into
account the much wider base bordering on the English Channel that would be
in enemy hands should their present land attacks succeed in securing for
them the coast of Belgium and north west France. This would mean that, not
only would much of England's south coast come within easy range of enemy
short-range fighters and dive-bomber aircraft, but the sea routes across
the English Channel were very short and the Germans could mass shipping for
a large invading force in the many suitable ports along the captured Conti-
nental coastline. The Chiefs of Staff believed that no such invasion could
be prepared without their knowledge and "in the meantime the East Coast
remins the most profitable area for invasion". Nevertheless, they noted
that "the possibility of invasion on the South Coast .... creates a new
threat to meet, for which plans must be prepared.". They believed, however,
that an invasion could not be mounted for several weeks, since:
"Germany would have to consolidate her position in Northern France and
Belgium, neutralise at least in some measure our Naval forces, arid obtain a
large degree of air superiority before she would be ready to launch a large-
scale seaborne attack from the French Channel ports. This would take some
time...."
They continued, however, on a note of warning:
36. CAB 65/7: WM 133rd (40):11, 22 Nay 1940. Annex: Minute from K. L.
Ismay to Prime Minister, 22 Nay 1940.
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".... we cannot ignore the possibility that action in the form of air-
borne, and to a lesser extent seaborne, raids might be taken very soon after
she had gained control of the coast line bordering the English Channel." 37.
The Chiefs of Staff now began to feel, for the first time in the War,
that the Kent sector was becoming particularly vulnerable to any attempted
invasion which might be mounted by the Germans, either combined with a
landing elsewhere, say in East Anglia, or even as a primary objective by
itself. The attraction of Kent to the Germans, they believed, was strong,
the object of such an invasion being:
".... to secure a base for land. operations against London, in order to
secure the richest and most densely populated area in the Kingdom and. to
jeopardize, if not paralyse, the Government in its prosecution of the War.
London and its port would then provide the base for subsequent operations....
Kent forms a salient favouring converging air attack." 38.
Unlaiown to the Chiefs of Staff until after the War, their appreciation
of the probable sequence of invasion, made as early as 21st Nay, was to
reflect closely the line of thinking that was to be embodied in the German
plans for 'Operation Sea 	 which were produced later in that fateful
suer of 1940. The Chiefs of Staff assumed, prophetically as it was to
turn out, that the Germans' first step would be to attempt to achieve air
superiority by attacking fighter aerodromes and centres of communication.
If this were successfully achieved, airborne landings would follow to seize
all approaches to Kent from London and the West. These preliminary opera-
tions would. be combined with intensive air attacks on shipping, harbours and
coast defences. Finally, the Chiefs of Staff expected the Germans to launch
their seaborne invasion, using air action and ininelaying to deny the narrow
sea approaches to the British light Naval craft. The German emphasis would
still be on seizing a port "such as Newhaven, Dover, Folkestone or Sheerness",
and they would aim at tactical surprise. The Chiefs of Staff believed that
the Germans had ample shipping available for the invasion, but erroneously
thought that Germany "presumably possesses sufficient landing craft for the
initial effort against Kent beaches". The whole operation would depend on
adequate port facilities to be available in Holland, Belgium and north west
France, and, of course, on complete German air superiority. The invasion of
Kent, the Chiefs of Staff concluded:
37. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 376: Seaborne and Airborne Attack on the United
Kingdom, 22 Nay 1940.
38. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 371 (JIC); and JIC (40) 77: German Invasion of
the United Kingdom (with particular reference to the Kentish Coast),
21 May 1940.
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".... would be carried, out on methodical lines .... with the utmost
drive and. energy, and the maximum sustained effort in the air, on land, and
by sea, of which Germany is capable. The operations would be undertaken
ruthlessly and regardless of loss. The military side would be intimately
linked with sabotage and similar activities by airborne troops and the
Fifth Column, and also with subsidiary operations desiied to mislead and.
mystify the defence in its control and. to cause dispersion by subsidiary
feints from the least expected directions. The dissemination of false
reports, alarmist rumours and contradictory orders would play a prominent
part. Full run would be given to ruse and artifice." 39.
On 25th Nay, the day before 'Operation Dynamo' began, the Chiefs of
Staff submitted a report on British strategy should French resistance
collapse completely, involving the loss of a substantial proportion of the
B.E.F., and the French Government were to surrender to the Germans. This
very serious situation, the Chiefs of Staff felt, was becoming increasingly
likely to happen. It would leave the United Kingdom and its sea approaches
exposed at short range to the concentrated attack of the whole of the
German naval and. air forces operating from bases extending from Norway to
Brittany, and the threat of invasion would be ever present thereafter.
Given these circumstances, and assuming that Italy too would be hostile,
but that the United States would give "full economic and f,rincial support",
the Chiefs of Staff stated that it was "impossible to say whether or not
the United Kingdom could hold. out", but that, whether the Germans opted for
a blockade to starve the country out, an invasion, or a 'knock-out blow' to
try to bring Britain to her knees, their opening move would probably be
heralded by air attack, a form of attack that must be met and. defeated if
Britain were to survive. They, therefore, saw no reason to revise their
conclusion of early May that "the crux of the whole problem is the air
defence of this country". Britain, meanwhile, should be "organised. as a
fortress on totalitarian lines" and the public fully informed of the
40.dangers confronting them.
The Air Staff, too, realized. only too well that everything depended on
a successful air defence. Only the previous day they had pointed out that
the Germans might use their large, well trained, and. experienced parachutist
force to administer a 'knock-out blow' to the air defence of the United
39. ibid.
40. CB 66/7: WP (40) 168; and COS (40) 390: British Strategy in a
Certain Eventuality, 25 Nay 1940.
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Kingdom. Of the 5,000 trained German parachutists available, 500 might be
dropped siimiltaneously at each of the seven vital sector stations in South
East England. This action would have the effect of not only destroying
hangars and aircraft, but would also wreck the Operations Room arrangement
controlling Air Defence, so that troop—carrying planes bringing reinforce-
ments might land in numbers without effective air opposition. Sustained
bomber attacks could then be mounted on the other aerod.romes with relative
impunity and the Germans would secure air superiority over South Last
England for a sufficient period to cover the landings by sea. 41.
Once the Germans had achieved the necessary air superiority, the
Chiefs of Staff believed that even if a reasonable proportion of the B.E.F.
could successfully be evacuated so as to bolster Home Forces, the British
prospects of repelling a German invasion would be slim indeed. They
pointed out, in their appreciation of 25th Nay,
"Germany has ample forces to invade and occupy this country. Should
the enemy succeed in establishing a force, vith its vehicles, firmly ashore,
the Army in the United. Kingdom, which is very short of equipment, has not
got the offensive power to drive it out." 42.
Britain's predicament as a whole was summed up by the Chiefs of Staff
in a review of their report the very next day, 26th Nay:
"While our ..ir Force is in being, our Navy and ir Force together
should be able to prevent Germany carrying out a serious invasion of this
country.
Suoposing Geany gained complete air superiority, we consider that
the Iavy could nold. up an invasion for a time, but not for an indefinite
period.
If, witn our Navy unable to prevent it and our ur Force gone, Germany
attempted an invasion, our coast and beach defences could not prevent
German tanks and. infantry getting a firm footing on our shores. In the
circumstances envisaged above, our land forces would be insufficient to
deal vith a serious invasion." 43'
41. Bundle 47/3, Paper 14 B, 24 May 1940.
42. CAB 66/7: v.P (40) 166; and COS (40) 390: British Strategy in a
Certain Eventuality, 25 Nay 1940.
43. CAB 66/7: ;'p (40) 169; and COS (40) 397: British Strategy in the
Near Fture, 26 Nay 1940.
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*	 *	 *
The Chiefs of Staff's sobering conclusions only stated the truth.
Towards the end of May 1940, Home Forces were at their weakest in equipment,
trained manpower and. formations available than at any time in the War,
either before or after this date. General Kirke was left with the meagrest
of forces to carry out his 'Julius Caesar' Plan, if it were required to be
implemented. The cream of the British Army, the best trained formations,
plus almost all of the most modern equipment, and there was little enough of
this available in any case, had been sent over with the B.E.F. to Prance and
Norway, much of it soon to be irretrievably lost.
In the middle of Nay, Home Forces had been considerably weakened by
the removal of its most valuable single asset, the relatively powerful 1st
Armoured Division. This division comprised most of the United Kingdom's
armoured strength and had. hitherto been the min contributor towards the
vital role in Home Defence that Winston Churchill, at a meeting of the War
Cabinet on 9th May, described as:
".... the first essential of a successful defence against invasion is
the holding of compact mobile forces composed of good troops, armed with
complete and up-to-date equipment, ready to strike any force landing in the
country." 44.
It had been accepted for some time that 1st Armoiired Division would be
despatched to France in the near future and. that a replacement formation was
urgently required if the 'Julius Caesar' Plan were to continue to have any
credibility in countering an attempted invasion. Shortly before the opening
of the German offensive on 10th Nay, the Secretary of State for War, then
Oliver Stanley, worried about the lack of trained troops available at home,
had even considered recalling the 5th Regular) Division from France, so as
to bolster Home Forces with the presence of a complete Regular Division and
replace 1st Armnoured Division in its vital role as the main part of H.Q.
Reserve. This solution had. been strongly opposed by the G.H.Q. of the
B.E.P., which pressed for both the retention of the 5th Division (less its
15th Brigade, which was already in the United Kingdom, having returned from
Norway), and the speedy despatch of 1st Armoured Division to France.
44. CAB 65/7: WM (40) ll6th:1, 9 May 1940.
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Finally, at its last meeting at 7.00 a.m. on 10th May, the Military Co-
Ordination Committee had. approved that:
"The 5th Division, which had been wanted for return to the United
Kingdom, had been placed at the disposal of the C.-in-C. in Prance. The
1st Armoured Division would be held in this country." 45.
However, at the War Cabinet meeting at 12.30 p.m. next day, 11th May,
General Ironside, the Chief of Imperial General Staff, pressed. strongly that
1st Armoured Division should. be  sent to France immediately as Lord Gort
requested, since "without this division, Lord Gort had no force suitable for
a counter-attack" • He convincingly argued that enough armoured and mobile
forces would still remain in the United Kingdom to provide a large enough
H. (. Reserve to counter an enemy landing:
"If the Armoured Division went to Prance, we should still have 160
light tanks in this country. Further, it was proposed to organise twelve
troops of tanks of various descriptions, which, although not suitable for
operations in Prance, would be very useful to deal with the contingency of
invasion. The Third. [Fourth?] Corps, which included the Canadian Division,
was now fit for operations. Two motorised battalions and one motorcycle
battalion would also be kept in this country." 46.
The War Cabinet accepted General Ironside's arguments and immediately
authorised the move of 1st Armoured Division to reinforce the B.E.F. in
Prance. The move began the very next day and between 17th and 23rd May the
main body, consisting of the 2nd (Light) and 3rd (Heavy) .Az'moured Brigades,
plus the Support Group, disembarked at Le Havre arid Cherbourg, while the
detached 3rd R.T.R. reached the doomed port of Calais on the 22nd May.
Thus, 134 Vickers Mk. VI light tanks, 30 Daimler scout cars and some 160
A 9, A 10 and A 13 Cruisers, which were according to G.E.. Home Forces' War
Diaries the sum total of Cruiser tanks then existing in the United Kingdom,
were mostly irretrievably lost to the strength of Home Forces. Not only did
this departure severely weaken Home Forces, but in the event 1 st Armoured
Division arrived too late to play a decisive role in the campaign in France,
and only a tiny handful of its tanks were ever to escape the debacle and be
returned to England.
45. CAB 83/3: MC (40) 38th:1, 10 May 1940.
46. CAB 65/7: WM (40) 119th A:3, 11 May 1940.
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Churchill, himself, was soon to have his doubts about the wisdom of the
move arid was un derstandably worried about the departure of Home Forces' only
really credible reserve. He was also beginning to consider seriously the
implications that a complete French collapse might have on the defence of
the United Kingdom. On 18th May, in a memoranda to General Isniay, he
suggested that:
"The Chiefs of Staff might consider whether it would not be well to
send only half of the so-called Armoured Division to France. One must
always be prepared for the fact that the French may be offered very advan-
tageous terms of peace, and the whole weight be thrown on us." 47.
The Chiefs of Staff, however, were adamant that the whole of the Division,
including the 3rd (Heavy) Armoured Brigade, should be despatched.. They
replied that:
"If the battle continues in France, the arrival of this Armoured
Brigade, which includes 160 Cruiser tanks, may have results of the utmost
importance. We recommend, therefore, that the flow should continue. If the
battle goes against us, it will be possible to stop the flow at any moment,
and probably to recover anything which has reached the other side, and has
not come into action." 48.
Unfortunately for Home Forces, the Chiefs of Staff's hopes were proved, all
too soon, to be vastly over optimistic.
The move of 1st Armoured Division to France was completed without
interruption despite Churchill's worries. However, its departure left the
armoured strength available to Home Forces at a very low level indeed. On
22nd. May, the so-called 2nd. Armoured Division in Lincoinshire was left with
a mere 108 Vickers light tanks and 7 obsolete mediums, while the independent
20th Armoured Brigade, recently moved to inid-Anglia, mustered 28 Universal
carriers, 24 'light wheeled tanks' (armoured. cars, by any other name) and a
paltry 11 Vickers light tanks. (See Appendix 5.) Hardly a single 2 pdr.
armed tank remained with Home Forces, while the thin-skinned, machine-gun
aimed Vickers light tanks would be no match for any but the very lightest
type of German tank. Luckily, a full-scale seabomie invasion was not
expected for several weeks.
47. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 364: Home Defence, Note by the Prime Minister,
18 May 1940.
48. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 365: Home Defence, Report by the Chiefs of Staff,
18 May 1940.
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Notwithstanding the obvious deficiency in armour, General Ironside, on
17th Nay, again attempted to reassure the War Cabinet that sufficient forces
existed in the United Kingdom to deal with the possibility of airborne
invasion at least. Reporting on the state of Home Forces at the War Cabinet
meeting that day, he said that:
".... there was no shortage in numbers, but that quality was lacking in
certain cases. He had spoken to the Comm pnder-in-Chief on this point and
had given definite instructions that they must imbue the troops with the
spirit that they must at all costs fight. Among the good material in this
country was the London Division, the 15th Brigade and. the Canadians. In
addition, the Regular Cavalry was being formed into armoured units. The
possession of mobile artillery was a reassuring factor." 49.
The War Cabinet appear to have been put at their ease, but General
Ironside was taking an unduly optimistic view in his assessment. Quality
was indeed lacking and in most, not just 'certain', cases. On 22nd. May,
General Kirke still had a mere 14 divisions available for the 'Julius
Plan. (See Appendix 5.) This total was, in fact, six divisions more than
were deployed on 3rd May, but only five out of the twelve Territorial
Infantry divisions included in this number were first-line formations and
few of these were yet trained to a standard that would enable them to cope
effectively with modern warfare. Only 52nd (Lowland) and 1st Canadian
Divisions in H.Q. Reserve, plus the 15th Brigade and 43rd (Wessex) Division,
and possibly 1st London Division, were in any-thing approaching an advanced
state of training and of these only 15th Brigade had yet seen a shot fired
in anger. 1st Canadian Division, though keen and eager to get to grips with
the enemy, had only been undergoing proper training since its arrival in
Britain in January, while this division, together with 52nd (Lowland) and
43rd (Wessex), made up IV Corps, which was earmarked to depart for France in
early June as reinforcement to the B.E.F..
The equipment situation for Home Forces, too, remained as poor as ever,
the shortage of effective tanks being especially evident. Mobile artillery
was available, but its lack of numbers, especially in modern field guns,
hardly justified General Ironside's description of it as a "reassuring
factor". The infantry divisions deployed for 'Julius Caesar' still only
possessed between 12 and 18 field guns per division, on 22nd May, out of a
theoretical establishment of 72 each, and these guns were almost all 18 pd.rs.
49. CAB 65/7: WM (40) 126th:6, 17 Nay 1940.
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or the equally obsolete 4.5" Howitzers. (See Appendix 5.) The only forxna-
tions having the modern 25 pdr., or more likely the converted 18/25 pdr., at
this time were the 20th Armoured Brigade with 8, 43rd. (Wessex) Division with
19, 52nd (Lowland) Division with 10, and 12th Army Field Regiment (also in
H.Q. Reserve) with 12 guns. Only the 1st Canadian Division was comparatively
well equipped with no less than 36 25 pdrs., formed. into three regiments.
This gave a grand total of 85 25 pdrs., or 18/25 pd.rs., with Home Forces,
only three more than on 3rd. May, since virtually all guns from new production
had been shipped straight over to France.
As for anti-tank guns, there were available on 22nd Nay a total of only
33 2 pdrs., spread between the entire complement of 14 'Julius Caesar'
divisions, a paltry eight of which were in H.Q. Reserve, with 1st Canadian
Division. (See Appendix 5.) This total of 33 2 pdr. anti-tank guns was
only three more than were available on 3rd Nay and meant that Home Forces,
in its entirety, still possessed fewer anti-tank guns than were allocated in
the War Establishment to a single division.
The Prime Minister knew the true situation and realized. all too well
that Home Forces had been left dangerously weak, because of the priority
being given to the requirements of the B.E.F. in trained manpower and. in all
types of equipment. Pressing once again for the return of eight Regular
battalions from India and. for further measures to control aliens, Communists
and Fascists, Churchill wrote on 18th May to General Ismay:
"I cannot feel we have enough trustworthy troops in England, in view of
the very large numbers that may be landed from air-carriers preceded. by
parachutists."
Though he added:
"I do not consider this danger is ,imirinent at the present time, as the
great battle in France has yet to be decided.." 50.
General Kirke, therefore, in the revision of his plans and dispositions,
was faced with the unenviable task of having to defend. the British homeland
with a meagre and inadequate collection of mostly semi-trained and. poorly
50. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 364: op. cit., 18 May 1940.
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equipped formations against an invasion threat that could not only material-
ize in any combination of a multitude of forms of attack, directions and
strengths, but also was becoming increasingly greater with each passing day.
To add to his problems, he was also not entirely happy with the attitude of
the new Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden, whom he evidently felt was
too much occupied with his public image. On 21st May, General Kirke atten-
ded. a meeting with Eden. He later wrote:
".... I endeavoured to explain the principles of the defence of Great
Britain. He seemed more interested in some question in the House he's had
to answer, and is evidently the complete politician. Two Staff Officers are
engaged the whole time on commenting on newspaper criticisms. He's very
like Hore Belisha in this respect." 51.
On 23rd May, General Kirke was summoned to present and explain his
revised 'Julius Caesar' Plan to the Defence Committee (Operations).
Essentially, the principles were little changed from those devised the
previous November, but the area of coastline vulnerable to attack was
continually being extended and the scale of the enemy assault, when it came,
would now be much greater. Three days earlier, on the 20th, the Defence
Committee (Operations) had expressed the view that, since the Dutch ports
were more suitable for collecting considerable quantities of small shipping,
the East Coast would still be most vulnerable and "little danger was antici-
pated from the Channel ports". 52. General Kirke, however, preferred to
take a wider view. At the meeting on the 23rd, he said he believed that:
".... it was not possible to say where the enemy would land or what his
objectives would be."
He therefore reasoned that the basic thinking behind the 'Julius Caesar'
Plan still applied:
".... the principle underlying the defences was to dispose troops to
cover vital objectives, while keeping as much as possible in mobile reserve."
He now had available for these tasks 14 divisions "in a varying state of
trai'iing and equipment". Certain of these were located in areas along the
coast, while others were in support and "three divisions" were in general
51. General Kirke Papers, op. cit.
52. CAB 69/1: DO (40) 5th:4, 20 May 1940.
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reserve. He had. also to dispose troops to guard against what was seen as
a very real danger, that of an airborne invasion:
"Certain troops were also held. within striking distance of London. For
defence against parachute troops, it was arranged that every searchlight
station up and down the country had a mobile detachment. These could summon
small mobile reserves to help mop up." 53
General Kirke still placed the emphasis on the defence of ports, since
it was a safe assumption that, to mntam a successful invasion, the enemy
would. have to seize a port. Hence, top priority had been given to the
strengthening of the defences of ports on the landward side, "So that it
would not be possible for airborne troops or troops landed on neighbouring
beaches to penetrate the port", as well as on the seaward side, where some
150 ex-Naval guns, which had already been made available under the Emergency
Battery Programme, were in the process of being emplaced in suitable sites.
Progress in this last task, however, was being slowed by a lack of holding-
down bolts for the guns, which would take three weeks to manufacture, and by
the need to provide enough gunnery officers and skilled gunners to supervise
the working of the guns. Indeed, many of the officers even had to be
recalled from retirement.
In subsequent discussion at the meeting, attention was drawn to a
possibility that had received minmal consideration up to this date, that of
measures to prevent enemy forces, and especially tanks, from landing on the
many exposed open beaches and then penetrating inland. There had been many
reports that the Germans were preparing tank-carrying, flat-bottomed boats
which might be speedily launched from close to our shores by specially
constructed landing ships. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, Chief of
the Naval Staff, correctly pointed out that "there was no reason to suppose
that the Germans would require a port at which to land tanks", but he then
went on to suggest a rather ambitious scheme to help prevent enemy tanks,
landed on the beaches, from deploying inland:
".... at many points on the coast where landing was possible, the exit
from the beach was through a comparatively narrow gap. If obstacles were
placed in these gaps, therefore, sufficient delay might be imposed on the
enemy's tanks to allow them to be engaged before they had time to penetrate
inland."
53. 0kB 69/1: DO (40) 6th:1, 23 May 1940.
54. ibid.
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The First Sea Lord's suggestion was strongly supported by Vice-Admiral
T. S. V. Philips, the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, who pointed out, in
its favour, one of the major weaknesses of Genera]. 	 Plan, that of
the chronic lack of anti-tank equipment. He thought that:
while mobile columns, which could move to engage the enemy as
soon as he had. landed, were the right means of defence in theory, they were
robbed of half their value in practice by the fact that they had nothing to
oppose tanks. The best hope, therefore, of repelling a lanth.ng by tanks
would be to prevent them leaving the beach. It would be a big undertaking
to block the exits of all practicable beaches, but he thought it ought to be
done."
General Kirke, however, was not convinced of the merits of this scheme
and objected strongly, emphasizing the practical difficulties of using beach
obstacles on such a large scale. He argued that:
".... there were very large stretches of coast, particularly in East
Anglia, where the beaches were quite open, and where tanks could land. and.
penetrate inland at any point. An obstacle was of little or no value unless
it were guarded, since the troops d.c.00mpanying the tanks could easily break
down the obstacle with explosives and. clear a way for the passage of the
tanks. To make an obstacle all along these open beaches and to spread
troops out to guard it, would be playing the enemy's game. It could only be
done at the expense of reserves. The enemy would soon penetrate the thin
crust thus formed, and. there would be nothing behind to oppose him in
strength."
He steadfastly refused to be diverted from the militarily correct principles
embodied in his 'Julius	 Plan, that the defence of the ports,
combined with the holding of adequate mobile reserves, should receive the
first priority. The amount of labour available for construction work, too,
was a limiting factor. He continued:
"There was a limit to the amount of construction work which could be
planned and supervised in a short space of time. All efforts were now being
concentrated on the defence of the ports to make them impregnable, arid on
preparing demolitions and obstacles on the approaches to London. If energy
were dissipated on work all along the beaches, nothing would be done in time.
Even if the enemy landed at a beach, he could not support his landing with-
out the capture of a port. For this reason the protection of the ports took
first place." 55.
General Kirke later recalled of this meeting:
55. ibid.
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"Pound is anxious to defend all beaches with obstacles. I pointed out
that it was better to concentrate on active defence, and in preventing the
enemy from getting a port, without which he could not land motor transport,
guns, stores, etc.. We could consider extending the defences later.
Obstacles were useless unless covered by fire, and could be removed by
troops landed by air behind them. Mines on beaches were different, as they
came as a surprise. Work depended on labour, which was insufficient. A
class should be called up for that purpose." 56.
Nevertheless, despite General 	 own personal reservations, the
Defence Committee agreed at the meeting that:
".... the provision of anti-tank obstacles to impede the progress of
tanks landed on beaches on the East and. South coasts deserved urgent
consideration."
And the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, was duly instructed, "to take
whatever action might be possible and. to report to the Chiefs of Staff".
Earlier in the day, General Kirke had also attended a meeting of the
Home Defence Executive at which the same subject was discussed and where it
was agreed that a special reconnaissance of the whole coast, carried out in
conjunction with the Navy and the Air Force, "should be undertaken immedi-
ately". 58. General Kirke, therefore, had. little choice but to order
urgently the preliminary steps to be put into hand. The G.R.., Home
Forces, War Diary records that straight after the Defence Committee meeting
on the very same day, 23rd May:
"Orders were issued to Commands for reconnaissance of beaches on the
East and South coasts between Wick and Swa.nage, to determine those suitable
for the landing of tanks." 59
General ICirke hoped that, as a result of this reconnaissance, which could
mostly be carried out by air,
".... it will be possible to define more clearly those beaches from
which there are few approaches inland and. are therefore easier to defend,
56. General Kirke Papers, op. cit.
57. CAB 69/1: DC (40) 6th:1, 23 Nay 1940.
58. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 39 6 : Home Defence, Protection of Beaches in East
and South East England and the Control of Enemy Aliens. Note by the
C.-in-C., Home Forces, 24 May 1940.
59. WO 166/i: op. cit., May 1940.
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and those beaches from which access inland is easy. A scheme can then be
prepared to utilise our means of defence to the best possible advantage,
particularly mines which need not, like other obstacles, be covered by
fire, if suitably hidden."
Indeed, General K.irke placed a great reliance on minefields, though few
mines were yet available, because he would not have to spread his troops so
much to cover them. He therefore urged:
".... that the manufacture of anti-tank and other forms of mines,
suitable for use on beaches and. approaches thereto 7 should be proceeded with
at the maximum capacity of the plant available." 6u.
The fact that the reconnaissance of beaches was ordered for the East
and. South coasts from Wick all the way to Swanage is interesting, because it
marked a further extension of the area of coastline which was felt to be
vulnerable to attack by the Germans, who were now gaining a firm grip both
on northern France and north Norway. General Kirke noted on 25th May,
following a meeting of the Home Defence Executive:
"The Executive consider that, in the present circumstances, the possi-
bility of an attempt at invasion on the whole of the East and. South coasts
from the Shetland.s to Swanage cannot be ruled out. The area of greatest
danger of invasion proper is between the Tyne and Flanborough, and The Wash
to Newbaven, inclusive.
Diversional landings may, however, be made in the North from Norway and
in the West and South West from submarines or from Eire, if the enemy estab-
lishes himself there." 61.
The Executive recommended that a dawn patrol should be instituted by the
R.A.F. forthwith to cover the coast from Sheringham to Newhaven.
It was to be nearly two weeks before the reconnaissance of beaches on
the East and South coasts, ordered on the 23rd, was completed. However, in
the meantime, work commenced almost straight away on beach defences along
the East xiglian and South East coastline, so as to attempt to fill the
intervals between the defended ports and the new gun sites. Indeed, on the
27th May, the Chiefs of Staff agreed that the preparation of the defence of
60. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 396, op. cit., 24 May 1940.
61. CAB 80/12: COS (40) 401: Invasion of the United Kingdom, Memoranda by
the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, 25 May 1940.
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beaches was "a matter of the highest importance" and that the construction
of anti-tank obstacles "should not be confined to a few likely landing
places, but they should be constructed on the widest possible scale." 62.
With so little time for reconnaissance, it was inevitable that the
early work tended to be rather haphazard and that many mistakes were made
at first. In response to General Kirke's plea for more labour, the War
Cabinet agreed. on the 26th May that:
".... save in regard to work on aerodromes, priority should be accorded,
until further notice, to the requirements of labour and. plant (for example,
excavating and concreting machinery) for urgent defence works." 63.
Gangs of civilian labourers were thus brought in to festoon the most vulner-
able beaches with barbed wire, covered by hastily constructed piliboxes.
Many of these early pillboxes were constructed at first with brick, since
most of the available concrete was being used for the uergency :Batteries.
They were often poorly sited, some having their embrasures pointing directly
out to sea instead of along the shoreline to form a far more effective
crossfire, while a few pillboxes even tumbled into the sea, having been
built on unstable foundations.
General Kirke remained sceptical as to the merits of defending the
beaches with extensive lines of obstacles. He mach preferred that, besides
defending the ports, the major emphasis of the defence should continue to be
on mobile columns which could move rapidly to counter-attack any incursion
on our shores. He was, therefore, far more worried about the problems which
were likely to prejudice the success of such mobile military operations in
the vulnerable coastal areas. Among the anxieties uppermost in his mind was
the threat to military movement, not to mention security, posed by civilian
weekend traffic to the coasts and, in the event of a German landing, by an
expected torrent of refugees. General Kirke, therefore, began to press hard
for various measures affecting the civilian population to be put rapidly
into force. At the Defence Committee (Operations) meeting on 23rd May, he
took the opportunity of the presence of the Prime Minister to put forward
for discussion two proposals that were also about to be considered by the
Chiefs of Staff Committee.
62. CA.3 79/4: COS (40) 154 th:4, 27 May 1940.
63. CLB 65/7: WM (40) 139th:2, 26 Nay 1940.
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The first of these, which was greeted. with approval, was that the East
and. South Coasts, from the North of Scotland to Southampton, should be
declared. a prohibited area, %-1th entry allowed only for those holding a pass
to prove they were on legitimate business and not visiting for pleasure.
The Couttee accepted. General Kirke's warning that:
"The weekend, traffic to the coast presented a great danger, since not
only was congestion caused at all the ports, but the presence of a mass of
cars right on the coast would be of great value to an enemy. t' 64.
General Kirke's second proposal, however, that women and. children
should be iiinned.iately evacuated from the neighbourhood of the threatened
coastline, both for their own safety from German attack or British counter-
attack, as well as to reduce the number of potential refugees which might
hinder military movement in a tine of emergency, received markedly less
enthusiasm. The main objection was to the scale of the operation and. to the
problems of disruption and relocation it would cause. General Sir Hugh
Elles, Chief ol' Staff to the Ministry of Home Security, said that a prelimi-
nary study to evacuate 60% of the population of Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Earwich
and. Pelixstowe within a period of 48 hours, had indeed been made, but if the
South and. the remainder of the East Coasts were evacuated "the problem might
assume unmanageable proportions". The Prime Minister, too, voiced. his
doubts and vent further, declaring that he was:
".... not at all convinced. of the desirability of evacuating any of the
population. When the time comes, they could. be ordered. to stay in their
homes, and. the people on the coast at points at which the enemy was not
landing would be in no great danger, since the enemy would strike inland. at
iznportan' objectives."
Churchill accepted., though, that arrangements would have to be made to
control the population "where operations were taking place" and the Chiefs
of Staff were asked to study the matter further. 65.
The Chiefs of Staff's recoendations were considered by the Defence
Coiattee two days later. The Conmittee agreed that, while it was not
practicable "for political and administrative reasons" to evacuate women and
64. CAB 69/1: DO (40) 6th:1, 23 May 1940.
65. ibid.
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children wholesale before the emergency arose, the voluntary evacuation of
children, pregnant women and. invalids should be initiated. at once from all
major East Coast towns between Yarmouth and Southampton. Priority for
evacuation was to be given to 15 coastal towns - Great Yarmouth, Lowestoft,
Felixstowe, Earwich, Walton, Frinton, Clacton and. Southend in East Anglia,
and. Nargate, Broad.stairs, Rainsgate, Sandwich, Deal, Dover and. Folkestone in
Kent. The danger to the coastal towns of Sussex was not yet considered. to
be great enough to warrant evacuation. The remnder of the population of
these 15 coastal towns as to be educated to realize that in the event of
enemy action they must remain at home, since there they were safer than on
the roads where "experience has shown they will be subject to deliberate air
attack". An area approximately 10 miles deep on the East and. South Coasts,
from St. Kiimaird.'s Head. in Aberdeenshire to Christchiirch in Dorset, was to
be declared. a prohibited area, in which control of the movement of persons
would. be
 in the hands of the military authorities, including the L.D.V.'s. 66.
The Committee also approved that the military authorities should be given
the necessary powers to enforce this, including powers of arrest, which was
another measure that General Kirke had. been pressing for. 67.
At this meeting the Minister of Home Security, Sir John Anderson,
revealed. that a conference held. earlier that afternoon had. agreed. that a
scheme should. also be prepared for a 60c, evacuation of all persons in the
coastal strip, which could be carried out in any particular area "if the
War Cabinet decided that the enemy's action could. be
 sufficiently foreseen
68.to be able to specify the point of attack".
	 This last scheme, however,
might well be potentially very dangerous to implement in practice. It was
unlikely that the precise location of an enemy landing could. be
 determined
until the last moment and. this would. probably not leave enough time for the
evacuation of such a large number of people to be completed.. If the enemy
landing, therefore, occurred while evacuation was still under way, the
result would inevitably be confusion and. chaos as an orderly exodus dis-
solved. into a panic-stricken mob which, quite aside from sustaining heavy
civilian casualties on the roads from enemy air attack, would. seriously
impede and. perhaps fatally delay the vital British reserves moving up into
the area of operations. It was also unlikely that the coastal population
66. CAB 69/1: DO (40) 8th:1; and Annex, 25 May 1940.
67. General Kirke Papers, op. cit.
68. CAB 69/1: DO (40) Bth:1, 25 May 1940.
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would reinMr at home in the area of the fighting, especially if their homes
were being destroyed. The only real solution would be the evacuation of a
significant proportion, say 60%, of the population of all the vulnerable
coastal towns on the East and South coasts, well before any invasion was ex-
pected to be implemented, but in May 1940 the authorities were not prepared
to go this far. It remained to be seen whether, in the coming months, the
greatly increased threat of invasion would persuade them to change their
minds.
At the same time as these discussions on various aspects of the inva-
sion problem were proceeding, General Kirke was reviewing the dispositions
of the formations of Home Forces in accordance with his revision of the
'Julius Caesar' Plan. Throughout the middle of May, General Kirke carried
out a series of moves that reflected a significant change in emphasis of the
thinking behind the 'Julius Caesar' Plan, though the principles of the Plan
remMned basically unaltered. The major change was a considerable shift of
formations towards the East Coast and. especially towards Eastern Command.
Before the German offensive opened on 10th Nay, there had been no less than
8* divisions still undergoing training, mainly in Western and Southern
Command, and only eight and part of a ninth were employed for 'Julius Caesar'.
(See Nap 4.) However, only two weeks after 10th Nay the pattern was very
different. East Anglia was still seen to be the most vulnerable area to a
German landing and General Kirke, therefore, considerably increased the
strength of his forces there. (See Map 5.) The 18th (East An.glian) and
55th (West Lancashire ) Divisions, in Norfolk and Suffolk, were rapidly rein-
forced by the 15th (Scottish), which was moved to the Essex coastline from
Wiltshire. The 2nd London Division, less two battalions left to guard the
capital, was repositioned from London to Cambridgeshire, while 43rd (Wessex)
was brought forward from Dorset to Hertfordshire. These latter two divisions
were thus conveniently placed, as Eastern Command reserves, to move to the
support of the three divisions on the East Anglian Coast. Also in Eastern
Command reserve, and with a similarly supporting role, was 20th Armoured
Brigade, which was moved on 16th May to the Newmarket area in mid-Anglia.
Prom this central position it could move quickly to counter-attack an enemy
incursion at any point along the long East Ariglian coastline, though its
mixed bag of only 63 Universal Carriers, 'light wheeled' tanks and machine-
gun armed Vickers light tanks would make its ability to fulfil this vital
role successfully extremely suspect, to say the least. South of London, also
within the Eastern Command area, 1st London Division in Kent was bolstered by
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the move of 45th (West Country) Division from Devon to the coast of Sussex,
so as to guard agairxst the increasing German threat from Northern France.
However, the fact that only these two d.ivisions were deployed south of
London during May reflected the general view that the enemy threat to this
quarter, while increasing, was not yet severe. Thus, the number of divi-
sions in total, deployed for 'Julius Caesar' under Eastern Command, was
raised from three in early Nay to seven plus an armoured brigade towards the
end of the month, quite a siguificant increase.
In Northern Commp.nd the number of divisions available for the Plan was
similarly doubled, as the 54th (East Anglian) Division in Northumberland and
the 2nd Armoured Division with its 108 light and medium tanks in Lincoln-
shire, were reinforced, first by 66th (Lancs. and Border) Division moving
from Lancashire to Yorkshire and later by the 59th (Staffordshire) Division
being brought forward from Staffordshire to Durham, both these latter
divisions having been relieved of their previous duties in connection with
aiding the civil powers in an emergency. (See Map 5.)
In Scottish Command, however, General Kirke saw the threat from Norway
to be relatively minor, now that the Germans were securing a far more
convenient coastline for assembling an invasion fleet opposite East Anglia
and the South East. On 19th Nay, he wrote:
".... I have only a certain number of troops [in Scotlandj as I con-
sider it preferable to maintain a preponderance in the East Anglian arid the
Home Counties areas and for the defence of London." 69.
General Kirke, therefore, left only one division on guard in Scotland, the
9th (Scottish). However, he also took the precaution of leaving a Brigade
Group of the 54th(East Anglian) Division in H.Q. Reserve, so that from its
position in Northumberland it could be easily sent to support either the
Tyne-Tees area in Northern Command, or Scottish Command, if an emergency
arose. The only two divisions in Home Forces, apart from the 53rd (Welsh)
Division in Ulster, which now remained in a purely training role and. were
thus unavailable for 'Julius Caesar', were the 38th (Welsh) Division in
South Wales arid the 61st (South Midland) Division in the NidJ.ands, both
second-line formations.
69. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 368: Invasion - Security of Scotland and the
Shetlands: Extract from a Letter from the C.-in-C., Home Forces,
19 May 1940.
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General Kirke's redispositions, however, meant that the majority of
divisions deployed along the East and South Coasts for the 'Julius Caesar'
Plan were now semi-trained second-line Territorial divisions. Not only
this, but their concentration for a possible operational role in these areas
meant that they were often situated well away from the best training grounds
which tended to be mainly in the West of the country. This, in turn, meant
that future training would inevitably be seriously hampered, while all of
these formations remained extremely ill-equipped to deal with an enemy well
supplied with armour, since they lacked tanks, anti-tank guns and artillery,
not to mention transport and much else.
Indeed, such was the weak state of Rome Forces, combined with the
strong possibility that the B.E.F. in France night be almost totally des-
troyed, that on 24th May the Chiefs of Staff decided to evacuate North
Norway, the Flag Officer, Narvik, being informed by telegram that:
".... the reason for this is that the troops, ships, guns and certain
equipment are urgently required for the defence of the United Kingdom." 70.
On the same day, too, the Prime Minister told the Defence Committee that:
".... in view of the danger of an invasion of the United Kingdom, we
could not possibly send any more troops to France, and M. Reynaud was being
informed accordingly." 71.
Churchill authorised the full-scale evacuation of the B.E.F. from Dunkirk
just two days later, following the fall of Boulogue and Calais, though some
further troops were in fact subsequently to be despatched to France in June.
General Kirke's dispositions, not to mention the process of training,
were also hampered by another serious problem that refused to go away, that
of continuously trying to find enough troops to guard the multiplicity of
vulnerable points. Before the opening of the German offensive on 10th May
he had had some considerable success in at least reducing the number of
field troops employed on vulnerable points. However, as the invasion threat
suddenly loomed much larger, he was once more bombarded with requests from
all quarters to supply troops for this purpose.
70. CAB 79/4: cos (40) 1 46th:3, 24 May 1940.
71. CAB 69/1: DO (40) 7th:5, 24 May 1940.
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The biggest demands were, as always, from the Air Ministry. So great
was this problem that General Kirke complained bitterly to the Chiefs of
Staff on 20th May:
"I am being daily asked to increase static guards in every direction,
the last and most serious demands being from the Air Ministry.
The first, amounting to over seven battalions, is for the protection
of [nine) aircraft factories .... as wide apart as Glasgow and Bristol.
An even more comprehensive demand has been made to protect the list of
aerod.romes .... [a total of 41 Fighter Command operational Sector Stations,
other aerodroines and headquarters, 25 Bomber Command operational Stations,
and 25 occupied R.A.F. aerodromes, in likely invasion landing areas against
the landing of a force of 500 parachute troops followed by troop carriers....
I am further asked to place guards on empty satellite aerodromes and
on 22 additional unoccupied landing grounds, and this would not, of course,
preclude the enemy from landing on an unlimited number of open spaces of
which the R.A.F. themselves do not make use."
These demands would place an unacceptable burden on an already much over-
stretched Rome Forces. To guard the aircraft factories on the scale
suggested by the Air Ministry, would, General Kirke objected:
".... entail the employment of the infantry of the division which at
present is responsible for supplying a certain number of the mobile columns
and for support of the Civil Power from Birmingham to Portsmouth. In that
case it would be necessary to replace it by one of the three divisions in
General Reserve, leaving only the Canadian Division and the 52nd Division to
deal with major enterprises."
If the number of static guards were increased on all the aerodromes, the
situation would be made even worse. To do this, he continued:
".... would iminobilise the majority of the Field Army troops now
available for an anti-invasion role and for the rapid reinforcement and
immobilisation of any areas where parachutists or troop-carrying aircraft
may be landed. My present system of defence is based on the principle of
reducing static guards to the minimum number possible, with the object of
keeping the largest possible proportion mobile and ready to concentrate
towards any area where the static guard may have been overpowered, or where
the enemy may have landed in open spaces not occupied by the R.A.F..
Undoubtedly, the protection of aerodromes would be greatly increased by the
addition of one or two vehicles even lightly or partially a.rmoured, but I
have none such available other than two light tank regiments and one Army
tank regiment, which it is essential to keep concentrated and ready to
counter-attack as quickly as possible."
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Not only this, but to guard unoccupied. landing grounds in addition:
would entail the dispersion and dissipation of a still larger
portion of the Field Army and most dangerously weaken my ability to deal
with major offensives, since innumerable open spaces would still be avail-
able to the enemy."
General Kirke thought the Air Ministry's demands were far too high. He
considered that the aircraft factories could be defended by half a company,
that 300-500 troops were sufficient only for the more important Fighter
Commnd Sector Stations and that most occupied aerodromes could be guarded
by 50-100 men. He strongly believed that the mobile columns should be
retained intact and that very few guards indeed could be spared for un-
occupied landing grounds in invasion landing areas. 72.
General	 ob3ections bore fruit. The Chiefs of Staff, meeting on
the 22nd Nay, agreed with General Kirke's proposals rather than pander to
the Air Ministry's demands. They suggested that L.D.V.'s might be used to
increase the number of guards on Fighter Conand airfields, while unoccupied
aerodromes should only be provided with guards, preferably L.D.V. 's and
searchlight trainees, only if there were no troops situated nearby. On no
account were any of these guards to be provided at the expense of the mobile
columns.	 The Chiefs of Staff's decisions went some way to placate
Genera]. Kirke. However, the problem was far from solved and the pressure on
Home Forces to supply guards for more and more vulnerable points was inevit-
ably to go on increasing with every passing day, as the invasion threat
became more real.
A successful defence against an enemy landing in Great Britain, then,
hinged as always on the few relatively well-trained and equipped formations
that made up H.. Reserve. Early in May the H.Q. Reserve had consisted of
three divisions - the first line Territorial 54th (East Anglian) Division in
the Northumberland-Durham area, the 1st Armoured Division in Dorset and the
1st Canadian Division at Aldershot. (See Map 4.) However, by 23rd Nay,
the 1st Armoured Division had departed to France, while only one brigade
group of the 54th (East .Anglian) Division was still desiguated. for H.1.
72. CAB 80/11: COS (40) 370: Home Defence, Memoranda by the C.-in-C.,
Home Forces, 20 Nay 1940.
73. CAB 79/4: COS (40) 1 45th:3, 22 May 1940.
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Reserve. On 20th May the Regular 20th Infantry Brigade, previously located
at Aldershot, also departed for France.
General Kirke now had the difficult task of filling the gap left by the
departure of 1st irmoured Division and, to this end, he brought the first-
line Territorial 52nd (Lowland.) Division up from its training area in Dorset,
between 23rd and 25th Nay, into H. . Reserve in the Swindon-Newbury area.
(See Map 5.) Prom this position the 52nd (Lowland) Division, supported by
the 12th Army Field Regiment with its twelve 25 pdrs., could intervene to
counter-attack a German landing either in East Anglia or in South East
England. The 52nd also acted as a relief to the 1st Canadian Division which
General Kirke ordered on 27th Nay to move by road from Aldershot to the
Kettering-Bigham Ferriers-Northampton area, from where it could support both
Northern Command and the considerable forces now deployed in the area regar-
ded as most threatened of all, East Anglia. To further strengthen and co-
ordinate Eastern Command, General Kirke also ordered on the 27th that the
Eastern Command Reserve should be formed on a Corps basis with its head-
quarters at Aldershot.
The positioning of both these reserve divisions was sound, but,
unfortunately, both the 52nd (Lowland) and 1st Canadian Divisions, virtually
the only two relatively well-trained and reasonably equipped divisions now
remaining with Home Forces, were earmarked by the War Office as early
reinforcements to France to form a new B.E.F. south of the River Soinme.
Preparatory to these moves overseas, the War Office announced, without any
warning, that they had taken over operative control of 1st Canadian Division,
then still situated at Aldershot. General Kirke had had cause several times
before to complain of what he regarded as continued War Office interference
in his dispositions and this last action caused his anger to reach boiling
point. He later recalled that on 24th May:
"The Canadians have been removed [from my command] by someone at the
War Office direct, without even informing Home Forces that it had been done.
They were my General Reserve. I protested to the Chief of the Imperial
General Staff and the Secretary of State." 75.
74. WO 166/i: op. cit., May 1940.
75. Kirke Papers, op. cit.
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This time his protests did, in fact, have some success, since three days
later, on 27th Hay, the War Office instructed that 1st Canadian Division
was to be returned, for the moment at least, to the operational control of
Home Forces. 76.
*	 *	 *
Notwithstanding Ins efforts in mid Nay 194 0 to strengthen and modify
Ins 'Julius Caesar' Plan to meet the escalating dangers posed by the
rapidly changing circumstances of the campaign on the Continent, General
Kirke's own days as Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, were numbered. There
was a strong feeling in the corridors of power that changes in the high
command of the rmy should be made, and made very soon. The Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, had never been particularly happy
in his exalted position at the War Office and for a long time he had been
hankering after a fighting post. General Ironside had never regarded him-
self as a 'desk general'. Indeed, General	 original appointment
as C.I.G.S. in September 1 939 had. been part political, since the previous
C.I.G.SS, Lord Gort, had. found it increasingly difficult to co-operate with
the then Secretary of State for War, Lesley Hore-Belisha. Hore-Belisha had.
consequently appointed Lord Gort as Commander-in-Chief, British Expediton-
ary Force, on the outbreak of war, perhaps to put him at arm's length.
This was the very post which the veteran General Ironside had confd.ently
believed that he, himself, would. receive and which he had even prepared
himself for, but instead he had to be content with the War Office. This
was, after all, promotion to the highest post in the British Lrniy, but
General Ironside was nonpiussed. He was reported to have said subsequently
of his acpointment as C.I.G.S.:
'I should never have been sent there.. I told liore-Belisha at the time.
I had never been at the \ax Office, ]mow a thing about it. I should.
have refused. the appointment. But what else was there? 77.
Because of General Ironside's reluctant and. possibly even incometen
approach to his new job, in wInch capacity there was also some frictcn
between himself and the various Secretaries of State for %a.r, it was
76. WO 166/i: op. cit., Iay 1940.
77. Divine, David.: The Hine Days of Dunkirk, pp. 266-269, Faber and
Faber, London, 1959.
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decided in April 1940 to strengthen the War Cffice team by recalling
Genera]. Sir John Dill from command of I Corps in Prance and. establishing
him as Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The post of Vice-Chief
was a newly created one and was part of a desii to relieve the three
Service Chiefs of some of their heavy burden by setting up a supporting
Vice-Chiefs of Staff Comittee to deal with matters of less urgency, Vice-
Admiral T. S. V. Phillips and Air Marshal R. E. C. Peirse being 2ppointed
respectively Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff and Vice-Chief of the ir Staff
at the sane time. General Dill took up his new appointment on 23rd April
and. quickly proved himself to be very competent. His opinions were already
highly reGarded and his undoubted capabilities in his new role were soon
made obvious to all. Winston Churchill wrote:
"There was a very strong feeling in Cabinet and high military circles
that the abilities and strategic Imowled.ge of Sir John Dill .... should
find their full scope in his appointment as our principal Lriny adviser. No
one could. doubt that his professional standing was in many ways superior to
that of Ironside." 78.
General Ironside was apparently all too well aware of this feeling.
He also saw that the post of Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, might very
soon become one which would. involve what he had long been seeking, control
of active military operations, in spite of the apparent demotion. He had
already turned his mind to the difficult question of the defence of the
homeland. On 25th I'Iay, General Ironside wrote:
"1 am now concentrating upon the Home Defence. The Cabinet are still
wondering wnat they will do about appointing a Commander-in-Chief.... They
want a change to some man well ±nown in England. They are considering my
aDpointnent. I have said I am prepared to do what they want. Obviously,
when one considers how the Germans have worked out their plans for conquest
of all the other countries, they must have considered how to get at us.
Parachutists, troop-carrying aeroplanes, tanks in flat-bottomed boats and
the like. Given perhaps foggy weather, they might get a footing. The
essence of the problem is information and instant action. Delay is fatal.
Attack every body of men seen, irrespective of loss. Only extreme energy
from the op will allow us to deal with this menace...." 79.
That very evening, as the B.E.F. appeared to be in increasingly dire
straights and. many were expecting that, barring a miracle, the final debacle
could not be long delayed, General Ironside, anticipating the Cabinet's
78. Churchill, W. S.: Vol. II: Their Finest Hour, p. 64. Cassell,
London, 1949.
79. Diares of Field Marshal Lord Ironsde, 25 May 1940 (Ccl. R. Nacleod
transcript).
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feelings that his tenure as C.I.G.S. would be shortly terminated, put
forward his suggestion to the Prime Iiiuster. Winston Churchill described
s.rhat happened:
".s tne adverse battle drew to its climax, I and. my colleagues greatly
desired. that Sir John Dill should become CI.G.S.. We had also to choose a
Coander-in-Chief for the British Island., if we were invaded. Late at
night on Lay 25, Ironside, Dill, Ismay, myself, and. one or two others in my
room at Ldiiralty House, were trying to measure the position. General
Ironside volunteered the proposal that he should cease to be C.I.G.B., but
declared himself cuite wllng to command the British Home Forces. Con-
sidering the unpromising task that such a command was at the time thought
to involve, tius was a spirited and selfless offer. I therefore accepted
General Ironside's proposal; and. the high diguities and honoiirs thich were
later conferred upon him arose from my appreciation of his bearing at this
moment in our affairs. Sir John Dill became C.L.G.S. on May 27. The
changes ;ere generally Judged aoDroprlate for the time being." 80.
General Ironsd.e was, in fact, very pleased that his suggestlon was
accepted, though he remained. unhappy about the causes of the move. At last
he had. obtained what was not only, at least potentially, a fighting post,
but was also one of enormous responsibility. Indeed, in view of the vital
importance of defending the United Kingdom against invasion, his nev post
was perhaps, given the circumstances of the time, even more important in
many ways than that of the job of C.I.G.S.. Certainly he was able to step
do'n from the .ar Office and yet still retain his d.iity. He Tote On
26th Iay:
".... I i-as told that I had to ta:e over the command. in igland and
organize hat. I am to be made a Field I:arshal later. Ict at once,
because trie pub_ic may trunk that .. am being given a sop and turned out.
An hono-ir for me and. a new and most important sob, cne much more to my
liking tan C.I.G.. in every way.t' 81.
The nforunae General Kirke, hov3ver, became a. vctim o' tiis high-
level reshufIle. The top man, General Ironsde, wanted his ob and. the
Cabinet had. agreed on the change, so General larke had little cnoice but to
accept his fate, and. this he did philosophically and. without fuss, behaving
wth diguity like the good. professional soldier he undoubtedly ias. He
later recalled that on 26th May:
80. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 65.
81. Diaries of Field Ilarshal Lord. Ironsid.e, 26 hay 1940, op. cit..
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It] was told by the Secretary of State that the Cabinet had decided to
put in Ironside as Commmder-in-.Chief, Home Forces, my term being up on 31st
June. Actually this was not so, as that date applied to my appointment as
Inspector General. It is not worth arguing about, so I have let it go.
I said. that at this juncture the Cabinet must have people in whom they have
complete confidence and that the interests of individuals did not count. If
I was to be replaced, the sooner it was done the better, so that the new man
could get firmly in the sadd.le. Eden thanked me and. said. of course I should
receive pay to the end of my original appointment." 82.
General Kirke was fully aware of the circumstances that had led to General
Ironside's ousting him from his job. He appeared., in fact, to find, his
successor less happy than Ironsid.e had. confided to lus diary. General
Ironside, though pleased with his new appointment, was obviously still
considerably peeved at having been edged out of his previous high position.
General Kirke continued his story:
"I returned to Kneller Hall and. arranged to meet Ironside next day to
hand. over.
Ironside did. this as C.I.G.S.. He is much upset at what he considers
to be demotion, particularly as Trenchard, the Daily Sketch's nomination,
had refused it.
I fancy it is 50% a desire to put Dill as C.I.G.S. and. give Ironsid.e an
easy way out. Eden even offered him a baronetcy to sweeten the piii.
I drafted and. issued my farewell message." 83.
Thus it was that General Sir Walter Kirke departed finally from the
military stage and. entered. retirement, ending a long and distinguished Army
career. His replacement was due to no obvious failure on his own part. He
had performed his difficult task as Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, most
credibly, considering the very limited resources placed at his disposal, due
both to the poor state of Britaints overall preparedness for war and to the
priority in all things of the needs of the B.E.F.. He had. shown a sound and
professional approach to the problems of defending the homeland. Up to 10th
May he had. regarded the invasion danger as being very Slight and had correct-
ly believed that the priority in equipment and trained manpower should lie
with the B.E.F., since it was only on the Continent that the war could. be
fought and. won. He had accepted that the resources allocated for Home
82. General Kirke Papers, op. cit.
83. ibid.
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Defence, therefore, had of necessity to come a poor second and had. even
opposed keeping back Britain's only effective Armoured Division. Despite
Churchill and. others, he held firmly to his belief that only if the Dutch
coastline fell would Britain be in any real danger from large-scale invasion
and. he saw his main task as being to train troops and formations as rapidly
as possible for overseas service, while deploying just enough forces for his
anti-invasion contingency plan, 'Julius Caesar', to ensure adequate security
and keep the politicians happy.
With the opening of the German offensive on the West on 10th Nay,
Holland very quickly fell and the Home Defence situation was transformed
almost literally overnight. The invasion threat was suddenly greatly
increased, though it was still not immediate. General Kirke now displayed
drive and. energy in adapting to the new situation, though he still privately
doubted the occurrence of full-scale invasion and fought a running battle to
moderate the more exaggerated demands of a Government obsessed by fears of
sabotage, fifth columnists, and enemy paratroopers raining from the skies.
Nevertheless, his considerable efforts, despite continuously meagre and.
often pitiful resources, in attempting to improve Home Defence by updating
and reinforcing the 'Julius Caesar' Plan, were most comxnend.able. His insis-
tence that only a thin force should cover the beaches and that the emphasis
should be on well defended ports, backed by strong mobile columns in reserve,
combined with his opposition to tying up large numbers of troops in the
static defence of airfields and other vulnerable points, beach obstacles and
piliboxes, was to prove a superior approach to that of his successor as
Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, General Ironside, and was more akin to that
of the highly competent General Brooke, who took over the post later on. In
May 1940, too, when the threat was much increased, General Kirke largely
overcame the reluctance he had displayed. during the early invasion scares
and. pressed with vigour for a host of other measures related. to Home Defence
to be rapidly implemented.. He recalled, for example, that just a few days
before his replacement the Chiefs of Staff Committee met:
".... to consider my requests for prohibited areas, internment of
aliens, powers of arrest by the Army, immobilisation of ports, more labour
and priority to be given to the Army by the Minister of Labour." 84.
84. General Kirke Papers, op. cit.
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However, in spite of his efforts in this sphere, the clear-sighted General
Kirke never ceased to regard the whole question of anti-invasion planning
and preparations in the United Kingdom as a serious impediment to the task
of Home Forces which he regarded as being the most important of all, that of
training the Army to the highest standards in modern mobile warfare.
Writing later, General Kirke coented:
"The worst feature of all the invasion scares has been the stoppage of
tr n ng for mobile warfare in favour of digging, wiring and general con-
centration on static defence.
The summer of 1940, which should have been devoted to the higher train-
ing of the Staff and troops, has been frittered away in creating obstacles
and pillboxes." 85.
Why, then, did. General Kirke have to be replaced as Commander-in-Chief,
Home Forces? Without doubt, the Tn{n reason was that General Ironside badly
wanted his job and, since Ironside was senior to him, General Kirke had
little choice in the matter. Unfortunately, at 63, General Kirke was one of
the more elderly generals, being three years older than Ironside. His term,
too, was almost up and his successor was better known in the country as a
whole, which was important for national morale at a critical time. The
rapid and tumultuous events of 10th May 1940 and the following weeks created
a climate of change at every level of high command, and the suddenly very
rea]. possibility that Home Forces might actually be forced. to engage in
active military operations gave rise to the feeling that there should be a
new hand at the helm. His opposition to the idea of invasion earlier may
have contributed to the lack of full confidence in him shown by the new War
Cabinet and especially Churchill, who from the outset of the War had, right-
ly or wrongly, repeatedly and forcefully warned of the dangers of invasion.
What is certain, however, is that General Sir Walter Kirke was an
important figure whose undoubted abilities have so far remiried largely un-
recorded by historians, having been overshadowed by succeeding Commanders-
in-Chief, Home Forces. The fact remns that it was General Kirke who laid
the foundations of Britain's planning and. efforts to resist invasion on land
in the Second World War, and it was he who initiated many ideas that were to
be developed by his successors. He is a figure whose achievements deserve
greater recognition by posterity.
85. General Kirke Papers, op. cit.
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PART II: THE IRONSIDE PERIOD: 27 May 1940 - 20 July 1940
CRAPPER 5: "TEE STATE OF TEE ARMANT IS CLTASTROPEIC"
General Sir William Edmund Ironside succeeded to the post of Commander-
in-Chief, Home Forces, on 27th May 1940. At the age of 60 he was only
slightly younger than his predecessor. A tall, well built and very imposing
figure, he was known as 'Tiny' to his colleagues. Re was a veteran soldier
with a long and distinguished career, having first tasted action as a young
Royal Artillery subaltern in the Boer War of 1899-1902. Serving throughout
the Great War of 1914-18, he had by its end risen to the rank of Brgadiex'-.
General with command of 99th Infantry Brigade. In October 1918 he was
appointed Commmder-in-Chief of the Allied troops operating from Archangel,
in northern Russia, against the Bolsheviks. He held this post until October
1919 and soon became widely known as an aggressive and competent cownnder,
displaying leadership, energy and coon sense. He then commded a British
force in northern Persia from 1920 to 1921. Since that time, however, he
had not seen any further active service, but had held a series of important
posts, both at home and. abroad. In 1922 he became Commiidant of the Staff
College, Camberley, until 1926 when he was given commd of the 2nd Division
at Aldershot. Then in 1928 he was sent to India as commander of the Neerut
District until 1931, when he was posted back to England as Lieutenant of His
Majesty's Tower of London. In 1933 he was sent back to India as Quarter-
master General of India. Promoted to a Lu].]. General in 1935, he returned
home once more in 1936 to become Genera]. Officer, Commander-in-Chief Eastern
Commiind. In 1938 he was posted abroad yet again as Governor and Commander-
in-Chief, Gibraltar. As the war-clouds loomed, he was again recalled home,
much to his relie and received the newly created appointment of Inspector-
General of Overseas Forces, in May 1939.
General Irons ide's next appointment as Chief of the Imperial General
Staff in September 1939, however, was to prove much more controversial. His
campaign in northern Russia had given him a tremendous reputation before the
War and his opinions carried a great deal of weight on its commencement.
He had. written a book about the German invasion of Poland in the First World
War and he was regarded as a great authority on the subject. General Ironside,
though somewhat reluctant, had. been appointed to this top post by Mr. Hore-
Belisha, the then Secretary of State for War. Rore-Belisha had earlier
consulted the eminent military correspondent, Captain Basil H. Lidd.ell Hart,
and had requested him to draw up a list of the merits aM failings of
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character of a number of the leading Generals of the time, so as to help him
assess their suitability to fill various posts. Lid.dell Hart had coimnented
of General Ironside: "He had been the strongest of the lot [of Generals in
1 939], but he had likewise suffered a deterioration with age." Liddell Hart
recalled that Hore-Belisha had said to him that:
".... he had been impressed by my emphasis on Ironside' s strength of
personality and capacity as a trainer, in my notes. I agreed, while remark-
ing that Ironside was also inclined to be intolerant and a 'Trade Unionist'.
These defects might possibly be a cause of difficulties...." 1.
By 'Trade Unionist' Liddell Hart meant, perhaps, that General Ironside was
inclined to be clannish and would. stick up for the requirements of the Army
against the Secretary of State for War. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart's
analysis was to be prophetic, since there was soon to be friction between
the General and the Secretary of State, but, nevertheless, Hore-Beliaha
could see no others with General Ironside's drive and therefore proposed to
the War Cabinet that General Ironside, though elderly, should take Lord
Gort' s place as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Liddell Hart records
that:
"Chamberlain and other members of the new War Cabinet, expressed doubts
about Ironside's judgement and discretion, but with Churchill's support
Hore-Belisha mRmged to persuade them to agree to Ironside being appointed." 2.
General Ironside did in fact prove to be a poor choice for the post of
Chief of the Imperial General Staff and he did not measure up to what was
expected of him. He was perhaps slightly past his prime and was never happy
in what he regarded as being a 'desk job'. His judgement, too, could be
suspect, as illustrated, for example, by an address he made to the assembled
officers at the Staff College, Camberley, just one month before the opening
of the German offensive on 10th May, in which he said: "The one thing I
want the Gerinn to do in France is to attack us!"
Smnfrig up his time as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General
Ironside wrote that it was:
1. Liddell Hart, Captain B. H.: Memoirs, Vol. II, pp . 238-239, Cassell,
London, 1965.
2. ibid., pp. 240 & 261.
3. Interview with Lt.Gen. Sir William Pike, 18 Aug. 1981.
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".... intensely interesting, but marred by too many committees and too
much explanation to al]. and. sundry. Military decisions delayed, or criti-
cized. and weakened, before they can be executed. One's own decision feels
weakened by the amount of talk to which it is subjected. It is bad enough
to have three Chiefs of Staff to Bettle something, but when their hard-
earned decision is subject to connnittee rulings, the running of war is
well-nigh impossible....
The real vice of the military position was its complete subjugation
to civilian control, almost in detail. The Cabinet assumed a predominant
position in the direction of military affairs and kept the military leaders
so much on the run that they never had. time to thii* and plan. We were
always hurrying along with explanations and justifications of what we
wanted. Too many cooks at the boiling of the broth. Anyway, as far as I
am concerned, there is an end of that phase. I never had to work so hard
in my life before, and. never had. the sense of futility so strongly before."
Referring to his new appointment, he went on:
"Now I start another phase. I must confess that it is much more in
my line than the other. I am now in command and am not hampered by a
machine that was made for peace conditions and was not fit to function in
war. I wonder how much more the civil side will fall into my hands." 4
The post of Commnd.er-in-Chief, Home Forces, indeed looked, on the
face of it, a much more suitable appointment for General Ironside and it
was certainly one in which he felt far more happy. His powerful personal-
ity, inspiring character, his drive and energy, his fighting spirit, his
excellent pre-War reputation, the fact that he was widely iown in the
country as a whole and had proved during the last few months that he could
keep his head in a crisis, and, above all, his keenness for an active field
command, were all attributes in his favour and the War Cabinet felt that he
would infuse more drive and puxpose into the defence preparations. It was
thought, too, that he would be fully capable of shouldering the immense
responsibility of actually having to lead the ill-trained, ill-equipped and
totally inadequate forces then remaining in the United Kingdom into a real
battle, as seemed increasingly likely - truly an unpromising and. thankless
task at this timeJ Un.forturxately, though, for his prospects of success in
this task, he had seen no active service for nearly twenty years and., due
to his previous post as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had missed out
on the bitter, but invaluable first-hand experiences of modern warfare
gained, very much the hard way, by his more junior colleagues in April and
May 1940 in Norway, Belgium and France. He was thus to adopt a somewhat
4. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord. Ironside, 27 May 1940. (Col. K. Macleod.
transcript.)
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outmoded approach to the problems posed by this new type of warfare.
Indeed, as it turned out, his time as Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, was
to be surprisingly brief and no less controversial than his previous
appointment.
*	 *	 *
How General Ironaide would make out was as yet unknown when he took
up his new post. He arrived at the Headquarters of Home Forces at Kneller
Hall, Twickenhm, on 27th May, in a cheery, but determined., mood:
".... I am at one more job. I always seem to get the tail-end of
things to pull them together. Knefler Ball (isl the most awful Victorian
country-house. Very different to being in London. A lovely summer's day
with green grass all round us and a comfortable little mess that has been
made up a few days ago. Kirke said goodbye and went off. He has been
placed on retired pay and was very sorry to go, poor chap.... He has done
a lot, but has been hampered by people not t p rin the defence of England
seriously. Now they do, which will make it much more easy for me. It is
always better to take over something on the up-grade." 5.
General Ironside was shortly to be given much greater powers than his
predecessor. On the day of his becoming Comminder-in-Chief, 'Headquarters,
Home Forces' was upgraded to the status of a General Headquarters in the
field and was subsequently to be known as 'General Headquarters, Home
Forces' • His staff was gradually enlarged and the able Major.General
Bernard C. T. Paget, just returned from Norway, was appointed Chief of the
General Staff, G.H. Q. Home Forces, and as such was to become General Iron-
side's right-hand man. Previously the organisation of Home Defence had
been centralized on the War Office. The C.-in-C., Home Forces, had had
command of the bulk of troops in Great Britain, his min duties being the
preparation of plans to deal with invasion, operational control of all
troops in the country except special formations nominated by the War Office
and AL. Conmind, executive control of all measures for the provision of
military protection at Vulnerable Points, and comm2nd and tra i ning of the
Home Defence Battalions • All atimi ni strative arrangements, such as quarter-
ing, movements, training of regular Army personnel, etc., were, however,
in the bands of the War Office, while Northern Ireland District was direct-
ly responsible to the War Office on all matters, and the Orkney and
-
5. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 27 May 1940, op. cit.
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Shetland Area was under the operational control of an Admiral, though
aiimin( stratively under Scottish Coninnd. Various committees had dealt
with certain aspects of policy, the chief of these being the Inter Services
Port Defence Sub-Committee, which dealt with coastal defence, the Deputy
Chiefs of Staff (Anti-Aircraft) Sub-Committee, which dealt with Anti-
Aircra.ft defence at home, and. the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Vulnerable Points)
Sub-Conmiittee, which covered defence arrangements for Vulnerable Points. 6.
All this was now changed, however. New instructions definft'g the
ComTnder-in-Chief' s increased powers were forwarded to him on 6th June by
order of the Army Council. These read as follows:
"1. The C.-in-C., Home Forces, exercises complete operational control
over all military forces in the United Kingdom except such as may from time
to time be withdrawn from his coimnsnd by the Amy Council, and Anti-Aircraft
formations, which will remein under the operational control of the Air
Ministry.
Transportation troops will, however, be held in Reserve under War
Office control.
Training units and establishments may be included in the defence plans
of the C.-in-C., Home Forces, and may be ordered to carry out any necessary
recoimnissances or rehearsals, but they will not be given any operational
duties which interfere with their tr-inthg till an emergency arises. If
such units have an operational role, they will not be moved without the
concurrence of the C.-in-C., Home Forces."
The existing machinery and organisation was to be retained for the ainiit,i-
strative requirements of the C.-in-C., Home Forces. However, requirements
on añminlstrative matters which affected operations and the defence of the
country were to be met differently:
"(a) Those which fail within the normal competence and power of the
Commands will be dealt with direct between G.K.. and the
Commands.
(b) Those which fall outside the normal competence and powers of
the Coimnands will be referred by G.H.Q. to the War Office,
where they will be dealt with in conformity with the policy
of His Majestys Government." 7.
6. CAB 106/1202: Memoranda Prepared for a Secret Session of the House of
Commons on Home Defence: Paper A, Organisation and Responsibilities of
the C.-in-C., Home Forces, 11 June 1940.
7. ibid.: 79/Mob/3149, Instructions for the Commander-in-Chief, Home
Forces, 6 June 1940.
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The Coninder-in-Chief, Home Forces, could already ensure that his
wishes were brought at once to the notice of the Government Departments con-
cerned through the machinery of the Home Defence Executive, of which he was
chairman. On 28th May the War Cabinet approved that this body should be
strengthened on the civilian side by the addition of a second representative
of the Ministry of Home Security, a representative of the Ministry of Thans-
port and a senior Civil Servant, Sir Findlater Stewart, who would represent
the civil power as a whole. The Executive would now be better able to give
direction on all matters which were the responsibility of the Civil Depart-
ments and was no longer responsible to the Chiefs of Staff, though it would
still receive direction from them on military matters. If a ruling were
required on a matter of policy or in the event of a difference of opinion
between the Services and Civil aides of the organisation, reference would be
made firstly to the Secretary of State for War and the Minister of Home Sec-
urity in consultation and, in the final resort, to the War Cabinet. 8.
The Lord President of the Council, who proposed these ch gee, hoped
that the Home Defence Executive could now, without reference to any other
authority, deal speedily and efficiently with most of the problems arising
in anti-invasion plsmning and. preparations before an attack. However, this
large and cumbersome body was no way to get quick decisions in an emergency.
Genera]. Ironsid.e referred. to it as "a debating society", while the Chiefs of
Staff considered that it was:
".... too unwieldy as an instrument for the conduct of active operations,
which must be under the general direction of one man armed with the necessary
powers, and served by a small staff."
If an attack took place, therefore, the Chiefs of Staff proposed that General
Ironside should have beside him on his staff his own Chief of the General
Staff, a Naval Staff Officer (a Rear Admiral), an Air Staff Officer (sri Air
Vice Marsha].) and. a Chief Civil Staff Officer, who would be Sir Find].ater
Stewart. This small group:
".... would keep the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, fully informed of
the state and availability of the forces, and conversely would convey the
requirements of the Cotvimnider-in-Chief to the Admiralty, the Air Officers
Cotmn nd.ing-in-Chief and to the Civil Departments."
8. CAB 65/7 WM(40)144th:8, 28 May 1940; and CAB 66/8 WP(40)173, The Home
Defence Executive: Memorandum by the Lord. President of the Council,
27 May 1940.
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The Coninarider-in-Chief, Rome Forces, would, with this small staff and a few
junior staff officers, operate from an Advanced Headquarters situated in the
Cabinet War Room. In the event of a conflict between military neCesBity and
constitutional rights or civil interests, the Cownder- .in-Chief would be
given direct access to the Prime Minister, to whom the advice of the Chiefs
of Staff would be available. Until active operations actually began, how-
ever, the Home Defence Executive would continue as at present. This sensible
arrangement would, the Chiefs of Staff believed, "provide the best means
which can be rapidly devised for ensuring the unified control of all measures
for the defence of this country", and it was readily approved by the War
Cabinet on 29th May.
In addition, a Home Defence (Security) Executive was formed under the
chairmanship of Lord Swinton with representatives from Rome Forces, the Home
Office, LI.5 and Special Intelligence Section. This highly confidential
body was linked to the Rome Defence Executive by a common staff and its duty
was to consider questions relating to defence against the Fifth Column and to
take immediate action.
In the event of communications between the Government in London and the
Provinces being cut by air raids or sabotage, the Regional Coximiissloners1
Organisation, which consisted of twelve local representatives of the Central
Government who were responsible to the Ministry of Rome Security and each
had their own staffs containing representatives from the various Whitehall
Departments, was already designed to carry on, in close collaboration with
the G.O.	 of the Command concerned, the functions of Government.
In the event of invasion, however, the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, or
the G.O. C.-in-C.'s of Commands, or Officers Commanding Areas, acting for him,
could proclaim martial law as soon as the course of the invasion rendered it
impossible for the civil power to carry on with its judicial and executive
functions. The military commander could then assume complete control, but
would normally still use the local Regional Commissioner's staff and organi-
sation to help him. 10.
*	 *	 *
9. CAB 65/7 WM(40)146th:15, 29 May 1940; and. CAB 66/8 WP(40)177 (also
COS(40)405), Home Defence, Conduct of Operations: Report by the COS
Committee, 28 I'lay 1940.
10. CAB 106/1202: op. cit.: Paper B, Note for the Secretary of State forWar on the Powers of the C.-in-C., Home Forces, 11 June 1940.
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The threat of invasion, meanwhile, appeared to be growing daily more
alarming. On 28th May, Neville Chamberlain, Lord President of the Council,
warned the War Cabinet that various recent indications pointed to the fact
that "a German move from Norway was impending". He added that, "there had.
been reports of troop movements from east to west in Southern Norway and
neutral missions in Berlin and Oslo had. been stopped from sending cypher
messages since 24th May", and. suggested that "special attention mast be given
at this time to Norway" since "the Germans might perhaps be intei Mng a raid
on Scotland" • The First Sea Lord and. Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral of
the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, however, said that he "did not think a seaborne
expedition was practicable, although there was, of course, the chance that,
if the Germans were willing to take the risk, it might slip through in bad
visibility." The First Lord of the Admiralty, A. V. Alexander, was also
sceptical about the possibility, pointing out that air reconnsissanceS on
the previous day had found nothing in the Norwegian fjords "except two
ships". • The following day, too, the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief
Marshal Sir Cyril Newall, attempted to reassure the War Cabinet that:
".... the Chiefs of Staff thought that an airborne expedition based on
Norway was only likely as part of a full-scale German invasion of the British
Isles. A seaborne expedition from Norway alone was still more improbable,
particularly during the summer months. Arrangements were, however, being
made for reconnaissance to be ,ni-i-r'tained to guard against the possibility of
a German expedition being directed from Norway against this country." 12.
The m-4 y, problem was simply the lack of effective sources of intelli-
gence combined with sketchy reconnaissance at a time when the evacuations of
British troops from Norway and France were in full swing and rumours and
'sightings' of Fifth Columnists were rife in the country. Any reports of
unusual activity by the enemy that might just conceivably indicate that an
invasion was in preparation often became exaggerated and blown up out of all
proportion. After all, the Germans had obviously planned the swift and
devastating invasions of Poland, of Denm.rk and. Norway, and of the Low Coun-
tries and France, in the greatest of detail, so there seemed little reason
for Britons to doubt that the enemy had not already planned an equally swift
and devastating descent by air and sea on the weakened forces rein1ning in
the United Kingdom. It was only after the War that it was learned that the
Germans had., in fact, hardly even considered, let alone planned for, such a
possibility as early as May or June of 1940. Winston Churchill called it
"the veil of the Unknown". After the War, he wrote:
11. CAB 65/7 WM(40)144th:5, 28 May 1940.
12. CAB 65/7 WM(40)146th:7, 29 May 1940.
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"Now in the full light of the after-time it is easy to see where we were
ignorant or to much alarmed, where we were careless or clumsy. Twice in two
months we had been taken completely by surprise. The overrunning of Norway
and the break-through at Sedon, with all that followed from these, proved the
deadly power of the German initiative. What else had they got ready-prepared
and organised to the last inch? Would. they sud.d.enly pounce out of the blue
with new weapons, perfect planning, and. overwhelming force upon our almost
totally unequipped and disarmed Island at any one of a dozen or score of
possible landing places? Or would they go to Ireland? He would have been a
very foolish man who allowed. his reasoning, however clean-cut and seemi.ngl
sure, to blot out any possibility against which provision could be made." '3•
In Britain, at the time, the dangers appeared to be increasingly acute.
On 29th Nay the Chiefs of Staff approved that the LA.F. should. institute a
Dawn Patrol forthwith, to cover the coast from Sheringham to Newliaven, and
decided to draw the attention of the War Cabinet to the "imminent danger" of
a seaborne and airborne invasion and to impress on them the urgent necessity
for preparing, not only the armed forces, but the whole country, to meet it. 14.
Their report, placed before the War Cabinet the very next day, 30th Nay,
stated that, "in our view .... it is highly probable that Germany is now
setting the stage for delivering a full-scale attack on England." The Chiefs
of Staff considered that with the French Army unable, in the near future, to
mount a resolute counterattack on a sufficiently large scale to keep the
German Army and Airforce fully extended, the Germans, rather than concentra-
ting their attention on destroying the French Army and eli minpting Prance
from the War at an early stage, might well "stabilize the front in France for
the moment on approrimtely the present lines and concentrate on a major
attack against Great Britain." They held the belief that, "the British
Empire is Germany's main enemy and if she can defeat us, the subsequent capi-
tulation of France follows as a matter of course." The Chiefs of Staff went
on to say that they had recently received reports of a new form of attack
that had not hitherto been seriously considered:
"We think it possible that the Germans might employ a large fleet of
fast inotorboats (possibly up to 200), carrying 100 men apiece, to carry out
a seaborne raid on a large scale. The boats could be assembled without undue
evidence at a number of ports in Germany and possibly in Holland. They could
make the passage of the sea during the dark hours.
These boats would be handled with the utmost boldness and would probably
be run up on the beaches without regard to loss of the craft or casualties to
the personnel. By this means we consider that a considerable force of the
enemy could be landed. at many points on the coast simultaneously with airborne
raids inland. We do not consider that by naval or air action we could prevent
such a landing."
13. Churchill, W. S.: Vol. II, Their Finest Hour, p. 143, Cassell, London,
1949.
14. CAB 79/4 COS(40 ) l 5Sth: 1 , 29 Nay 1940.
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They continued with a stern warning:
"In our view it would not be right to assume that the Germans will take
their time about preparing to launch the attack.
The late Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, asked us to inform him when
the Chiefs of Staff considered an attack was imminent. We think that General
Ironside should be so informed now." 15.
Indeed, such an attack, following hard. on the heels of the Dunkirk with .
-drawal, would have had a good chance of lTlPklng land without effective inter-
ference, especially at night or in weather conditions of limited visibility
or if German air superiority prevented reasonable air reconnaissance, because
the Royal Navy did not have nearly enough destroyers or patrol craft to cover
the whole East Coast from the Wash to Sussex, the local seaward defences of
estuaries were not yet proof against light surface craft, the fixed defences
were weak and the beaches were atfil largely unobstructed. Moreover, if the
enemy did obtain air superiority they might be able to guard their lines of
coiniunications against the Royal Navy and enable a mere raiding force to
procure a bridgehead through which a full-scale invasion might be launched.
The Admiralty, in an Appreciation the same day, forecast that the Germans
would employ their maximum effort and. would accept almost catastrophic losses,
making the best possible use of airpower, Fifth Coluimi and armoured vehicles
in the first wave. They stated that, "the success or failure of the first
wave would decide whether the enterprise ever reached the scale of an inva-
sion," while the Chiefs of Staff noted, "We have ample evidence of the
difficulty of dislodging the German once he has established himself on enemy
soil." 16.
The Chiefs of Staff concluded their report by advising the War Cabinet
that, "the Country should be warned and roused to the imminent danger," and
emphasizing the importance of defending the beaches and denying the enemy a
lodgement they urged that, "all labour facilities required to put the beaches
on the Yorkshire Coast, in East Anglia, and on the South-East and South
Coasts as far as Newhaven in a state of defence should be mobilized and the
necessary work put in hand without a moment's delay." They had already
15. C 66/8 wp(40)178 (also COS(40 )406 ), Invasion of the United Kingdom:
Report by the COS Committee, 29 May 1940.
16. Collier, Basil: History of the Second World War: The Defence of the
United Kingdom, p. 123, H.M.S.0., London, 1957; and. C.kB 44/47
Admiralty L010329, 29 May 1940.
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instructed, the Conmiand,er-in-Chief, Home Forces, to review his dispositions in
the light of this new form of attack, and. that, "the Army at home should be
brought to a high degree of alertness, particularly at night. 17.
The War Cabinet approved the Chiefs of Staff's recommendations and
immediately took steps to see that measures to procure sufficient labour and
to warn the Count:ry of the dangers were put into hand. Submarine arid trawler
patrols had already been instituted and the coast watching serv'ice had been
recently greatly strengthened, while the product!on of anti-tank beach mines
would begin in a week's time, at first only at the rate of 10,000 a week,
though this was expected to rise soon to 20,000 a week, still a painfully
small output considering the vast stretches of beach to be mined. The Chief
of Staff's conception of a large-scale seaborne expedition embarked in a
flotilla of fast motorboats, however, like the invasion threat envisaged from
Norway, was based on the slenderest of evidence and much was left to the
imagination. At the War Cabinet meeting that day, Admiral of the Fleet Sir
Dudley Pound said. there were merely "indications" that motorboats had been
collected at Bremen and Hamburg, and that while the Germans were known to have
an organised. force of ships at Vigo, "it might also be siiificant that the
Germans had left one particular stretch opposite our coast clear of mines."
This was hardly overwhelming evidence and, at the meeting, the Prime Minister
said he "doubted whether a raid on a large-scale could be carried out by fast
motorboats", because to put enough men ashore they would have to come over in
large flotillas which would be far more liable to detection and interception
by the Royal Navy on the high seas. It also emerged from the discussion that
"there was some doubt as to the precise number of motorboats which the Germans
possessed", though "they could be fairly quickly constructed". Stretching
their imagination somewhat, the War Cabinet also envisaged that they would be
fitted "with the aerophane type of engine" and. that, if concentrations of the
craft were present in German or Dutch harbours, they might be "readily die- -
guised against air reconnaissances as bargesU 18.
Nevertheless, in the desperate day-s during and immediately following the
Thrnkirk evacuation, such fears seemed all too real and in any case undue risks
could. not be taken. All measures to ensure the security, and indeed the sur-
viva], of the Home Base were of paramount importance, however desperate. The
17. CAB 66/8 WP(40)178 (also cos(40 )406), Invasion of the United 'irigdom:
Report by the COS Committee, 29 May 1940.
18. CAB 65/7 WM(40 )148th:10, 30 May 1940.
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Prime Minister even went 80 far as to say that, in the last resort:
".... we should not hesitate to contRin4ntte our beaches with gas, if this
course would be to our advantage. We had the right to do what we liked with
our own territory." 19.
General Ironside, while acknowledging the dangers posed by a seaborne
invasion using motorboats combined with an airborne landing and agreeing with
the need to improve defensive preparations with all haste, himself doubted
that an attack on the United Kingdom was "iTnminent" at that time. He believed
that to complete the destruction of France would be Germany's immediate prior -
ity. On 30th May, the same day as the War Cabinet considered the Chiefs of
Staff's warning, he mused:
"What will the German do now? Will he turn on the French, or will he
have a go at us in this country? The soft spot is undoubtedly the French.
They wouldn't take much finishing off. To get control of England would finish
the War completely, but I fancy he will make his preparations most carefully
before he tackles us. That must take him time, even if he has begun his pre-
parations already. After all, he may well try to finish us off by air—attack
alone. He evidently wants to finish it straight away.... I should say that
there will be a respite for the Germans to lick their mechanical sores and.
then the avalanche.... Personally, I think that the Germans are more likely
to finish up the French than to go straight for us. They usually finish what
they have put their hand to. At the moment I do not think we are in any
immediate danger - U days." 20.
*	 *	 *
General Ironside lost no time in setting to work with a will, for much
had to be accomplished in the space of a very few weeks if the ration were to
survive. On 30th May, following the Chiefs of Staff's instruction, he accord-
ingly increased the state of readiness of Home Forces by issuing orders to all
Comnands for "all defences to be manned during dar1iess and all steps to be
taken to resist an iiminent invasion by sea and air". By 3rd. June, the re- -
connaissa.nce of all beaches on the East, South East and South Coasts to
determine those suitable for the landing of troops and vehicles had been
completed between Fraserburgh and Southampton, and work on the defences of the
most vulnerable of these was being "accelerated. to the utmost", especially on
the Yorkshire, East Anglian, South East and South Coasts. The same day,
19. CAB 65/7 WM(40)148th:10, 30 May 1940.
20. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord. Ironside, 30 May 1940, op. cit.
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General Ironside, bearing in mind the possibility that the Germans might even
seize Ireland as a base, so that "our West Coast ports, particularly Liverpool
and Bristol, and aero&romes in the West are as exposed to attack by airborne
troops as those on the East Coast", and because of the danger this would pose
to essential supplies, these ports "should have the same priority for defence
purposes", issued orders to Southern and Western Commands for the extension
of the reconnaissance to include beaches from Southampton to the Soiway Pirth.21'
The constrnction of static defences was already making good progress.
On 4th June, General Ironside was able to report to the War Cabinet that:
"In all Commands, preparations for defence against airborne and seaborne
attack are proceeding as rapidly as possible. Civil contractors are in very
close touch with Chief Engineers of all Commrids and, through the latter,
with experienced R.E. officers who are supervising work now being undertaken.
A specially qualified senior LE. officer is attached to G.R.Q. as an Inspec-
tor to ensure that work is quickly and. efficiently done."
By this date work was already well advanced on the construction of piliboxes
and wiring on many of the beaches which were considered most likely for the
landing of troops and vehicles, though on many others, revealed by the recon-
naissance on the East, South East and South Coasts, work was just beginning.
Contracts had been placed for concrete anti-tank obstacles, but few had yet
been positioned. A supply of beach lighting sets had been arranged for. A
total of 50,000 anti-tank mines had already been issued and a further 200,000
had been ordered. A reconiffidssance of beaches was soon to be carried out in
Northern Ireland. Every possible landing ground in the Metropolitan Area had
been reconnoitred and work on many such grounds to render them unusable had
been completed. Contracts had been made and work started "on 90% of possible
landing grounds within five miles' radius of certain specified ports between
Yarmouth and Newhaven and on 40% of such grounds between the Tyne and the
Humber", and. also on similar areas in Scottish and Southern Conmands. The
Air Ministry had. begun similar work on possible landing grounds within five
miles of all aerodromes in the Eastern Counties, though this would obviously
be an immense task. Preparations to immobilize facilities at all ports on
the East and South Coasts from Peterhead to Newhaven were in preparation.
The blocking of port areas from landward attack was also progressing with
preparations for the demolition of bridges on roads providing egress from
21. WO 166/i: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, G.H.Q. Home Forces, May & June,
1940 ; and, CAB 80/12 COS(40)417: Forces for the Defence of the United
Kingdom, Memoranda by the C.-in-C., Home Forces, 31 May 1940.
-146-
selected ports on the East Coast from Aberdeenshire to lent being 90% corn-.
pleted, while temporary roadblocks on these roads were 80% completed. Road-
blocks were springing up in every Comm'nd, the policy in the case of ports
being to ensure that access was barred to any enemy who might have lauded on
neighbouring beaches or from the air, and also to ensure that areas occupied
by troops could not be rushed without any warning. Elsewhere, the mriin
roads would be kept free for our own troops, possible enemy movements being
prevented by artillery. Obstacles were being provided on side-roads to hold
up enemy vehicles, while strong points were to be made in villages. The
roadblocks were still being made with any improvised material that was to
hand, and Dannert concertina wire was also being used. Defensive posts were
being prepared for the guards of these blocks, since they were useless unless
covered by fire. In addition and in close conjunction with the )Iinistry of
Transport, many stretches of wide arterial roads, on which hostile aircraft
might land, were being rendered unusable for this purpose "by the erection
of upright posts with wire stretched between them or by blocks on alternate
sides of the road. Borne 300 yards apart". In short, rapid progress had been
made in a matter of less than a month. However, most preparations were still
very improvised and were often hastily planned, flimsy and. poorly sited,
while a vast amount of work remned to be done. 22.
Some progress, too, had been made with strengthening the fixed defences.
General Ironsid.e's report stated that 47 emergency beach batteries, each of
two 6" guns, were being installed on the East Coast for seaward defence.
These, however, would. have to cover a coastline which stretched from Amble
in Northumberland to Newhaven in Sussex and only 16 of these were ready on
4th June. Further 6" guns for port defence, together with 3" and 4" guns,
had. been installed. on Tyneside, Humberside, and at Lowestoft and. Harwich, but
another 50 guns of various calibres from 4" to 6", which it was planned would
be sited mainly on the West Coast and in northern Ireland, had yet to have
their emplacements constructed before they could. be  installed. Progress was
also being made with improvised anti-tank measures and. with arming the Local
Defence Volunteers. 23 Despite the seriousness of the true situation,
Genera]. Ironside attempted to put on a brave face to the .ar Cabinet and had
22. WO 166/i: op. cit., June 1940. Appendix A: Memorandum by C.-in-C.,
Home Forces, 4 June 1940 (also CAB 66/8 WP(40)194); and. CAB 65/7 WN
(40)154th:iO, 4 June 1940.
23. WO i66/i: op. cit., June 1940. Appendix A: op. cit., 4 June 1940
(also CAB 66/8 wP(4o)194).
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couched his report in confident tones. He recalled at that meeting:
"I appeared in front of the Cabinet and gave them an account of what we
have been doing towards meeting an invasion. Anthox3y Eden told me after-
wards that they were all very happy that I was there, and felt that some-
thing was being done...." 24.
The War Cabinet seemed satisfied, but these measures, however credible,
still represented in early June something of a drop in the ocean.
The task before General Ironsid. of defending the British homeland
against an invasion threat that seemed increasingly likely to materialize at
any time, was clearly going to be a very formidable one indeed. The disposi-
tions of Home Forces at the beginning of June were essentially those of the
updated 'Julius Caesar' Plan and had changed little since Genera]. Kirke had
made his alterations in the middle of Nay. (See Map 5.) Now, including the
38th (Welsh) and. the 61st (S. Midland) Divisions, which were still disposed
in a training role in Western and. Southern Commands respectively, General
Ironside had. 15 Infantry divisions, totalling about 170, 000 men, and. the
weak and incomplete 2nd Armoured Division at his disposal. There were also
57 Home Defence Battalions, many of which were employed on the defence of
vulnerable points, as yet only 18 Holding Battalions, and. some 140,000 men
in trinir'g centres and training units, plus 300,000 newly enrolled, un-
trained and. largely unarmed Local Defence Volunteers, and. the troops manning
the coastal defences. Not available to General Ironside were the troops of
A.D.G.B., the 53rd (Welsh) Division in Northern Ireland and the two brigades
of the 49th (w. Riding) Division, which was reforming having just returned
from Norway (its third brigade had. been sent to secure Iceland). With these
meagre forces he had to guard the whole of Great Britain against the duel
threat posed by seaborne forces that might land anywhere along the East
Anglian or South East Coasts, or even further afield, and airborne troops
that could. land almost literally anywhere. Eight of the 15 Infantry d.ivi-
sions available to him, the 45th (West Country) and 1st London in Sussex and
Kent, the 15th (Scottish), 55th (w. Lancashire) and 18th (East Anglian) in
East Anglia, the 66th (Lancashire and Borders) in Yorkshire, the 54th (East
Anglian) in Durham and Northumberland, and the 9th (Scottish) in Scotland,
had. "the primary role of coast defence with their rear elements disposed to
deal with airborne attack" • In CoTnmmd Reserve were the 2nd London Division
24. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord. Ironside, 4 June 1940, op. cit.
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and 20th Armoured Brigade in Eastern Commmd, and the 59th (Staffordshire)
Division, which were within supporting distance of the coastal divisions in
East Anglia and north of the Humber, respectively, while 2nd Armoured Divi-
sion guarded Lincoinshire in Northern CommRnd. The two divisions still in
a purely tr-inig role, 38th (Welsh) and 61st (s. Midland) could now be
called upon by General Ironside in an emergency. Finally, the IV Corps,
which was reaffirmed as G.H.Q. Reserve on 3rd June and consisted of 1st
Canadian, 43rd (Wessex) and 52nd. (Lowland) Divisions in the area Northampton-
North London-Aldershot, was "suitably disposed to move rapidly by brigade
group to any threatened area between The Wash and Southampton, a coastline
of about 400 miles". 25. (See Map 5.)
These dispositions, which Genera]. Ironside had inherited from his pre-
decessor, appeared on the face of it fairly sound, but a closer exm,frnttion,
especially bearing in mind the new form of attack envisaged by the Chiefs of
Staff, reveals that there were grave flaws. General Ironside wrote on 31st
Nay:
"A large proportion of this force is as yet insufficiently trained and
provided with artillery and. A.F.V.'s to undertake offensive operations, and
must therefore act on the defensive in prepared positions." 2b.
The standard of mobility and training, indeed, left much to be desired.
The eight Infantry divisions on the coast, five of which were insufficiently
trained second-line Territorial Divisions, in fact had little choice but to
act on the defensive, since they were in any case largely immobile, while the
supporting formations, also mainly second-line Territorial units, were little
better off. Transport in general was provided only for supplies and certain
details such as field artillery units, and most troops, if ordered to move
faster than they could march, would have to do so in hired motor coaches
driven by civilians who were completely unprepared for battlefield. conditions.
In most cases, the vehicles and drivers were to be assembled at "short notice"
which meant at least eight hours would elapse before the troops could start.
Thus even quite small landing parties, especially if supported by A.F.V.'s,
might do irreparable harm before being rounded up. 27. The coastal divisions,
25. CAB 80/12 C0S(40)417 (also CBF 1/1074/5(6)): Forces for the Defence
of the United Kingdom, Memorandum by the C.-in-C., Home Forces, 31 May
1940.
26. ibid.
27. Collier, Basil: op. cit., p. 124.
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too, already overstretched, would be even more so by having to dispose troops
not only to guard against the threat of a seaborne landing over, as yet,
almost unobstructed beaches, but also to counter any airborne attack on their
rear. Most of these divisions consisted chiefly of semi-trained riflemen and,
in addition, many of the troops were employed on frantically digging and sand-
bagging static defence works, which left little time for essential elements
of training, such as taking part in exercises or practising firing weapons.
The standard of training and expertise among the Territorial officers and
IT.C.O.'s was appallingly low. ilso the severe shortage of adequately trained
troops coming from training units, coupled vith the demands of the B.E.P.,
meant that most of these infantry divisions averaged little over 5O of their
15,500 man establishment. The numbers were soon to be made up by taking
7,000 men from the Holding Battalions, by increasing the 18 Holding Battal-
ions to 30, so as to hold a further 15,000 men, and by generally taking
measures to speed the flow of trained men coining from the Infantry Training
Centres. By these measures it was hoped to have a total of 60,000 in.fantry
available as riflemen in the shortest possible time. Most of the additions
actually reaching the fighting formations, however, would. be recruits with
little more than four months' training. 28.
Even the relatively well-equipped, trained and mobile IV Corps in G.H..
Reserve was inadequate for its important task. It was expected to have to
intervene "by infantry brigade groups or, exceptionally, as a Corps" at one
or more points anywhere within a vast radius, moving "by day or night". This
could create enormous problems of co-ordination and control. Indeed, it was
ordered on 5th June to "arrange for the reconnaissance of routes to Home
Counties, East Lnglia, Humber and Lancashire areas", to practise the neces-
sary troop movements by road end. to arrange for the reconnaissance of aero-
drones. . simuj.taneous eneny landing, for example, in both ast Lnglia and
Kent, would necessitate the Corps to attempt to conduct operations or. two
fronts, ir. this case both north and. south of the difficult barrier to move-
ment presented by the River Thames, or, more likely, to have a large propor-
tion of its strength decentralised. to Coands to be frittered away in penny
packets rather than used in a crushing blow. Tot only this, but on 3rd June
and 5th June, respectively, 52nd (Lowland.) Division and. 1st Canedian Division
received preparatory orders to move overseas at an early date, and were
28. C.B 66/8 T(40)182: Manpower for Home Defence: Memorandum for
Secretary of State for ar by the 'iar Office, 30 May 1940.
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immed.iately placed under War Office control, temporarily leaving 43rd (Wessex)
as the sole division in G.LQ. eserve. 29.
The greatest problem of all, however, rem.ined that of the acute shortage
of almost all types of equipment. (See Appendices 5 & 6.) The equipment
situation for Home Forces at the beginning of June had, in fact, marginally
improved since 22nd May, due to the emphasis shifting from reinforcing the
B.E.F., to attempting to evacuate it from France arid Norway. Thus, equipment
from new production was supplied to Home Forces, rather than sending it overl_
seas straightaway. The increase in equipment was also due to further units,
mainly artillery Field Regiments, being put at General Ironsid.e's disposal
for home defence. Thus, the number of 25 pdrs., or 18/25 pdrs., available in
the hands of troops for Rome Defence, had. increased from 85 on 22nd May to no
less than 295 on 31st Nay, the number of 18 pdrs. from 52 to 110, and the
number of 4.5" howitzers from 107 to 193. This gave a grand total of 598
field guns available on 31 at Nay, compared to only 244 on 22nd. May, which was
quite a significant increase. There were also over 200 more field guns in
depots, with trir'ing units and at practice camps, and 101 medium and. perhaps
about 40 mobile heavy guns in the Country. Nevertheless, only the three
divisions of IV Corps were in the course of completion to their full estab-
lishment of 72 field guns, and. this was not a measure for Home Defence, but
was, in fact, preparatory to sending them abroad! Thus, on 31st Nay, both
the 1st Canadian and 43rd (Wessex) Divisions had 48 x 25 pdrs., while the
52nd (Lowland) Division had, as yet, only 16. The rest of the Home Defence
divisions were still very short of field. artillery, having between 8 and 30
field. guns apiece, well under half their proper establishment, while most of
these were the outdated 18 pdr. or 4.5" howitzer, instead of the modern 25
pdr.. Only the 49th (w. Riding) Division, freshly returned from Norway, had
its full complement of 72 x 25 pdrs.. (See Appendix 6.) Not only this, but
ammniition for all types of field guns was also in very short supply.
The anti-tank gun position was even worse. (See Appendices 5 and 6.)
For similar reasons there were, on 31st May, 122 x 2 pdr. anti-tank guns
available for Rome Defence, compared with only 33 on 22nd Nay, but, again,
only the three divisions of G.H.Q. Reserve had anything even approaching
their full establishment of 48 guns each. The 1st Canadian Division had 36,
29. WO 166/i: op. cit., June 1940. Appendix B: G.H.Q. Operational
Instruction No. 1, 5 June 1940.
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43rd. (Wessex) Division had only 8, and. 52nd (Lowland) Division had 12,
while the independent 58th Anti-Tank Regiment at Aldershot had only two
complete batteries of 12 x 2 pdrs., instead of its usual four batteries.
All the other divisions available to General Ironside had between two and
eight 2 pdr. anti-tank guns, at most one sixth of their proper establishment,
except the 59th (Staffordshire) Division, 18th (East Anglian) Division in
Norfolk and. 1st London Division in the vita]. Kent salient which still posses-
sed. no anti-tank guns whatsoever!
To stop the German tanks, therefore, the defenders would have to rely
chiefly on the relatively ineffective .55" Boys anti-tank rifle. (See
Appendix 6.) However, apart from the 9th (Scottish) and the three G.H.Q.
Reserve divisions which had their full establishment of 307 of these, and
two other divisions which had 154 each, the majority of divisions on 31st May
had at most 47 Boys anti-tank rifles, less than a sixth of establishment,
while ammunition for these also was in critically short supply. Few divi-
sions, except those in G.H.(. Reserve, too, had their full quota of 90 Bren
Carriers and some had none at all, and. while most divisions had their full
establishment of 590 Bren light machine-guns, there was a shortage of Vickers
heavy machine-guns and. an even worse one of 3" mortars. There were only an
average of 3,000 Mills bombs per division and, althongh most divisions were
up to establishment in 2" mortars, there were only about 20 rounds per gun! 30.
The tank position, too, had. improved but little since the middle of Nay.
(See Appendix 7.) According to a statement furnished by the War Office in
May 1947 which is quoted in the Official History, there were on 1st June 1940
some 963 tanks in the United Kingdom, comprising 110 infantry tanks, 103
Cruisers, 618 light tanks and 132 obsolete 'medium' tanks. 
31. in actual
fact, this presents a very misleading picture, since it includes some 300
tanks in depots and training units, arid perhaps 130 obsolescent light tanks,
as well as the 132 old mediums, which were totally unfit for modern warfare
arid were probably best employed as static pillboxes. All the 103 Cruiser
tanks, for example, were either in depots being completed or repaired, or
being used in training schools, arid none of these had. yet been issued to
30. CAB 80/12 cO(.0)417 (also cP 1/1074/5( 6 )): Forces for the Defence
of the United Kingdom, Memorandum by the C.-iri-C., Home Forces, 31 May
1940; and CAB 70/1 DC(S)(0)2nd.:1, 7 June 19ñ0.
31. Collier, Basil: op. cit., p. 124.
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fighting units. Thus, a few days later, on 10th June, there were only 404
tanks actually in the hands of the troops in the United Kingdom. Of these
292 were tracked, machine-gun armed Vickers Mk. VI light tanks and. 38 were
'wheeled' light tanks - actually machine-gun armed Guy Ilk. I heavy armoured
cars - and only 74 were infantry tanks. A mere 47 of the infantry tanks
had. 2 pdr. guns!
The armoured units at home were almost unbelievably weak in early June.
(See Appendix 7.) On 10th June, the 2nd .Armoured Division in Lincolnshire
was still equipped entirely with 197 light tanks and lacked a single Cruiser.
A further 28 light tanks were with the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, while the
20th Armoured Brigade in Eastern Command Reserve in East nglia had a mere
31 tracked and 38 'wheeled' tanks. There were a further 29 light tanks and
24 Matilda Mk. II's distributed between the embryo 21st, 23rd and 24th Army
Tank Brigades and other units, but these were for training purposes only and.
the three Army Tank Brigades were under War Office control. In fact, the
only fully equipped armoured unit in the whole of the United Kingdom in
early June was 8 R.T.R., which had been left behind for Home Defence when
4 R.T.R. and 7 R.T.R., the greater part of 1st Army Tank Brigade, had been
ordered to France in April. Situated at Tidworth on Salisbury Plain, 8
R.T.R. was not, in fact, released by the War Office to the control of the
Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, until 13th June. This formation comprised
its full 50 infantry tanks plus 7 Vickers light tanks, but only 23 of the
infantry tanks were the new well arnioured and 2 p&r. armed Matilda Ilk. II,
the rem-inder being the old pattern, machine-gun armed Matilda Mk. I, which
had no anti-tank capacity whatsoever! Thus, when General Ironside took
over the post of Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, on 27th May, and indeed
up until the middle of June, there was not a single 2 pdr. armed tank
directly under his control! The paucity of armour with his reserves,
combined with the chronic lack of towed anti-tank guns and even anti-tank
rifles, meant there was, in early June, almost a complete lack of anything
with which to oppose German tanks effectively, a factor which would bode
extremely ill with the defence of the U.K. if the Germans landed. General
Ironside was forced to pin his hopes on improvised petrol bombs. He wrote,
on 28th May:
"The state of the armament is catastrophic. I hope that it will get
better in a week or two. Rope we get the week or two.... Local Defence
Volunteers going well. I must get them armed with Molotoff cocktails in
all the vila€es of ngland. The only way to deal with a tank." 32.
32. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 28 Z'Iay 1940, op. cit.
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An example of the predicament to which Home Forces had been reduced
may be furnished by a closer eyamnMjon of the forces under Eastern Command
which were most likely to be the first to meet any German attempt at inva-
sion. The 1st London Division of three brigades (let London, 2nd London and.
135th Brigades), which guarded the vital coastal sector from the Isle of
Sheppey to Rye, was in a sorry plight. The commander, Major General C. T.
Liardet, complained to Eastern Command on 31st Nay:
"I am very weak in field artillery. I have no anti-tank guns, and an
inadequate supply of anti-tank rifles and ammunition; I have no armoured
cars, no A. F. V. '5, no medium machine-guns."
For mobile reserves the division depended for troop transport on civilian
owned and driven 32-seater motor-coaches, which could take from 8 to 24
hours to collect, and since September 1939 almost all of its vehicles were
still those hired or requisitioned from civilian firms. In late Nay its
motorcycle reconnaissance unit had been removed and lost in the last-ditch
defence of Calais, and the division possessed, at most, 21 Bren Carriers.
The troops, busy preparing static defence works, lacked the time for essen-
tial training. Yet, despite their vulnerable position and the appalling
lack of equipment, General Ironside noted that their spirits remained high.
Visiting Kent on 29th May, he observed. that the troops were, "... in fine
form and very keen. They are all settling down in deadly earnest."
The 45th (West Country) Division next door in Sussex, whose 135th Bri-
gade in Romney Marsh was at this time under command of 1st London Division,
was a little better off for equipment, having 30 field guns to 1st London's
23 on 31st May (mostly 4.5" howitzers and 18 pdrs.), 154 Boys anti-tank
rifles to 1st London's 47, and 63 Bren Carriers. However, there were only
six 2 pdr. anti-tank guns. (See Appendix 6.) The troops of 45th (West
Country) Division in early June:
".... consisted of approximately two weak Brigades [134th and. 136th]
disposed on the coast. The hinterland was manned almost entirely by the
Volunteers .... [manning barricades consisting of tree trunks, old motor
cars, farm carts and. barbed-wire trestles on the main approaches to towns
and villages]. The role of both regular troops and L.D.V. 'a in the area
was entirely defensive. Both had orders to hold their positions 'to the
last man and. the last cartridge'." 34.
33. WO 166: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, Home Forces: 1st London Divi-
sion, Nay & June 1940; and Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironsid.e,
29 Nay 19.O, op. cit.
34. rigadier G. V. Sutton Papers (G.s.c. I Home Guard, Sussex District)
IWM 72/59/5, Memorandum: Dispositions of the Home Guard. in Sussex,
June 19d0.
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East Anglia, it was felt at the time, vas even more likely to take the
first chock of an ene landing. The three divisions on the coast were no
better off for equipment. (See Appendix 6.) On 31st l4ay, the 15th (Scottish)
in Essex had 20 field guns, while the 55th (\. Lancashire) in Suffolk and the
18th (East t.nglian) in rorfolk had only 12 field guns apiece, almost all of
these field guns being the obsolete 18 pdr. or d..5" howitzer. Lach division
had 50 to 60 miles of coastline to guard against invasion, most of it unob-
structed open beaches with a hinterland of excellent tank country, not to
mention the vulnerable ports of Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Felixstowe and. Harwich.
To guard against a tank breakthrough, the 15th (Scottish) and 55th (w. Lanca-
shire) Divisions had only six 2 pdr. anti-tank guns between them, while 18th
(East Anglian) had none at all, and there were at most 47 Boys anti-tank
rifles per division! Only the 15th (Scottish) Division had any Bren Carriers
and 18th (East .Anglian) Division was 183 short of its full establishment of
590 Bren light machine-guns, and. all those divisions were largely immobile.
The supporting 2nd London Division inland in Cambrid.geshire was relatively
mobile, but used mostly civilian transport and was no better off for field
or anti-tank guns, having twelve and two respectively! It had also been
weakened through having left two of its battalions to guard London, while
the handful of machine-gun armed light tanks of 20th Armoured Brigade in mid-
Anglia would be of little value. East Anglia was also extremely vulnerable
to airborne attack, it being an impossible task to obstruct the innumerable
possible landing sites.
The predicament of the vital Eastern Command was summarised by General
Ironside in a memorandum written to the C.I.G.S. on 11th June:
"The extent of coast to be defended by Eastern Command is approximately
320 miles, 160 miles north of the Thames and 160 miles south of the Thames.
Although landings are not practicable on the whole of the coast, these
figures give an idea of the extent of the problem.
The area covered by Eastern Conmiuid is very approiinately 11,200
square miles. Although many of the possible landing grounds in this Command
have been obstructed, it might still be possible for strong parachute detach-
ments to seize a landing ground and enable troop-carrying aircraft to land.
In view of the fact that the min threat of seaborne invasion is
between The Wash and Newhaven, six divisions have been allotted to Eastern
Commmd. Even so, divisions are holding some 80 miles of coast and 1,100 to
1,600 square miles behind the coast. As divisions are about 10,000 strong,
it is apparent that there are few places in which a German landing can be
opposed in strength quickly." 35
35. C&3 106/1202: Memoranda Prepared fox a Secret Session of the House of
Commons on Home Defence; CREP 1/1074/5: Memorandum to the C.I.G.S.
from C.-in-C., Home Forces: Appendix A, 11 June 1940.
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Such indeed was the state of Home Forces as a whole during the early
days of his new appointment that General Ironside, carefully disguising the
fact that he privately thought that the Germans were more likely to complete
the conquest of France than to invade the United Vthgdom immediately, wrote
to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 31st May:
"It is of vital importance that all possible steps be taken immediately
to i.ncrease the strength of the forces available for Home Defence. I agree
with the Chiefs of Staff that the British Empire is Germany's min enemy and.,
if she can defeat us, the subsequent capitulation of France follows as a
matter of course. It may, therefore, be that Germany will launch her next
offensive against this country. We are at the present time very ill-prepared
to meet such an offensive which may have an initial strength of 20,000 sea-
borne and 20,000 airborne troops who will be relatively well trained.
I realise that there are bound to be pressing demands from the French
for assistance in men and material, but the security of Great Britain must
now come first and I cannot be responsible for that security unless all
available forces are placed at my disposal." 36.
In his memorandum to the C.I.G.S. on 11th June, he listed certain essential
steps that should be taken "to render our defence reasonably secure", inclu-
ding the provision of extra Home Defence Battalions to relieve a.11 field
army personnel from the duty of guarding Vulnerable Points, the provision of
hard-hitting mobile Command reserves, the provision of a G.R.Q. Reserve of
the equivalent of five divisions (four extra at the time) and an extra divi-
sion in Northern Ireland, the provision of a full establishment of both
artillery and anti-tank guns together with the necessary ammunition, and an
increase in the amount of labour and material "to construct such beach and
rear defences as it is possible to man". Concluding that, "Unless these
requirements can be met quickly, the very serious risk of a successful
German invasion of this country .... must be accepted," he received instead
a frosty comment from the War Office:
".... this memorandum asks for the impossible. The Coini'rumder-in-Chief
is aware that every effort is being made to equip all the divisions in the
country as rapidly as possible, and to provide such arms and. material as are
available. His task is to make the best use of what has been placed at his
disposal." 37.
*	 *	 *
36. CA3 80/12 COS(40)417 (also CREF 1/1 074/5( 6)): Forces for the Defence
of the United Kingdom, Memorandum by the C.-in-C., Home Forces, 31 May
1940.
37. C 106/1202: op.cit4 and. Note on Memorandum by C.-in-C., Home Forces
by the War Office, 13 June 1940.
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General Ironside was already trying his utmost to do this. He had begun
to formulate his ideas for the land defence of the Nation. On taking up his
new post on 27th Nay, he wrote:
"I have been into the general situation:
(i) Enemy aliens. They must be cleared out of the coast area at once.
(ii) ai [unitsjmust be filled up with men and material at once.
(iii) The petrol situation is not good. There is far too much petrol
in the coast areas, most of it unguarded.
(iv) There is unrestricted movements at week-ends in the coast areas,
offering the Germans any amount of transport for the taking.
(v) There must be much more realisation of the serious nature of the
position in England.
(vi) There is a very scratch staff here in the Home Forces.
(vii) The Civil Departments are all very slow in their methods and do
not realise the value of time in military operations.
I am to have a meeting tomorrow afternoon of the Defence Committee [Home
Defence ExecutiveJ and I am going to get things on the move. I shall have
much more authority than poor Walter Kirke had and people cannot withstand
our demands •" 38.
General. Ironside had great hopes for the newly raised Local Defence
Volunteers. He wrote on 29th Nay:
"Anyway, we shall get these L.D.V.s going. Static defence in every vil-
lage by blocks, and information going out from there. And thousands of
Nolotoff cocktails thrown down from the windows of houses. That might well
settle tank columns. We just want the courage of the men. Nothing else
matters. No defence is any good if the men behind it leave it and run away.
The old L.D.V.s won't do that."
The following day, as the Dunkirk evacuation moved into full swing, he added:
"I shall get a great deal out of these L.D.V.s. It will d.ffer according
to the man who is in charge. I put down the following:
1. Static defence of village by blocks to prevent armoured columns
moving.
2. Information from bicycle patrols issuing from the village.
3. Nolotoff cocktails to deal with tanks from the windows of houses."
38. Diaries of Field Narsha]. Lord Ironside, 27 May 1940, op. cit.
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General Ironside had been very much influenced by the German breakthroughs
in France and had noted the paralysing effect of even very small highly mobile
enemy forces operating in rear areas once the breakthrough had been made.
He saw the Local Defence Volunteers as a means to prevent this paralysis from
happening in England. He continued:
"If we can get this going, we ought to make easy movement through the
country impossible and SO avoid [repeating] the spectacle of France having
her guts torn out without any effort being made to deal with the aggressor.
All the troops cowering behind a water obstacle and facing nothing. Not
fighting, but waiting while their very entrails were being torn out, A
pitiable sight." 39.
This new concept, envisaged by General Ironside, marked a change in
the role of the Local Defence Volunteers. At first, they had been conceived
largely as a force to meet parachute troops, because of the tremendous re-
action to the use of paratroops and airborne troops in Holland, and this role
had been reflected in their members being colloquially laiown as "Parashots".
Their primary role had. been to observe and give warning of attack, and to
delay, obstruct and harass the enemy when he landed, containing his movement
until regular troops arrived. Now, as information about the German methods
of exploiting breakthroughs filtered through to Britain, the emphasis was to
shift, from opposing parachute and airborne troops, to a primary role of
delaying and obstructing the small, fast, mobile, mechanised detachments
that the enemy was expected to use, so as to prevent them from running wild,
from destroying all communications and from creating complete confusion and
panic. Already small detachments of Local Defence Volunteers were sprinkled
throughout the land. and improvised roadblocks were appearing at the entrances
to villages to supplement those on roads leading inland from beaches or to
ports. The villages were at first seen as being local rallying points for
defence against paratroopers. Now, however, the scattered units would be
gradually drawn into greater density at appropriate positions which lent
themselves naturally to defence against the expected German equipment and
tactics. Relatively strong, prepared defensive positions in villages, at
road junctions, at bridges or tunnels, or even within a town, would thus be
established with Local Defence Volunteers mnntng slit trenches, sandbagged
positions in brick or stone houses, and. later piliboxes and other field
fortifications which would, cover concrete roadblocks or obstacles on the
approaches to the strongpoint. Any place on an important road, where nature
39. Diaries of Field Marshaj. Lord Ironside, 29 & 30 Nay 1940, op. cit.
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presented a good opportunity for field fortification, might be organised into
a local strongpoint, so as to deny the use of the road. to the enemy, esipeci-
ally, of course, in the vulnerable East Anglian and South Eastern areas. 40.
All this, however, was a gradual process and was still in its infancy
in June 1940. It was also to be retarded not only by the trirnng and organi-
sation of the Local Defence Volunteers, which was necessary to achieve this,
but also by the acute shortage of effective arms. Nevertheless, progress was
being made. By 1st June, over 300,000 Local Defence Volunteers had been
enrolled and, though only 94,000 rifles had been issued, more were expected
very soon from Canada. Two million rounds of .22" ammunition had been issued
to Commands and a further three million were to follow in the next few days.
The Police were collecting all available rifles from private firms for issue
to the L.D.V. and in rural areas many shot-guns were already in use. The
manufacture of cartridges with lethal bullets was being pressed forward. One
of the Local Defence Volunteers' tasks would be to help guard the 622 factor-
ies and. public utility undertkirigs that had been placed on the priority
lists to receive protection, thus relieving Army troops. This total was to
rise to 800-900 vulnerable points by the middle of the month, and. already
involved 26,000 men of the Home Defence Battalions and. up to 10,000 more of
the Infantry Tr1ring Centres. Most of those on the East Coast were already
being guarded and the L.D.V. had established a close liaison with search-
light and gun units of the A.A. Commrid, as well as with the Observer Corps,
Police and Civil Defence organisations, and with Balloon Command. 41.
By 10th June, the numbers of the L.D.V. had. soared to 471,000, and by
15th June had topped 550,000 men. The issue of rifles did not keep pace with
the increase in numbers and the majority were still unarmed or had merely
improvised weapons. Over 100,000 rifles, including 4,000 private rifles, had
been issued by 10th June, but this still meant that fewer than one man in
four had a rifle. However, 15,000 Ross rifles, the first of an eventual
total of 75,000, had already arrived from Canada and were in the course of
issue, while over 8,000 shotguns had been handed in or were in the possession
of individuals within the L.D.V.; nevertheless, the primary weapon of the
40. CAB 106/1189: Home Guard: Summary Report prepared by J. K. Howard arid
K. Wendell Endicott, pp. 27-29, June 1941.
41. WO 166/1: op. cit., June 1940. Appendix A: Memorandum by C.-in-C.,
Home Forces, 4 June 1940. (Also CAB 66/8 WP(40)194.)
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L.D.V. at this time was still the simple, home-made 'Molotoff cocktail'
petrol bomb, which was now being mass-produced by the thousand. Instructions
for their manufacture had been issued to all Commnds and, by 10th June,
three million matches had been distributed to Commards for use with an
estimated one and a half million 'cocktails'. Experiments were also being
made to improve their method of manufacture by Eastern Command. 42. Though
it was intended that Nolotoff cocktails would be used. against tanks, it re-
mned, however, "very doubtful that they would be effective against anything
other than soft skinned or perhaps open-topped A.F.V.'s, and. then only if the
thrower survived to get close enough". Their greatest benefit was "simply
one of morale". Nevertheless, "any weapon was better than none".
Despite his expectations for them, General Ironside fully realised that
the Local Defence Volunteers were as yet at an early stage and that not too
much should be expected of them until they were properly armed, trained,
uniformed and organised. He admitted to General Dill, the C.I.G.S., on 11th
June:
"The L.D.V.s should be of some value in giving a warning of air landings
and should be of assistance in preventing the enemy from d.ebouching from his
landing points, but their exact value is problematical as they are only un-
paid volunteers without commissioned officers." 44.
Due to the paucity of tanks and A.F.Vs with Home Forces, another of
General	 immediate priorities was to find a means of providing some
sort of armoured vehicle which could be used by the mobile columns for the
purpose of rapidly counter-attacking any enemy landing by sea. On 30th May
he wrote:
"&y chief desire is now armoured cars. When I can have those, I shall
be very much better off. They should deal with motorboat landings. With
infantry in buses, we should be able to deal with the parachutists."
His solution was novel, but could. be
 speedily improvised using available
resources:
42. CAB 69/1 D0(40)15th:2, 10 June 1940; and c 106/1202 op cit., Paper F:
CR 1/2556: Defence Measures in Hand, Latest Details, 10 June 1940.
43. Interview with General Sir Ronald Forbes Adam, formerly G.O. C.-in--C.,
Northern Coiimand, 27 Feb. 1980.
44. CAB 106/1202, op. cit., CRBF 1/1074/5: Memorandum to the C.I.G.S. from
C.-in-C., Home Forces: Appendix A, 11 June 1940.
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"I have decided to form troops of three motor-cars with Brens in them,
commanded by a young Tank Corps officer, and to christen them 'Ironsides'.
They will be given to each division to the tune of three troops." 45.
He expected to have over 400 of these improvised armoured cars ready within
a matter of weeks. It was planned that 288 of the light armoured car type,
mostly the Humber Mk. I 'Hunberette' or 'Ironside Nk. I', on a Humber Super
Snipe car chassis, would be issued in lieu of tanks to the newly formed 1st
Lrmoured Reconnaissance Brigade, which would be positioned. in reserve in
East Anglia. The first 70 would. be ready by 21 st June and another 50 during
the week ending 29th June. L second type, called 'Beaverette ):. 	 after
Lord Beaverbrook, Minister for !ircraft Production, on a Standard passenger
car chassis, protected by mild steel plates on a backng of 3" oak planks,
entered production at the same time and was to be used for, of all things,
the .efence of aircraft factories, though it was also to be supplied to the
R.A.P. for airfrield protection and to armoured regiments waiting to be me-
ecuipped with tanks. Both open-topped vehicles, they carried no fixed
armament, but could be equipped either with a .303" Bren light machine-gun
or a 
.55" Boys anti-tank rifle, as available, which could easily be dis-
mounted for ground. action. In addition 152 armoured wheeled vehicles of
various types were soon to be produced in Eastern Cormarid, though these were
not likely to be completed for some time. These included an 8 ton fully
enclosed version on a Dodge lorry chassis, which was conceived by Sir
Malcolm Campbell, the racing driver and sometime holder of the world land-
speed arid water-speed records, who was at this time Officer Coand.ing,
Provost Company of 1st London Division, and a simple addition to a 30 cwt.
Bedford lorry chassis, which consisted of virtually no more than a rectangu-
lar armoured box mounted behind an armoured cab, with armoured plates over
the radiator and petrol tanks 1 Both lorry types had ports for crew weapons
arid could mount the Bren L.M.G. or the Boys anti-tank rifle. 1one of these
improvisations would, in fact, have been a respectable opponent to a gun-
46.
armed German tank.
45. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 27 & 30 May 1940, op. cit.
46. C.B 106/1202, op cit., Paper F: CREF 1/2556: Defence Measures in Hand,
Latest Details, 10 June 1940; and White, B. T., Tanks and Other A.F.V.s
of the Blitzkrieg Era, 1939 to 1945, pp. 135-137, Bland.ford, Poole,
1972.
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Notwithstanding their obvious deficiencies, both the Local Defence
Volunteers and the 	 were essential elements of the plan of de-
fence that General Ironside was forming in his mind. He envisaged that:
"What we want is the static defence in the towns and villages and the
mobile columns working inbetween..... We cannot make the whole place a
fortress, but we can probably canalise the routes of attack.... My own
view is that we want for the defence of gland two things:
(a) A static defence:
To cover vulnerable points, and the L.D.V.s for the
restriction of movement.
(b) A mobile defence:
Largely motor columns, with the special 'Ironsides',
followed by sufficient infantry in lorries. All these columns
must be small. They should not be organised on a divisional
basis at all. Such an organisation is too clumsy." 47
Nevertheless, in early June, the defence plan was essentially still an
updated version of 'Julius Caesar', even though the two elements of the
Local Defence Volunteers and the 'Ironsides' with the mobile columns, had
now been introduced. G.R.(. Operational Instruction No. 1, issued to Home
Forces on 5th June, made no major changes in the sequence of action that
the troops would take in the event of an enemy attack, except that now the
emphasis was on repelling both an airborne and a seaborne landing, not
primarily an airborne landing as had been the case up until the end. of May.
Thus, firstly the troops, including the L.D.V.s, in the area of a seaborne
or airborne landing, would inflict maximum casualties on the enemy while he
was landing, the enemy forces having, with luck, already been discovered
while in passage and having suffered losses through attack by the Royal
Navy and LA.?.. Secondly, should the enemy have succeeded in landing, the
area held by him was to be picketed by a cordon of such troops as could be
quickly made available, to give time for stronger forces to concentrate and
attack the enemy. Commands would organise small mobile columns ready to
move to the area where landings had been effected, while the L.D.V.s would
hold their observation posts and, in certain cases, man roadblocks to help
prevent the enemy d.ebouching from the area, at the same time sending infor-
mation of any enemy movement to the nearest military commander. Certain
A.A. mobile detachments would come under command of the G.0. C.-in-C.'s
47. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 1 June 1940, op. cit.
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Coimnand.s, as soon as operations against parachutists commenced. Thirdly,
larger formations would be moved by the Commands as necessary to attack the
enemy and., finally, the IV Corps in G.H.Q. Reserve would be employed as
necessary "either remaining under command of G.H.Q. or a part of the whole
being d.ecentralised to Commands". Home Forces would also have the support of
two bomber squadrons which would be under comiriarid of G.H.Q. and be allotted
as required, and five Army Co-operation squadrons, two of which were under
Eastern Command, while one each was under Northern, Western and Scottish
Commands, respectively. Beach defences, obstructions on landing grounds,
roadblocks, piliboxes and d.emolitions were all to play their part in the
scheme of things, while the general policy for defence:
".... is that there will be no withdrawal and that, should the enemy
gain a foothold anywhere, he will be driven out again as quickly as possible."
The overall intention was stated simply as being: ttTo destroy any enemy
troops landed in the British Isles." 48.
There was, however, one significant change that was to have grave
repercussions on a grim night three months in the future. This was the
substitution by General Ironside of the existing codeword 'Caesar', which
was to warn units that invasion was imm{nent, by the more inspiring one of
'Cromwell'. 'Julius' had already been issued on 10th May arid Home Forces had
since been at a state of readiness of eight hours' notice, so the existing
double codeword 'Julius Caesar' was now outdated. G.E.Q. Operational Order
No. 1 stated that, on receipt of the new codeword 'Cromwell', "troops would
take up battle stations, telegraph lines essential for operational purposes
will be taken over and all liaison officers will take up their dunes."
Issue of this word would reduce the normal eight hours' notice down to
readiness for immediate action. Unfortunately, there were two shortcomings
that were not apparent until much later, the first being that no provision
was made for intermediate stages between the eight hours and immediate readi-
ness, and the second was that the system was not properly explained to
formations and units which subsequently came under the conm]and of Home
Forces.
48. WO 166/i: op. cit., June 1940. Appendix B: G.R.Q. Operational
Instruction No. 1, 5 June 1940.
49. ibid.
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CHAPTER 6: ButtrT OF THE B.E.F.
Progress continued apace in providing General Ironaide '5 twin elements
of a static and. a mobile defence. By the middle of June, the production of
anti-tank mines had. reached 80-90,000 a month, while of a further 200,000
anti-tank mines "of a heavy type", that were being supplied by the Admiralty,
100,000 would be available by 20th July and another 100,000 by 24th August,
issue having alrea&y commenced. These mines would mostly be placed in care-
fully charted minefields, either in beach exits or, where egress from the
beaches was unobstructed, above the high-water mark. Not many minefields or
concrete anti-tank obstacles, however, had been provided as early as June,
though good progress was made during the month on the East and South East
Coasts on wiring beaches above the high-water mark and in the construction
of piliboxes with L.M.G.'s to cover all these obstacles, both on the beaches
themselves or in the beach exits. Some 291,000 coils of Dannert concertina
wire and 2,000 tons of barbed wire were issued for beach defence during June
to supplement the 251,000 coils of Dannert wire and 100 tons of barbed wire
issued up to 31st May. As early as 10th June, General Ironside was able to
report optimistically on the static defence of the coast:
"A complete system of coast watching, with communications to the head-
quarters of divisions, had been instituted, and was being improved. Special
bodies of men were being appointed in the various districts adjoining the
coasts, who would. lmow the country intimately, and. who were mobile
32,000 men were allotted to the holding of defensive positions in places
where we could not afford to give up any ground to the enemy. Very rapid
progress was being made in the preparation of beach defences, the manning
of guns, the erection of wire and pillboxes, and. on the defences of harbours
on the land.ward side." 1.
Inland, progress was being made on the construction of roadblocks; the
obstruction of possible landing grounds, not only within five miles of
certain specified ports, within five miles of aerodromes required by the
R.A.F., and within the Metropolitan area of London, but also within five
miles of civil and. private aerodromes and of practicable beach landing
places; and also on preparations for demolition of bridges near specified
ports, though it was instructed that charges on bridges on main communica-
tions should definitely not be laid. The general policy as regards road-
blocks and demolition of communications was that they should be designed to
1. CB 106/1202: Memoranda Prepared for a Secret Session of the House of
Commons on Home Defence, Paper F: CR 1/255 6: Defence Measures in
Hand, Latest Details, 10 June 1940; and C.A3 69/1 D0(40)l5th:2, 10 June
1940.
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prevent or delay the extension of any enemy foothold without prejudicing
offensive operations to destroy that foothold.. 2.
Throughout June too, a significant degree of progress was made on the
fixed defences. The 'beach batteries' of the nergency Battery Programme
were now to comprise 54 batteries each of two 6" guns, two batterieB each
of two 4" guns and nine batteries each of two 4.7" guns on the East, South
East and South Coasts from Shetland to Fowey, while an additional six two-
gun 6" batteries were to be installed on the West Coast from Avonmouth to
Barrow. Of this grand total of 71 'beach batteries', 39 were ready on 11th
June, compared with only 16 on 4th June, 12 more would be completed by 18th
June and, it was hoped, the remaining 20 would be ready by 25th June. Each
battery also comprised two searchlights arid, due to the shortage of troops
for coast defence, half of these ex-naval guns were mimned at first by Royal
)larine or Navy personnel until Army crews became available • The primary
role of the 'beach batteries' was seaward defence, with beach defence being
their secondary role. Placed in open pits without overhead protection, they
relied on camouflage to prevent them being dive-bombed, straffed or shelled
from the sea. Also, to aid concealment for as long as possible as well as
to save ammunition that was in critically short supply and. to offset the
inexperience of the crews, orders were given that the gunners should hold
their fire until the enemy approached within four miles. Unfortunately this
would limit them to about half their effective range of around 12,000 yards
and such batteries were likely to prove woefully inadequate to stop a deter-
mined invasion force from pressing ashore. If an enemy landing occurred in
the vicinity of a port or important estuary, however, the beach batteries
might be supplemented by fire from the guns of the permanent defences, which
were themselves being reinforced during June by further 6 pdr. and 12 pdr.
guns to deal with light surface craft at Yarmouth, Lowestoft, Painsgate, New-
haven and West Hartlepool, and. on the Humber, Thames and. Nedway estuaries.
In spite of all these additions, the fixed defences left many places unguarded
or inadequately protected, while annnunition for all guns was often severely
limited, the 4.7" pieces, for example, having only 60 rounds per gun.
2. WO 166/1: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, G.R.Q., Home Forces, June 1940,
Appendix B: G.H.. Operational Instruction No. 1, 5 June 1940.
3. ci 106/1202: op. cit., Paper F: CREF 1/2556: op. cit.; and Collier,
Basil: Eistozy of the Second World War: The Defence of the United Kin g
-dom, p. 131, B.N.S.O., London, 1957.
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To help provide the other essential element, a mobile defence, Genera].
Ironside had begun the process of re-organising all the infantry divisions
on a basis of mobile brigade groups of all arms, while a scheme was in hand
"whereby two infantry brigades per division for 16 divisions will be made
mobile by the creation of Troop Carrying Companies R.AeS.C.". 	 He inten-
ded to use these mobile columns at an early stage if the Germans attempted
a seaborne landing:
"If the Germans ever attempt a landing here, they will put the utmost
energy into establishing what might be called a 'bridgehead' in England.
All our energies mast be put into stopping this. No waiting for more troops
to come up. Our mobile forces must attack at once, regardless of losses,
and nip the landing in the bud. We cannot inculcate the idea too much into
everybody concerned." 5.
By 10th June, he was able to report to the Defence Committee that, "the arm-
ing of these divisions with rifles, Bren-guns, anti-tank rifles, and armour-
ed carriers, was on the whole fairly complete". There were, however, two
chief weaknesses, firstly that, "the men in these divisions were not yet
adequately trained for attack," and. secondly that, "there was a great short-
age of artillery and anti-tank guns". 6.
Thus, if the Germans gained a bridgehead and managed to land tanks in
force, they might very well succeed in penetrating deep into the Country,
bypassing the stronger static defences or crashing the positions of the
poorly armed L.D.V.s, while the mobile columns could do little to prevent
them. This nightmarish situation had already led to the French defeat and.
General Ironside was seriously worried by the lack of means in Britain to
counter it effectively. He wrote on 30th Nay:
"Our great handicap in this country is the lack of any kind of tank.
If the Germans get their tanks ashore, they will be much more difficult to
round up. Once a column is ashore, they will push on with the utmost bru-
tality. I hope to have a good many of these 6 pdr. and 12 pdr. guns mounted
on light lorries. They may not be tanks, but they may get a shot and knock
the gentlemen out. Our people must act just as the Germans do and go
straight in and attack whatever the casualties. Gradually, perhaps, I shall
get some tanks." 7
4. WO 166/i: op. cit., June 1940. Appendix A: Memorandum by C.-in-C.,
Home Forces, 4 June 1940; also CAB 66/8 wP(40)i94.
5. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 30 May 1940 (Col. K. Nacleod
transcript).
6. CAB 69/1 DO(40)i5th:2, 10 June 1940.
7. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 30 May 1940, op. cit.
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Progress was swift. As early as 4th June, he was able to report:
"A number of 3 pdr., 12 par. arid 4" guns are being mounted in lorries
and. are being issued to Commmds. The first lot will be available in three
or four days and. the total number of 76 will be completed in about a fort-
night." 8.
By 10th June, General Ironsid.e was able to add. that 32 x 6 pdx'. Hotchkiss
guns were being mounted on extemporised. travelling carriages and. organised
on an eight gun battery basis for mobile anti-tank work, while 24 x 4" guns
and. 25 x 12 pars., also organised, into eight gun batteries, were to be
mounted. on 10 ton lorries for a similar role. In addition, it was planned
that some 350 additional 6 pdrs., of which 50 were immed.iately available,
were to be mounted on concrete pedestals in piliboxes for static anti-tank
defence, while another 50 x 4" guns were also available and would be placed
on immobile baulk platforms for beach defence against tanks or landing craft,
either sited for the landward. defence of ports, to cover beach exits, or to
fire in enfilade along the beach itself. By 16th June, no less than 112 x
6 pdrs. were available for a similar static role, enough for 14 batteries,
and more guns were to follow quickly. A proportionate allotment of all these
types was being made to Comimmds, with Eastern Command, of course, receiving
the most, followed closely by Northern Command.
In fact, these 3 par., 6 pdr.,arid 12 par. guns were all Naval quick-
firing artillery pieces, while the 4" was also a shell-firing Naval gun.
They were not true anti-tank guns at all, though they did. have some anti-
tank capacity at the closest ranges. There was little else available,
however, so every shot had to count. G.LQ. .Lrtillery Instruction ITo. 1,
issued on 16th June, gave strict instructions on this point:
tt1f gun positions are exposed too soon, they may be neutralised. by
enemy supporting A.P. V. 's and. aircraft, hence the vital importance of con-
cealment. The first shot must be a hit and. fire must be withheld until a
hit is certain. The maximum range for opening fire should be 600 yards with
all anti-tank guns." 10.
8. WO 166/i: op. cit., June 1940. Appendix A: op. cit., 4 June 1940;
also CB 66/8 wP(40)194.
9. CAB 106/1202: op. cit., Paper F: 1/2556: Defence )Ieasures in Hand,
Latest :Details, 10 June 1940; and WO 166/i: op. cit., June 1940.
Appendix G: G.H.(1. Artillery Instruction No. 1, 16 June 1940.
10. WO 166/i: op. cit., June 1940. Appendix G: op. cit., 16 June 1940.
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Despite the appalling deficiencies of Kome Forces at this time, General
Ironside strove to inintain a confident exterior. In an exhortation for
all senior officers to be handed out to troops on 11th June, he, n1!-shPmedly
using his o suiiame, as he bad done already by iml-ng the improvised
aured cais, 'Ironsides', and. the new Codeword, 'Cromwell', to conjure up
the inspiring historic figure of Oliver Cromwell, whose cavalry, nickned
the 'ironsides', had. performed so well during the English Civil Wars almost
300 years before, wrote:
".... We must train and. prepare in deadly earnest. We must turn that
preparation to the best account by fighting in deadly earnest, as did
Cromwell's Ironsides, for what they considered their rights. There must be
no weakling amongst the military leaders, just as there must be none amongst
the rank and. file. The day has only a certain number of hours in it and we
must work as if there were only too few available. The time has gone for
quiet and ease and the comfortable routine of peace. All military leaders
must exact the utmost from their subordinates. In the defence of our
country, the principle of instant attack against any enemy landing on our
shores, either from the air or from the sea, must be inculcated into all
ranks. There must be no question of cowering behind an obstacle, waiting to
be attacked. The enemy must be located instantly, isolated, and attacked
before he can gather strength. When he comes, he can be but lightly equipped
during his initial assaults. Then is the time to des]. with him with the Ut-
most determination and. self-sacrifice. Any leader who fails to act at once
is failing in his duty. Let each leader and each man go out with Cromwell's
words in his mind: 'It's no longer disputing, but out instantly all you
can.'"
Privately, however, he admitted:
"Ny main fear is the penetration by armoured fighting vehicles. I am
very lacking in gun-power and I can see no immediate prospect of reinforce-
ment at the moment. I have called into being every available gun that I can
find and. I have mounted them both as static and. as mobile units. I can do
no more at the moment." 12.
*	 *	 *
In the meantime, the British Expeditionary Force had succeeded in
struggling back from Dunkirk. By the close of 4th June, the evacuation was
complete and. all resistance at Dunkirk had come to an end. A total of
338,226 troops had been landed in England, of which some 225,000 were British.
Almost overnight the bulk of twelve divisions, plus another from Norway, had
11. Diaries of Field Marsha]. Lord Ironside, 8 June 1940, op. cit.
12. ibid., 9 June 1940.
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been added to the strength of Home Forces. These additions from the B.E.F.
in France comprised the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and. two brigades of the 5th
Regular Divisions; the first-line Territorial 42nd (East Lancashire), 44th
(Home Counties), 48th (south Midland), and 50th (Northumbrian) Divisions;
arid the second-line Territorial 23rd (Northumbrian), two brigades of 46th
(North Midland arid West Riding) and one brigade of 12th (Eastern) Divi-
sions, which had. been used primarily for labour duties on the lines of
communication. Also rescued from Dunkirk were the personnel of 1st Army
Tank Brigade and various supporting and lines of communications units,
while the two battalions of the independent 20th Guards Brigade had been
successfully evacuated from Boulogne, though the composite Brigade of Rifle-
men and. 3 R.T.R. at Calais were not so lucky. With the two brigades of 49th
(West Riding) Division, which had been evacuated from south of Narvik by
31st Nay, this gave a total of 28 infantry and one a.rmoured division now in
Great Britain, compared with the 15 infantry and one armoured division pre-
viously with Home Forces, while a further infantry division, 53rd (Welsh),
still remdned in Northern Ireland. Winston Churchill minuted exuberantly
to the Chiefs of Staff:
"The successful evacuation of the B.E.F. has revolutionised the Home
Defence position. As soon as the B.E.F. units can be reformed on a Home
Defence basis, we have a mass of trained troops in the Country which would
require a raid to be executed on a prohibitively large scale. Even 200,000
men would not be beyond our compass. The difficulties of a descent and its
risks and losses increase with every addition to the first 10,000...." 13.
while it was true that there were now thousands of trained, and battle-
experienced troops in Great Britain and that the shortage of manpower had.
been largely resolved, Churchill, however, was being unduly optimistic.
The will to fight on was never lacking and was epitonised in the Prime
Minister's mauficent speech to the House of Commons on 4th June, in which
he avowed:
".... we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be. We shall
fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight
in the fields and. in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall
never surrender." 14.
13. CAB 80/12 COS(40)419: Future Military Policy: Note for the C.0.S.
Committee by the Minister of Defence, 2 June 1940.
-
-
14. Churchill, W. S.: Vol. II, Their Finest Hour, pp. 103-104. Cassell,
London, 1949.
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However, the means to do so were very laoking The mpin handicap was, as
usual, the chronic lack of equipment with Home Forces, and the arrival home
of the B.E.P. increased this problem severalfold. The B.E.P. had, in fact,
lost over 2,300 guns incluMug 432 x 2 pd.r. anti-tank guns, 315 of the 380
25 mm. anti-tank guns purchased from the French, 837 modern 25 pdr. or
18/25 pdr. field guns, 208 medii guns, 24 heavy guns and over 500 L.A.
guns, 7,000 tons of anuuidtion, 90,000 rifles, 8,200 Bren light manhine
guns, over 4,000 Boys anti-tank rifles, 63,900 motor vehicles of all types
and almost half a million tons of stores. The 1st Army Tank Brigade had
lost all the infantry tanks that it had t2ken to Prance and 3 R.T.R. all
its Cruisers, while several hundred ii ght tanks with these units and. with
the cavalry elpmpnts of the infantry divisions had also been lost • About
400 tanks of all types had been lost in all. Nearly 34,000 personnel, too,
had been lost in the retreat or on the beaches, meny as prisoners-of-war,
though s 13,000 of these were wounded and had been returned h before
or during the D1ri vr evacuation. 15.
Thus, the returned divisions of the B.E.P. would not become an effec-
tive weapon of Home Defence until the greater part of these losses had. been
made good, a task that would take considerable time and would be in addition
to the making up of' the deficiencies of the original Home Defence divisions.
Britain's position was unenviable, to say the least. General Ironside
ccmented on the returned B.E .P.:
"I must say that I never credited the fact that we should get so many
bodies off. Now they are useful, but the equipment is lacking. Shall we
ever get the time to get them ready to fight....?"
Nevertheless, he noted their good morale, despite their ordeal. Visiting
York on 6th Juxie, he recalled:
"We saw all kinds of B.E.F. men going off on leave. All very sunburnt
and cheery. They will have a good effect upon the people in England. They
will make them realise that there is a war on and that we have to fight to
keep what we have got. I am sure that they will bring a healthy spirit into
things.... We now have the men of the B.E.F. in the country and after
seventy-two hours' leave they will be back forming in their divisions. They
will be of the greatest value in every way...." lb.
15. Churchill, V. S.: op. cit., p. 125; and Collier, Basil: op. cit.,
p. 127.
16. Diaries of Pield Marshal Lord Ironside, 4 & 6 June 1940, op. cit.
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Genera]. Ironside's problems, however, were far from over. On 3rd June,
the War Cabinet decided, in response to French demands for assistance at the
Supreme War Council on 31st Nay, to approve the build up of a second B.E.F.
for operations in France to the south of the River Somme. This was a coura-
geous decision at a time when General Ironside needed every formation for
Rome Defence. The core of this new B.E.F. was already in France, and con-
sisted of the detached 51st (Highland) Division, the recently arrived 1st
Armoured Division, the remainder of two of the three second-line Territorial
'labour 1 divisions, 12th (Eastern) and 46th (North Midland and West Riding),
and a host of lines of communications formations, some of which had been
formed into the improvised 'Beauman Division' on 27th May. French pressure
on Britain to reinforce these British forces in Western France continued,
and Churchill had given Britain's promise that, barring keeping an adequate
force at home including the vital R.A.F. fighter squadrons to secure against
invasion, no effort would be spared by Great Britain and. her Empire to help
the French continue the fight. 17. The Chiefs of Staff, too, had advised
the War Cabinet in favour of establishing a second B.E.F., because of the
"good psychological effect on France" it would have, and because Britain
could not ignore "the grave military consequences .... which might arise
should we give no further support to France". However, they had also added
the grim warning that, "Ax]y forces despatched to France can virtually be
written off." 18.
The renewed German offensive on France to the south of the River Somme
commenced on 5th June and from this time onwards it became a race to rein-
force the British forces in Western France in a vain attempt to prevent a
French collapse. Despite the Chiefs of Staff's grave warning, preparatory
orders had already been sent from the War Office to G.H.(., Home Forces, on
3rd June, that the fully-trained 52nd (Lowland) Division was to be prepared
to move overseas at an early date and. on 5th June the Chiefs of Staff made
their decision to d.espatch this division, to be followed soon after by 1st
Canadian Division, a reconstituted 3rd (Regular) Division and 43rd (Wessex)
Division, in that order as they became available. 19. Departing on 7th June,
52nd. (Lowland) Division began landing in Western Prance on 9th June. On 5th
17. CAB 99/3 SWC(39/40)l3th:1, 31 Nay 1940; and CAB 65/13 WM(40)153rd:1O,
3 June 1940.
18. CAB 66/7 WP(40)189; also COS(40)421 : Western Front: British Military
Policy, Report by COS Committee, 3 June 1940.
19. CAB 79/4 COS(40)169th:1, 5 June 1940.
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June, General Ironsid.e received similar preparatory orders from the War
Office for 1st Canadian Division. This division at first had. been almost
held back because of political reasons, but it was finally sent as the
Chiefs of Staff considered it to be "in the most advanced state of readiness
for despatch overseas .... fully trained with its equipment nearing comple-
tion". This was despite the Chiefs of Staff deciding, on 2nd June, that "it
would be a grave military risk to let the Canadians go to France", since it
was "the most effective mobile reserve for the defence of this Country and
can consequently be less easily spared than any other division". 20. The
1st Canadian Division was to begin its departure on 11th June, arid its lead-
ing 1st Canadian Brigade landed at Brest the following day. Even worse was
to follow for Home Forces on 8th June, as notification reached Cr.H.Q. that
the 3rd. (Regular) Division, recently returned from Dunkirk, was to receive
priority in re-equipment so that it, too, could shortly be despatched. to
Western France. 21.
Thus, within the space of a few days, General Ironside was deprived of
the use of two of the three relatively well-equipped divisions that made up
IV Corps in G.H.Q. Reserve. Since the formations of the B.E.F. at home were
only just commencing re-forming and. re-equipping, this left him temporarily
with only a single well-equipped division, the 43rd (Wessex), to act as the
G.LQ. Reserve for the whole of Great Britain. In view of the Chiefs of
Staff's recent assertion that an invasion of the United Kingdom was "immi-
nent", the task of repelling it successfully would. be truly a daunting
prospect!
Not only this, but the divisions now ordered to Western France, or ear-
marked to follow shortly, could only be made up to their full establishment
in materiaJ. by drawing on the equipment of the other Home Defence divisions.
On 30th May, General Ironside had warned the new C.I.G.S., General Dill,
that:
".... it would probably take the essential equipment of one or perhaps
two divisions to make up the Canadians to their full strength, if they are
to go to France. That is a most serious thing to contemplate." 22.
20. CAB 79/4 COS (40 ) 163rd.: 4, 2 June 1940; and. CAB 66/7 WP(40 )1 89, also
COS(40)421: op. cit., 3 June 1940.
21. WO 166/1: op. cit., June 1940.
22. Diaries of Field. Marshal Lord Ironside, 30 May 1940 , op. cit.
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The Chiefs of Staff themselves noted on 3rd. June that the 52nd. (Lowland)
Division, too, could only be completed and made ready for service "by trans-
ferrin,g to it the artillery and anti-tank guns of the 49th Division". 23.
The Canadians were, in fact, to take a full quota of 72 field guns with them
and, though the 52nd. were only to take 36, these were all invaluable modern
25 pdrs. and., together with Corps artillery, was to leave Home Forces with
only 485 serviceable field guns with units, on 14th June. The anti-aircraft
guns of the Corps troops of the new B.E.F. could "only be provided at the
expense of the A.D.G.L", while the 3rd Division had lost all its heavy
equipment at Dunkirk and needed. to be fully equipped, the Chiefs of Staff
noting, on 14th June, that:
"The result of concentrating on the re-equipment of the 3rd Regular
Division for service in France was to hold. up very seriously the re-equipment
of the remaixu.ng Regular divisions which were to be used for Rome Defence." 24.
Even 43rd (Wessex) Division, the last division remaining in G.H.Q.
Reserve on 5th June, was earmarked as a reinforcement to France in the near
future, to follow 3rd Division later in the month. This division was not
only equally badly off for equipment, but was as yet under-trained. The
Chiefs of Staff noted on 3rd June that it:
".... has only just completed Company training, and is deficient in
certain essential items of artillery equipment. It is possible that a
certain amount of the artillery could be collected from various sources or
possibly even provided. by the French. If the grave deficiencies in training
and. equipment of this division are accepted it could be ready for despatch
some time during the latter half of June." '5
The despatch of these forces, virtually all the best equipped forma-
tions in the hole of the United Kingdom, was indeed a desperate gamble at
this most dangerous time. It 'ould involve the gravest risks to British
security, though the plight of France vas, of course, regarded as being ch
greater. The Chiefs of Staff concluded, on 3rd. June:
23. CB 66/7 WP(40)189; also COS(40)421: op. cit., 3 June 1940.
24. CAB 79/5 COS(40)l8lst:2, 14 June 1940.
25. CAB 66/7 WP(40 ) 189; also COS(40)421: op. cit., 3 June 1940.
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"We endorse the opinion of the Commariderin_Chief, Home Forces, that
the forces present in this country ar by reason of their lack of equipment
and of training, barely adequate to meet a serious seaborne invasion. The
return of the B.E.F. on which N. Reynaud places so much emphasis, though
improving considerably the calibre of the manpower available, does not at
the moment increase our defersive pouer, owing to the fact that they have
lost all their equipment." 2t).
The equipment situation at home was so desperate that, on 10th June,
the War Cabinet approved a proposal by the Secretary of State for liTar to
amalgamate five pairs of divisions so as to economise on eauipment, though
each of the infantry brigades of both divisions in each pair would be re-
tamed, as complete units. This arrangement would also be economical in
Head.auarters Staff and. ancillary troops, would leave sufficient infantry
over to form independent brigade groups, arid would relieve the Holding
Battalions from coast defence duties, thus enabling them to revert to their
proper role. 27. In the event, though, only three divisions, the 12th
(Eastern), 23rd (Northumbrian) and 66th (Lancashire and Borders), were actu-
ally to be broken up within the next few weeks, while a fourth, the 9th
(Scottish), was to suffer a similar fate early in August, when it was merged
into the depleted 51st (Highland) Division. This latter division, indeed,
suffered a disaster on 12th June, when the bulk of its strength was surroun-
ded, and forced to lay down its arms at St. Valerie in Prance, some 4,300 men
only escaping in all. General Ironside commented on this further blow to
the British Army:
"Another division, the last of the original B.E.P., destroyed in a
few days. We seem to be fated. Are we going on shipping people to Prance
to be caught and stripped of their equipment?" 28.
As a result of the decision to establish a second B.E.F. in Western
France, it was now decided that the fully-trained arid battle-experienced
division that had been plucked from disaster at Dunkirk, were to be the
first to receive new equipment as it came from the factories. General
Ironside wrote, on 8th June:
26. CAB 66/7 WP(40)189; also COS(40)421: op. cit., 3 June 1940.
27. CAB 65/7 WN(40)l6Oth:11, 10 June 1940; and. CAB 66/8 WP(40)196: Re-
organisation and Re-equipment of the B.E.F., 1emorandum by the Secretary
of State for War, 8 June 1940.
28. Diaries of Field ?Iarshal Lord Ironside, 12 June 1940, op. cit.
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"It is extraordinary how the shuttle moves backwards and. forwards. Now
the P.M. has given 'priority' to the re-equipment of the B.E.F. for Prance.
Naturally, while they are in this Country they are available for perations.
We shall get no more equipment for the troops in this country." 27.
The first stage was merely to bring these divisions of the B.E.F. up to full
strength in manpower and to provide basic personnel arms and equipment.
This could be achieved fairly quickly. General Ironside described their
state to the Defence Connnittee (Operations) on 10th June:
"The strength of divisions varied between 7,000 and. 11,000, but they
would. rapidly be made up to full strength from Holding Battalions. A com-
plete new issue of rifles was being made, which would be concluded in a few
days. Bren guns were also being issued, but this would be a slower process,
as we had not got enough in hand to complete all the divisions. The 3rd
Division, which would be the first to complete, would have its full outfit
of arms and equipment by 20th June. Progress was at present being held up
by the fact that some of the Holding Battalions were actually in the line
in certain parts of the defences. These would be relieved as soon as the
B.E.F. was re-formed, and the progress of this again depended upon a deci-
sion on the proposals .... for amalgamation of divisions." 30.
Heavy equipment, however, would, take much longer to provide. In fact,
the only heavy equipment that could be produced in some numbers within a
short space of time was the improvised 'Ironside' types of lightly armoured.
motor cars equipped with Bren guns. On 13th June, General Ironside wrote
enthusiastically:
"We are now going to turn the cavalry from the divisions of the B.E.F.
into the 'Ironsides'. They have no equipment and are somewhat at a loose
end. They are the best troops in this country and will be fitted to attack.
....
Rearmament of the B.E.F. goes faster than it was. I shall be able to
get these divisions moved into their proper positions very soon. I am call-
ing for a report each evening of the state of the six cavalry regiments being
rearmed with armoured cars. That is what we want for dealing with oth air
and sea-landings. Infantry are no good for attack without them." 3
The rate of re-equipment depended on production and this, in spite of a
production drive, increased agonisingly slowly. The production of modern 15
pdr. field guns, for example, was only 42 a month in June, which, added to a
29. Diaries of Field Narsha]. Lord Ironside, 8 June 1940, op. cit.
30. CAB 69/1 DC(40)'i5th:2, 10 June 1940.
31. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 13 June 1940, op. cit.
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similar number of 18/25 pdrs. converted during this period, plus a small
number of obsolete 18 pdrs. and. 4.5" howitzers which had undergone repair,
gave only enough field artillery produced in June to equip the equivalent
of a single division2 The number of 25 pdrs. produced, however, was to rise
to 60 in July and. to 72 in August, while further 18/25 pdrs. were converted
and more old guns repaired. The production rate of Cruiser and Infantry
tanks was better with a rate of 115 a month in June, a figure that was to
increase to 129 in July and drop marginally to 126 in August. In June and
July, production rates per month averaged about 8,000 rifles, 2,000 Bren
L.Lc:s, 250 Vickers H.N.Gs, 1,400 Boys anti-tank rifles, 500 2" mortars,
200 3" mortars, 60 2 pd.r. anti-tank guns, 120 Bofors light A.A. guns, 150
3.7" heavy A.A. guns, and 9,000 wheeled military vehicles. 52. Considering
that the establishment of a British infantry division in June 1940, even
excluding its base reserves, was 11,800 rifles, 590 Bren L.M.Cr.'S, 36 Vickers
E.M.G., 307 Boys anti-tank rifles, 108 2" mortars, 36 3" mortars, 48 2 pdr.
anti-tank guns, 90 Bren Carriers, 72 25 pdr. field guns and 2,576 technical
and. drawing wheeled. vehicles, not to mention load-carrying vehicles, it can
be reaMly seen that to equip fully the 30 infantry divisions soon to be
present in the United Kingdom, especially in anti-tank and field guns and
in wheeled vehicles, from new production alone, would take many months. The
only hope was from arms which were now being sent from the U.S.A. and the
Empire. General Ironside wrote, on 14th June:
"We are working away and. pouring out the equipment as fast as we can
and every day makes a difference to us. It takes a week's output of Brens
to equip a division. Slow enough.
The U.S.A. seems to be send.ing off the stuff to us and it may come in
time. Shall we have any of our ports open in three months' time? A great
struggle for the existence of the Empire...." 33.
*	 *	 *
The Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, had been reappraising the scale of at-
tack that the Germans could mount on the United Kingdom. A detailed report
by the Joint Intelligence Sub Committee, which was discussed by the Chiefs
of Staff Committee on 7th June and a copy sent to General Ironside, stated
32. Postan, 14. 14.: History of the Second World War: British War Produc
tion, pp. 176 & 183, LLS.0., London, 1 952 ; and CAB 70/1 & 2:
Minutes & Memoranda of Defence Committee (Supply), June & July 1940.
33. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 14 June 1940, op. cit.
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that, although the Germans had adequate land. forces for an invasion even
with the renewed offensive on France in full progress, their air forces were
presently heavily committed south of the Somme and did not have the ability
to deliver a full-scale attack against both Prance and Britain. It was
thought that the Germans preferred their strategy of concentrating on one
aim at a time and. would attempt to complete the defeat of France before
embarking on a new and difficult venture. Therefore, the J.I.C. correctly
assumed that, "It is probable that the Germans will not attempt an attack on
the British Isles co-incident with the renewed attack on the French."
Nevertheless, an invasion was increasingly likely and would be even more so
if the French collapsed. The J.I.C. report continued:
"The invasion of this Country will be for Germany her cnitn, niting
effort of the War. She may be expected, therefore, to press it with the
utmost intensity, regardless of loss, and to throw into the balance all her
available resources." 34.
The sequence of attack, though, would differ little from previous
assessments. The first effort was expected to be an air offensive lasting
without cessation for a number of days, with the aim of neutralizing the
R.A.F. fighters and bombers by air combat and by bombing aerodromes, R.D.P.
stations, R.A.F. storage and m2intenance depots and the aircraft industry.
Air attack would also be likely on Government and military centres, and on
centres of communication and transportation, especially those which would
affect the movement of reserves and supplies to the threatened point. There
might also be indiscriminate and widespread bombing to break down public
morale. This initial effort would be combined with, or followed by, opera-
tions to reduce severely the Royal Navy's effectiveness to intervene by air,
submarine and LT.B. attacks on ships at sea, air attacks on ports, attempts
to mine our Naval forces into their bases, and by attempts to divert British
light Naval forces away from the invasion routes by means of diversions
staged by the German Navy in the North Sea or Western Approaches, or even by
airborne landings in such places as Iceland, the Faroes, Shetlands or
Northern Scotland. The Chiefs of Staff were to add that even a landing in
the North of igland might be attempted as "an embarrassing diversion" • No
less than 4,800 tons of bombs per clay might be expected, though this figure,
based on the initial carrying capacity of the aeroplanes thought to be
34. CAB 80/12 cOS(40)432(JIC); also JIC(40 ) 101: Summary of the Likely
Forms and Scales of Attack that Germany could Bring to Bear on the
British Isles in the Near Future, Report by J.i.C., 6 June 1940.
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available, was later considered to be too high and was reduced. Up to 1,600
long-range bombers and, subsequently, 400 dive bombers and. 500 fighters,
were expected to be involved.
The initial invasion, which was likely to be made from the air, using
landing ounds and open spaces, was expected to follow only when a large
measure of air superiority had first been attained. The Germans were
believed to have sufficient aircraft to transport some 9,750 lightly equip-
ped men in one flight. The number of flights per day would vary between one
and. a half for East Anglia to three for Kent. In view of air and. ground
opposition and the need to land some heavy equipment, it was thought "un-
likely that the number landed. in the first day would be more than 10,000
[soon increased. to 15,000J for East Anglia or 20,000 for Kent". These
figures would include the 5,000 trained parachutist troops that the Germans
were Imown to possess, while seaplanes and. gliders might also be used. The
bulk of the airborne troops would form the advance guard. of the mdn sea-
borne invasion, but perhaps 1,000 others "would certainly be landed. else-
where over wide areas to co-operate with the Fifth Column, and to cause
confusion and. dispersion of effort". 36. Finii.11y, there would. follow the
seaborne invasion, which General Ironside expected would be "pushed forward
with the utmost brutality". 37.
General Ironside considered this assessment as being something of a
'worst	 scale of attack. He commented.:
"This is a dismal enough picture as regards numbers and takes little
account of weather and opposition from the Navy and. Air Force. Probably it
can be very much reduced...."
Airborne attack he regarded as being a serious nuisance, but not a deciding
factor in itself. This, he wrote:
".... may take place at many places and. from any direction. It may
begin by parachutists, to be followed. by troop-carrying 'planes. Such
attack may come very quickly, but it must be limited. in strength, both by
reason of numbers and of weight. It is impossible to block all possible
landing-places for troop-carriers, and. parachutists cannot be prevented. from
35. CA3 80/12 COS(40)432(JIC); also JIC(40)101: op. cit. , 6 June 1940;
and CA3 79/4 COS(40)172nd.:3, 7 June 1940.
36. CA3 80/12 COS(40)432(JIC); also JIC(40)101: op. cit., 6 June 1940.
37. Diaries of Field Narshal Lord Ironside, 8 June 1940, op. cit.
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landing. But they can be subjected to very heavy casualties before they
reach the ground. The answer to such attacks is extreme mobility and instant
action for their extermination, combined with a good local defence to supply
information, and a check to movement from the centre of the main landing.
Such attacks will be employed in conjunction with seaborne landings to
cause dispersion and to upset our command. They may be extremely annoying
if the commanders do not keep their heads. But in themselves such attacks
will not be decisive." 38.
Seaborne attack, however, would be another kettle of fish entirely.
The Joint Intelligence Sub Committee felt that this would immed.iately follow
on from an extensive airborne operation, due to the difficulty of supplying
the airborne troops over a lengthy period by air alone. They expected that
the Germans would still mount their main expedition from the North German
ports, so as to achieve the greatest measure of surprise. This was likely
to be carried in large transports, while smaller craft, including fast motor-
boats and "special landing craft", would collect in the numerous canals and
estuaries along the Dutch, Belgian arid French coasts. By assembling shipping
at many points in this manner and in the shortest possible time, the Germans
might expect to have the greatest chance of evading our reconnaissance, and
by attacking on a dark night or at early dawn, and. at high tide, be able to
secure a lodgement before the British defenders could be sufficiently alerted.
"It is probable," stated the J.I.C., ".... that the Germans will employ their
maximum scale of effort, and will be prepared to accept almost catastrophic
losses."
Due to the limited range at which their dive bombers and short-range
fighters could fully co-operate, the short sea crossing and. the overriding
importance of capturing London, it was expected that the Germans would. most
favour the area between The ash and Newhaven, with the East nglian and
Kentish coasts, as usual, being the most likely of all, because of the diffi-
culty involved in "forcing the straights of Dover" if the invasion were to be
in Sussex. This area, however, the J.I.C. warned, "will extend to the West-
ward according to the progress of a German advance in Northern France". The
J.I.C. even thought that it was probable that Germany "will not confine her-
self to this area, but will try to force transport into the Humber and the
Tyne". Neither the quantity of land forces, nor even that of shipping, were
38. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 8 & 9 June 1940, op. cit.
39. CB 80/12 CCS(40)432(JIc), also JIC(40)101:	 op cit., 6 June 1940.
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expected to be limiting factors to the Germans. The first wave, estimated
at five divisions complete vith L.F.V.s, perhaps some 75,000 men, carried
in 200 to 250 merchant vessels or small craft, and with an adequate naval
escort and ample air support, would be rushed across to seize beaches end
capture a port. Finally, if this first wave were successfully landed, the
J.I.C. expected that Germany:
".... will endeavour by sea and air action to neutralise our Fleet in
order to secure her couiucations with the first wave, and to enable her
to maintain and reinforce the troops already landed." 40.
The Chiefs of Staff, studying this report on 7th June, agreed with the
J.I.C.'s findings in general, but emphasised the dangers of a seaborne
attack, considering that it might possibly coincide with, or even precede,
the other forms of attack "in view of Ritler's tendency towards the un-
41.
orthodox, and. therefore the unexpected". 	 General Ironsid.e, too, was
chiefly worried about the dangers from seaborne attacks, particularly if
the enemy landed at several points and achieved a measure of surorise, and
most especially in view of the inadequacies of his own troops:
"Seaborne attacks will be of a much more serious nature. It is poss-
ible to make surprise landings, however vigilant are our air and sea
patrols. They may be carried out at many points, thus confusing the com-
mander in his judgement as to which are feint attacks and which the real
ones. All may be intended as attempts to gain a footing, with a view to
exploiting any success gained. Several landings will tend to confuse the
defending commander and make him disperse his troops and so prevent him
from crushing a landing at its conception.
The enemy now has very definite advantages over his predecessors. He
now has the use of many fast motorboats arid special craft for landing, that
he has been preparing for many years. He has the choice of many landing-
places and he has the advantage of combining his seaborne attack with air-
borne attacks.
There still remains the difficulty for the enemy that a seaborne ex-
pedition is a risky affair. Unless It has luck it may come to hopeless
grief, through failing to achieve surprise, through bad weather, or through
lack of experience in preparation. The balance of chance that the lending-
places available, beaches, coves, piers and. small harbours, is very large.
We are forced to disperse our troops to oppose the actual landing owing to
the existence of so many landing-places, and. In our case we are forced to
disperse still further owing to the lack of training and equipment of our
troops. We dare not hold back and concentrate, both because our troops are
not fit to attack, and in many cases can only be trusted to act defensively,
and because we dare not give the enemy any elbow room. Our Country is a
small one arid armoured troops can penetrate at a prodigious speed." 42.
40. CA 80/12 COS(40)432(JIC), also JIC(40 ) 101 : op cit., 6 June 1940.
41. CA3 79/4 COS(40)172nd.:3, 7 June 1940.
42. Diaries of Field Narshal Lord Ironside, 9 June 1940, op. cit.
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Writing to the C.I.G.S. on 11th June, about the J.I.C.'s report,
General Ironside warned:
"Clearly with the forces I at present have available, it would not be
possible to prevent invasion by those which can be employed for this purpose
by the enemy, unless the Navy and Air Force can very largely reduce the
scale of attack and. prevent reinforcement of any initial success; but I am
not informed of the extent to which this is likely. We cannot as yet pre-
dict the date at which Germany may begin operations against Great Britain,
but we cannot afford to risk any delay in our preparations to meet them,
seeing what the state of our defences is at the present time....
I therefore urge as a vital necessity that not one hour be lost in com-
pleting the B.E.F. to strength in personnel, in re-equipping it and then in
moving formations to the areas I have planned.... I must be informed of when
all this will be completed, so that I may plan ahead to meet the greatest
danger in the history of the British Empire." 43'
The Prime Minister, however, was more critical of the scale of seaborne
attack and tended to take a far too optimistic viewpoint. General Ironside,
summoned to see him on 14th June, afterwards recalled in his diary:
".... he tackled me about my answer to the War Office upon their paper
giving me the scale of offensive by the Germans of five divisions. He was
indiant and said that the Navy could stop that. I thought to myself that
with France out of it we might well have more than that coming against us." 44
Indeed, General Ironside's fears seemed to be confirmed, as the Joint Plan-
ning Sub Comnittee, reviewing the J.I.C.'s estimates on 17th June, was to
add that the Germans might use, in calm weather, some 800-1,000 self-
propelled barges with a capacity of up to 150 tons each and. capable of 8-9
knots; 24 train ferries, which might be used to carry tanks across so that
they could be unloaded onto open beaches by means of rafts; and 50 LT.B.s
which could be supplemented further by large numbers ol' Italian N.T.B.s
moved to the coast by rail. The J.P.C. was to conclude:
"We feel that, if the enemy succeed in achieving a high degree of air
superiority before she launches her seaborne attack, the scale of that
attack may considerably exceed that of five divisions...." 45.
*	 *	 *
43. CAB 106/1202: op. cit., CB' 1/1074/5: Memorandum to the C.I.G.S.
from C.-in-C., Home Forces, 11 June 1940.
44. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord. Ironside, 14 June 1940, op. cit.
45. CAB 80/13 COS(40)471(JP), also IP(40)253: Seaborne and Airborne
Attack on the U.K., Report by J.P.C., 17 June 1940.
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The J.I.C. thought that Fifth Column activities might occur at any
stage of a German invasion. These might take many forms; for example, spy-
ing and. passing information to enemy forces; indication of bombing targets
by pre-arranged. signals; demoralising the population by spreading false news
or subversive pamphlets; the sabotage of factories, particularly im,nition
and. aircraft factories, or of dockyards, public utilities, vulnerable points
on railways or transport, communication centres, such as W/T or R.D.F.
stations, broadcasting stations arid telephone exchanges; the release and
possibly even arming of internees and prisoners of war; and, finally,
active help to the invading enemy forces, including firing on troops, supply
columns and refugees, to create a climate of confusion and panic. 46. To
reduce the threat posed by the Fifth Column, all aliens were being excluded
from a defined coastal strip and from the vicinity of important bases or
installations, while many German and Austrian nationals had already been
interned in camps; and, on Italy's declaration of war on 10th June, the
Prime Minister had immediately instructed the Minister of Home Security, Sir
John Anderson, to intern all male Italians in the Country. 	 Many were
soon to be shipped to Canada. The Chiefs of Staff, however, still had cause
to complain on 19th June that:
".... out of approximately 76,000 male and female Germans in this
Country, only 12,000 have been interned, and. out of 18,000 Italians, about
4,500 have been interned.. To leave such a considerable proportion of enemy
aliens at large at such a time as this seems to us to be t1cing unwarranted.
risks.
From the purely military point of view, we consider that all enemy
aliens should. be detained forthwith, on the understanding that those who
could be proved. beyond all doubt to be harmless could. be released. subse-
quently." 48.
This policy of 'guilty until proved innocent' was all very well in the cir-
cumstances, but, in fact, the main problem was simply one of accommodating
so many internees in the British Isles. Added. to this, was the danger from
the I.R.A. and from the British Union ol' Fascists, the Communist Party and
other disaffected. British sub3ects, very few of which had. yet been rounded.
up, not to mention a flood. of thousands of civilian refugees and Allied
soldiers from the Continent, any of whom might be irliltrated. enemy agents.
46. CAB 80/12 COS(40 )432(JIC), also 310(40 )1 01 z op. cit., 6 June 1940.
47. CAB 65/7 WM(40 ) l6lst:6 , 11 June 1940.
48. CAB 66/8 WP(40)2 1 3, also COS(40)471 : Urgent Measures to Meet Attack,
Report by COS, 19 June 1940.
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Reports of Fifth Column activities had indeed been flooding in through-
out the period of uncertainty accompanying end following the Dunkirk evacua-
tion. Even Vice Admiral Ramsey, busy directing this very operation, had
reported from Dover on 31st May that there were:
"Indications of numerous acts of sabotage and Fifth Column activity in
Dover, e.g. coumunications leakages, fixed defences sabotage, second-hand
cars purchased at fantastic prices and. left at various parking places." 49
Anything even remotely suspicious or out of the ordinary was eagerly reported
by a 3ittery and over-enthusiastic public, or by the police and the military,
often in a highly exaggerated or eiabelished form. It was extremely rare to
establish anything definite and very difficult to separate the truth from
fiction, yet the threat seemed to be very real at the time. General Ironside
noted on the same day:
"Fifth Column reports coming in from everywhere. A man with en arm-band
on and. a swastika pulled up near an important aerodrome in the Southern
Connnd. Important telegraph poles marked, suspicious men moving at might,
all over the country. We have the right of search and. I have put pickets on
all over the place tonight. Perhaps we shall catch some swine."
The newly formed Local. Defence Volunteers, indeed, proved. an ideal force
for the task of searching for suspicious people and keeping watch for para-
chutists in even the remotest districts. Members of the Mid-Devon Runt, for
example, patrolled Dartmoor on horseback, armed with shotguns and sporting
only their L.D.V. armbands for a uniform. The experiences of the 4th Essex
Battalion, Local Defence Volunteers, in the Hornchurch area of Essex were
typical:
"June 1940 was a month of scares and rumours. Several times, detach- -
ments had to be conveyed in borrowed lorries to outlandish places to make
all night searches for paratroops who existed only in the imaginations of
the rumour mongers. But no chances were taken; the rumours were symptomatic
of the time and there was always the possibility that they might be true. It
was therefore the duty of the Local Defence Volunteers to ensure that their
small part of Britain remained invulnerable." 51.
49. Flem rg, Peter: Invasion 1940, p. 62, Hart-Davis, London, 1957.
50. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironsid.e, 31 May 1940, op. cit.
51. Graves, Charles: The Home Guard of Britain, p. 209, Hutchinson, London,
1943.
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Nebulous reports continued to flow in, even for some time after the
Dunkirk evacuation was complete. One of the favourite subjects, never pro-
perly explained, was that of flashing lights seen near aerodromes, especi-
ally during air-raids. On 9th June, the War Cabinet heard that:
"There had been a recrudescence of reports of suspicious activities
around aerodromes, including alleged signals by lights. There was a wide-
spread belief that there was real foundation for them. As a result, 'para-
shooters' had been ordered out." 52.
These particular reports continued to persist. A couple of weeks later, on
25th June, General Ironside, complaining to the Chiefs of Staff Committee
that "there were still a considerable number of aliens who had not yet been
removed from the tdangerous areas", added that:
"Numerous reports had. been received from all sources of light signals
fired from the ground near aerodromes, etc.. All military and R.A.F. units
were trying to catch the people who were making these signals, but there
had been so far no success. On the evidence available, however, there
seemed to be no doubt that Fifth Column activities of this nature were in
fact going on." 53
However, by the end of the month only a very few suspected persons had.
been arrested and no positive evidence had come to light that any large- -
scale Fifth Column activities were in operation. General Ironsid.e's
"pickets" had had little success in the hunt for the elusive Fifth Column
and he was already sceptical of its existence. As early as 9th June, he
noted:
"Do whet we can, we have not been able to discover the Headquarters -
if such exists - of any alien Fifth Column...."
Later, on 2nd. July, he adnitted. privately:
"It is extraordinary how we get circumstantial reports of Fifth Column
and yet we have never been able to get anything worth having. One is per-
suaded that it hardly exists." 54
In fact, despite all these reports and. rumours, it was not officially con-
cluded until much later, that there was scarcely any Fifth Column in the
Country.
-
52. CAB 65/7 WM( zl.0 )159th:2 , 9 June 1940.
53. CAB 79/5 COS(40 ) 1 93rd:2, 25 June 1940.
54. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 9 June & 2 July 1940, 09. cit.
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*	 *	 *
One of the major pre-occupations of both the War Cabinet and. the Chiefs
of Staff in June, and indeed throughout the suzuiier of 1940, was that of the
dangers that a German invasion of the Republic of Ireland would entail to
the security of the United Kingdom. On 30th Nay, Neville Chamberlain, Lord
President of the Council, warned the War Cabinet that "it seemed that the
I.R.A. forces were by themselves almost strong enough to overrun the weak
fire forces", and. two days later, as the War Cabinet e y mined a report by
the Chiefs of Staff on the dangers posed by a possible German invasion of
Ireland, he argued that:
".... we ought to be ready to send over forces immediately, if the
Germans attempted to seize places in fire, so as to dislodge them before
they had established themselves." 55.
The Chiefs of Staff's report stressed the inability of Eire to defend
itself effectively against even a small-scale German attack. The Irish Army
was poorly equipped and comprised only 8,000 regulars. There was virtually
no air force and no navy whatsoever. Coast watching was inefficient and
there were only a handful of anti-aircraft guns in the whole of Eire. There
were many German sympathisers in Southern Ireland and no attempt had been
made to intern them, indeed fire still maintained diplomatic relations with
Germany and there was no restriction on the diplomatic immunity of trans-
missions to Germany. Previous discussions in Nay with the Irish Prime
Minister, Eamon De Valera, though, had made the Irish Government more aware
of the danger and the Irish Prime Minister had given an assurance on 23rd
May to Viscount Caldecote, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,
that "Eire would fight the Germans if she were attacked and would immedi-
ately call upon the United Kingdom for help". However, because of his
insistence on a policy of Irish neutrality until actually attacked and Irish
forces were engaged, and due to the "political consequences" if this neutr-
ality were infringed by the British, De Valera had been absolutely ad-rrnnt
that there was "no question that Eire could invite in British troops before
a German descent had begun". De Valera had, though, suggested secret con-
sultations between the Irish Military authorities and the British Service
staffs, with a view to arranging concerted military action if a German
landing arose. The British had agreed and. had already taken advantage of
55. CAB 65/7 WM(40)147th:3, 30 May 1940; and WM(40 )l5 lst:1 3, 1 June 1940.
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these to urge the Eire Government to adopt certain precautionary measures
against air-raids, German airborne and seaborne landings, and Fifth Coluimi-
ists. Nevertheless, these precautionary measures, the Chiefs of Staff
concluded:
".... will not secure Eire against the dangers that threaten her.
Until she abandons her attitude of neutrality, she cannot fully safeg.iard
herself against the danger of enemy activities within her territory, nor
obtain the full co-operation of our forces to anticipate and. resist attack.
Unless this security can be achiev, Eire vill remain a serious weakness
in the defence of these Islands."
Discussing this report on 1st June, the War Cabinet welcomed the view that
"the moment the Germans attempted to land. troops in Eire, the Country would
rally to our side", but they were reluctant to admit that:
in present circumstances we could not hope that the Eire Govern-.
ment would allow us to co-operate openly in the defence of Eire, unless
Eire was attacked." 57
Despite this, talks with the Irish Government were to continue in an effort
to persuade the Irish to change their position.
Besides the scale of attack on Great Britain, the Joint Intelligence
Committee's report of 6th June also examined that which the Germans might
bring to bear on Ireland. They expected this to be relatively small, but
warned. that an invasion of Eire might form an important element in the
German plan to invade the United Kingdom, especially as a diversion to draw
off part of an already much overstretched Home Forces and Royal Navy.
"Ireland," they considered in their report,
".... is particularly favourable for an air landing in view of the
I..A. organisation and of known German activities. Germany might, there-
fore, attempt to establish herself in Ireland with the object of attacking
our Western ports and shipping in the Western approaches. It is not con-
sidered that such attacks would be carried out in any force, as the Eire
Government could put up little resistance, and supplies for large air and
air defence forces would have to be brought in by sea. Thirthermore, the
numbers of troop-carrying aircraft available for Ireland are likely to be
limn.ited by the German need to reserve the main portion of their air trans-
port fleet for the main blow - the invasion of Great Britain.
56. CAB 66/8 WP(40)183, also COS(40)410t Eire - Report by the COS
Committee, 30 ?'Iay 1940.
57. CAB 65/7 WM(40)l5lst:13, 1 June 1940.
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There is evidence that Germany is deliberately stressing the threat
to Ireland with the object of encouraging a dispersion of our forces."
While the J.I.C. considered that an invasion of Ireland by air was possible,
they thought that there was mach less likelihood of a seaborne attack:
"Reports have been received of projected seaborne landings in Ireland
from Spain, but there is no evidence that these have been planned, and at
present these reports are open to doubt. It seems possible, however, that
we may expect a feint against Ireland in order to draw our fleet away from
the main seaborne expedition." 58.
The Chiefs of Staff's Committee, however, meeting the following day,
criticised these assumptions, saying that,
".... the report did. not sufficiently stress the dangers of an attempt
to invade Ireland and. use that country as a base for attack on our West
Coast."
There was also the danger such an invasion of Eire would pose to Northern
Ireland., where there were industries vital to the war effort, quite apart
from its being part of the United Kingdom. The Chiefs of Staff urged that:
"Some troops, in addition to those already stationed in Northern Ire-
land, should be earmarked for immediate action against any forces that
obtained a footing in Southern Ireland. The two brigades ol' Royal !iarines
were suited to this role and, if stationed near a convenient West Coast
port and if the necessary sea transport was held in readiness at that point,
they should be able to reach Ireland within about twelve hours of the
initial German landing. Their employment against other possible objectives,
such as the Canary Islands, was not excluded." 59
Indeed, the J.I.C. were shortly to admit that up to one German division,
say 15,000 men, might be used to invade Eire by sea, carried by German or
neutral merchant vessels from Spain, or even Western France, together with
anti-aircraft guns to protect aerodromes and heavy guns for coastal defence,
and that perhaps 1,000 airborne troops, including parachutists, would be
employed. 60. In addition, small forces might be landed from submarines
58. CAB 80/12 C0s(40)432(JIc), also JIC(40 ) 101 : op. cit., 6 June 1940.
59. CAB 79/4 COS(40)172nd:3, 7 June 1940.
60. CAB 80/13 COS(40)465(JIc), also JIC(4 0)121 : Seaborne and Airborne
Attack on the U.K., Report by J.I.C., .Aiinexe A, 15 June 1940.
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and. fishing vessels. Thus, despite the relatively small scale of attack
expected on Ireland, compared with that on Great Britain, further precan-
tions to prevent it would have to be taken.
As the Germans completed their conquest of Western France, and. France
entered its death throes, the danger to Ireland, not to mention England,
appeared to grow even more acute. The talks with Eamon De Va].era, however,
though impressing him with the British Government's view of imminent inva-
sion, soon cane to nothing. Even the bargirilng counter of the British
Government's accepting, "in principle" and subject to the agreement of Lord
Craigavon, the Ulster leader, some sort of arrangement in favour of a United
Ireland in exchange for British use of Atlantic ports such as Berehaven,
the stationing of British troops arid R.A.F. units in Eire, and immediate
action by the Irish Authorities against the I.R.A., Germans and Italians in
that country, completely failed to move the Irish from their insistence on
neutrality until actually attacked and. their resolve to resist any belliger-
ent by force, while the ideas mooted for a 'United Ireland' only succeeded
in upsetting the Dister politicians. The Eire Government also asked for
arms, but the British Government were reluctant to supply more than a token
amount of arms to the Irish Army, partly because of the general dearth of
arms in the United Kingdom, in any case, but also, perhaps less credibly,
because of the intransigent Irish attitude which fostered the fear that
such arms might easily fall into the hands of subversive elements, such as
the I.R.A., who would not hesitate to use them against any British forces,
whether entering Eire or not. 	 Neville Chamberlain, who as Lord Presi-
dent of the Council had been responsible for supervising the negotiations,
considered that the chief reason for De Valera's attitude was in reality
that,
".... their people were really almost completely unprepared for war....
They had not a well-equipped army, nor had they guns to resist tanks and
mechanised troops. Dublin was practically an undefended city, where there
were only a few anti-aircraft guns and no air-raid shelters or gas masks for
the citizens. The people would. be mercilessly exposed to the horrors of
modern war, and. he could. not have it on his conscience that in this state of
affairs he had taken the initiative in an action which led to war."
61. CB 65/7 WM(40 )1 68th:5, 16 June 1940; viN(4O)173 rd.: 9, 20 June 1940;
WM(40 ) 182nd:1, 25 June 1940; WM(40 )1 86th:1 , 28 June 1940; and
CiB 65/8 WN(40)189th:9, 1 July 1940; WM(40)l9lst: 11 , 2 July 1940.
62. CA 66/9 WP(40)223: Eire - Negotiations with Mr. De Valera, Memorandum
by the Lord President of the Council, 25 June 1940.
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Thus it was that undue pressure could not be put on Northern Ireland to
consent to union without inf1iiirg passions in the North, while any attempt
by by British forces to enter Eire and. occupy ports in advance of German
aggression, or even to supply large quantities of arms to the Irish iriny,
could not be made without the risk of inflaming active resistance in the
South. On 6th July, the War Cabinet finally had to admit defeat and "author-.
ised. the Lord President to inform Lord Craigavon that the negotiations with
the Eire Governmer.t were now at an end". 63. The Irish problem, as usual,
seemed to defy solution.
Nevertheless, even while these discussions were still in progress,
measures were already afoot to strengthen the British forces that could
intervene in the event of a German invasion of Eire, either from Northern
Ireland or from the mainland of Britain. The Chiefs of Staff had strongly
recommended that further troops should be placed in readiness for possible
operations in Eire as early as 7th June, while on 21st June Winston Churchill
told the Defence Committee that,
".... we must accept the prospect of the Germans being able to get into
Eire before us, but as soon as this took place we must be ready to pounce
upon them with strong forces from every quarter at once, with the least
possible delay."
Indeed, the Chiefs of Staff had concluded on the previous day that,
".... first priority should be given to the requirements for dealing
with a German invasion of Eire, w1uc in their opinion was the most serious
menace outside the United Kingdom." b4.
Already on 15th June, the partially trained and. equipped second—line
Territorial 61st (South Midland) Division, previously in the Oxford area, had
been ordered to move to Northern Ireland. District at short notice, less its
divisional artillery, Royal xgineer and other services, starting at noon the
next day, and. by 20th June it was concentrated. in tfl.ster. 65. This division,
now comprising only 7,000 infantrymen, was to take over the role of the
static defence of Northern Ireland from 53rd (Welsh) Division, and. was to
63. CAB 65/8 WM(40)195th:11, 6 July 1940.
64. CAB 79/4 COS(40)172nd.:3, 7 June 1940 ; and CAB 69/1 D0(40)l8th:2,
21 June 1940.
65. WO 166/i: op. cit., June 1940.
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supplement the 8,000 defence troops in Ulster. The latter comprised some
5,000 men in infantry trn1n4ng centres, one Home Defence battalion, a second
Home Defence battalion being raised, and the troops of A.D.G.B. and. those
mnnir the Belfast port defences. Also in Ulster were the Irish Horse with
their 15 armoured cars, who were soon joined by the 2nd Fife & Forfar Yeo-
manry. Thus relieved, the 53rd (Welsh) Division, a first-line Territorial
formation, became available "for mobile operations, if called upon, in
support of Eire". Organised into three brigade groups, the 14,000 strong
53rd. (Welsh) Division was, by 20th June, being placed on a fully motorised
basis, with motor transport in the process of being provided. In addition,
a Royal Marine Brigade, of some 2,500 men, was moved to Milford. Haven,
".... ready to move at the shortest notice by the 22nd. June; ships will
be standing by. The destination of this brigade would have to be settled in
the light of information received as to the enemy's action. Its role would.
be to seize a bridgehead for the landing of further troops."
This bridgehead was at first likely to be an Irish port and., to exploit this
gain, one Regular division was "being held in readiness in the United flngdom
to follow up the Royal Marine Brigade as quickly as possible". 	 T,ji
squadrons of Battle bombers were to move to Northern Ireland. to co-operate
with the troops by making air attacks on the points of enemy landings. These
would replace the improvised squadrons that had been made up from tr-in4-ng
establishments. Further R.A.E. support could be quickly supplied from the
British tninland. The Defence Coittee also agreed, on 21st June, that a
commander of all the British land forces which would operate in Eire "should
be appointed immediately". 67.
These arrangements, involving over 31,000 troops in an attaci Irig role,
backed by another 15,000 for static defence, would, it was hoped, be more
than enough to deal with the maximum of 15,000 seaborne and 1,000 airborne
troops which it was estimated the Germans might send. to Eire to co-operate
with perhaps 2,000 well armed synipathisere and. members of the I.R.A.. How-
ever, it would be a while before these arrangements would become fully
effective and. certain flaws were already apparent. The 53rd (Welsh) Division
bad not yet completed. its tr-1nl-rig, nor was it fully equipped. It was to be
66. CAB 80/13 COS(40)473: Eire - Revised Draft Report by COS Conmiittee,
19 June 1940; and. COS(40)479: Eire - Plans to Meet a German InvaBion,
Aide Memoire, 20 June 1940.
67. CAB 69/1 D0(40 ) lBth:2 , 21 June 1940.
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let July before all the necessary motor transport could be provided.. In the
meantime, one of its brigade groups would have to move south by train. 68.
The Royal Marine Brigade were only capable of seizing a bridgehead, since
they "had little or no transport of their own and would not be suitable to
undertake operations far inland". At first they lacked field artillery and.
L.A. guns. They would also be wrongly placed to counter a possible German
landing, perhaps from Norway, on the northern half of the coastline of
Ireland, though, by the beginning of July, Northern Ireland itself would be
chosen as the bridgehead for operations. 69. Finally, the 3rd Regular Divi-
sion, which was the division selected. to be held in readiness in Britain,
had just been moved, on 19th June, to the West Sussex Coast, which would
mean a very long time would elapse before it could. land in Ireland. This
formation, in fact, was,
".... at present the only fully equipped Regular reserve in the United
Kingdom. Its three brigade groups were being trained for various offensive
operations, but the division was not definitely earmarked for Eire. If it
was to go at short notice, it would have to be moved nearer to the West
Coast, and ships would have to be made available for it at short notice."
Thus, the British capacity to intervene effectively in force in Southern
Ireland at this time, and. indeed throughout the following month at least, was
in actual fact very limited, the handicap of having to send reinforcements
across the Irish Sea being particularly evident, with all the time-consmnirig
loading and unloading of troops, stores and equipment that this would in-
volve, not to mention the necessity of having to assemble adequate shipping
in a very short space of time. Time was the key to the whole matter. The
drawbacks were to give continuing canse for concern. The Chiefs of Staff
commented on the arrangements in June:
"In spite of these resources .... the situation is very serious and it
seems certain that, unless strong British forces can be stationed in Eire
before any invasion takes place, a large part of the country at any rate
must be overrun before help can arrive." 11.
*	 *	 *
68. CAB 80/13 COS(40)479: op. cit., 20 June 1940.
69. CAB 79/5 COS(40)189th:3, 21 June 1940; and CAB 79/5 COS(40)203rd:1,
Arinexe, 1 July 1940.
70. CAB 69/1 DO(40)l8th:2, 21 June 1940.
71. CAB 80/13 COS(40)473: op. cit., 19 June 1940.
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It was by now becoming obvious that France could no longer hold. out
against the German forces that were advancing ever deeper into her interior.
On 16th June, the French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud., resiied. and at noon
the next day the new leader, the veteran Marshal Ptain, announced over the
radio to the French nation, "It is with a broken heart that I tell you today
that fighting must cease." Britain, the last bastion of resistance to the
Germans in Western Europe, backed only by her far-flung Empire, would hence-
forth have to continue the fight alone, and by herself attempt to defeat all
the massive forces that a triumphant and. immensely powerful Germany could
throw against her skies and her shores, in order to survive. Nothing
daunted, the British Prime Minister was determinedly preparing the country
for just this task. At 4 p.m. on 18th June, Winston Churchill rose in the
House of Commons to deliver his immortal speech. He concluded:
"What General Weygand called the 'Battle of France' is over. I expect
that the Battle of Britain is about to begin.... The whole fury and might
of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler 1iows that he will have
to break us in this island or lose the War. .... Let us therefore brace
ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire
and its Commonwealth lasts for a thousand years, men will still say, 'This
was their finest hour.'" 72.
Just four days later, on 22nd June, the French finally put their
signatures to the surrender document. General Ironside commented:
"So ends France in under two months. A dreadful disaster for a great
nation. Shall we be the sane? The Battle of Britain begins...." 73.
72. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., pp. 198-199.
73. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 23 June 1940, op. cit.
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CHAPTER 7: 'PILLBOX MANIA': TEE IRONSIDE PLAN
The prospects of an immediate invasion had receded somewhat as the
divisions of the B.E.F. had returned from Dunkirk and. as the German offen-
sive on Prance was renewed, but a fortnight later, with the French suing for
an armistice, the War Cabinet were again warned that an invasion of the U.K.
was imminent. The "Certain Eventuality" that the Chiefs of Staff had fore-.
seen in their report of 25th May, had now come to pass and Prance had fallen.
Stressing the importance of a successful air defence to offset the weaknesses
of the Army at home, this previous report had listed unrestricted air attack
aimed at breaking public morale, starvation of the Country by attack on
shipping arid ports, or occupation by invasion, as the three m.,n strategies
that the Germans might use to break down the resistance of the United King-
dom. Just a few days before, on the 13th June, a telegram had been drafted
to the Dominion Prime Ministers on these lines. Now, however, on 19th June,
the Chiefs of Staff were positive that the option of invasion offered the
quickest and most final method. Urging the War Cabinet that all their
previous recommendations which bad not yet been carried out, especially
ru.thless action to elim,nte any chances of Fifth Column activities, should
be "pressed on with day and night", they warned that:
"Experience of the campaign in Flanders and France indicates that we
can expect no period of respite before the Germans may begin a new phase of
the war. We must, therefore, regard the threat of invasion as immediate.
In now emphasizing the immediate threat of invasion, we mast not
overlook the fact that a major air offensive against this Country will
almost certainly take place as well, arid will tax our air defences and the
morale of our people to the full.
The Germans have accepted prodigious losses in Prance, and. are likely
to be prepared to face even higher losses and. to take even greater risks
than they took in Norway to achieve decisive results against this Country.
The issue of the War will almost certainly turn upon our ability to
hold out during the next three months." 1.
The forces available to General Ironside to deal with this "iinmed.iate"
threat of invasion, bad. received some welcome additions during the last few
days and were to receive more before the end of the month and, though not
all of these were to be immediately released by the War Office for Home
Defence, they would be under his coiimind in the event of actual operations
1. CAB 66/8 wP(4o)213, also COS(40)471: Urgent Measures to Meet Attack,
Report by the COS, 19 June 1940.
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and could meanwhile be included in his defence plans. The independent 24th
Guards Brigade had been evacuated from Narvik itself by 8th June, together
with much of itB equipment. It was soon being completed to full equipment
in the London area, joining the depleted. 20th Guards Brigade which was still
re-organising there, following its stand at Boulogne late in May. The Regu-
lar 15th Infantry Brigade, located on the Scottish Borders, was one of the
very few formations in the United Kingdom to be already completely equipped
and mobile, and had rejoined its parent 5th Division. 2. On 14th June,
Lieutenant General Sir Alan Brooke, who had. arrived to take co1nTnnd of the
British forces in Western Prance from Lieutenant General. Sir Henry Karslake
only on the previous day, gave orders for the evacuation of these forces in
Prance, because of the continuing collapse of French resistance. Over the
next few days, British forces were shipped out of the French western ports
of Cherbourg, St. Nab, Brest, St. Nazaire, Nantes and La Palhice, and by
noon on 22nd June a grand total of 136,500 British troops, including 2,500
wounded, had been landed in the United Kingdom from Western France, together
with some 4,739 vehicles and 322 guns of all types, including many valuable
25 pdr. field guns. These troops included the uncommitted and virtually un-
touched 1st Canadian Division and the little tiinged 52nd (Lowland) Division,
both of which would greatly bolster Home Forces. However, the 1st Axmoured
Division had. returned in disarray, having saved only a tiny handful of its
tanks, while the remainder included the mauled remnants of the portions of
12th (Eastern) and 46th (North Midland and West Riding) 'labour' Divisions,
and a host of improvised fighting formations and lines-of-communication
troops, which had been cut off from the original B.E.F.. Also a great deal
of transport nad. some of the guns of all these formations had been lost,
much of these needlessly so in the panic of the evacuations. 	 In addition,
some 17,600 Polish troops, 3,700 Czechs, 1,200 Dutch, 1,100 Norwegians, 600
Belgians and 12,000 French troops had. been landed in the United Kingdom by
22nd June or shortly afterwards, though many of these would have to be
formed into organised units before they could be useful, while most of the
French troops were unwilling to continue the fight and had to be repatriated.
to the French Colonies, and some 500 of the Czechs had soon to be interned.
Nevertheless, the Polish troops were already in the process of being formed
into two mixed brigades to the south of Glasgow by the end of the following
2. CAB 69/1 DO(40)l5th:2, 10 June 1940.
3. Karslake, Basil: 1940: The Last Act, pp. 189 & 236-240. Leo Cooper,
London, 1979.
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month.	 A further very important addition to Home Forces were some 9,500
troops of the Australian Infantry Force and 6,500 men of the New Zealand.
contingent, which had been generously sent by their respective Coimnonwealth
governments. These arrived by convoy at the Clyde on 16th June and. were
immediately formed into brigade groups in Wiltshire and N.E. Hampshire,
respectively, but, though excellent infantry, they still had to be supplied
with heavy equipment by their hosts.
Thus there were in Great Britain on 20th June, counting the remnants
of 51st (Highland.) Division of which little more than a single brigade had
been rescued from France, no less than 28 infantry divisions, two armoured
divisions, one axmoured. reconnaissance brigade, four Army Tank brigades,
two independent infantry brigade groups, and several independent Army or
Royal Marine infantry brigades, plus a further two infantry divisions in
Northern Ireland. (See Map 6.) There were, on this date, even excluding
the 36,200 Allied troops and. almost 600,000 men of the Local Defence Volun-
teers who were still largely a "broomstick army", no less than 1,313,000 men
under arms in the whole of the United Kingdom. The latter figure comprised
595,000 troops with the Field Army, inc].ud.ing the returned B.E.F., 42,600
with the Home Defence battalions, 49,000 with the Holding battalions or
being used. to make Field Force units up to strength, 13,000 in Coastal
Defence, 151,000 in A.D.G.B., 365,000 in Tr-ining units, half of which were
due to make up Field Force units, 59,400 in various miscellaneous establish-
ments and. 38,000 Dominion troops, including the 22,000 Canadians, and 16,000
Australians and New Zealanders. Of the grand. total, however, the 164,000
men of the Coastal and Air Defences, and some 220,000 men of the R.A.S.C.,
R.A.0.C. and R.A.LC. were not trained to fight, while a further 150,000 bad
less than two months' service. 	 The totals of formations in Great Britain
too are much less impressive if it is remembered that 16 of the 28 infantry
divisions were re-equipping and. recovering from their ordeals in France and
Norway, while the remining 12 were also mostly severely short of equipment
and. mobility, not to mention tr-ining; that, of the two armoured divisions,
one bad only a few Cru..iser tanks, while the other was almost entirely
equipped. with light tanks; that the a.rmoured. reconnaissance brigade was
only just being equipped with improvised. light armoured cars; that the
4. CAB 66/10 wP(40)281; also cos(40)562: Organisation of Allied. Naval,
Army and. Air Contingents, Report by the C.0.S., 22 July 1940.
5. CAB 66/8 WP(40)210: Manpower in the Army, Memorandum by the Secretary
of State for War, 18 June 1940.
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independent infantry brigades or brigade groups were but lightly equipped;
and. that, of the four Army Tank brigades, only one had even approaching half
its proper strength of 150 infantry tanks. Even the total of 28 infantry
divisions in Great Britain was very soon reduced to only 24 as one, the 49th
(West aiding) Division, less its 148th Brigade which was to be sent to
iflater, departed on 26th June for Iceland, while three others were broken
up towards the end of June or at the beginning of July. The equipment
actually in the hands of the troops in the fighting formations, including
those returned from Western France, amounted at this time to approim-tely
710 field guns, 198 medium and heavy guns, perhaps 263 towed anti-tank guns,
133 mobile Hotchkiss Naval guns on lorries, 291 tracked light tanks, some
185 of which were with 2nd Armoured Division, 38 'wheeled' light tanks, 39
Cruiser tanks which were being supplied to re-equip at first 3 R.T.R. and
then the remainder of 1st Armoured Division, 81 infantry tanks, 754 Bren
Carriers, 264 'scout carriers', about 10,000 Bren guns and 4,500 anti-tank
rifles. Preparations were being made to use French 75 mm. guns, which it
was hoped to receive from America. General Ironside, however, commented on
the latter that, "The ammunition would require reconditioning, as it was
very old, but it would be quite good enough for use at point blank range
against tai1Is." 6. By contrast, the German forces on the Western Front
totalled some 114 divisions, of which four were mechanised and. no less than
ten were arinoured, with almost 2,500 tanks.
*	 *	 *
General Ironside was by now fully engaged in the process of re-
organising the mass of troops and formations in Great Britain into an effec-
tive fighting instrument that would. have a reasonable chance of dealing with
any German attempt at invasion. His plans for the defence of the Country,
too, had reached completion by this time. At first, General Ironsid.e's
defence plan had merely been an updated version of his predecessor's 'Julius
Caesar' Plan, but with the twin elements of the Local Defence Volunteers and.
the 'Ironsides' with the mobile columms added in, together with a much
increased emphasis on defending the coastline and its immediate hinterland
against seaborne attack by means of wire, mines, anti-tank obstacles, pill-
boxes, 'beach batteries', demolitions and roadblocks, and the obstruction of
nearby landing grounds to prevent attack on the rear of the troops who were
6. CAB 106/1202: Memoranda Prepared for a Secret Session of the House of
Commons on Home Defence: Troops Available in Great Britain, 18 June
1940; and CAB 69/1 D0(40)l7th:1, 19 June 1940.
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to man these defences. This approach had been outlined in the first Opera-
tional Instruction from G.H.Q. which bad been issued to all Conimards on 5th
June, the only other major change being that of the codeword for "immediate
readiness", which was altered from 'Caesar' to 'Cromwell'.
With the initial recormaissances of the beaches completed. and work on
the coastal defence works proceeding in earnest, General Ironsid.e's next
priority was to look, in detail, to the inland defence of the Country and
at how to deal effectively with the problem of what would happen if the
Germans breached the initial coastal defence line and used tank co].uinns to
penetrate in depth, as they had in France. His greatest fear was that
these enemy tank columns would run amok and. "tear the guts out of the
Country". Because of the lack of equipment and vehicles, and. the under-
trained state of most formations, there were few units which were fit for
offensive operations and the great bulk of the Army had accordingly to be
committed to static defence. General	 solution to the problem of
tank breakthroughs, therefore, had of necessity to be ind-n1y a static one.
His answer was to introduce a further new element into the plans for de-
fence to supplement the combination of static defence in towns and villages
and action by the mobile columns, that he already envisaged for the defence
of the inland areas. This new element was a system of lines of defence
which he called "stops" or "stoplines". A fresh Operational Instruction,
No. 3, which covered the detailed policy for Home Defence was issued by
G.H.Q. on 15th June and in this General Ironside outlined his train of
thought:
"The general plan of defence is a combination of mobile columns and
static defence by means of strong points and 'stops'. As static defence
only provides limited protection of the most vulnerable points, it mu.st be
supplemented by the action of mobile columns. However mobile such columns
may be, they cannot be expected to operate immediately over the whole area
in which it is possible for the enemy to attempt invasion by sea or air.
It is, therefore, necessary to adopt measures for con.fird-ng his action
until such time as mobile columns can arrive to deal with him. This will
be done by means of 'stops' and. strong points prepared for all-round de- -
fence at aerodromes, which are necessary to prevent the enemy obtaining air
superiority, at the min centres of communication, and distributed in depth
over a wide area covering London and the centres of production and. supply.
This system of 'stops' and strong points will prevent the enemy from run-
ning riot and tearing the guts out of the country as has happened in France
and Belgium." 7.
7. WO 166/i: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, GCR.Q. Home Forces, June 1940.
Appendix F: G.H.. Operational Instruction No. 3, 15 June 1940.
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G.LQ. Operational Instruction No. 3 went on to outline the nature of
these "stops" in greater detail:
tI	 inland area will be d.ivid.ed into zones consisting of a series of
'stops', ci'lmin-ting in a zone selected to cover London and important
industrial centres. This zone will be selected by G.LQ0. Although it may
not at the present time be possible to garrison all 'stops', they should
all be prepared immediately and. provided with necessary defensive weapons
such as anti-tank obstacles, piliboxes, wire, static anti-tank guns and.,
where suitable, mines. The major proportion of the limited number of static
anti-tank weapons at present available will be sited in these 'stops', the
remainder being used for beach defence. Guns with sufficient mobility will
be included in mobile columns. Anti-aircraft defence will also be fitted
into the general framework of the zones and. its use against A.F.V.'s as a
secondary role will be considered.."
Two categories of "stops" were envisaged. Firstly, defence lines were to
make maximum use of efficient natural tank obstacles such as rivers and
steep hills; canals, if local defence of the lock gates was undertaken so
as to ensure their retention of water and carefully controlled inundations,
would also be used where appropriate:
"It is essential that the fullest use of waterways must be made. In
order to make efficient demolition belts, successive lines of bridge demoli-
tions and the cratering of important road. junctions are essential. Water-
ways at right angles to the general line of the front are of great value as
they hinder lateral methods of the attack, they will always be included. in
the demolition scheme."
Eowever, due to the long frontages of the "stops", added. to the shortages
of artillery, these stretches would. at present have to be only lightly held
in order to provide sufficient troops and. artillery for the rema-inder of
the zone where no natural tank obstacles existed. In this latter, second
category, the "stops" would have to be provided by lines of static defences,
including concrete pillboxes which would be sited, utilising also the
improvised. static anti-tank guns as well as those in the formations, to
cover artificial tank obstacles such as ditches and mines, the whole being
distributed in great depth:
"It cannot be too strongly emphasized. that great depth in the anti-
tank defence is of primary importance. The determined. advance of a few
tanks deep into the position iB intended. to create alarm and confusion;
the effect of such penetration can be prevented. by a resolute defence to
avoid. any widening of the gap." 8.
8. ibid.
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In fact, General Ironside had already given orders as early as 12th
June that reconnaissances were to be undertaken "of a rear line and south
line in Northern and Eastern Commands respectively .... to prevent the enemy
running riot behind our main defences."	 The seine day he noted:
"We have now got down to dividing the Country into lines of defence.
They must largely be lines of posts, defended villages and river lines.
They are in all directions because one can never tell where the enemy may
come from. He will try landings in many places and will exploit any
successful one very quickly." 10.
Nevertheless, despite General Ironside's enthusiasm for the new element of
"stops" in his defence plans, he little 1iew then how much this concept of
linear static defences, positioned often a great way inland from the coast,
was to provoke intense debate and controversy over the next few weeks or how
the resulting loss of confidence in him was to lead to his eventual replace-
ment.
At the same time, General Ironside was also struggling to build up
again a suitably strong force in his G.LQ,. aeserve and, once collected, to
hold on to the command of it. The departure of 52nd (Lowland) Division for
Western France beginning on 7th June, followed by the 1st Canadian Division
on 11th June, had temporarily left only 43rd (Wessex) Division in IV Ccrps
in G.H.Q. Reserve. This division vas supplemented on 13th June by 8 R.T.R.,
then situated on Salisbury Plain, but soon to be moved to Aldershot.
General Ironside 'rote:
"War Office have released to me the 8th Tank Battalion at Tid.worth
with fifty 'I' tanks of old pattern and seven (teen?) light tanks. I have
fixed up flats on the railway for them and. they should be brought cpiickly
wherever we want them. I am collecting a mobile reserve, if it is not taken
away from me at once.
One's hopes go up and down as one collects something, and. then has it
taken away from one. The Reserve must be able to attack. If it cazuiot, it
iB not fit to be a reserve and had better be laid out statically, which is
most uneconomical militarily. It is all a race for time to get something
organised. before we are attacked...." 11.
9. WO 166/i: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, G.H.Q. Home Forces, June 1940.
10. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord. Ironside, 12 June 1940, (Co].. H. l4acleod.
transcript).
11. ibid., 13 June 1940.
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Actually, 23 of the infantry tanks were the modern Natild.a 14k. II, but this
was still only a drop in the ocean. Further forces were outlined in G.H.(.
Operational Instruction No. 3 on 15th June:
"A G.E.(. Reserve will be formed probably consisting in the first
instance of one armoured division, less 	 tanks, one battalion LT.R. and.
two infantry divisions.
One portion of this reserve will be located north of the Thames and
one portion south of the Thames. It will be made as mobile as possible and
will not be used for static defence." 12.
The only armoured. division immediately available was 2nd Armo'ured
Division in Lincoinshire and. within the next few days this was brought into
G.H.Q. Reserve to bolster IV Corps and was moved to the Northampton area,
from whence, aided by 1st Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade with its "Iron-
sides" in Runtingdonshire, it could operate on "the flanks and. the rear" of
any enemy advancing inland from either the East Anglian or the Lincoinshire
coast. (See Nap 6.) An allotment of R.A.F. recorinissance aircraft was to
assist. 13. Unfortunately, consisting as it did of only about 178 machine-
gun armed Vickers light tanks by the end of the month, this role could
really be no more than a harrying one and. would have little effect against
any enemy coluzmi which included gun-armed tanks.
One of the infantry divisions, the 43rd (Wessex), situated in IV Corps
in the Hertfordshire area, was already organised in brigade groups and was
available for G.LQ. Reserve. (See Nap 6.) The other infantry division
was selected to be the 1st Canadian Division, which had returned from
Western France by 20th June and was reforming at Aldershot. On the 23rd,
it began its move from Aldershot to a new "position of read.iness" in G.H.Q.
Reserve in the Oxford area, from whence it could strike effectively in any
required direction. Here it was soon kept busy reconnoitring routes to
likely points of enemy attack, its comm'nder, Najor General A. G. L.
MoNaughton, describing it as "a mobile reserve with a 360 degree front",
which might have to operate "anywhere in Great Britain from the South Coast
to Scotland, or in Wales". Like 43rd (Weasex), this division was organised
in brigade and battalion groups, comprising mobile columns capable of rapid
and flexible action, and was supposedly 100% mobile. However, 1st Canadian
12. WO 166/i: op. cit., Appendix F: op. cit., 15 June 1940.
13. WO 166/230: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, IV Corps, June 1940.
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Division's ability to perform this task, which was one of enormous responsi-
bility, was weakened by the fact that its 1st Canadian Brigade, which was
the only portion of it actually to have lathed in Western Prance, had lost
almost all of its vehicles and had to ren''in immobile at Ald.ershot until it
could be re-equipped; though, to compensate for this, its ancillary troops,
including three invaluable artillery regiments with their full quota of
twenty-four 25 pdr. field guns each, were formed into an additional
"reserve" group. 14. Also placed in G.R.Q. Reserve at this time were the
newly arrived Australian and New Zealand brigade groups in Wiltshire and.
N.E. Hampshire, respectively, and by 19th June these were already being
made 100% mobile by the provision of transport. 15. The 52nd (Lowland)
Division, which had suffered greater losses in equipment and. transport in
Western Prance than the 1st Canadian Division, was not reallocated to G.L(.
Reserve on its return, but was instead sent to the Cambridge area on 20th
June and was placed in Eastern Command Reserve.
These initial dispositions of G.H.C. Reserve gave some extent of cover
to East Anglia, but paid scant regard to the need for part of the Reserve
to be situated south of the River Thames within reasonable distance of the
Kent and Sussex coasts. (See Nap 6.) The New Zealand contingent was too
far inland effectively to undertake this role at short notice, while the
tasks given to 1st Canadian Division in Oxfordshire were over-ambitious, to
say the least. The mere handful of gun-aimed tanks iumiediately available
at Aldershot with 8 R.T.R. was almost laughable, while the reserves cover-
ing East Anglia lacked any 2 par. gun-aimed tanks at all. It was not to be
until 30th June that any siiificant moves were made to attempt to rectify
these deficiencies in the composition arid dispositions of the G.R.Q.
Reserve. Nevertheless, a start had at least been made.
These initial movements of the G.LQ. Reserves were just part of a
whole series of moves of the various units and. formations in Home Forces,
for which orders were given on 16th June and which were to be continued
throughout the next few days and indeed, in some cases, up to the beginning
of July. These moves were in accordance with the re-organisation of the
forces in Great Britain for the purposes of General Ironside's plan for
resisting invasion. They were also made necessary by the fact that the
14. Stacey, Col. C. P.: The Canadian Army 1939-45. An Official History
Smmary, pp. 18-19. Dept. of National Defence, Ottawa, 1948.
15. CAB 69/1 DO(40)l7th:1, 19 June 1940.
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returned units and formations of the B.E.F. had. originally been slotted into
the pattern of dispositions with regard primarily to the ease of quickly
reforming and re-equipping them from the military depots, rather than to the
needs of Home Defence. Most movements were carried out by rail, because of
the lack of road transport and because of the density and convenience of
Britain's extensive railway system. There was no time to wait for units to
receive adequate heavy equipment before moving them, but they were instruc-
ted at first that, "No movement will take place until units are complete in
personal equipment. t' This instruction, however, caused. some misunderstand-
ing and. delay. So, to clarify this and speed the re-organisation, this was
amended on 22nd. June to read that:
"Moves .... may take place as soon as units concerned. are reasonably
complete in personal equipment and should NOT be postponed. to await comple-
tion where the amount of equipment concerned. is small." 16.
The main moves at this time, besides those of the G.E.Q.. Reserves, were
as follows. (See Nap 6.) To strengthen the defence of the South Coast,
the 3rd (Regular) Division was moved from Frome in Somerset to the area of
Nidhurst-Brighton-Bognor Regis on the hitherto relatively unguarded West
Sussex Coast on 19th June, though this division was inmiediately placed under
War Office control "for special training", which might include despatch to
Ireland. The 4th (Regular) Division was already in Hampshire with a brigade
on the Isle of Wight; but to extend the defence of the coastline further to
the west, in view of the German occupation of Western France, the 50th
(Northumbrian) Division was moved. to the Dorset coast from Western Commrid.
In Western Commrid itself, the 38th (Welsh) Division was moved from South
Wales up to Cheshire, thus allowing 2nd London Division to be moved on 24th
June to replace it in South \ales. Both these were second-line Territorial
formations that were urgently in need of further training in some of the
best training areas. The battle-experienced 52nd (Lowland) Division, oust
back from France, replaced 2nd London Division in Eastern Command Reserve in
Cambridgeshire. Within Northern Command, the 1st and 2nd. Regular Divisions
were moved to the coasts of Lincolnshire arid the East Riding of Yorkshire,
respectively, so as to fill the gaps left by the move of 2nd Armoured Divi-
sion out of Lincolnshire, and by the second-line Territorial 66th (Lancs.
and Borders) Division in East Riding, which was about to be broken up. The
16. WO 166/i: op. cit., Appendix E: Reforming of B.E.F., 16 June 1940;
and. Appendix J: Moves of Divisions, 22 June 1940.
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44th (Home Counties) Division, which like the two Regular divisions had.
been to Prance, was removed from Southern Command and placed in support of
these two in the Doncaster area, less a single brigade that was despatched
to guard The Wash. Finally, on 28th June, the 48th (South Midland) Divi-
sion was ordered from Western Command to the Severn area of Southern
Command to replace 44th (Home Counties) Division. 17.
All of this first phase of movements was completed by 29th June. In
the meantime, other reorganisations were in progress. Three motor machine
gun brigades were in the process of formation, each comprising three
divisional cavalry regiments which had returned from Dunkirk minus their
equipment. The 1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade in Sussex was already almost
complete and consisted of the 17/21st Lancers, the 16/5th Lancers and the
2nd Lothian and Border Horse, each of three squadrons mounted, at first,
in Austin utility lorries equipped with Vickers heavy machine guns or
Brens. The 2nd and 3rd M.M.G. Brigades soon followed, and all three were
being equipped largely with the Humberette and Beaverette "Ironsides".
Useful as these mobile columns would be, however, their heaviest weapon
for dealing with tanks was only an anti-tank rifle.
A further important step during June, which followed on naturally from
the reorganisation of Commands into field armies with their own operational
Command E..'s at the end of Nay, was the formation of the divisions and
independent brigades into properly co-ordinated and supported Corps. (See
Nap 6.) The I, II and III Corps Headquarters had been in Prance and, on
their return, had been re-established at Hickleton Hall near Doncaster in
Northern Command, at Lower Hare Park near Newmarket in Eastern Coninand, and
at the Old Rectory, Whitchurch, Salop, in Western Command, respectively.
The IV CorDs was already established as G.E.. Reserve with its headquarters
at Guilsborough House near Northampton. By 14th June, a V Corps had. been
established with its temporary headquarters at Bhurtpore Barracks, Tidworth
on Salisbury Plain in Southern Command; and next to be established uere X,
) and JI Corps, with headquarters at Scotch Corner near Darlington in
Northern Command, at Bishop's Stor±ford in East Anglia, and at Tumbridge
Wells in the South East, respectively. Their respective conders were
17. WO 166/i: op. cit., Appendix E: op. cit., 16 June 194 0 ; and
Appendix I: Distribution of Formations on Completion of Moves,
21 June 1940.
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appointed and took up their posts, and. the various units and. formations
were soon placed under their coim,nd. On 21st June, orders were issued to
Commands for the moves of various field, medium and heavy artillery regi-
ments to form the corps and army artillery elements and. these moves took
place over the following few days. 18.
If any properly mounted. German invasion or expedition, therefore, could
have taken place soon after Dunkirk, perhaps in the latter half of June,
there is little doubt that it would have been an unqualified, success, since
it would have caught Home Forces off balance in the throes of a major re-
organisation, as well as in an appallingly bad state of equipment. Genera].
Ironside was all too well aware of this. He commented, on 17th June:
"How soon will the Germans be able to start their attacks? They will
be very stupid if they delay much longer."
He continued:
".... With all our units reforming, re-arming and. moving into their
new areas, we are in a pretty good. confusion. I calculate that it will be
nearly towards the end. of the week before we can say that we are in posi-
tion. It was unavoidable, with all these troops and materials coming back
from the front. They were all put in place very hurriedly and. the men of
the B.E.F. were allowed to go on leave - in some cases 72 hours, which was
a long time in the circumstances." 19.
\lhile General Ironside was giving a good deal of his attention to the
concept of static defence lines and G.H.Q. Reserves to protect the interior
of the Country, and to the reorganisation, re-arming and redistribution of
the units and formations of Home Forces for Home Defence, he bad also not
been neglecting the defence of the coastline and its immed.iate hinterland.
G.H.Q. Operational Instruction No. 3, of 15th June, gave instructions on
coastal areas as well:
"This should. be regarded. as an outpost zone, to give warning of, to
delay and break up the initial attacks. Attempts to approach the ports and
beaches in transports, and the disembarkation therefrom, will be hampered
by the Fixed Defences, but these defences will require to be supplemented
by other defence weapons, such as lighter artillery, small-arms, mines, etc.
for their local protection.
18. WO 166/169-344: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, I-XII Corps, June 1940;
and WO 166/i: op. cit., June 1940.
19. Diaries of Field Marsha]. Lord Ironside, 17 June 1940, op. cit.
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Since our resources will not peit the occupation of defensive Dod-
tions to cover all possible land.ing beaches with fire, the defence of the
latter will be confined to those which lend. themselves to a landing in force
with L.F.V.'s, particularly those which give access to important ports or
ob3ectives inland..
These beach defences will be reinforced by strong points in rear,
desgued primarily to hold up enemy L.F.V.'s, and giving facilities for all-
round. defence. Similarly, ports will be protected by all-round defence.
The principle must be to obtain early information and to hold. mobile
reserves reedy to move to the threatened points and to attack the enemy."
The defence of the selected beaches was to be based on self-contained strong
points centred around the 6" lavel gun 'beach batteries' now being mounted
along the coastlines or situated at points on the beech, particularly at
suitable tank exits, which might be considered to be especially vulnerable.
Local defence of the beach batteries, by entrenched infantry carefully wired
in, was very important, so that the gunners could concentrate without inter-
ference on their prlmary task of dealing with enemy transports attempting to
land troops and	 To guard the tank exits from beaches, one or more
of the improvised anti-tank guns, mostly Naval 6 pclrs. or 4" guns, might be
included in strong points, but since "the dissipation of a too great propor-
tion of the limited, number of guns in isolated points will result in a
dangerous weaiiess in the main defensive system", it was instructed. that the
main defence against tanks would be provided by nti-tk mines "which, to
'be fully effective, must always be under the fire of the defence." 	 phetic
instructions were given as to both types of strong points:
"The task of these strong points vll be to stop the enemy's ,.P.V.'s
end other troops at all costs, and. from them there must be no vithdrawal."
The remainder of the beaches ws to 'be covered, merely by coast 'atching and
ratrolling, including bicycle and. motorcycle patrols, the "greatest atten-
tion" being paid to obtaining early nformation. This Operational Instruc-
tion, however, admitted.:
"Reconnaissance reports show that the coastline from Newcastle-upon-
Tyne down the Eaat Coast and South Coast contains a very great number of
beaches suitable for the landing of both troops and. L.F.V.'s, and. a strong
defence of all of them is impracticable. We must therefore accept the
possibility of the enemy being able to land. in certain selected spots im-
opposed." 20.
20. WO 166/i: op. cit., Appendix F: op. cit., 15 June 1940.
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General Ironside was soon made to realize just how great was the
problem of adequately protecting even the most vulnerable stretches of
coastline against enemy landings, as he began a series of visits, on 20th
June, to inspect coastal defences, starting with East Anglia. Re wrote:
"The whole of the day I made a reconnaissance from King's Lynn to
Cromer, looking at the troops and their work .... guns and wire are being
put up on all the likely points. Work will never end. It ought to have
been begun months ago."
The next day, he continued his reconnaissance from Cromer round. the coast
to Southwold:
"An iense amount of work being done. An immense amount to be done
still. Decentralisation to all the lesser commanders. All civilian con-
tractors should be put to the work at this critical moment. No frills are
necessary. The bottle-neck is the allotment of the work by the military.
They axe so apt to make a fuss about an intricate reconnaissance, and then
never get any work done."
The defence of the hinterland of East .Anglia, too, gave General Ironside
much cause for concern:
"The great failure is to realize that all the nodal points inland must
be fitted with blockhouses to cover big solid blocks. To restrict all 21
movement in the country and so prevent enemy columns rushing about. . .."
General Ironside was determined to get large numbers of civilian
labourers, especially those of the local Councils and the larger building
contractors, to aid the military in the construction of defence works, both
on the coast and inland. On 17th June, he wrote:
"I have decided to start in with making all the Town Councils and
Borough Councils to do work. It is stupid to have all their employees
doing repair work on the roads, and cutting hedges and grass, when we want
pill-boxes made. I must decentralise, but getting out instructions alone
takes time. And all the troops are moving into their positions from where
they were assembled. So few people can be spared to make reconnaiss-
ances." 22.
Two days later, he told a meeting of the Defence Conmu.ttee, at which the
Prime Minister was present, that:
21. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord. Ironside, 20 & 21 June 1940, op. cit.
22. ibid., 17 June 1940.
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"The system adopted was to decentralise as much as possible, and to
make use of big contractors who were accustomed to handling large numbers,
and had the machinery for orgazu.sing and supervising the work. This was
believed to be a much more satisfactory system than to attempt the direct
emplovment of quantities of unskilled labour. The main bottleneck was
reconnaissance, which was an indispensable preliminary to the start of work;
otherwise much that was done would be wasted. About 150,000 men, and all
the excavating machinery in the Country, were employed on the work. The
whole coast had been surveyed, and had. been divided into three grades:-
(a) Places where tanks could land.
(b) Places where infantry could land.
(c) Places where a landing was almost impossible.
These categories were being tackled in that order, and work on the
defences of the beaches was proceeding fast." 23.
The use of large civi1an contractors, such as the rell-lmoin building
firm of Taylor Woodrow of London, proved to be an immediate bonus. The
commencement of work on defences could not be postponed while detailed
reconnaissances were made, so the Chief Engineers of Commands often had to
make snap decisions on the most urgent work as far as could. be judged at
the time and. arrange for its execution by any means at their disposal, des-
pite the risk of poor siting and. uneconomical use of the defence works.
One Chief Engineer rang up a big building contractor and asked him "to
build 200 concrete piliboxes, hurriedly sited by the General Staff, on a 50
mile stretch of coastline, and to complete the job in three weeks". The
contractor agreed and. this work, on the South Coast, was apparently very
nearly completed in the specified time, in spite of the great difficulties
due to transport shortages. Similar efforts were made along much of the
East, South-East and. South Coasts, both by large contractors working under
the direction of ILE. officers of the War Office Works Service or, to a
lesser extent, by R.E. Units themselves; though inland many of the L.D.V.-
manned local defences, such as concrete roadblocks covered by small pill-
boxes desiied for riflemen and even parts of the main inland stoplines,
were often erected by small local contractors or even by L.D.V. personnel
acting under what little R.E. supervision that could be spared from the
main defences. Such extemporised arrangements, combined with dual control
by the War Office and G.R.Q. Eome Forces, led to many mistakes which would
not have occurred. if previous planning had been possible, but even so much
valuable work was carried. out by the hard-pressed Royal Engineer organisa-
tion during this period, and soon formation R.E. officers became available
23. CAB 69/1 DO(40)l7th:1, 19 June 1940.
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to take over much of the work burden of the Chief Engineers of Commands arid.
to supervise closely most of the work by the civilian contractors in their
om areas. 24. Some 900 piliboxes were being constructed by civilian
contractors in Kent alone by 25th June. 25.
Genera]. Ironside had. less success in getting civilian labour from the
local Councils. On 22nd. June, he complained:
"I have been held. up over the getting of Town Councils and. Borough
Councils to work in with the military over necessary work. So many of them
are already doing so, but the wretched central authority, the Home Office,
does not seem to be able to get out the Instructions. We are still very
unnalitary." 26.
Three days later, though, at a meeting of the War Cabinet, Genera]. Ironside
was able to answer Churchill's complaint that "only 57,000 civilian workers
were employed on work of a military nature", by saying that "the number of
civilians employed would be doubled, if not trebled, in the ensuing week". 27.
Despite the virtual impossibility of constructing and. manning defence
works all along the whole coast, arrangements were at least complete for
the watching of the entire coastline by coastgu.ards arid special coast
watchers, so that "every bit of coastline would be seen every half hour
throughout the day and. night". The coast watchers would be in telephone
coiunication with the nearest naval and military authorities, while behind
them was the Observer Corps, which covered most of the country. General
Ironside was also able to inform the Defence Committee on 19th June that a
number of depth charges with electrical firing apparatus were now being
employed on beach defences, while there was no shortage of barbed. wire.
The delivery of Army anti-tank mines had now reached the rate of 30,000 per
week, while that of the heavier Admiralty anti-tank mine, which had 20 lb.
of explosive, was 20,000 a week. 28. The laying of these in iranefields,
24. Pakenhain-Waish, Major General R. P., History of the Royal Engineers,
Vol. VIII, 1938-1948, pp. 114-115, The Institution of Royal Engineers,
Chatham, 1958.
25. CAB 79/5 COS (40 ) 1 93rd: 2, 25 June 1940.
26. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 22 June 1940, op. cit.
27. CAB 65/7 WN(40 )lSlst:9, 25 June 1940.
28. CAB 69/1 DO(40)l7th:1, 19 June 1940.
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however, was the first large-scale practical experience that the British
Army had in this type of warfare and. lack of experience, combined with the
hurried operation, led to many mistakes, many of which did not become
apparent until later on. The drill for laying out, recording and marking
the position of minefields had not yet been fully developed or practised, a
drawback that led to great difficulty when it became necessary to alter or
remove the fields. This difficulty was compounded by the fact that many
minefields located on or near the beaches were soon covered by drifting
sand that obliterated all traces of the markings, while individual mines
buried in sandy soil could often move several yards. 29.
General Ironside was aware that all this emphasis in the coastal areas
on completing the beach defences as soon as possible might lead to the
dangerous attitude of 'Maginot-mindedness', whereby large numbers of troops
would work frantically on construction and then sit idly in their prepared
linear defences, watching the direction that the enemy might come from for
days on end, completely neglecting the vital necessity for training in
offensive operations. Re took care to make the point to his subordinates
that too much emphasis should not, therefore, be placed on their construc-
tion and defence, and that they should merely be held as an "outpost zone",
as instructed in the G.R.. Operational Instruction of 15th June. On 22nd
June, immediately following his visit to the East Angliari coast, he wrote:
"We are now engaged. in putting up minor Naginot lines along the coast,
but I have impressed upon the Corps Commanders that they are only meant as
delaying lines, and are meant to give the mobile coluimas a chance of coming
up to the threatened points."
Considering the overall picture, too, General Ironside continued:
"I have impressed upon the Government that they ought to be ready with
offensive operations if we can see a reasonable chance of upsetting their
efforts at invasion. To sit immobile here is the worst thing to do.... It
is the weakness of waiting for an attack that preys upon people's minds.
Waiting for an attack which may come in so many places. Even the stoutest
heart begins to wonder whether he can meet all the eventualities he pictures
to himself. I felt it myself as I went round the endless coastline of East
Anglia yesterday. Still, we can meet these swine with stout hearts if we
mean to defeat them. Right is on our side...." 30.
29. Pakenham-Walsh, Major General R. P., op. cit., p. 116.
30. Diaries of Field NarshaJ. Lord Ironside, 22 June 1940, op. cit.
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The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, continued to place great faith in
the offensive role, which, in the context of anti-invasion planning, would
firstly be provided by the mobile columns, mostly of brigade strength, act-
ing in immediate support of the troops manning the static coastal defences.
Despite the long frontages held. by the divisions on the coastline, it would
not be sound to lock up too many troops in a static role, and in any case
the noble cclunns provided the troops with an invaluable opportunity for
important training in an attacking role, thus installing an aggressive
offensive spirit which would. relieve the tedium and. boredom caused by the
constant construction and. manning of static defences. The mobile columns,
too, uould help to counter the worrying attitude of mind, that General Dill
warned, the War Cabinet about at their meeting on 17th June, and which
stemmed from the B.E.F.'s experiences on the Continent:
•• the retreats and withd.rawals which we had recently been compelled
to carry out must necessarily have left their mark on the psychology of our
troops. We must once and for all cast behind us the spirit of 'looking over
our	 and of looking for a position to fall back on." 31.
Aggressive offensive tactics also appealed greatly to the Prime Mini-
ster. At this same meeting on 17th June, the War Cabinet had. noted that
whereas the British had. in the past aimed at training the whole Army to a
uniformly high level, a method that had "on occasions resulted in a certain
lack of enterprise among the rank and. file", the Germans on the other hand.
had always made a clear distinction between the "Storm Troops" who led the
way and. the "dense solid mass" who consolidated the position after the
Storm Troops had won it. These "young Nazi hot-heads who filled the
armoured. divisions" had suffered very heavy losses, but had been respons-
ible for a shattering series of German victories. The War Cabinet invited
the Secretary of State for War to take a leaf out of the Germans' book 'by
introducing a Storm Troop element into the Army which, together with the
rapid replacement of "all leaders who should prove themselves lacking in
drive and initiative", would help to improve training arid "instil sri
offensive spirit into the Army as a whole". 32. Winston Churchill inimedi-
ately took up the idea arid minuted it the next day to General Ismay, with
his customary verve:
31. CAB 65/7 WM(40)l7Oth:9, 17 June 1940.
32. ibid.
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"What are the ideas of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, about
Storm Troops? We have always set our face against this idea, but the
Gernians certainly gained in the last War by adopting it, and this time it
has been a leading cause of their victory. There ought to be at least
20,000 Storm Troops or 'Leopards' drawn from existing Units, ready to
spring at the throat of any small landings or descents. These officers and
men should be armed with the latest equipment, Tommy guns, grenades, etc.L
and should be given great facilities in motorcycles and armoured cars." 3.
At the Defence Committee meeting on 19th June, Churchill closely
questioned Genera]. Ironside as to whether the idea of Storm Troops had been
accepted by the Army and, if so, what progress had been made. The C.-in--C.
replied that he was proceeding on the principle that there should be a
large number of small units in the nature of Storm Troops, such as Tank
Hunting Platoons in each battalion, the five Independent Companies that had.
returned from Norway, and "Special Irregular Units". However, he declared
himself opposed to turning any particular division into a division of Storm
Troops, and pointed out that while steps were being taken to inculcate
throughout the Army the offensive spirit which was so important, "it should
be remembered that effective counter-attacks could not be carried out with-
out the requisite weapons". 	 After the meeting, Genera]. Ironside good-
humouredly commented, "Winston in good form and gingering people up. His
enerr is unabated."
The mn limiting factor to the effectiveness of the mobile coluimis in
late June, though, whether or not they included Storm Troops, was simply
the problem of equipping them. The independent brigades, such as the 1st
Armoured. Reconnaissance Brigade and the three Motor Machine Gun Brigades,
were not yet fully mobile and were still receiving their improvised "Iron-
side" armoured cars. They had virtually no anti-tank capacity. The small
mobile reserve formed by the Carrier Platoon in every infantry battalion
still largely lacked its Bren Carriers. The divisions on or near the coast,
which had been reorganised on a basis of "mobile brigade groups of all
arms", still did not have enough transport for the conveyance of two of
their three brigades, and many could only move a single brigade at any one
time. Most of the troops in these divisions were stretched along the coast-
line, manning the static defences or worki.rig on their construction. Motor
33. Churchill, W. S.: Vol. II, Their Finest Hour, p. 147. Cassell,
London, 1949.
34. CAB 69/1 DO(40)llth:1, 19 June 1940.
35. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironsid.e, 19 June 194 0, op. cit.
- 211 -
Coach Companies were being organised as fast as drivers could be made avail-
able, but often civilian drivers could. not be taken as many of them were
over the age of 41 and were, therefore, immune from conscription, as the law
stood. Many divisional Field Artillery regiments, while mobile, had at most
only 10 field guns each, instead of their proper establishment of 24, and.
few of these were the modern 25 pdrs., while the shortage of anti-tank guns
was as serious as ever. 36. It was to be a while yet before this state of
affairs saw any significant improvement and, in the meantime, GeneraJ.
Ironsid.e had little choice but to rely primarily on static defence.
*	 *	 *
A further problem for General Ironside was that still posed by the
large civilian population living in the coastal areas which were most liable
to enemy attack, a population that was likely to dissolve into a hoard of
panic-stricken refugees that would. stream inland and. severely congest the
roads if the enemy landed, unless their numbers were severely reduced.
Already, on 25th May, the Defence Committee had. agreed to initiate the
voluntary evacuation of children, pregnant women and invalids or old people
from all major East Coast towns, with priority given to fifteen and then,
with the later addition of Sheringhrn, Cromer, Sandgate and. Rytthe, to nine-
teen towns between Sheringham and Hythe. The remnder of the population
was strictly instructed to "stay put" in the event of an invasion. However,
the Committee had flinched from ordering an immediate full-scale evacuation
from these towns and instead. had contented itself with a scheme for the
evacuation of 60% of the population of any particular coastal area, only if
an emergency arose.	 General Sir Hugh Elles, Chief of the Civil Defence
Operational Staff, told the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 14th June that the
60% evacuation scheme "would be on a semi-compulsory basis, in that all
evacuees would be told that it was their national duty to move out", but
G.H.Q.. Operational Instruction No. 3, issued only the next day, stated that
this scheme "is likely to be ineffective, as it is voluntary". 
38. A
further difficulty was the timing of this 60% evacuation. Too early would
cause unnecessary hardship to the evacuees and an unjustifiable burden on
the reception areas; too late, and the scheme would fail, possibly with
36. CAB 69/1 DO(40)l7th:1, 19 June 1940.
37. CAB 69/1 DO(40)8th:1, and Annexe, 25 May 1940.
38. CAB 79/5 COS(40 )l8lst :3, 14 June 1940; and. WO 166/i: op. cit., June
1940, Appendix F: op. cit., 15 June 1940.
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disastrous results. The scheme had been prepared on the basis of its being
put into operation at 12 to 24 hours' notice, and being completed. within 48
hours from the departure of the first train. mis, however, meant that
perhaps three days' notice was necessary before the invasion materialised,
if the scheme were to be of any real value. On 24th June, the Joint
Intelligence Sub-Coimnittee warned the Chiefs of Staff that:
"Whilst we shall no doubt receive beforehand indications that seaborne
invasion is impending, we cannot guarantee being able to give three days'
warning.... Even if three days' notice of a seaborne invasion were possible,
preliminary air attacks on rail or road communications would so dislocate
traffic that the evacuation of the civil population of coastal towns might
be impossible or at least chaotic. Evacuation under such conditions would
seriously interfere with military movement."
Noreover, the J.I.C., as yet lacking the effective aid of 	 or the
benefits of long-range air reconnaissance, could guarantee no warning at all
in the case of seaborne raids or after the Germans bad regrouped their air
force for a large-scale air attack on the U.K., an event which might be a
preliminary to an invasion at any time thereafter. 40.
Yet another difficulty, concerning the evacuation of the civilian
population from coastal areas, was that of the rapidly widenftig extent of
coastline which was considered to be vulnerable to attack. As early as 6th
June, the J.I.C. had stated that:
"The most favourable area for seaborne invasion .... stretches at
present from The Wash to Newbaven. It will extend to the westward according
to the progress of a German advance in Northern France." 41.
Nevertheless, only the towns between Great Yarmouth and Rythe were earmarked
for even partial evacuation at this time. On 18th June, the J.10C. con-
sidered that, due to the damage at Belgian and French ports and the hazards
negotiating the Straits of Dover, any enemy expedition from Northern France
would "for the time being .... be limited to one of small vessels,
including probably tank-carrying pontoons". Because of its slow speed and
39. CAB 79/5 COS(40 )l 8lst :3, 14 June 1940.
40. CAB 80/13 COS(40)487(JIC); also JIC(40)138: Coastal Evacuation:
Notice to Rome Defence Executive, Report by J.I.C., 24 June 1940.
41. CAB 80/12 COS(40)432(JIC); also JIC(40)101: Siimmry of the Likely
Forms and Scales of Attack that Germany could bring to bear on the
British Isles in the Near Future, Report by J.I.C., 8 June 1940.
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vulnerability to attack by the Royal Navy, such a German expedition would.
be most likely to take the shortest sea crossing to Eigland so that it could
travel entirely in darkness. The area most likely for an enemy landing,
therefore, would include, besides the most exposed part of the Kent promon-
tary, the coastline from HTthe to Beachy Head. in Sussex, and here "the
length of warning probable will be too short to allow of an orderly evacua-
tion taking place". They considered that "partial evacuation should now be
carried out in this area". Given adequate air support, of which there was
expected to be no shortage, a German expedition of this nature might shortly
be able to land as far along the coast as Chichester Harbour, and. then:
"When the Germans occupy ports west of Havre (including Cherbourg,
which is 80 miles from the higlish coast), an expedition in craft of large
tonnage against ports as far west as Lyme Regis might be attempted...." 42.
The very next day, the Chiefs of Staff were to add. that,
".... the area bordering the East, South East and South Coast from
Tyneside to Portland (inclusive) should be declared a defended area." 43.
This last suggestion was re3ected by Sir John Anderson, the Secretary
of State for Rome Affairs and. Minister for Rome Security, at a War Cabinet
meeting on 21st June, on the grounds that there was insufficient staff
available to control all civilian movement in such an area and because he
was unwilling to extend the already quite considerable defended area
"without further experience of the steps already taken". Aliens had been
removed from the whole of this coastal strip. 	 Even so, out of these
statements, both by the Chiefs of Staff and by the J.I.C., there arose the
question of the desirability of thinning the population in the coastal
areas, firstly from Hythe (exclusively) to Newhaven, and secondly, and much
less conveniently because of the large numbers of people involved., from
Newhaven (exclusively) to Portland. or Lyme Regis or perhaps even further
afield.
42. CAB 80/13 COS(40)473(JIC); also JIC(40)125: Evacuation from South
Coast Towns, Report by JIC, 18 June 1940.
43. CAB 66/8 wP(40)213; also COS(40)471: Urgent Measures to Meet Attack,
Report by COS, 19 June 1940.
44. CAB 65/7 WM(40)174th:13, 21 June 1940.
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The question of the evacuation of the population from vulnerable
coastal areas was also to lead to a continuing conflict between the differ-
irig points of view of the military and the civil authorities. The greater
the numbers of civilians in coastal areas liable to attack, the more the
military authorities had cause for concern, whereas conversely, the more of
these civilians that were evacuated, the greater would be the burden on the
civil authorities, especially in matters of reception areas and accominoda-
tion for the evacuees. On 25th June, the War Cabinet had a long discussion
on the evacuation question. The Chief of the Air Staff put forward the
Chiefs of Staff Committees' view that they could not undertake to give
three days' notice of enemy invasion and. that "as it was impossible to pre-
dict when invasion was likely to be attempted •... evacuation should take
place as soon as possible". General Ironside, also present at this meeting,
confirmed that it would be desirable, from the military point of view, to
carry out evacuation forthwith. Sir John Anderson said that active steps
were being taken to define the classes of people who were to leave, but in
some towns the population earmarked for evacuation might be as high as 90%,
not 60% as previously envisaged, since it now included all but essential
personnel. Departments had even been insisting that evacuation should
cover the removal of workers engaged on war production. Moreover, whereas
the present scheme covering the East Coast towns had been chosen "because
this was the area most likely to be attacked by an enemy seeking to capture
London", the burden of the civil authorities might soon be compounded,
since:
"If there was any idea of extending the scheme to the more populous
cities and towns on the South Coast such as Brighton and Hove, the diffi-
culties of organising an evacuation would be immensely increased by the
shortage of billets in reception areas."
The War Cabinet nevertheless approved, in principle, that the evacuation of
'useless mouths' from the 19 East Coast towns should start on 1st July or
"as soon thereafter as possible" and. the Home Secretary was invited to
deliver his full report to the War Cabinet in three days' time.
At the War Cabinet meeting on 27th June, however, Sir John Anderson
produced a long list of objections to the scheme:
45. CAB 65/7 wri(40)l8lst:3, 25 June 1940.
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"The complete scheme would involve the evacuation of 250,000 to 300,000
persons, and. would entail compulsory billeting on a scale never before con-
templated. So heavy a burden could be justified in the face of an obvious
military necessity, but not as a purely precautionary measure .... invasion
would probably not affect the whole coastline, but only two or three points.
It would therefore be unreasonable to denude the whole coast unless military
considerations made this imperative."
The preparation of plans for compulsory evacuation had., in fact, produced a
large-scale voluntary evacuation, which had already reached. 40% in the South
East towns and 25% in East Anglia, and Anderson felt that this could. be
increased further. In the face of these powerful arguments, the Chiefs of
Staff and General Ironside were more conciliatory, saying that while, from
the military point of view, complete evacuation of this coastal strip "would
undoubtedly help", it was however "not essential". They added. that:
"Arrangements had been made to allot roads for the use of refugees, and
most of the rein'-1ning population could. be moved. if and. when necessary by
'tactical trains'. By a further tightening up of these and similar arrange-
ments, it should be possible to meet the situation without compulsory
evacuation, provided. that voluntary evacuation was stimulated."
The War Cabinet, therefore, concluded that the plan for the compulsory
evacuation of all but essential personnel from the 19 coastal towns between
Sheringham and. Hythe should be held. in readiness, so that it could. be  imple-
mented at short notice if it became necessary, but that "it should not be
put into operation for the present". They decided that a scheme on this
scale should. only be carried. out "as a military necessity, in the face of
invasion or imminent invasion" and, in the meantime, the Ninister of Rome
Security was to encourage voluntary evacuation from these towns "up to the
level of say 60% of the population". 46.
Despite their conciliatory attitud.e on 27th June, the Chiefs of Staff
were to make one further attempt at persuading the War Cabinet to begin the
compulsory evacuation of the nineteen East Coast towns straightaway.
General Sir Hugh Elles reported. to a meeting of the Vice-Chiefs of Staff on
1st July that the plans for the compulsory evacuation of these towns were
now ready to be put into limnediate effect as soon as the War Cabinet made up
its mind to implement them. Lieutenant General R. H. Rining, Vice-Chief of
the Imperial General Staff, who was chairing the meeting, added that:
46. CAB 65/7 Wi'i(40 ) 184th:1, 27 June 1940.
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".... in the light of the more recent reports received from various
sources, large-scale operations (either invasion and/or air attack) against
this country must be considered as likely to take place any day now .
it was his view, and. that of the C.-in-C., Home Forces, that the compulsory
evacuation of East Coast towns •... should begin at once."
The Vice-Chiefs, therefore, decided to recommend to the War Cabinet that it
should review its recent decision on this matter. The Vice-Chiefs also
decided that, independently of this, the civil population from Hythe
(exclusively) to Newhaven "should now be thinned out to the greatest
practicable extent" in view of the German threat from Western Prance,
though it was not thought necessary yet to thin out the heavily populated
West Sussex towns because the presence of refugees would be less of an
embarrassment to the military in the more open countryside of the South
Downs. Up to now, the only evacuation that had. taken place from South
Coast towns west of Bythe had, except for some thinning out of school-
children in the Portsmouth area, been entirely voluntary and there were
still present in these towns many schoolchildren who bad been evacuated
there from "dangerous areas" elsewhere. Despite this extension, it was the
East Coast scheme that was to receive priority in the event of conflicting
claims for transport and billeting accommodation.
On 3rd. July, therefore, the War Cabinet was presented with a strongly
worded report by the Chiefs of Staff, which urged them to review their
previous conclusion of 27th June that compulsory evacuation should not yet
be carried out. Repeating that they were unable to give an assurance that
Britain would. receive three days' notice of attack, they warned:
"There are indications that major operations against this Country
either by invasion and/or heavy air attack may commence any day from now
onwards.
We cannot be certain that we shall receive any more definite informa-
tion than is in our possession at present as to the day arid hour that the
operations will commence. Noon and tide conditions and various reports
from foreii countries, of varying reliability, indicate that between the
3rd and 10th July may be the critical days....
The Coiminder-in-Chief, Home Forces, considers that from the military
point of view compulsory evacuation should take place now." 48.
47. CAB 79/5 COS(40)203rd:2, 1 July 1940.
48. CAB 66/9 WP(40)240; also COS(40)514: Evacuation of Civil Population
from East, South-East and South Coast Towns, Report by C.O.S., 3 July
1940.
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At the War Cabinet meeting that day, both Air Chief }larshal Newall and
General Dill argued that there were many signs of an invasion in the near
future that "could not be ignored" and emphasized the danger of delaying
the evacuation until it was too late. However, in spite of the efforts of
the Chiefs of Staff to persuade them to change their minds, the War Cabinet
rem1ried. unconvinced, Sir John Anderson especially pointing out that the
problems involved. in compulsory evacuation for the nineteen East Coast
towns were too great. Listing again the difficulties involved in compulsory
billeting massive numbers of people end. the fact that invasion was only
likely to affect certain points on the coastline, he added that:
"Public opinion was already somewhat jumpy, and. would, become more so
if this scheme .... was carried out. Further people on other parts of the
coast would. ask why they also were not evacuated."
The War Cabinet thus decided. again not to initiate compulsory evacuation,
but instead. to continue to place their faith in voluntary evacuation, which
had actually reached. 50% in the South East coastal towns. People who
relnzLined. in an area affected by operations, therefore, would simply have to
stay put.
In reality, thcse of the civilian population who did stay put would.
risk severe casualties not only by enemy bombing and shelling, but also by
that of the British defenders, and, unless voluntary evacuation were to
reduce considerably the population of the vulnerable coastal towns, many
thousands would. inevitably have to take to the roads if the enemy landed,
especially if their homes were destroyed. Nevertheless, the policy of
voluntary evacuation only was to continue during the comirg months and,, in
fact, was to prove very successful. Just a couple of weeks later, on 18th
July, the Chiefs of Staff Conmittee heard that, by various means, inc1uing
moving original evacuees elsewhere, the state- aided evacuation of local
children, by preparing evacuation schemes and. making them iown locally, by
urging the local inhabitants who could. go to do so, and by nialcirig certain
arrangements to assist them, such as a moratorium for rents or a billeting
allowance, the population of the East Axiglian coastal towns had. been re- -
duced by 54% from 280,000 to 129,000, and that of the Kentish coastal towns
by 61% from 207,000 to only 80,000. Thus, these reductions, achieved
indnIy by voluntary means, already appror4mted to the 60% figure it was
49. CA3 65/8 WM(40)192nd:14, 3 July 1940.
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originally hoped to attain by a compulsory scheme, and. the numbers evacua?-
ted were to continue to increase throughout the summer. The Chiefs of
Staff, suitably impressed, now anthorised. that similar measures should be
applied to the South Coast towns as far as Newhaven. New Romney, Lydd,
Rye, Hastings, Bexh.il]., Eastbourne, Seaford and Newhaven itself were,
therefore, added to the list with a recommendation that voluntary evacua-
tion should take place on the same scale as from the nineteen East and.
South East Coast towns. Like the Chiefs of Staff, General Ironsid.e had. by
now also accepted that complete evacuation was impracticable and he de-
clared himself "fully in favour" of continuing to thin out the coastal
population by these means. 50. Unimpeded. by the presence of large numbers
of civilians, the troops on or near the most vulnerable coastlines would
henceforth be much freer to concentrate their attention on the primary task
of repelling the invaders.
*	 *	 *
In the meantime, the greatest problem of all for General Ironsid.e
remained simply the crucial question of whether there were sufficient time
for Home Forces to complete its preparations and build up its strength
enough to be able to resist successfully the German onslaught when it came,
as it was believed it might do any day. The greatest fear of man is that
of the unknown, of what might happen. What Churchill called "the veil of
the unknown" was as thick and. as impenetrable as ever. General Ironside
confided, on 2id June:
"The tactical problem is such a difficult one with no idea where the
enemy may come from, either from the sea or the air. A clever enemy may be
able to join up the two efforts very quickly. We want so much time to get
our preparations ready, and. time is the one thing the Germans are not
likely to give us. The complete blank wall of Intelligence is still in
front of us, and. we can get no information about the preparations being
made the other side."
He added, on 29th June:
"Every day gets our preparations better and our troops better armed.
If the Germans intend to attack - and everything seems to point to the fact
that they will - it is a race between their preparations and ours. They
are much better prepared. than we are, and we are improvising all the time.
50. CAB 79/5 COS(40 )227th:1, 18 July 1940.
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We have the Navy arid, the Air Force, neither of which can guarantee us
against a landing, though they can limit the alimentation of such landings
as have taken place.
With luck they may not surprise us.
We are forced to disperse. They can concentrate on any point or
points they have chosen. All the inn points are therefore in the Germans'
favour, so long as they can be assured of good weather...." 51.
The latter, in fact, was being as contrary as ever. Britain was having one
of its finest summers for years.
General Ironside was also not being helped by a controversial debate
that sprang up at the highest levels towards the end of June, as to the
nature and effectiveness of his plans for the land defence of the Nation.
On 25th June, General Ironside exposed his completed plans to the Chiefs of
Staff Committee. All the carefully thought out elements of the defence
were embodied in the general scheme and each had its vitally important part
to play. The main points of his plan were, firstly, an extended "crust"
along the probable invasion beaches. This was to be held as an "outpost
line" and was designed to beat off minor enterprises, to keep a watch for
and to report immediately German attempts at invasion, and. to break up,
delay and. canalize all penetrations. The troops manning 'this line were to
fight where they stood, so as to gain time for support by mobile reserves
who would put in immediate local counterattacks. They would also have the
support of most of the available field guns which were sited near the coast
to cover the most likely landing places. Secondly, there would be blocks
manned by the L.]).V. at all defiles and nodal points, to stop or delay
German armoured columns that had broken through, and to harry any penetra-
tion. This "local defence" would make full use of concrete and. other types
of roadblock to stop the movements of enemy tanks, while the L.D.V. had
Nolotov cocktails and other devices with which to attempt to destroy them.
Thirdly, in support of both the "crust" and these local defences, there
would be small local mobile reserves, including mobile columns with
A.F.V.'s such as the "Ironsides". These would deal with any minor break-
through and would also have the additional task of dealing with paratroop
landings. Under Corps and Command. control there would be larger mobile
reserve formations with a similar counter-attacking role. FourthJ.y, there
51. Diaries of Field Narshal Lord. Ironside, 22 & 29 June 1940, op. cit.
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was to be a strong major defence line, constructed to stop any major break-
through from reaching London or the industrial Midlands. (See Nap 7.)
This was to consist of a "G.E.Q. stopline" of natural or artificial anti-
tank obstacles, covered by fire from over 2,500 blockhouses. This line
would primarily be held by the L.D.V.. It was to extend, in East .Anglia,
from The Wash at King' s Lynn via Cambridge and Chelmeford to the River
Thames at Canvey Island, Tnking use of the line of the Rivers Great Ouse,
Cam and Upper Chelmer; and, in the South East and South, it was to con-
tinue from the River Thames east of Gravesend via Rochester, Maidstone,
Tonbrid.ge and Edenbridge on the Rivers Nedway and Eden, along the southern
edge of the North Downs to cover Reigate, Guildford and £Ldershot, and from
there via the River Blackwater to join the Kennet and Avon Canal just west
of Reading. The line was then to follow this canal via Newbury, Hungerford
and Devizes until its junction with the River Avon at Bath, and finally to
follow the River Avon to the Bristol Channel, so as to cover the important
City of Bristol. It was also planned to continue the G.H.Q. Line from The
Wash at Boston, via the Rivers Withain and. Trent to the Thimber, and thence
via the Vale of York to finish at Niddlesbrough. There were also to be
add.itionaJ. shorter Corps and Divisional lines of "stops" forward between
the min G.H.Q. Line and the coast. Five of these were apparently planned
for East .Anglia, so as to confine, break up and delay an enemy advance from
the vulnerable beaches about Lowestoft and Harwich, either towards the Mid-
lands or across the open uplands north of London; and three were to be
situated in Kent, Sussex and Surrey to bar the approaches to London from
the South East. Fifthly and lastly, there was the G.H.Q. Reserve, consist-
ing at first of one armoured and the equivalent of three infantry divisions
with most of the few available towed anti-tank guns, centrally placed to
the rear of the G.LQ. Line as the major counter-attacking force. 52.
These dispositions, therefore, were meant to ensure defence in great
depth, so as to prevent enemy tank columns running riot and to stop the
invaders reaching the capital or the industrial towns of the Midlands, both
of which were essential to the continuation of the war, and also, as far as
resources permitted, to provide troops for counterattack. With 500 miles
of beaches on the South and East Coasts suitable for the landing of
A.F.V.'s, of which a third were in areas where the full might of the German
52. CAB 79/5 COS(40)193rd:2, 25 June 1940; Macleod, R. and Kelly, D.
(ed.s.): The Ironside Diaries, 1937-1940 , pp. 371-372, Constable,
London, 1962; and Collier, Basil: History of the Second World War:
The Defence of the United Kingdom, pp. 129-130 , LM.S.0., London, 1957.
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air force 'could be emnloyed, arid, with his troops suffering from a chronic
lack of equipment, mobility and. trirtirig, especially in the offensive, with
virtually no armoured formations, and with the recent experience in France
of the wholehearted offensive tactics which the Germans were likely to
employ, added to the threat of enemy airborne troops who might be landed a
long way inland., General Ironsid,e was forced to conclude that the only
answer lay in combining his few mobile or armoured units with this exten-
sive scheme of static preparations deployed over a wide area. Only as more
equipment and transport became available, and as training improved, could a
more offensive form of defence become possible and. be implemented.
General	 plans, however, were destined to cause severe alarm
especially on the vital question of where the inMn battle should be fought
if the Germans tried to invade. At the morning meeting on the 25th June,
the three Chiefs of Staff had seemed satisfied with General Ironside's
explanation. However, at 3.30 p.m. the very next day, the Vice-Chiefs of
Staff, who had presumably scrutinised. the plans in more detail but who had
not been present at the Chiefs of Staff's meeting, met to d.iscuss various
matters of Home Defence. Lord. Hankey, Chancellor of the Dachy of Lancaster,
had written a letter to be circulated to the Committee on the role of the
Army, Navy and Air Force in Home Defence, and. in this he had srnnnirised the
Armys role as being "to attack the enemy as violently as possible from the
moment when he came within range of whatever weapons are available on the
spot".	 Arising out of discussion on this item, Lieutenant General H. H.
Raining, the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, then drew attention
to the minutes of the Chief of Staff's meeting the previous day, and
especially to the fact that General Ironside had declared. his intention of
holding the coast as a "crust" or "outpost line" arid. of holding the G.R.Q.
mobile Reserves "in rear" of the min defence line, which was to run "down
the East centre of England". Both Lieutenant General Raining and lus two
colleagues, Air Marshal Sir Richard Pierse, the Vice-Chief of the Air Staff,
and. Vice-Admiral Thomas Phillips, the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, then
went on to express "the greatest concern at these dispositions", since, as
they saw it,
53. Collier, Basil: op. cit., pp . 129-130.
54. CAB 80/13 COS(40)490: Rome Defence, Letter by Lord Hankey to the
C.O.S. Committee, 25 June 1940.
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..•. it appeared that the main resistance might only be offered after
the enemy had. overrun nearly half the country, and obtained possession of
aerodromes and other vital facilities."
The Vice-Chiefs echoed Lord. Hariicey's opinion that "the only policy was to
resist the enemy with the utmost resolution from the moment he set foot on
the shore". They continued:
"Once he established himself firmly on land, experience had shown that
the German was extremely difficult to dislodge. The enemy would use their
best troops for the initial landing, arid we should have to face the fact
that their training arid equipment would. be superior to that of our own
troops. For this reason we should have to dispute every inch of the ground
at the landing places themselves. It had always been recoiized that the
most hazardous part of an opposed landing was in the disembarkation on the
beaches."
They also criticized the fact that General Ironside's plan had. made very
little mention of the defence of the South Coast "which was now quite as
liable to attack as the East and South East Coasts". The Vice-Chiefs
concluded that, in their view, "the plan was completely unsound and needed
drastic and immediate revision". Agreeing to place their views before the
Chiefs of Staff "forthwith" and to request the latter to discuss this ques-
tion with them present "as a matter of urgency", the Vice-Chiefs added.:
"It was, of course, impossible to be strong everywhere along the
coast. Nevertheless, the idea of holding the 'crust' with outposts arid
contemplating the main line of resistance after half the Country had been
overrun, seemed nothing short of suicidal." 55.
Learning of this alarming reaction from the Vice-Chiefs, General Dill
immediately hurried down to G.H.Q., Home Forces, at Kneller Hall, T'wicken-
ham, to see General Ironsid.e and discuss with him his Operational Instruc-
tions for the Defence of the Country. General Ironsid.e maintained, that his
scheme of coastal defence was the best that could be devised, taking into
account his severely limited resources. He continued to insist that he
would. have liked nothing better than the opportunity to frame a more
offensive strategy, if only he had the means to do so.
The Chiefs of Staff and the Vice-Chiefs met at 9.45 p.m. that day
specifically to discuss General Ironside's plans. The Vice-Chief of the
Air Staff explained the worries of the Vice-Chiefs. The Chiefs of Staff,
55. CAB 79/5 COS(40 )195th: 2, 26 June 1940.
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however, unlike the Vice-Chiefs, had actually been present at the explana-
tion given by Sir Edmund Ironsid.e on the previous day. Air Chief Marshal
Sir Cyril Newafl, chairing the meeting, said. that he had received "rather a
different impression" from the explanation. He had understood that,
t,,•. the coast was to be defended by positions established at the
most likely landing places and sufficiently strong to check and. delay
landings. Behind this was a mass of manoeuvre which would be used to check
penetration and the anti-tank obstacle referred to as running down the
centre of England would only be used in the last resort."
General Dill, fresh from his talk with Genera]. Ironside that afternoon,
also supported the Commander-in-Chief. quoting relevant extracts from the
G.LQ. Operational Instructions, he argued that General Ironside's original
explanation had petaps been badly worded:
"It was clear from the Instructions that defences had been prepared
and would be manned along stretches of the coast where landings by tanks
were considered possible. At other places arrangements had been made to
patrol the beaches and repulse landings, if discovered, by the use of local
reserves. The beach defences, however, were referred to as 'outposts',
giving the impression that they might at some time be withdrawn and. might
not be expected to resist to the bitter end. In order that there should be
no misconception on this point, it would be better to refer to them as
foremost defended localities which would then in no case be abandoned."
During the discussion, the view was expressed that the CoTmnnder-1n-Chief
intended that the battle should be fought on the seashore and that this
intention was fully appreciated by the troops mn1ng the coastal defences.
Major General Hastings Ismay, who had accompanied the Prime Minister that
day on a visit to the defences in East Anglia, said that "the troops and
Commanders that they had visited undoubtedly intended to fight on the sea-
shore and had no thought of withdrawal", while Air Chief Marshal Newall,
who had. also seen General Ironsid.e earlier in the day to co-ordinate the
use of the R,A.F.'s bombers in the event of invasion, warned that "it was
particularly important from the Air Force point of view that the battle
should take place on the seashore", since "there would be no difficulty
then in d.istingu.ishing between friend and. foe and little danger of bombing
our own people". All in all, however, the Committee agreed that, in both
General Ironside's explanation on the previous day and in "certain para-
graphs" of his Operational Instructions, "too much emphasis had been placed
on the line of anti-tank obstacles down the centre of England and that the
object of the beach defences had not been clearly expressed." 56.
56. CB 79/5 COS(40 ) 1 96th:1 , 26 June 1940.
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Worry, too, was expressed at the meeting as to the positioning and,
indeed, the adequacy of General Ironside's reserves. Troops fighting from
static defences were only able to obstruct, delay and harass the enemy,
and could not destroy him by themselves. Ultimately, the success of the
battle must depend upon the rapidity with which both these troops and the
small mobile reserves supporting the coastal defence could be rein.forced
by formations from the Tnfl reserve, which was located behind the G.E.c.
anti-tank line, so as to be able to deliver a killing blow. It was
pointed out, however, that:
"The line of anti-tank obstacles was in places a long way from the
coast and there seemed a great danger that reserves might arrive after the
enemy had consolidated any success, particularly if airborne troops were
landed between the coast and the reserves with the object of delaying the
advance of the latter."
Not only this, but the local reserves themselves were felt to be insuffi-
cient. Najor General Ismay had found during his visit to East Anglia that
day that the local divisional commanders were "worried by the absence of
local reserves, as they had been obliged to use most of their troops in
the forward localities. The main reserves were some distance back and.
would not arrive within twelve hours even under favourable conditions."
He, himself, thought that "one or two extra divisions" could be moved
forward, so as to reduce the length of the coastline held per division and.
increase the size of the local reserves, though the Committee preferred
the view that now that the coastal defences were more advanced, a propor-
tion of the troops should spend their time training "in movement and.
counter-attack", rather than in constructing and. manning the defences.
The Chief of the Air Staff added that "the system of warning and inter-
communication, particularly with co-operating Air Forces, should be
practised". The Committee as a whole agreed that a memorandum covering
their views on all these points should be prepared for General Ironside's
consideration.
Their memorandum, the details of which were approved by the Chiefs of
Staff on the following morning, 27th June, stated that General Ironsid.e's
plan of defence "appears to us to be generally sound". All, however, was
far from well. Though the Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to believe that
General Ironside intended anything other than putting the min emphasis on
57. CJB 79/5 COS(40 )196th : 1 , 26 June 1940.
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the coastal battle, they were understandably anxious that any nasinterpreta-
tions of the plan should be dispelled immediately and that General Ironside
should give the necessary assurances as soon as possible, otherwise doubt
and confusion would prevail. The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, went on to
summrize the criticisms levelled against the plan:
".... We are not entirely satisfied that sufficient emphasis has been
laid upon the paramount necessity of resisting the enemy by all the means
in our power, during that vital phase in the operations where he will be
most vulnerable, i.e. during the process of disembarkation on the beaches.
We have formed the impression that the term 	 or outpostt, when
applied to the defence of our shores, is liable to misconception and danger.
A defence which is termed a 'crust' implies that it is expected to be
broken, while an 'outpost' is indicative of thinly held posts from which
retirement is permissible under pressure.
We fully appreciate that it will be impossible in the time available,
and with the forces at the Commnder-in-C1uef's disposal, to make impreg-
nable the whole coastline on which a landing might be attempted, especially
as airborne landings on a considerable scale must also be guarded against.
Nevertheless, we feel that the balance of our defence, as the plan has been
explained to us, may lean too far on the side of a thinly held 'crust' on
the coast with insufficient mobile reserves in the immediate vicinity of
the points at which penetrations might occur."
They continued:
"We are not clear as to the location of reserves. While the position
of London and the need for space for deployment in any required direction
necessitates the retention some way inland of the Tn?in reserves, yet the
need for immediate counter-attack against any penetrations is paramount,
and troops so situated as the main reserves may take an unduly long time in
coming into action.
Consequently, we are anxious for an assurance that, bearing in mind
the total forces available, there is a sufficient proportion available as
local reserves in close support of the troops on the coast to hold. the
invader until the main reserves can intervene.... We fully agree that,
having regard to the limited forces available, our main reserves must not
be concentrated too close to the coast. Ievertheless, we are not entirely
satisfied that the present location of the main reserves is sufficiently
far forward to enable them effectively to counter a penetration of the
forward defences." 58.
General Ironside, meanwhile, was becoming exasperated. On 26th June,
he wrote:
58. CAB 79/5 COS(40)197th:4, 27 June 1940; and CAB 80/13 COS(40)495,
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"1 am being bombarded with letters from people saying that this and
that place is not defended, and that the quality of the troops is bad here
arid there. I know that it is, and can do nothing to alter it. Our equip-
ment is ludicrously deficient and the War Office knows it. Only about 30%
of our complement of guns."
On the 27th, he inspected defences on the South East Coast from Folkestone
to Rye in Lieutenant General A. F. N. 	 XII Corps area:
"Work is going on apace, but we are woefully short on the ground. We
cannot put all the men into the	 of defence on the beaches. We may
be attacked at so many points and. must have a reserve that can be moved
about to meet both the sea landings and the air landings. I think there is
no doubt that the Germans might effect a landing at any point and with
little warning. Our defences are advancing, but terribly slowly in view of
the iiiiminence of the attack arid. the resources available to the Germans.
Every portion of the coast at which I look seems weaker than the other and.
the troops less trained and more unhandy...."
The nert morning he continued his inspection along the coast to Brighton,
where Major General Bernard Montgomery's 3rd Regular Division had recently
taken up position. Here he found work was "progressing well". He confided
to his diary that day, however:
"They are beginning to worry at the War Office, and. both I and. Paget
axe being continually sent for to see people. Paget to see the P.M. and I
to see the Secretary of State and the Chiefs of Staff. I also find. that
the paper which is being poured out by the War Office is terrific. It is
hampering efficiency in every way. You cannot make war with a pen.
Everybody is getting nervous and is beginning to scent the invasion
coming. Just what Hitler wants to make us believe. Feint attacks or
attacks which may be turned into main attacks if they are at all successful.
I had. an example today of the 3rd. Division being taken into War Office
reserve, put back to me again, and sent back to the War Office. Shiuly-
shallying and doubt. The politicians will not leave the soldiers alone."
The Prime Minister, himself, now added further confusion to the
existing scheme. That day, 28th June, he drew up a memorandum in which he
agreed with the War Office view that the East Coast was still the area
which was most vulnerable to a German invasion attempt. "The South Coast,"
he declared, "is less immed.iately dangerous." Re went on, however, to
oppose the Chiefs of Staff's view that the mn-in emphasis should be placed.
on the defence of the coastline:
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"No one can tell, should the Navy fail, on what part of the East Coast
the impact will fall. Perhaps there will be several lod.gements. Once
these are made, all troops employed on other parts of the coastal crust
will be as useless as those on the Maginot Line. Although fighting on the
beaches is favourable to the defence, this advantage cannot be purchased by
trying to guard all the beaches.... Every effort must be made to man coast
defences with sedentary troops, well sprinkled with experienced late-war
officers."
Nevertheless, he was in agreement with the Cluefs of Staff as to the
importance of the mobile reserves and. especially the immediate local re-
serves which he had already dubbed as the "Leopards". Winston Churchill' a
memorandum continued:
"The safety of the Country depends on having a large number (now only
nine, but should soon be fifteen) of 'Leopard' brigade groups which can be
d.irected swiftly, i.e. within four hours, to the point of lodgement. The
difficulties of landing on beaches are serious, even when the invader has
reached them, but the difficulties of nourishing a lodgement when exposed
to heavy attack by land, air and sea are far greater. All, therefore,
depends on the rapid, resolute engagement of any landed forces which may
slip through the sea-control. This should not be beyond our means, pro-
vided the field troops are not consumed in beach defences, and are kept in
a high condition of mobility, crouched and ready to spring."
Adding that "four or five good divisions" with artillery should also be
held in general reserve, in case of "the unhappy event of the enemy captur-
ing a port", the Prime Minister concluded:
"In general, I find myself in agreement with the Commander-rn-Chief's
plan, but all possible field-troops must be saved from the beaches and.
gathered into the 'Leopard' brigades arid, other iinmed.iate mobile supports.
The battle will be won or lost not on the beaches, but by the mobile
brigades and the main reserves." 60.
Churchill's memorandum contrasted strangely with his famous, "We shall
fight on the beaches", speech that he had. delivered so recently. It also
contrasted with the views of another politician, Lord Hankey, who, not to
be outdone, now produced a revised version of his own earlier memorandum
to the Chiefs of Staff which had. been to some extent responsible for initia-
ting this debate over General Ironside's plans. In his revised memorandum
of 28th June, sumrnvizing the duties of the various Services in repelling
invasion, he declared:
60. CkB 80/13 COS(40)498; also WP(40)236: Note by the Prime Ninister to
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"The general policy of Home Defence is to attack the enemy so far as
possible from the moment when his preparations are discovered.; during the
voyage by sea or air, if he succeeds in starting; in the act of landing
(which mast be prevented if possible); and. after landing until the forces
are completely destroyed.'t
With this, the Prime Minister would have agreed. Lord Hankey, however,
went on to add. that:
"The beaches and ports are the main line of defence of tis Country
and the enemy mast be repulsed there by all possible means." ol.
General Ironside, in the meantime, had been summoned to attend a
meeting with the Chiefs of Staff. This meeting took place at 11.30 a.m. on
29th June, and General Ironside was immediately confronted with both the
Prime Minister's and Lord Hankey's memoranda of the previous day, as well
as the Chiefs of Staff's own memorandum of the 27th June. Overworked,
overburdened and aggravated by the extreme pressure, General Ironside once
again explained his unenviable position. As regards the question of
whether the mp in battle should be fought on the beaches or further inland,
he insisted that it had been made "quite clear" in the G.H.Q. Operational
Instructions that "there was to be no withdrawal from the beach defences
and that the troops in them were to fight it out where they stood". He
admitted, however, that not only were the troops manning the beach defences
themselves already largely "sedentary" or "partially trained troops un-
fitted for mobile operations", but the divisions holding the beaches "had
very few troops indeed disposed. in depth as local reserves". Thus, both
the beach defence and the local mobile reserves were very weak, which was
the imin reason for the extensive scheme of static "stoplines" far inland.
This appalling situation existed purely out of necessity and. was certtirily
not through choice; he would have liked nothing better than the opportu-
nity to frame a more offensive strater. The simple explanation, though,
was as ever the chronic lack of training and equipment, especially among
the divisions ranged along the coasts. The battalions holding the beach
defences, General Ironsid.e explained to the Chiefs of Staff,
".... were, of course, disposed. in depth to some extent, but they had
very wide fronts to cover. They would have their Bren Carriers as a small
mobile force for immediate counter-attack, but the majority of the divi-
sions in the line were only partially trained and had very little artillery.
61. CAB 80/13 COS(40)500; also WP(40)236: Home Defence, Note by Lord
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Formations in this condition were unsuitable for counter-attacks on a large
scale and in these circumstances there would be little advantage in keeping
larger local reserves for counter-attack."
Far from attempting to guard all the many miles of beaches, General Iron-
side also pointed out that the allocation of troops to beaches "had. been
very carefully considered in relation to the probability of landings upon
them". Where landings were improbable for navigational reasons, troops
were econoinised as much as possible, even though the beaches themselves
might be good landing places. Nevertheless, despite the weakness of the
troops manning them, the construction of the actual beach defences was
progressing well. General Ironside went on to say that alrea&y,
".... anti-tank obstacles had been erected at all places where tanks
were likely to land. These were being supplemented by wire entanglements
as quickly as possible. The defensive position on the coast would be much
more than a 'crust' within a very short time as these defences were
completed and strengthened." 62.
In answer to the second major point raised by the Chiefs of Staff,
that of the positioning of the min G.R.Q. and the Command reserves,
General Ironside pointed out that, though these made up a "considerable
proportion" of the total forces available, their location so far inland was
so that they would be able "to deal not only with landings by sea, but also
air landings, of which we were likely to get no warning at all". Indeed,
the whole layout of the defence had to be directed to both these ends. Re
revealed that the G.H.. Reserves were now being divided into two main
groups which, operating to the north and to the south of the barrier to
movement posed by London and the River Thames, would be able to reach the
threatened points "within a few hours", while reserves in the hands of
lower formations could get to the coast "very much more quickly". General
Ironside explained that, with even his main reserves insufficiently pro-
vided with tanks, anti-tank guns and artillery, with the danger of seaborne
landings occurring at any point along a very long coastline from Norway,
the Baltic, Rolland, Belgium, France, or from Ireland if the Germans
captured that, with the danger of airborne landings taking place literally
anywhere, with the British anti-invasion preparations still very incomplete
and with a total veil of secrecy still hanging over the preparations of the
enemy, he had little choice but to place the G.R.Q.. Reserves far inland in
62. CA 79/5 COS(40)199 th : 1 ; also WP(40)236, 29 June 1940.
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a central position. The Germans, he felt, would "probably make one nin
land.ing by air and perhaps up to three landings by sea" and would. "exploit
whichever of these proved to be the soft spot". He considered that he
could only do so much with the forces at his disposal:
"If we had four armoured divisions in the United Kingdom, the whole
problem of the defence of the country would be solved.." 63.
The Chiefs of Staff agreed that the plan of defence as described by
the Commander-in-Chief covered the requirements that they had drawn up in
their memorandum, while Winston Churchill later wrote of the plans:
"They were of course scrutinised with anxious care by the experts, and
I ennined them myself with no little attention. On the whole they stood.
approved." 64.
General Ironside, however, recalled. of this day:
"I spent an unsatisfactory day with the Chiefs of Staff. They are not
clear in their minds as to what they want as to our defence. At one time
they say that we must defeat the enemy on the beaches when he lands, and
that we must hold a sufficient reserve. [At another timej that the teach-
ing of the war is that we mustn't hold lines. The whole thing is very
difficult and. I have given them my views.... And so we have decided to
hold the coast as a 'crust'. Work is proceeding fast on anti-tank obstacles
at beaches, wire and pillboxes. The idea is to inflict all the losses we
can, and to attack at once with our mobile forces at the beaches or at any
point to which they have penetrated. For this we have what local reserves
we have, and two [G.H.Q.) reserves each of a mobile division and an armoured
division. We are also creating a local static defence of armed riflemen
using blocks and pillboxes all over the country." 65.
*	 *	 *
The argument appeared on the face of it to be over. Nothing, however,
was further from the truth. Even though the Chiefs of Staff now seemed
satisfied, the debate in fact had the effect of sowing the seeds of uncert-
ainty and doubt about General Ironside's plans and dispositions, both among
the War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff and, much more seriously as regards
the successful defence of the Country, among certain of the higher-placed
commanders in the field. Fostered by the tense and jumpy atmosphere caused
64. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 155.
65. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 29 June 1940, op. cit.
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by almost daily expectation of the German invasion, uneasiness and dis-
satisfaction were to grow steadily in many quarters into a serious lack of
confidence in the abilities of the Conmander-in-Chief, Rome Forces, himself.
Some field commanders were determined to plan their own tactics,
regardless of the official directives from the War Office and G.L., Home
Forces. Chief among these was the newly appointed General Officer,
Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, Lieutenant General Sir Alan Brooke,
who had. replaced the elderly Lieutenant Genera]. Sir Bertie Fisher on 26th
June. On arrival at Southern Command E.. at Wilton, near Salisbury, he
found that his immediate comrnprid essentially consisted of only a single
Corps H. ., that of V Corps, which comprised only two ill-equipped infantry
divisions, the 4th (Regular) Division in Hampshire and the Isle of Wight,
and the 50th (Northumbrian) Division in Dorset; although the 48th (South
Nidland) was ordered to the Severn area on 28th June from Western Command.
(See Map 6.) With these three divisions, all of which had. only recently
recovered from their ordeal at Dunkirk, Lieutenant General Brooke was
expected to defend a coastline stretching from the borders of Sussex round
to Wales. Preparations to defend this extremely long coastline were
virtually non-existent, except in the vital Isle of Wight and. Solent area
in Naor General 'Rusty' Eastwood's 4th Division sector. Devon and Cornwall
were practically bare of troops; while across the Channel the Germans were
now firmly established in Western France. Everywhere there seemed a lack
of drive and preparedness. General Brooke wrote on 26th June:
"The overall impression I had was that the Command had. a long way to go
to be put on a war footing and. that a peace atmosphere was still prevailing."
Following a visit to the Dorset coast on 2nd July, he ad.ded.:
"The more I see of the nakedness of our defences the more appalled I
am! .... no arms, no transport and no equipment and yet there are masses of
men in uniform, but they are mostly untrained: why, I cannot thirk, after
ten months of war. The ghastly part of it is that I feel certain that we
can only have a few more weeks before the Boche attacks." 66.
Though he immediately set to work to strengthen the coastal defences,
Brooke was steadfastly opposed to the War Office view that these should
form the mn line of defence. He was equally opposed to the concept of
66. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 26 June & 2 July 1940.
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extensive static stoplines placed far inland. Far more important, in his
opinion, was the need. to build up a strong reserve for mobile operations.
He also believed, unlike the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister, that
the Germans' main thrust would come not across the North Sea against East
Anglia and Kent, but across the English Channel against the South Coast, and
he was therefore very anxious about the small number of troops under his
command. An opportunity to put forward his views soon presented itself.
Late on 29th June, he was invited to lunch at Chequers with the Prime Mini-
ster and. Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Paget, General Ironside's Chief of
Staff. Declining to disrupt his hectic activity in Southern Command, he
successfully suggested that Paget should visit him at his Headquarters
instead. Lieutenant General Brooke recalled, the next day:
"Had a long talk with him, telling him what I wanted for the defence
of Southern Command, namely, another Corps H.., another division, some
armoured units and a call on bomber squadrons. Some of these things I may
get. At any rate, I rubbed into him the nakedness of this Command taken in
relation to the new situation in Western Prance." 67.
The Germans began the occupation of the demilitarised Channel Islands on
the very same day, thus increasing the threat still further. Two days
later, on 2nd July, he followed up his discussion with the Chief of Staff
by writing to General Ironsid.e's G.H..:
"I consider that the threat to the South West of England. is as great,
if not greater, than any of the northern portions of our East Coast. At
the present time I understand that six divisions are allotted to the North-
ern Command, while only three to the Southern, and I submit that, in view
of the increased threat that now exists to South West England, this is not
sufficient.
G.H.Q.. at first refused him troops, saying that his comparison omitted the
vulnerability of London and the major industrial areas to attack from the
East Coast compared with the difficulties of an advance from the South \qest,
the fact that the Germans could not force the Straits of Dover with their
large ships, and the limited range of German air cover. Unknown to both
General Brooke and G.H.,., the Germans had, in fact, only begun on that
same day seriously to plan and prepare for an invasion, following their
high command' a first official order to this effect. Following a further
67. Bryant, Arthur: The Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943, pp. 189-190,
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request, however, Genera]. Brooke was soon to receive many of the reinforce-
ments he had asked for. Meanwhile, he threw himself into the work of
inspecting beach defences from Boior Regis to Plymouth, visiting formations,
replacing unsuitable officers, attending conferences with his commmders,
organising exercises, establishing a central mobile reserve on Salisbury
Plain and generally "trying to instil a greater war atmosphere". 68.
Another very vocal critic of the official defence policy was Major-
General Bernard Montgomery, who was at this time in a relatively junior
position as Commander of the 3rd Regular Division in Eastern Coiznnand. This
division had been moved to the West Sussex coastline up to and. including
Brighton, on 19th June, and found the same peaceful atmosphere and lack of
urgency as existed then in Southern Command, especially among the large
civilian population. The 3rd Division, Montgomery recalled:
".... descended like an avalanche on the inhabitants of that area; we
dug in the gardens of the seaside villas, we sited machine-gun posts in the
best places, and we generally set about our job in the way we were accust-
omed to do things in an emergency. The protests were tremendous. Mayors,
County Councillors, private owners, came to see me and. demanded that we
should cease our work; I refused, and. explained the urgency of the need
and. that we were preparing to defend the South Coast against the Germans....
It was not understood that the British Army had suffered a crushing defeat
at Durikirk and. that our island home was now in grave danger. There was no
sense of urgency."
The 3rd Division had been given the highest priority for re-equipment and
had been about to sail for France when the French resistance ended. It was
even now earmarked to be sent to Southern Ireland in an emergency. The
division, however, was being spread along thirty miles of coast, instead, of
being held back concentrated in reserve, ready to move against any serious
enemy lodgement. Moreover, the infantry of this division, though otherwise
fully mobile, had not been permitted to retain their transport close at
hand. Like Lieutenant General Brooke, Major-General Montgomery did not
miss an opportunity to air his views. On 2nd July, his division received a
visit from Winston Churchill. The two quickly saw eye to eye on the
tactics of home defence. "The m-iri thing which seemed curious to me,"
Montgomery told the Prime Minister,
".... was that my division was immobile. It was the only fully equip-
ped division in England, the only division fit to fight any enemy anywhere.
And. here we were in a static role, ordered to dig in on the South Coast.
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Some other troops should take on my task; my division should be given
buses, and be held in mobile reserve with a counter-attacking role. Why
was I left immobile? There were thousands of buses in Ragland; let them
give me some, and release me from this static role, so that I could practise
a mobile counter-attack role."
Churchill thou,ght that the idea was "the cat's whiskers" and, indeed, he
minuted the very next day to the Secretary of State for War to this effect.
Montgomery later recalled, with satisfaction, "I do not laiow what the War
Office thought, but I got my buses." 69.
The majority of the field commanders, however, went along with the
official view that strong mobile reserves were at present simply not practi-
cal, due to the lack of equipment, training and transport, and that with
such limited resources a strong coastal defence line was the only possible
answer. Gradually, nevertheless, many of these were persuaded to change
their minds by the opposers. Lieutenant General Claude Auchinleck, at this
time coTifiBanding V Corps and soon to take over Southern Conunand, was one of
these. At first he was content to echo the policy of General Ironside and
the Chiefs of Staff. He wrote in an urgent arid secret letter to General
Sir Robert Raining, the V.C.I.G.S., on 29th June:
".... I am pretty busy here making bricks without much straw. Two
divisions on a hundred mile front! However, we are getting on with it and
every day makes things better, but the lack of mobile reserves is serious.
At the moment we have all our goods in the front window which, in my opin-
ion, is the right policy, as our lack of equipment arid transport does not
make it possible for us to fight a mobile battle in the interior. I hope
we will be in a position to do so before long, as equipment seems to be
coming along well, though the distribution of it seems patchy and incoher-
ent. But this may be justified by reasons beyond my ken.
Anyway, I am sure that we should make every effort to prevent the enemy
landing on the beach. I still believe that this is his most difficult task,
and my recent small experience confirms me in this opinion. After all, the
holding of a 'line' such as the coastline cannot be likened to the holding
of a 'line' or the attempt to hold a 'line' in Prance, which some say was
the cause of our downfall.
Until he can get his heavy stuff ashore, the enemy cannot do much.
Therefore he must be prevented by all possible means from getting it ashore.
At least, that is how I see it. Once he does establish himself at all
securely, it won't be so easy to get him out...."
Soon, however, he was persuaded to come round to Lieutenant General Brooke's
opinion. Following discussions with his superior, he summed up a more
69. Nontgotnery, Field Narshal the Viscount: 1emoirs, pp. 68-70, Collins,
London, 1958.
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enterprising policy in a statement made to his senior commanders and. staff
officers at a conference on 9th July:
"Enemy to be stopped on beaches; but maximum possible reserve to be
made available for hitting the enemy. Briefly, an offensive defensive.
A formation reserve to be organised as mobile striking forces for
immediate counter-attacks against landings. Defence would. NOT be passive.
War mentality must be cultivated; i.e. phrase 'IF we are attacked'
should never be used; the phrase should. be 'WHEN we are attacked."
attack was not improbable, but was practically certain." 70.
The debate, as to whether the emphasis of the defence should be on
the coast or with the mobile reserves inland, was to simmer on over the
next few weeks, as was also the other fundamental and related issue of
which parts of the coastline were most liable to German attack and from
which direction the enemy might come. Each of the field cormanders under-
standably sought to obtain as much strength as possible for the defence of
his own particular area, while criticism of General Ironside's plan con-
tinued unabated. The commanders in the field did not always seem to
realize that only General Ironside, as Commander-in-Chief, could see the
picture of the defence as a whole, and had to make his plans and disposi-
tions taking into full account the severely limited resources that existed
overall as well as the threat that might come from almost any direction.
Lack of liaison and co-operation between certain commanders and G.R.Q.,
nevertheless, combined with divergencies of opinion amongst the field com-
manders themselves and confusion over the plans generally, meant that all
too slender reserves were being deployed in uncertain pattern, while much
invaluable time and effort was being expended on the construction of static
defences which were often situated in the wrong places. The urgency of the
latter's construction, too, combined with the use of civilian contractors,
who lacked experience of military engineering, meant that mistakes were
inevitable. Many of the road blocks were useless, because •p••5 could.
simply go round them, while some of the pillboxes were sited to face the
wrong way or where they could serve no purpose, where they were far too
conspicuous or could not be occupied. "We are becoming pilibox mad," wrote
one divisional commander in East Anglia on finding that the garrisoning of
block-houses along the system of static 'stoplines', in addition to the
large number of vulnerable points, was consuming most of his manpower and
-
70. Corinell, John: Auchinleck, pp. 156-157, Cassell, London, 1959.
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leaving too few troops available as local reserves for effective counter-
attacks. The lure of so much concrete threatened to direct attention too
exclusively to purely defensive measures and. 'stoplines' came to be re-
garded as a succession of unsupported. linear defensive positions. 71.
The Naval staff, meanwhile, were uneasy about the strength of the
seaward. defences in the Dover area, which failed to conrpensate for the
danger stemming from the inability of large ships of the Royal Navy to
manoeuvre adequately in the confined, waters of the Channel, while the Air
staff remained far from content about Army arrangements to defend. their
airfields. Grumbling about insufficient and inadequate direction from the
top rumbled on and the ever-present air of uncertainty and. rumour hung
over all. All this, combined with the inescapable fact that Britain's
land forces were still disorgazused, weak and. grossly outnumbered by the
enemy, might have resulted. in a disastrous situation if the Germans had.
attempted to land in force.
Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary for Foreii Affairs,
noted. in his diary at the end of June:
"Certainly everything is as gloomy as can be. Probability is that
Hitler will attempt invasion in next fortnight. As far as I can see, we
axe, after years of leisurely preparation, completely unprepared. We have
simply got to die at our posts - a far better fate than capitulating to
Hitler as these damned Frogs have done. But uncomfortable." 72.
71. Collier, Basil: op. cit., p. 142; arid. WO 166/186: War of 1939-1945
War Diaries, Home Forces, II Corps, 1 July 1940.
72. Dilks, David (ed.): The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945,
p. 308, Nacmillan, London, 1971.
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CHAPT 8: JULY PROGRESS
July had opened with a renewed spate of invasion rumours that served
to heighten further the tension in these beleaguered islands. Britain's
situation had improved but little since the beginning of June and she was
still very weak. With the surrender of France, it was felt in many quarters
that the invasion of Britain could not now be long delayed. On 1st July,
General Ironsid.e wrote in lus diary:
"We seem to have passed through June and this looks like the decisive
month now coming, if the Boches have made up their minds to come for us.
They cannot allow us to go on bombing them, as we are doing, without doing
something to stop us. They should have finished with France during this
month and re-organised their forces.... The weather still remains very
fine, worse luck. We could do with storms." 1.
Renewed expectations of imminent invasion were sparked off by a Fighter
Command Intelligence assessment issued. that day which claimed that there
were "indications that a sea and. airborne expedition is in an advanced stage
of preparation", and by two telegrams from Angorra and Berne which reported
that "the invasion of igland was planned for a date between the 7th July
and 10th July". 2. At 6.40 p.m. on the following day, G.H.Q., Home Forces,
sialled to all Coininaxids, "Parachutists have been captured in Reading area.
All troops and local L.D.V. to be warned that parachutists are expected.."
The latter report was soon proved. to be false, but, at 10.15 a.m. on
3rd July, the Chiefs of Staff met to hear a disturbing assessment by Major
General F. G. Beaumont-Nesbitt, who was Director of Intelligence at the War
Office. Pointing out that, because Britain was expecting an invasion in
force, "care had to be taken that all the information which came in was not
interpreted in that light", the Director of Intelligence warned the Chiefs
of Staff that, nevertheless, "there was a considerable body of' evidence
which pointed to an invasion of this Country at an early date". Re then
went on to outline this evidence. In Norway there had. been an increase in
the number of troops in the south of the country, which included parachut-
ists, while there was enough shipping for the transport of two divisions
1 • Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Iron.side, 1 July 194 0 (Col. R. Macleod.
transcript).
2. CAB 65/8 wN(40)189th:8, 1 July 1940.
3. WO 166/i: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, G.E.Q., Home Forces, 2 July
1940.
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in Norwegian ports, and. hundreds of Norwegian craft of all types had. been
requisitioned and armed. He added that the innumerable harbours made
detailed reconnaissance very difficult and that, "We could not hope to get
any long warning of an invasion from this quarter." In Denmark and Holland.,
too, there were reports of troop concentrations and large amounts of ship-
ping, including special rafts and requisitioned private motorboats, being
present in the North Sea and. Baltic ports. Two parachute regiments had
been moved. to Belgium, together with "special assault detachments" which
had. performed well on the Western Front. Long-range guns were already
being emplaced at Calais, while the concentration of large numbers of
German aircraft, fuel stocks, etc., might indicate the imminance of an air
offensive. The enemy, indeed., was already maintaining fighter patrols over
the Calais area. The postponement from 7th July until after 10th July of a
ceremonial parade in Paris, at which Hitler might declare his intention to
invade Britain, however, Najor General Beaumont-Nesbitt declared., "indica-
ted. that the German measures were not quite ready". The German Air Force,
too, was not yet up to strength. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that, while
they believed that an invasion on a large scale "would. not be a practical
proposition until the Germans had obtained a large measure of air superi-
ority", it was nevertheless possible "that the enemy would throw in the
whole of the resources at his command arid hope to get ashore considerable
numbers of troops in the general confusion".
Winston Churchill, meanwhile, was becoming concerned. about the 'jumpi-
ness' of feeling in official circles in the tense atmosphere created. by the
constant invasion scares. Later that day, following a War Cabinet meeting,
he circulated a letter to the Fighting Services and the Civil Departments
in an attempt to boost morale. It read.:
"On what may be the eve of an attempted invasion or battle for our
native land, the Prime Minister desires to impress upon all persons holding
responsible positions .... their duty to maintain a spirit of alert and
confident energy. While every precaution must be taken that time and means
allow, there are no grounds for supposing that more German troops can be
landed. in this country, either from the air or across the sea, than can be
destroyed. or captured by the strong forces at present under arms.... The
Prime Ninister expects all His Majesty's subjects in high places to set an
example of steadiness and resolution. They should. check and. rebuke express-
ions of loose and ill-digested. opinion in their circles, or by their sub-
ordinates. They should not hesitate to report or, if necessary, remove any
4. CA.B 7915 COS(40 )205th: 1, 3 July 1940.
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officers or officials who are found to be consciously exercising a disturb-
ing or depressing influence, and whose talk is calculated to spread alarm
and despondency...." 5.
The Prime Minister learned of the latest evidence for an imminent
invasion at a Defence Committee at 11.00 p.m. that same day. Sir Cyril
Newall, reporting what the Chiefs of Staff had. been told that morning,
added that there was "nothing that could be taken as definite evidence",
but warned that "there were indications from a number of directions which
pointed to the imminence of invasion, which it would. be unsafe to ignore".
Churchill asked for a full report to be presented by the Joint Intelligence
Sub-Connnittee the following day, 4th July. 6.
The report was duly completed and submitted to the Prime Minister.
The J.I.C. repeated their view, reached on let July, as to what Germany's
next move would be, now that France had collapsed:
tI 01 view was that there is at present little direct evidence to indi-
cate what this next move is likely to be, and Germany's military superiority
is such as to enable her to move in any direction she pleases with little
or no wanu.ng."
The J.I.C. went on to list the evidence which had been reported to the
Chiefs of Staff the previous day. This included a very reliable report
that the German Air Force in Belgium and. North-West Prance was in the pro-
cess of being reorganised and regrouped for further operations and. that
this process "is nearing completion", whilst, significantly, dive-bombers
were being concentrated in these areas. The report that the Germans would
hold a parade of their armed forces in Paris after 10th July was also said
to come "from a most reliable source", though the J.I.C. warned that some
of the evidence listed "is capable of more than one interpretation" and
that "the question of Germany's inediate action is much confused by the
flood, of tend.entious reports and. propaganda which are being deliberately
put about". Less certain, for example, were reports that the Germans had
recently practised large-scale landings at Memel in the Baltic. The J.I.C.,
nevertheless, declared themselves satisfied from the available evidence
that Germany was making preparations for raids in force, or for invasion of
5. CAB 65/8 WM(40)192nd:15, and Appendix, 3 July 1940.
6. CAB 69/1 DC(40 ) l 9th: 4, 3 July 1940.
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the British Isles, though the evidence suggested that the enemy's full
strength would not be developed until 15th July. The J.I.C. concluded:
"We consider large-scale raids on the British Isles involving all three
arms may take place at any moment. A full-scale invasion is unlikely to
take place before the middle of July. This matter is under our daily
review." 7
Over the next few days, therefore, the invasion fears temporarily
subsided. On 6th July, General Ironside wrote:
"Iiany people now begin to doubt an invasion. Personally, I think that
the Boches mast have a go at us, and they will be sure to make a determined
effort when they do."
On 9th July, he added:
"Ny morning that I thought likely for invasion, has come and gone
without incident. Three D.itch Naval officers came over from Holland in a
small boat. They all said that the Germans were all talking about the 11th
as "Der Tag".... There can be no doubt that vast preparations in the way
of air arid sea invasion are being made." 8.
Then, on 10th July, came an upsurge in enemy air activity, as the
Germans began an intensified offensive directed mainly against ports and
shipping, especially coastal convoys, in an effort to test Britain's air
defences and. erode her fighter strength. That afternoon the first heavy air
battle took place over the Channel. In many quarters this was taken to be a
preliminary to invasion, and it was decided to stop all leave for the troops
of Home Forces. A fresh crop of rumours and unconfirmed 'sightings' of para-
chute landings, "often accompanied by vivid and. precise details," began;
vhile Sir Edward Grigg, Parliamentary Secretary at the Ninistry of Informa-
tion, reporting on the day's events to the House of Comaons later added that:
"Tonight thousands of our soldiers will be on the alert, waIting for an
attack ihich may come in several places at dawn." Indeed, the rumours were
such that the Ministry of Information found it expedient that evening to
state officially that no enemy had "as yet" descended upon the Kingdom. 9
7. CAB 66/9 P(40)244; also coS(40)529 (JIC): Tmminence of a German
Invasion of Great Britain, Report by J.I.C., 4 July 1940.
8. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 6 & 9 July 1940, op. cit.
9. Fleming, Peter: Invasion 1940, p. 101, Hart-Davis, London, 1957.
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No invasion materialised. the next day, however. General Ironside
notes in his diary: "Another day gone without the predicted. invasion. All
the more for our work." 10. The evidence still pointed to an enemy exped.i-
tion from Norway, possibly against the East Coast. A War Cabinet r6sum of
the past ueek up to noon on 11th July stated:
"Increased preparations for a possible invasion of Great Britain have
been reported and it is possible that, in Norway, preparations for a sea-
borne expedition of two to three divisions, including some A.F.V.'s, must
now be nearly complete. It is, however, still uncertain if all, or any, of
these forces are intended for the invasion of the United Kingdom. Hire, the
Shetlands, the Faroes and Iceland are all possible subsidiary objectives.
Air reconnaissance of Bremen and Emd.en has not shown the presence of
any abnormal quantity of shipping. No concentration of shipping has been
observed in the ports of the Low Countries and. Northern France. While
there is a considerable number of barges in these ports, this may be due to
the interruption of other communications and does not necessarily indicate
preparations for invasion." 1.
The War Cabinet's weekly rsum was substantially correct in its
appreciation of the German dispositions, though the enemy activities in
Norway were, in reality, only ever intended as a diversion. The fears of
an inrn,nent invasion, however, were in fact entirely unfounded since,
completely unbeknown in Britain at this time, it was only on 2nd July that
Hitler gave orders that German staff planning to mount an invasion of
England. was to commence, and. even then this was at first to be undertaken
on the basis that invasion was still only an idea and had yet to be decided
on. It was not to be until 16th July that Hitler was to issue more positive
orders in the form of his Directive No. 16 for serious preparations to begin
and then, too, an invasion remained conditional on the German Air Force
obtaining air superiority and would only actually be launched as a final
resort, if Britain failed to seek a peace.
The British seemed to sense Hitler's mood of hesitation. "I find a
general idea that the Germans will not now attack us," commented General
Ironside on 13th July, though he did not himself, however, share this
opinion:
"A false hope, I am afraid. They daren't not do something. They will
begin with some three or four days' intensive bombing, and then air landings
10. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 11 July 1940, op. cit.
11. CAB 66/9 WP(40)262; also COS(40 )545: Weekly Rsum 1o. 45 of the
Naval, Military and Air Situation, 12 July 1940.
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with parachutists, followed by sea landings, according to the weather. All
carried out in very- different places so as to upset us and get our troops
rushing about the country. If our men will attack 	 fond', all is well.
But they are so dreadfully untrained that we cannot depend upon them to go
in successfully."
The danger of invasion seemed, in fact, to have passed for the moment, in
the opinion of official circles. The Home Commands had. been informed that
day that tidal conditions, especially on the East Coast, which had been
favourable over the last four or five days, had now changed for the worse
and that Admiralty opinion seemed to point to the 27th or 28th July as
being the next most likely dates. This apparently indicated a brief
respite, every single day of which would be welcomed by the harassed
General Ironside, for every day would see the preparations of Home Forces a
little further advanced and the equipment and training situation a fraction
more improved. The General wrote:
"It is curious how one goes to bed wondering whether there will be an
attack early the next morning. As we have done all we can in the way of
preparation, it doesn't worry me mach. I merely give thanks that we have
another day of preparation and issue of defence material." 12.
Indeed., on 15th July, the War Cabinet authorised the resumption of leave
for the troops of Home Forces, on a limited scale, though the Ministry of
Information was instructed to take special measures to see that this fact
was not publicised. 13.
*	 *	 *
General Ironside had not been idle during these first few weeks of
July. On 30th June, he had. begun a second phase of movements among the
formations of Home Forces. (See Map 8.) That day, 1st Lrmoured Division,
less its 2nd. Armoured Brigade and 3 R.T.R. from its 3rd. Arnoured Brigade,
was moved by rail from Warminster, in Wiltshire, forward to the Ald.ershot-
Guildford area. Since its arrival back from Western Prance less than two
weeks previously, this division, which had lost almost all its tanks in the
campaign, had been re-organising and re-equipping under War Office control
and recovering from its ordeal. The Division had, in fact, been receiving
the entire output of Cruiser tanks then being produced, and work had been
12. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 13 July 1940 , op. cit.
13. CA 65/8 \*M(40)204th:4, 15 July 1940.
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proceeding night and day in the depots so that there would be no delay in
getting the tanks ready for issue to the troops. Now coming under the
Commander-in-Chief's command, the Division was still very weak, however,
consisting as it did only of 2 R.TSR. and 5 R.T.R. in 3rd. Armoured Brigade.
Already at Aldershot, though, was part of 1st Army Tank Brigade (including
8 R.T.R. with its 50 infantry tanks, which had been moved there a few days
previously, and this formation now passed temporarily under the control of
1st Armoured Division. A third brigade was added shortly afterwards, as
20th Armoured Brigade joined, the Division from East Anglia, though this
possessed only a number of light and light 'wheeled' tanks. On 30th June,
too, 1st Canadian Division was ordered. from the Oxford area to the area of
Dorking-Rediull in Surrey, a move it made by road on 2nd July, and 1st
Canadian Brigade, now mobile again, rejoined its parent formation soon
afterwards from Aldershot. 14.
These moves, as General Ironside had explained to the Chiefs of Staff
on 29th June, effectively created a second Corps in G.B:.Q. Reserve situated
to the south of the barrier to movement posed by the River Thames and the
great metropolis of London. (See Map 8.) This corps, situated in front of
the G.LQ. Line, was to be numbered as VII Corps, and on 7th July General
Ironside sought authority from the War Office for its formation, to be
commanded by the Canadian Major General A. G. L. McNaughton with the rank
of Lieutenant-General. The Canadian Government concurred with this arrange-
ment and the formation of its headquarters was officially approved on 19th
July. Its staff were partly British and partly Canadian, and its head-
quarters were situated at Eeadley Court, near Leatherhead. Besides 1st
Canadian Division, now under Major General G. R. Pearkes, V.0., and Major
General Roger Evans's 1st British Armoured Division, VII Ccrps was also to
include the New Zealand Force. The latter, situated just to the west of
Aldershot, was soon to be expanded to divisional size, and. was commanded by
Major General Bernard Frey-berg, V.C. Since the Corps troops also con-
sisted of British and Canadian units, VII Corps was to assume a truly
Imperial flavour. 15.
14. WO 166/1: op. cit., June 1940, and Appendices; War Diaries of 1st
Armoured Division, June 1940; and CA.B 69/1 DO(40)l7th:1, 19 June
1940.
15. Stacey, Col. C. P.: The Canadian Army 1939-45, An Official Ristory
p. 19, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 1948.
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The splitting of the previously cumbersome G.H.. Reserve, which had.
hitherto consisted of the e quivalent of three infantry and. one armoured
divisions, by the formation of VII Corps, was a great advance. North of
the Thames, Lieutenant-General F. P. Nosworthy's IV Corps, now consisting
only of 43rd (Wessex) Division, 2nd imoured Division and 1st Lrmoured.
Reconnaissance Brigade in the area Hertfordshire to Northamptonshire, was
able to concentrate its attentions entirely on planning for operations in
East Anglia, or possibly Lincoinshire, and was freed from the burden of
operating against an enemy land.ing on the South East or South Coasts, the
latter task now becoming the preoccupation of VII Corps. This very
sensible arrangement was to be continued in principle by General Ironside's
successor. The precise role of the newly created VII Corps was summarised
in G.H.. Operational Instruction No. 11, of 14th July:
"VII Corps will be in G.LQ.. Reserve, ready to move at eight hours'
notice, and will act on the orders of the C.-in-C., Home Forces. It will
be located as at present in the Aldershot Command and the area Redhill-
Reigate-Westerham--Tonbridge.
The role of VII Corps will be to counter-attack and destroy any eneny
forces invading the counties of Surrey-Kent-Sussex-Hampshire, which are not
destroyed by the troops of Eastern and Southern Commands.
G.O.C. VII Corps will reconnoitre, plan arid train to carry out this
role in co-operation with G.O.C. XII Corps and G.O.CO Southern Command,
with whom he will arrange for training facilities to practise his role.
His force will be organised and trained to operate in co-ordinated mobile
brigade groups, special attention being paid to the following:-
(a) Co-operation between infantry and 'I' tanks.
(b) Co-operation with the R.A.P..
(c) Movement of N.T. Columns by day and by night, including traffic
control and A.A. protection.
As regards (a), 'I' tanks should be employed in mass wherever possible,
and against definite and worth-while objectives. The remainder of 1st
Armoured Division should not be tied to the infantry, but employed as a
whole to deliver a decisive stroke against the enemy flanks and rear.
Three days' preserved rations will be carried by VII Corps." 16.
A further great improvement was the delegation of part of Lieutenant-
General Sir Guy Williams's equally cumbersome Eastern Command to Lieutenant-
General Andrew Thorne, a highly efficient officer, who had recently
16. WO 166/i: op. cit., July 1940, Appendix G: G.LQ. Operational
Instruction No. 11, 14 July 1940.
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commanded 48th (South Midland) Division with the B.E.F., and who had. now
been promoted to command XII Corps in the event of active operations.
Thus, Sir Guy Williams, a competent but elderly officer who had not seen
active service in the present war, was to retain command of "all troops
other than G.R.Q. Reserves now in the Eastern Command area and. north of the
Thames", while Thorne would have a similar responsibility for those troops
of Eastern Command. which were situated to the south of the Thames. Until
active operations occurred, however, the G.O. C.-in-C., Eastern Command,
would continue to be responsible for the administration of all the troops,
excluding those in G.H.Q. Reserve, in his Command. 17.
General Ironside also carried out some other siiificant changes in
the early part of July. Not the least of these was the move, on 1st and
2nd. July, of his own Headquarters from Kneller Rail to St. Paul's School,
Kensington, which was both more spacious and much nearer the Government at
Westminster. Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Brooke's requests for more troops
to be allocated. to Southern Command., too, shortly bore fruit. General
Ironside soon allotted a second Corps headquarters to Southern Command, in
view of the increasing threat against the lengthy South Coast from Western
Prance. Its formation was officially approved by the War Office on 19th
July. Numbered VIII Corps, its headquarters was established. at Pyrland
Hail, Taunton, in Somerset, and. the able Major General Sir Harold Franklyn,
who had distinguished himself in the retreat to Dunkirk as commander of 5th
(PLegular) Division, was given the command. The new VIII Corps would have
the responsibility of guarding the hitherto virtually undefended areas of
Devon and Cornwall, as well as part of Somerset. For this task, it was
allotted the 48th (South Midland) Division, which was moved. to South Devon
from Gloucestershire by 10th July, and the Independent 70th Brigade, which
took up position in the Exeter area following the disbandment of its parent
2rd (Northumbrian) Division. A second brigade of the latter division, 69th
Brigade, was given to 50th (Northumbrian) Division of V Corps, to strengthen
the coastal area of Dorset. The troops of VIII Corps who, like those of V
Corps, had fought in Prance and Belgium, irmiedietely set about constructing
beach defences along the South Devon and South Coriush Coasts, thus extend-
ing the coastal 'crust' along the entire South Coast from Ient to Cornwall.
Ilevertheless, VIII Corps, with only a single division and. an  independent
brigade at its innediate disposal, rith a very long coastline to defend. and.
17. WO 166/i: op. cit., July 1940, Appendix J: Order Issued for Conduct
of Active Operations in Eastern Command, pending decision of re-
organisation of that Command., 15 July 1940.
-a considerable distance from the nearest mobile reserves, clearly could not
withstand an enemy attack in force; therefore, work was started on a strong
inland Istoplinet of anti-tank obstacles and. over 300 piliboxes, stretching
from the River Pa.rrett's estuary near Bridgewater across the narrow neck of
the peninsula just east of Taunton to Seaton on the River Axe's estuary.
Called the 'Taunton stopline', this relatively short defence line was built
as the main defensive feature to halt any incursion to the east if the enemy
18.
should succeed in establishing himself in the western park of the peninsula.
The latter situation, in fact, seemed very possible in July 1940. Brooke,
visiting beach defences in South Devon on 10th July, wrote afterwards:
".... much more work and drive required.... From what I have seen, I
am not happy at the state of the defences in these parts; people have not
yet realized the danger of attack." 19.
Lieutenant-General Brooke was also given a call on further reinforce-
ments to Southern Command, if this were warranted by an emergency. The
Australian Infantry Force in Wiltshire, temporarily in G.H.Q. Reserve, but
then placed under War Office control, would be made available to him if
necessary. This Force, soon to be two brigades strong, remained., however
in July, still largely untrained and ill-equipped. Lieutenant-General
Brooke, visiting them on 28th June, declared, "It will take at least a month
before any of them are ready for any active operation." While, on 16th
July, General Ironsid.e, also having paid. them a visit, wrote:
"They axe very raw and untrai.ned, but are beginning to get in trim.
Things will go quickly once they have their equipment. They mean to fight
if called upon to do so. As usual, discipline a little lax...." 20.
Additional formations were soon placed within supporting distance of
VIII and V Corps. Winston Churchill's visit on 2nd July to 3rd. (Regular)
Division on the Sussex Coast and. the frank opinions of its outspoken
commander, Major General Bernard Montgomery, had made a considerable impact
on the Prime Minister who, like 'Monty', was very much in favour of increas-
ing the numbers of formations with the mobile reserves. A peeved General
Ironside wrote, on 9th July:
18. WO 166/i: op. cit., July 1940 ; and War Diaries of VIII Corps, July
1940.
19. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount AJ.anbrooke, 10 July 1940.
20. ibid., 28 June 1940; and Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside,
16 July 1940, op. cit.
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"The Prime Minister has sent down an order, or what is practically an
order, to withdraw two divisions from the beach-line. I have sent in to say
that I can withdraw one in a few days. He has his son-in-law, now Captain
Sandys, on his staff and. he uses him as a go-between with my staff. It is
difficult to tackle Winston when he is in one of his go-getter humours." 21.
General Ironside naturally selected the 3rd (Regular) Division to be with-
drawn. Highly trained, well led, the best equipped formation in the Country
(though, on 2nd July, it still had. only 36 x 25 pdr. field guns), now fully
mobile with its recently acquired buses and, in any case, earmarked for Eire
or various other possible overseas operations, it was clearly the obvious
choice. Orders were issued from G.H.., Rome Forces, for the move the very
nect day and., on 11th July, it took up position in the Gloucester-Cheltenham-
Cirencester area, recently occupied by 48th (South Midland) Division. (See
Map 8.) Unlike its predecessor, however, it was placed, at least for a
while, in G.R.. Reserve and was instructed "immediately to be prepared to
undertake mobile operations in new area", which meant, in fact, not just
towards the South Coast but virtually in any direction. The rapid. progress
in the beach defences of the Brighton-Littlehampton stretch of coastline,
effected during the last few weeks under Montgomery's eagle eye, meanwhile
allowed the coastline to be manned by various miscellaneous or 'sedentary'
troops in this sector, backed by the newly formed 1st Motor Machine Gun
Brigade poised, 'Leopard'-like, on the easily defensible obstacle of the
South Downs, incidently perhaps the first practical example of Churchill's
hypothesis for defence actually being applied. 22.
The 3rd (Regular) Division in its new area was also to be supported. by
21st Army Tank Brigade, which was ordered to a position just south of Devizes
on 12th July and also came into G.R.. Reserve. This partly-trained Terri-
torial formation, which had. not been to Prance, was ordered as follows:
"Wiule continuing your training, your Brigade will prepare, with such
resources as it has, to co-operate in an emergency with 3rd Division, if so
ordered by G.R.C..... You will form all available battle-worthy A.F.V.'s
into a composite unit, suitably organised for the possible tasks.... All
A.P.V.'s that can be gunned will be included. In addition, such of your
transport as remains will be utilised to carry any surplus armed personnel
who will be organised into a suitable unit.... When general issue of 'I'
tanks to your Brigade begins (estimated 3-4 weeks), you will report when
the training tanks can be withdrawn for other units." 23.
21. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 9 July 1940, op. cit.
22. WO 166/1: op. cit., July 1940.
23. ibid., Appendix E: G.R.Q. Operational Instruction No. 9, 12 July 1940.
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In fact, 21st Army Tank Brigade had a mere 16 Matilda Mk. II's d.istributed
among its three tank regiments; its theoretical establishment should have
been 150. (See Appendix 8.) The Brigade provided virtually the only tank
reserve available to Southern Command. This example of optimistic improvi-
sation typifies the state of Home Forces in the early summer of 1940.
Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Brooke's comment, the following day, was some-
thing of an understatement:
".... I feel that I require a great deal more time to complete arrange-
ments in the Command. There is a lot of work to do and many officers to be
replaced.... We are painfully thin on the ground." 24.
The question of the defence of Scotland was another continuing cause
of concern to the military authorities. General Ironside had told the
Chiefs of Staff Committee, on 25th June, that:
"The defensive organisation in Scotland was less well advanced than in
England, though the area south of the Firth and Clyde was already well
defended. North of this line defences were weak and consisted mainly of
isolated battalions in strong points. In the Shetland.s there was one
battalion with some guns. The battalion was 950 strong and should be able
to deal with any raid on the islands." 25.
At this time, though, the Chiefs of Staff were far more worried about the
defence of England, where attack was thought to be more likely. General
Ironside shared their view and, despite the reports of German troop and
shipping concentrations in Norway at the beginning of July compared with
the relative absence of such signs in the Low Countries and. France, he at
first steadfastly and correctly, in view of the severely limited resources
available to Home Forces, maintained that it was England that should receive
total priority for defence. The Commander-in-Chief wrote, on 5th July:
"Everything seems to point to the Germans starting something from
lTorway and the Baltic against Iceland, the Shetlands or perhaps Scotland..
I have only the troops necessary for the barest defence there and cannot
send any of my reserve up to the north, for that will be the thing that the
Germans will want me to do. I shall have screams from Scotland to go and
save them, but I shall have to try and resist that, or I shall not have the
people ready in the south for the main thrust...." 26.
24. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alambrooke, 13 July 1940.
25. CAB 79/5 COS(40)193rd:2, 25 June 1940.
26. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 5 July 1940, op. cit.
- 2Lt9 -
As the reports from Norway persisted, however, General Ironside realized
that the defences of Scotland must be strengthened to some extent. Hitherto,
9th (Scottish) Division had been responsible for Scotland's defence from the
Firth of Forth northwards to the Shetlands, while the weakened 5th (Regular)
Division guarded the Scottish borders. (See Naps 6 and 8.) The remainder
of 49th (West Riding) Division had. departed for Iceland from the Clyde on
26th June, while the severely mauled remuants of 51st (RighJ.and) Division,
recovering their strength in Galloway after their ordeal in Western France,
were in no fit condition to do anything. Over the next few days, therefore,
General Ironside moved the 5th (Regular) Division to the Central Lowlands of
Scotland to relieve the vastly overstretched 9th (Scottish) Division of part
of their burden, while on 13th July, 7 R.T.R., part of 1st Army Tank Brigade
at Aldershot, was ordered to Scotland to provide Scottish Command with some
tanks. Despite these improvements, the Chiefs of Staff noted on 15th July
th&t, "In view of the reported troop concentrations in Norway, the defences
of Scotland seemed very liglit." 27. indeed, the 9th (Scottish) Division was
a semi-trained, ill-equipped, second-line Territorial formation; the 5th
Division, though trained and battle experienced, had had two of its brigades
much weakened by losses of personnel and equipment in the withdrawal to
Dunkirk; while 7 R.T.R., with about 35 slow Natilda Nk. II infantry tanks,
could be of value only locally in a vast area, and. its addition in reality
succeeded merely in weakening the armoured reserves in South East England.
*	 *	 *
To gain a first-hand ]mowledge of the state of morale, training and
equipment of the formations wider his conmmnd and of the progress of the
defence works, General Ironside devoted as much of his time as possible to a
series of personal inspections. He had already inspected beach defences in
Last Anglia, Lincolnshire and the South East and South Coasts round to the
Isle of Wight, in June, and. in July he extended his visits to the reserve
formations, starting with the 1st Canadian Division in Surrey on 6th July.
At first, he was pessimistic. "We want a good many months before we can
possibly be ready to put the troops we have called up into action," he wrote
on 4th July. "They are untrained and unequipped." The essential equipment
needed both to re-arm the formations of the B.E.P. and. to bring the original
Home Defence Divisions up to establishment was only just beginning to come
forward quickly from the factories:
27. CAB 79/5 COS(40)222nd:5, 15 July 1940.
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"I an told. that mass production is only just beginning and one can only
hope that Industry will be able to get going without being smashed. up by
bombing.
General Ironside was pleased, however, to see things gradually improving.
"Every week gives us something more in hand, and. training is now going
better, t' he noted on 6th July. He added two days later:
"Our fortifications are getting better every day. Our L.D.V. are being
steadily aimed. and we could. soon reduce the number of mobile troops that are
being used for a static role. It is all a matter of time. We are working
against time."
On 14th July, he visited Lieutenant-General Nosworthy's IV Corps in G.E.Q.
Reserve. "Nosworthy has his Corps in fine order and is an efficient leader,
full of enthusiasm and conI'id.ence," he wrote that evening. The 2nd Armoured
Division, under Major General J. C. Tilly, he found had now been re-armed
and was "in good condition". Its Support Group included two R.H.A. batter-
ies with brand-new 25 pdr. field guns, while its two Yeomanry Regiments were
now commanded by Regular Cavalry officers and. had. "a high state of effici-
ency". "I felt much more happy after seeing such a good show," he wrote
afterwards; and on concluding three clays' hard work of inspection with a
visit to Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Brooke's Southern Command on 16th July,
he commented with satisfaction:
".... I was glad to see an immense amount of defence work had been done
since I was last there.... Things are much better and every day makes a
difference.... I noticed. no 'defeatism' at all. What there is, is now
among certain intellectuals." 28.
"Lnd now it has come to us to stand alone in the breach and face the
worst that the tyrant's might and emnity can do. . ..", so came forth the
stirring words of Winston Churchill in a broadcast to the Nation on 14th
July, in a tone that left no doubt of Britain's determination to resist:
"We are fighting by ourselves alone. But we are not fighting for our-
selves alone.... Here, girt about by the seas and. oceans where the Navy
reiis; shielded. from above by the prowess and. devotion of our airmen - we
await undismayed. the impending assault. Perhaps it will come tonight,
perhaps it will come next week, perhaps it will never come. We must show
ourselves equally capable of meeting a sudden violent shock or what is
perhaps a harder task, a prolonged vigil. But be the ordeal sharp or long,
28. Diaries of Field. Marsha]. Lord. Ironside, 4, 6, 8, U & 16 July 1940,
op. cit.
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or both, we shall seek no terms, we shall tolerate no parley, we may show
no mercy - we ask none." 29.
Three days later, General Ironside noted in his diary:
"We have reached another monung without any active operations by the
Boches.... There are tentative statements in the papers about a 'peace
ultimatum', but nothing very definite. Winston's speech in the House the
other day ought to have dissipated any hopes of our people having become
intimidated like the French. Winston minced no words. I wonder if the
Boches think that their present bombardment is better than it is. Will they
increase it in violence as they find we continue firm? I an sure that any
honest effort at peace will find, a following here in England, but we all
Iciow that we cannot trust the Boches at all.... But the show is warming up
one way or another. We have had seventeen days in July which I would never
have expected to get." 30.
Two days afterwards, on 19th July, Hitler made his final 'peace offer'
in a speech in the Kroll Opera House in Berlin, only to have it contemptu-
ously rejected in an unauthorised statement by the B.B.C. less than sixty
minutes later. The War Cabinet did not even bother seriously to consider
Hitler's proposal, though Lord Halifax, the Forei Secretary, issued a firm
refusal to the offer in a broadcast on 22nd. July. The Royal Navy was by now
fully disposed to meet an invasion, while the R.A.F., given a valuable
breathing space after Dunkirk in which to recoup its losses, had already
begun to demonstrate its determination in the opening phase of the struggle
in the air. How ready, however, were Britain's preparations to resist
invasion on land, by the latter half of July, and how effective would have
been the various elements of General Ironside's plan, if the Germans had
landed at this time and they had been put to the test?
The answer is that, while much progress had been made since the end of
Iay, there was still a great deal more work to do, and that many of the
preparations already made would in fact have been singularly ineffective.
The greatest 'white elephant' was undoubtedly the main G.H.Q. Line, together
vith the lesser Corps and Divisional 'stoplines' between the main line and
the coast. This system of stoplinest, or 'lines of no withdrawal' by Army
definition, was intended to gain time for the mobile G.H.Q. Reserves to be
concentrated to meet any threatened attack; the G.H.Q. Line itself, where
built, consisted of a continuous anti-tank obstacle covered by pillboxes of
29. B.B.C. Broadcast 'by Sir Winston Churchill, 14 July 1940 (following a
speech in the House of Commons).
30. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 17 July 1940, op. cit.
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various types. The anti-tank obstacle was often a river line, the river
being dredged out arid the banks raised where the river or stream was shallow
and. normally fordable by tanks, as, for example, along Debden Water, a
tributary of the upper River Cam in North-vest Essex. The Rivers Great
Ouse, Cam, upper Chelmer, Nedway, Eden, Blackwater and the Somerset Avon
were utilised, together with the Kermet and. Avon Canal. Elsewhere, railway
embankments, steep slopes and. even lakes or inundated gravel-pits were used.
Failing any natural or existing man-made obstacle, an artificial one had to
be created. On the main G.H.. Line and. on forward 'stoplines', a wide and
deep 'V' shaped anti-tank ditch, some 20-30 feet across and sometimes
revetted with brushwood and. logs, was excavated, using civilian mechanical
diggers. The ditch was crossed at various points by temporary wooden
bridges for vehicles and. people, which could be removed quickly if necessary.
Anti-tank mines were, at first, generally reserved for beach exits, rather
than for use inland, but sometimes single or double lines of large concrete
blocks or truncated concrete pyramids were used, as, for example, on the
Taunton 'stopline', near that town itself. All trees along the defended
lines were felled, so as to provide a clear line of fire, the stumps being
left to make additional obstacles to tanks. 31.
On the main G.H.C. Line the building of the defences, often using
civilian contractors, had. made good headway in East Anglia and the South
East by late July. Every bridge crossing the water obstacles of the G.H.Q.
Line could either be blocked at short notice with rows of portable concrete
cylinders, with truncated cone concrete tdolliest, or by using iron rails
that could be slotted either vertically or horizontally into prepared holes,
or else was prepared for demolition. In addition, all possible crossings of
the anti-tank obstacle were covered by a group of mutually supporting pill-
boxes of various standard types. A typical road bridge might be covered,
for example, by a rectangular anti-tank pillbox built to house a 2 pdr. gun,
often with a built-in Bren chamber, flanked at a short distance by one or
two usually hexagonal pillboxes desigued to take the Bren L.N.G.; further
Bren pillboxes were sited at fairly regular intervals along the anti-tank
obstacle, so as to sweep it in enfilade with interlocking arcs of fire.
host main-line pillboxes had walls 3'6" to 4' thick, with overhead protec-
tion 1' thick and had. firing slits at the sides and rear for all-round
defence. Sometimes, trench type infantry positions, well sandbagged, or
31. Fieldwork by the writer, including questioning of local people resident
in 1940, October 1979 - I'Iarch 1980.
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later concrete lined pits for spigot mortars were used instead of pillboxes,
especially where the water obstacle to be covered was wide and clearly
impassable except at bridges or on the lesser 'stoplines'. Both piliboxes
and earthworks were often cleverly camouflaged and were, ideally, carefully
wired in, if wire were available. 32.
The G.ES. Line and the system of forward 'stoplines', however, were
destined never to be completed. The main G.R.Q. Line only ever neared full
completion from Cambridge via Chelnisford. to the River Thames and. from thence
round via Maidstone, Tonbridge and. Reigate to, approximately, Guildford.
This was the most vital section, since it covered the direct approaches to
London from East i1nglia and the South East. Prom Guildford to Bristol, arid
from Cambridge north to The Wash, the G.H.. Line consisted merely of a
mainly water obstacle, backed by scattered strongpoints. 4ny wide out-
flanking movement by a highly mobile enemy who had secured. a substantial
lodgement in the South East or East .Anglia, therefore, might have met little
resistance from the G.R.. Line and been able to approach the capital from
its most vulnerable side, the north-west, where the latter's own ring of
anti-tank obstacle and pilibox defences was the weakest. Joreover, the
G.LQ. Line was in fact planned, but never built, in the area from The Wash
northwards through Lincoinshire and the Vale of York. In these areas of
Northern Command, the only static defences inland were scattered pillboxes,
sited to cover vulnerable points such as airfields, crossroads or bridges,
or used as roadblocks, as, for example, on the Great North Road where pill-
boxes were built singly or in mutually supporting pairs on every rise, so
as to have a good field of fire.
The only significant forward 'stoplines', too, Imovn to be reasonably
completed in Thigland were in the I Corps sector in Kent, from Graveney
Iarshes via just east of Canterbury to Dover, facing north-east so as to
contain any advance from enemy landings on beaches from Uutstable round the
Isle of Thanet to Deal; as well as along the entire length of the Royal
Kilitary Canal in S.E. Kent and along the line of the River Rother possibly
to beyond Eeathfield in East Sussex, also in XII Corps sector, to guard the
equally vulnerable beaches either side of Dungeness Point and around
32. ibid.; correspondence with Henry Wills, 25 Narch 1980; and Wills, H.:
Pllboxes: A Study of U.K. Defences, 1940 , pp. 15-36, Leo Cooper,
London, 1985.
33, Interview with General Sir Ronald Forbes Adam, formerly G.0. C.-in-C.,
Northern Command, 27 February 1980.
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Winchelsea and. Bexhill-Pevensey; from the coast near Coichester to Bu.ry St.
Edmunds and. from thence probably to Littleport on the G.H.Q. Line in East
Lnglia, to cover the miles of exposed beaches on the Norfolk, Suffolk and
N.E. Essex coastlines; and, finally, the aforementioned strong Taunton
'stopline' in the South West. 	 Of these, neither the Canterbury 'stop-
line' nor the line in East Anglia were able to make particular use of
natural anti-tank obstacles, though the former made some use of railway
einbankinents and the latter of the Rivers Stour and. Lark. Otherwise, it
seems, the remainder of the forTard 'stoplines' which had been provislonally
planned, sometimes surveyed and in some cases even begun, 'ere either never
intended to be properly fortified or, more likely, iere cancelled towards
the end. of July due to a change in policy introduced by C-eneral Ironside's
successor as C.-in-C., Home Forces.
Would these 'stoplines' have served their purpose in preventing the
German tanks from "tearing the guts out of the Country" ? At least, only for
a very short time. The G.R.(. Line piliboxes were spaced on avera€e some
two or three hundred yards apart and were, theoretically, able to bring to
bear an efficient crossfire at any point along the line of the anti-tank
obstacle, but in most places the line completely lacked any sort of depth
and. if breached, at any point, the whole of the rest of the line would have
been immediately rendered useless. Only occasionally ras there a second
line of defence, consisting of a further line of pillboxes similarly spaced.
and sited, often on higher ground, though lacking the anti-tank obstacle,
as, for example, on the G.H.Q. Line to the south of Chelmsford. Where
constructed, the second line would be situated. several hundred yards to the
rear ol' the first and would. be  able to cover the piliboxes of the first
line.	 Both the G.H.Q. Line and the forward 'stoplines' would. require
vast numbers of troops, very thinly spread, to man then fully, though the
G.H.. Line, at least, was expected to be primarily manned by the L.D.V..
Iioreover, although the pillboxes were built specially to house certain
weapon types, for example the 2 pd.r. anti-tank gun, these were very often
simply not available. The ma3orlty of the pillboxes on the G.H.. Line were
desigued to accommodate up to five Bren L.M.G.'s each, with four to eight
men manning a typical pilibox and. the remainder of the section either in a
34. Correspondence with Henry Wills, 25 Narch 1980; end. German Documents
for Operation Sea Lion: Nap, 'Durch Luftbild. festgestellte Befesti-
gungen in Sttdostengland.', 10 October 1940, Imperial War Museum Library.
35. Field.vork by the writer, October 1979 - March 1980.
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sandbagged trench nearby or in a second pilibox with more Brens, if there
were a pair of them. By mid-July, however, most L.D.V. units had at most a
single L.N.G. per platoon, let alone even one per section, and this was
almost invariably an aged Lewis gun, not a Bren, while a large proportion
of the L.D.V. still lacked even rifles! The 4th (Guildlord) Battalion,
Surrey Home Guard, for example, responsible for the defence of the G.H.Q3
Line within the borough boundaries, only received their first batch of
rifles on 17th July and. by 31st July still had a mere 420 rifles and 30
shot guns between 850 Volunteers. Their rifles had. at most 20 rounds of
S.A. t.. apiece. 36. Regular troops, mainly manning the forward 'stoplines',
would doubtless have been both better equipped and. better trained, but
would have been equally overstretched. All in all, the G.H.. Line and
most of the forward 'stoplines', whether planned or actually built, really
represented 'Maginot Line thinking' at its very worst and their greatest
benefit was probably one of morale only, since at least both troops and
civilians could see widespread evidence that something was being done to
defend the Country. The Germans had, in fact, already developed efficient
tactics to deal with such pillboxes and. anti-tank obstacles from their
experiences with the ?aginot Line. However, with a plentiful supply of
concrete, with local contractors and labour available, with the L.D.V. and
many of the troops not adequately trained or equipped for offensive action,
coupled with a lack of tanks to provide mobile piliboxes or means of
counter-attack, the system of tstopines seemed the best solution that
General Ironsid.e could devise in the circumstances.
In addition to the main lines that were formed throughout June and
July, collections of local defence works were often sited around particular
objects to be protected, such as river crossings, airfields, railway yards,
factories, bridges, public utilities and fuel depots. Some of the larger
tons in the South East and East Anglia had pillboxes or sandbagged posi-
tions sited at street corners and road junctions, usually manned by the
local L.D.V.. Around many smaller towns and villages in these areas, too,
were roadblocks to prevent the rapid advance of German mobile columns,
covered by similar L.D.V.-manned defences. The piliboxes, where used, for
all these widely distributed local defences, were generally small ones
desiied for riflemen, though on some airfields mobile pillboxes were to be
seen, consisting of concrete pipes mounted on lorries that could be driven
36. Various authors: A History of the Giuldford Home Guard, 18th Ia y
 1940
- 31st December 1944, p. 5, Guildlord, 1945.
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out into the centre of the runways, also steel retractable pillboxes in the
runways themselves or, eventually, massive six-foot thick many-sided. pill-
boxes, well wired in and. designed. to take Vickers LLG.'s for perimeter
defence and sometimes even with J.A. machine guns mounted on the roofs (for
example at Debd.en Airfield, a vital fighter Sector Station in Essex). Iany
of the small local piliboxes, together with some of those on the 'stoplines'
or on the coasts, were ingeniously camouflaged to resemble cottages, exten-
sions to buildings, barns, cattlesheds, huts and even haystacks, teashops or
advertising hoardings or, on the coast, beach-huts and. kiosks	 iviany
mistakes, too, were inevitably made in the positioning and construction of
these local defences and. examples axe legion. On the Great North Road, for
instance, one pillbox had to be pulled down soon after it ras built, because
it was found. to obstruct half the traffic flow on this vital arterial
route. 38.
It was, however, the actual beaches and. their nmiediate hinterland. that
vould be in the forefront of any attempt at invasion. Progress on the beach
defences by mid July varied greatly. Generally speaking, the most vi.i.lner-
able beaches, those of East Anglia, East Kent and the South Coast as far as
the Isle of Vight, were now mostly obstructed and covered. by fire. Coils of
triple Dannert concertina wire festooned the upper beaches, while lines of
solid concrete blocks were beginning to make their appearance to bar egress
from the beaches to tanks and. vehicles where there were no sea-walls or
cliffs. anti-tank minefields, together with further barbed wire entangle-
ments and. concrete obstacles, were being placed in beach exits. All these
obstacles vere sited to hold up the attacker under close-range small arms
fire, while artillery fire-plans were carefully worked out so as to cover
all the beaches. Sea-valls, padded out with sandbags, became infantry
breastworks and themselves provided a ready anti-tank obstacle, though soon,
as at Southend-on-Sea in Lssex, a line of concrete blocks vould often be
added at the top of the sea-wall to further increase the obstacle. Infantry-
men also manned rifle pits, sandbagged firing trenches, or even concrete
sever pipes specially set into the upper beaches. Nachine-gun posts vere
established at the ends of piers, in sandbagged positions roofed with stout
timber covered with sand, in newly constructed pillboxes, or in kiosks,
cafes or other buildings strengthened by a sandbag or concrete inner wall,
37. wills, E.: op. cit., pp. 58-64; and fieldwork by the writer, October
1979 - Narch 1980.
38. Interview with General Sir Ronald Forbes Adam, op. cit., 27 Feb. 1980.
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while 19th century forts, Napoleonic Nartello Towers or even older coastal
defences were wired into provide ready-made self-contained strongpoints.
Nearly 150 guns, mostly 6" in batteries of two, had by now been established
by the Admiralty, working at great speed under the Emergency Beach Battery
Progranme, and these provided the nuclei for further strongpoints.
Strongly built concrete or iron rail roadblocks had been established on
road.s leading inland, from the beaches and at intervals along the promenades,
while the landward ends of piers, jetties and the more substantial break-
waters had been blown up to prevent enemy ships from unloading onto them.
Various anti-boat boom defences to protect against the expected specially
designed enemy landing-craft, together with anti-submarine nets, had been
placed. across the Thames and Humber estuaries and the Plrmouth Sound, in
addition to those already in place at Dover, Earwich and Itosrth. Lighter
and simpler boom defences were to be placed so as to hinder access to the
most vulnerable open beaches, though these were soon found to be difficult
to lay and vulnerable to the elements. At many of the smaller ports, such
as Newhaven or Ramsgate, blockships stood ready to be swung into position
and sunk across the harbour mouth. Demolition plans now existed to deny
the enemy the use of any East or South Coast port if that became necessary,
while some provision was made at many ports for all-round defence. The
Admiralty had placed a number of fixed torpedo tubes in suitable positions
to protect harbours or estuaries; the Dover defences were being added to
by the provision of further long and medium-range guns, as well as close-in
defences, and the Dover minefield was being thickened up. "
How strong were the beach defences by the middle of July, however9
The beaches were only ever properly fortified. between The Wash and Cornwall,
and by this date little work had yet been carried out on beach defences
further west than the Isle of Wight. On the West Coast end north of The
Wash, where only raids were anticipated, the beaches remained virtually un-
fortified and. were only gu.arded. by a chain of watchers nd by constant
patrolling, leter mainly by the Home Guard, except at vital points .'here
Regular battalions on a wide front maimed mainly earthwork defences. There
was no continuous anti-tank obstacle, while very few pillboxes were built
on the coasts in Scottish, Western or Northern Commands. Some of the few
pill'boxes that were built in Northern Command were constructed in a line
39. Collier, Basil: op. cit., pp. 132-133, LN.S.0., London, 1957; and
CAB 65/14 1'I(40)198th:3, 9 July 1940.
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along some sandstone cliffs just to the north of the River Humber in the
East Riding of Yorkshire. It was noted that a line of First World War pill-
boxes already existed at the top of the beach below these doffs, but it was
only later discovered that these latter piliboxes had., in fact, slipped down
the steep slope due to the cliff having receded some 20 or 30 feet, a fate
which was shortly to happen to the brand-new pillboxes on top3 40. The
newly promoted Lieutenant-General Harold fl. L. G. Alexander, on arriving at
1 Corps H.Q. at Doncaster shortly after its return from Dunkirk, found that
"the most prominent defence works dated from Napoleonic times" 41.
On the East Anglian and South-East Coasts, too, the beach defences,
though far more advanced than elsewhere, were still far from complete.
Flimsy coils of barbed wire were only just beginning to be replaced by more
substantial and well wired builders' scaffolding at the top of the more open
beaches, and. the provision of solid concrete anti-tank blocks was at an
early stage, while further builders' scaffolding placed below the high-water
mark and. armed with mines was still a thing of the future. Nore anti-tank
landmines were still desperately required. Combined with the severe short-
age of anti-tank guns, therefore, there was as yet little available to stop
enemy tanks from rapidly debouching inland from the beaches. Winston
Churchill, vlsiting beaches in St. I'Iargaret's Bay, near Dover, about this
time, was informed by the Brigadier of 2nd London Brigade that:
"... he had only three anti-tank guns in his brigade, covering four or
five miles of this highly-menaced coastline. He declared that he had only
six rounds of ammunition for each gun, and he asked me with a slight air of
challenge whether he was justified in letting his men fire one single round
for practice in order that they might at least Imow how the weapon wored.
I replied that we could not afford practice rounds and that fire should. be
held for the last moment at the closest range." 42.
There was still, moreover, a great shortage of the necessary field guns to
give an adequate weight to the artillery fire-plans; the troops on the
coast 'ere often very thinly spread; and many of the hastily built and
often improvised defence works were improperly sited, sometimes with build-
ings obscuring the line of fire, or the main embrasures of plilboxes sited
40. Interview with General Sir Ronald Forbes Adam, op. cit., 27 Feb. 1980.
41. Nicolson, Nigel: Alex: The Life of Field Marshal Earl Alexander of
Trnis, p. 116, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1973.
42. Churchill, W. S.: Vol. II, Their Finest Hour, p. 148, Cassell, London,
1949.
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to fire out to sea instead of so as to provide for more effective flanking
fire. It is clear that a determined assault, using assault engineers,
amphibious or submersible tanks led by fast, light infantry assault boats
in the first wave and dive bombers as artillery instead, of naval bombard-
ment, all of which the Germans were in fact already planning to use, would.
have suffered losses, but vould have secured a lodgement at many places
uithout a great deal of difficulty, thus nullifying the effort and. resources
spent by the British on defending the beaches in other sectors.
The successful defence of the coastline really depended. on the presence
of sufficient arid well trained., equipped and motivated., immediate local
mobile reserves for instant counter-attack, backed 'by equally prepared
larger mobile reserves under Corps or even Command control to deal with
major breaches of the coastal 'crust'. liere again, much progress had. been
made by the latter half of July, but inadequacies still continued to abound.
At first the coastal divisions had had, of necessity, to position the bulk
of their troops along the coastline itself in an outdated form of linear
defence, with little local depth. Gradually, however, as the coastal de-
fences themselves were improved, as more equipment caine from the factories
and improvised sources or, starting in mid-July, from the United States of
Iunerica, and as further vehicles, such as buses or coaches, were requisi-
tioned by the military from their civilian owners, the Divisional Commanders
were able to withdraw more and. more troops for training as local mobile
reserves. The process was an agonisingly slow one, especially for all the
more offensively-minded commanders, but it was a steady process nonetheless.
By mid-July, a typical arrangement of mobile defence in depth was just
beginning to emerge in many of the most vulnerable areas to supplement the
Regular troops manning the forward static defences, who were themselves
gradually being relieved 'by more sedentary troops. Thus, the actual beach
defences would. be held by Section and Platoon posts within the Company posi-
tions. Small local reserves would generally be provided within each Battal-
ion on the coast by the Carrier Platoons and perhaps by an anti-parachute
Platoon, mounted on bicycles. Decisions on the layout of the beach defences
were generally made at Brigade level and each Brigade usually held a Battal-
ion in local reserve some six miles inland, so that it could. move on foot,
on bicycles or in buses to the point of attack. Brigades were ideally to be
positioned 'two up', with a third brigade in divisional reserve that could
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be moved forward as the battle plan became clearer, or be available to re-
capture any coastal airfields which enemy airborne forces might seize.
This last arrangement, however, was rarely attained as early as July
1940. In most cases, all three of the Brigades had to be disposed near the
coastline, as, for example, in 45th (West Country) Division's lengtby sector
in East Sussex and South East Kent (under IIajor General E. C. A. Schreiber)
where its 136th Brigade was responsible for the Eastbourne area, its 134th
Brigade for the Bexhull-Eastings area and its 135th Brigade (transferred
back from 1st London Division at the beginning of July) for the Rye to
Dymchurch sector, and where the divisional reserves merely consisted of, in
the main, a few troops of the improvised 'Ironsid.es', a tiny handful of 2
pdr. anti-tank guns, and a meagre assortment of divisional artillery.
In fact, among the five divisions ranged along the coast in Eastern Command,
only 1st London Division, which had received the addition of 196th Brigade
from 66th (Lancs. and Border) Division at the end of June, and 35th Brigade
from 12th (Eastern) Division on 10th July, and thus now consisted of four
brigades, was lucky enough to be able to hold a reasonably sized local
reserve. This consisted of no less than two infantry brigades, 1st London
Brigade 3ust east of Canterbury and 2nd London Brigade to the north of
Polkestone and. Eythe, both having been made fully mobile for a counter-
attacking role, mainly by the use of requisitioned civilian lorries, vans
and coaches. The actual coastline in 1st London Division's sector zas held
in mud-July by 35th Brigade in the Isle of Sheppey-Whutstable area, 198th
Brigade on and around the Isle of Thanet, some 3,000 Royal Harines in the
Deal garrison, various miscellaneous and. training units which made up the
Dover garrison which also guarded Folkestone, and the Shorncliffe garrison
which had responsibility for the coastline from Sandgate to the Dimchurch
redoubt. Since the 35th and 198th Brigades consusted of insuffuciently
trained second-line Territorial troops, the coastal 'crust'	 therefore,
largely manned by sedentary troops, with the two better trained first-line
Territorial brigades acting as the 'Leopards'. Thus, on the face of it,
1st London Division's dispositions were more satisfactory than those of the
other divisions on the coastline of Eastern Command and, indeed, elsewhere
in the Country. otwithstand.ung, 1st London Division still only possessed
34 field guns, a mixed bag of 18 pdrs., 4.5" howitzers, 25 pdrs. and even a
43. iTicolson, Icigel: op. cit., p. 116; and interview with Lt.-Col. J.
icigel St. G. Kirke, formerly G.S.0. 3(Ops.) 45th Division, 11 Aug. 1981.
44. Interview with Lt.-Col. J. Th.gel St. G. Kirke. op. cit., 11 Lug. 1981;
and V0 166: op. cit., 45th Division, July 1940.
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few 13 pdrs. on 5th July, compared with 23 field guns on 31 st I"Iay, and,
though the d.ivision admittedly d.id. have the benefit of the guns of the
coastal fixed defences and. 'emergency' batteries, it could. by July still
only boast 12 assorted 4", 12 pclr. and 3 pd.r. guns with a speculative anti-
tank capacity. Only eight of the latter were mobile; there were no modern
2 pdr. anti-tank guns or tanks; while the division was disposed to meet an
attack from the most easterly beaches rather than from the south-east;
ammunition of all types was terribly short and there was none to spare for
practice. The beach defences were still incomplete with little effectively
to stop enemy tanks, the seaward. defences had yet to be further strengthened,
the units on the coast spent most of their time digging, wiring and prepar-
ing defences rather than in training, and. virtually no troops of the
division, except for 35th Brigade, had ever seen a shot fired in anger.
Major General C. P. Liard.et, 1st London Division's commander, had. good.
reason to call its situation "ludicrous". 'h"
Corps reserves, too, were almost non-existent in mid-July (see Map 8),
especially in Eastern and. Southern Commands where the main reliance was on
the G.H.Q. Reserves, though in East Miglia Major General J. S. Drew's reason-
ably well equipped, mobile and battle-experiences 52nd. (Lowland.) Division
was poised east of Cambridge to move rapidly by brigade oups to reinforce
any of the three ill-equipped, insufficiently trained and inexperienced
divisions stretched. along the long East Anglian coastline, while 37th Bra-
gade from the broken up 12th (Eastern) Division was soon moved. to Norwich to
undertake a similar role in Norfolk or in the vicinity of Lowestoft in
Suffolk. Neither I Corps in the South East, V Corps in the South, the
newly created VIII Corps in the South West of igland, nor the whole of
Scottish Command, had any substantial formations in reserve under Corps
control. The exception was n Lieutenant-General S.r R. F. Adam's Northern
Coiiand, which was mostly oit of effective reach of the G.E.. Reserves,
where both Lieutenant-General H. R. L. C. Alexander's I Corps to the south
of Flainborough Head and Lieutenant-General Holmes's to the north, had a pair
of divisions covering the coast and a third division in Corps reserve placed
some 30-40 miles well inland. These reserve divisions, 44th (Home Counties)
around Doncaster in I Corps and 42nd (E. Lancs.) around. Darlington in X
Corps, were well trained. and. battle-experienced., having seen action in
Prance, and. though needing all types of heavy equipment, had been made
45. WO 166: op. cit., 1st London Division, July 1940.
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mobile, using requisitioned civilian transport, and stood ready to move to
tai:e up positions on the coast within three or four hours' notice once the
direction of the enemy threat was defined. Routes were earmarked and recon-
noitred, end moves practised, while the plentiful open moorland in Northern
Command, largely free from civilians and arable faraing, provided excellent
training grounds. Despite this, it was firmly believed in Northern Command
that a greater threat existed not from the sea, which would involve a long
and dangerous crossing for the enemy over the North Sea vith little chance
of subsequent supplies or reinforcements reaching the enemy lodgement, but
from the air and, consequently, much training was practised by all the &ivi-
sons in rounding up parachutists. Even more important, too, was Northern
Command's major task of providing substantial reinforcements in the event
of an enemy invasion of ast Anglia or of Southern England, since it had no
less than six divis:ons at its disposal. Plans and preparations were,
therefore, made to rush the experienced troops of ileander's I Corps,
which also included Major General K. A. N. Anderson's 1st (Regular) Division
and Major General N. N. S. Irwin's 2nd (Regular) Divson, both of which
were well trained, if lacking much of their equipment, and which had been
to Prance and Belgium, south rard.s by lorry convoys to take over the function
Of IV Corps in G.H.C. Reserve, should that formation be conmm.tted to battle.
The heavy equipment of I Corps would follow by road at a slower pace. In
the event ol' this southward move, Holmes's X Corps was to take over the
defence of the East Riding and Lincoinshire; though mainly consisting of
undertrained, inexperienced., ill-equipped and largely immobile Territorial
-roops, its ability to undertake this role in July would at the very least
have been greatly suspect. There were, moreover, virtually no tanks and
very few 2 pdr. anti-tank guns available within the whole of Northern
Command, the only armour being the improvised 'Ironsid.es' and a handful of
ancient Yeomanry armou.red cars. 46	 in all, both the local mobile
reserves and the larger mobile reserve formations leit much to be desired.
by aid-July.
Finally, everything depended. on the two Corps, plus the smaller forma-
tions in Southern Command, that comprised the G.E.(Z. Reserves. (See Nap 8.)
These included. three of the best trained, equipped and. mobile formations in
the Country, namely 1st Canadian Division, 43rd (Wessex) Division and 3rd
(Regular) Division; the only other divisions which had reached a comparable
46. Interview with General Sir Ronald Forbes Adam, op. cit., 27 Feb. 1980;
and WO 166/24: op. cit., Northern Command, July 1940.
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state were 52nd. (Lowland) and possibly 1st (Regular) Divisions. Britain's
only two .rmoured Divisions, also in G.H. Q. Reserve were both far from
complete. Major General J. C. Tilly's inexperienced 2nd .Sxmoured Division
in Northamptonshire still consisted, in nLid-July, of only some 178 machine-
gun armed light tanks, instead of its proper complement of 213 Cruisers and
108 light tanks, while !Iajor General R. Evans's 1st Armoured Division in
Surrey, despite receiving tne utmost priority for re-equipping following its
losses in France, mustered three depleted brigades of only two under strength
regiments each, instead, of its normal establishment of two Armoured Brigades,
each cf three regiments of Cruiser and light tanks. Thus, in mid-July, the
latter	 3rd Armoured Brigade, consisting of 2 R.T OR and 5 R.T.R.,
had about 70 Cruisers of assorted types manned by battle-experienced crews;
its 1st Army Tank Brigade (under command) possessed, on 17th July, 27
machine-gun armed Matilda 1k. I's and 23 Matilda Mk. II's with the in-
experienced 3 R.T.R., and a further 26 Matilda Nk. II's with the battle-
experienced 4 R.T.R.; while its inexperienced 20th Armoured Brigade from
East .Lnglia, which had a motley collection of around 30 light tanks and
light 'wheeled' tanks, plus improvised 'Ironside' armoured cars arid. some
lorried infantry, would only really be capable of a reconnaissance role.
The Division's Support Group included a number of towed 25 pd.r, field guxis
with 3 R.H.A., but its artillery support was thin and would be split between
the three Brigades. The gunners were also handicapped, as were those with
the remainder of Home Forces, by a shortage of radio sets.	 The 1st
Armou.red Reconnaissance Brigade in G.E.. Reserve in Huntingd.onshire was
equipped only with Ilumberettes and similar improvised light armoured cars of
the	 type, while the equally inexperienced and semi-trained. 21st
Army Tcnk Brigade in G.H.Q. Reserve in Wiltshire still mustered only 16
Ilatilda flk. II's.
Thus, lacking large numbers of effective tanks, with relatively few
experenced or highly trained tank-crews, rith the infantry rninly untrained
in close co-operation with tanks, with a shortage of artillery and anti-tank
guns still apparent amongst some formations in G.H.Q,. Reserve, and with long
distances to travel by road or rail - very likely under heavy enemy ar
attack - to reach the areas of operations, it is clear that the ability of
the G.H.Q. Reserves to mount any rapid and powerful counter-offensive
against a major German incursion would have been, in mid-July, severely in
47. WO 166: op. cit., 1st Lrinoured Division, July 1940.
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doubt. Indeed, given the state of the G.Lç. Reserves at this time, com-
bined with that of tne other elements of General Ironside's plan for the
land defence of the Nation, it is very likely that if the Germans had
planned and prepared an invasion of Britain to take place in July and had.
managed to secure a reasonably-sized bridgehead and to reinforce it with
tanks, artillery and transport, they would have had little real trouble in
advancing to complete the conquest of the remainder of the British Isles.
1evertheless, progress was being made, and General Ironside was
looking to the future with a certein degree of optimism. He wrote in his
diary, on 19th July:
"We must begin to get a Home Army organised at once. \e cannot use
all the Field Army for operations of pure defence in England.
I have started with the principle that we want the following forces:
(i) A coast defence and its iimnediate reserves.
(ii) Striking columns.
(iii) tAnti-] parachute columns.
We still have an immense amount of work to do to get the coast
defences in order, but we are well on the way towards it. When that is
finished, we can arrange the local reserves...." 48.
*	 *	 *
General Ironside was destined never to be given the chance to put his
plans for the future into effect. Instead, he was to be abruptly replaced
in the post of Coiimander-in-Cluef, Home Forces, and his long and. distin-
gu.j.shed career was to come to a sudden and dramatic end. The seeds of
doubt, as to the abilities of the veteran General, had been sown in the
controversial debate that had. sprung up in the latter days of June over
the nature of his plans for the land defence of the Ilation and, though the
m2tter had appeared to be settled, dissatisfaction had in fact lingered on
in many quarters, growing rapidly into a lack of confidence in his leader-
ship of Rome Forces. General Ironside's own diary gives us hints that all
ias not well behind the scenes. On 8th July, he had attended a meeting of
the Chiefs of Staff, at which he had argued that it was undesirable on
military grounds, in the event of an invasion, to fight the battle in
48. Diaries of Field Narshal Lord Ironside, 19 July 1940 , op. cit.
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person from the small Advanced Headquarters in the Cabinet War Room in
Whitehall, where the lack of accommodation would lim.it the size of his
Operational Staff, and that he would remain instead, without being continu-
ally called away for conferences and consultations elsewhere, at his main
Operational Headquarters at St.	 School, Kensington, where a proper
Combined Operations Room was being established and which was only ten
minutes' distance from Whitehall anyway. Contact between himself and the
Government, he suggested, could be maintained by telephone and. by means of
liaison officers where necessary, while an Advanced Intelligence Head-
quarters could remain at Whitehall and would duplicate for the information
of the Government all the intelligence that came in to the Combined Opera-
tions Room at the main Headquarters. 	 "One	 want .... to be
continually on tap," he commented in his diary, and then added, somewhat
mysteriously:
"Odd people, like Lord Eankey, are continually sending for Paget to
interview him about something or other. We should not be at the beck and
call of odd people...." 50.
In fact, General Ironside's suggestion, though it met with the Chiefs
of Staff's approval, was emphatically re3ected by the Prime Minister the
next day, who insisted that it was "absolutely essential" that the
Commander-in-Chief should be available for consultation with the Chiefs of
Staff, Jar Cabinet and himself at all times, and that the existing arrange-
ments should stand. unchanged. 51. General Ironside's problems were to
continue. Two days later, he wrote:
"I find a great many fingers in the Home Defence pie. I allow them to
work away so long as they do not overstep the mark. It is natural that
things should. be scrutnised closely, as everybody is in this sho':...."
Further indications of impending trouble came the following day, 12th July,
as General Ironside took dinner with Lady Maureen Stanley. "She confided
to me that there was a 'vhispering campaign' going on about me, " he re-
called that evening. "She implored me to be careful in what I said. I
told. her that I never went out anywhere and. never discussed military
49. CAB 79/5 COS(40 )2llth:1 , 8 July 1940.
50. Diaries of Field. Marshal Lord Ironside, 8 July 1940, op. cit.
51. C3 79/5 COS(40)215th:1, 9 July 1940.
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matters outside my own staff." Criticism, too, was being voiced by some
keen, but ill-informed I'Iembers of Parliament, criticism which General Iron-
side was not permitted to answer. "They ought to lmow what is going on,"
he commented on 18th July:
"The soldiers are blamed for crimes that are committed by Government,
and I am personally blamed for a great deal that is beyond my control. And
yet one is tied absolutely by the veto put upon talking by soldiers." 52.
The military historian, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, was more specific, how-
ever, in his criticism. He r ote, on 16th July:
"Ironside is in better form since he has been out of the War Office
and. doing a more executive job as Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces. Even
so, he is not very good, nor strong." 53.
Related to the question of General 	 plans, to a large extent
was a further continuing source of disagreement. This was the crucial
problem of whereabouts on Britain's long coastline the main German attempt
at invasion might fall, in what strength and by what means he might come,
and. the proportion of Home Forces' formations needed to ensure adequately
against the expected threats in the various sectors of coastline. It was
still firmly believed in most higher circles that the main enemy invasion
attempt would be against the East Coast. The enemy activity observed in
icorway and to a lesser extent in the North German and Baltic ports and in
the Low Countries, compared with the paucity of evidence in the Channel
ports or Western France, and bearing in mind the difficulties envisaged for
the enemy in the passage of the Dover Straits, all seemed, in July, to
point to the East Coast as being the most likely area and especially that
between The \.'ash and Dimgeness. General Ironside, despite reinforcing both
the South Coast and Scotland to some extent, was amongst the many who
favoured the official view as held by the War Office. "The main landings
in this Country," he wrote, on 4th July,
".... .rill undoubtedly be carried on in Kent and East Lnglia. All
other operations, which may be landings in the Shetland.s, Yorkshire, the
South Coast, Devon and Cornwall, and Ireland, all be diversions to get us
to move aray our main reserves." 54'
52. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 11, 12 & 18 July 1940, op. cit.
53. Liddell Hart Papers: 11/1940/72, Notes for History, 16 July 19t10.
54. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 4 July 1940, op. cit.
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'Jinston Churchill at first shared this viev, though 'ith much scepti-
cisin as to the real possibilities open to the invader. .t a 'Jar Cabinet
meeting on 9th July, he declared that, in view of the lack of enemy shipping
seen in the Channel ports, he "did. not think .... that in the iied.iate
future, at any rate, there was much possibility of an attack being launched.
from the I'rench Coast." Next day, he minuted to General Ironside, General
Dill and. Major General Ismay:
"I find it very difficult to visualise the kind, of invasion all along
the coast by troops carried. in small craft, and. even in boats. I have not
seen any serious evidence of large masses of this class of cra±t being
assembled, and, except in very narrow raters, it would. be  a most hazardous
and. even suicidal operation to commit a large army to the accidents of the
sea in the teeth of our very numerous armed patrolling forces.... A. sur-
prise crossing should. be impossible, and in the broader parts of the North
Sea, the invaders should be easy prey, as part of their voyage would. be
made by daylight .... t viii be very difficult for the enemy to place large
well-eçuipped bodies of troops on the East Coast of fligland rhether in
formed bodies or flung piecemeal on the beaches as they get across....
Even more unlikely it is that the South Coast would. be attacked. We
Iniow that no great mass of shipping exists in the French ports, and. that the
numbers of small boats there are not great. The Dover barrage is being re-
plenished and. extended. .... [the Admiralty do not think any important vessels,
warships or transports have come through the Straits of Dover. Therefore I
find. it difficult to believe that the South Coast is in serious d.anger at
the present time. Of course a small raid. might be made upon Ireland from
Brest. But this also would be dangerous to the raiders vhile at sea."
"The na:n danger," the Prime Minister asserted., "is from the Dutch and German
harbours, which bear princapally upon the coast from Dover to The Wash."
binston Churchill concluded his minute by again urging the Commander-
in-Chief, Home Forces, to modify his largely static and. defensve plans as
quickly as poss'ble. Placing great emphasis on his favourite point, he wrote:
"1 hope, therefore, relying cn the above reasoning, .... that you riil
be able to bring an ever larger proportion of your formed Divisions back from
the coast into support or reserve so that their training may proceed in the
highest forms of offensive varfa,re and counter-attack and that the coast, as
it becomes fortified, will be ..ncreasingly confided to troops other than
those of the formed Divisions, and. also to the Home Guard. I am sure you
will be in agreement with this view in principle, and the only cuestion open
would. be the speed of the transformation. Here too, I hope we shallbe
agreed that the utmost speed shall rule." 56.
55. CLB 66/9 WP(40)264; also COS(40 )55 0 , Annexe I: Invasion, Iiiiiute by




The harassed Genera]. Ironside, who had already suffered the Prime
'go-getter humours' on tius and similar issues several times before, and
would indeed have liked nothing better than the means to comply with such a
request, connented wearily at this time:
"1 have so many factors to take into account:
(i) The state of the beach defences.
(ii) The state of the training of the troops in reserve.
(iii) The state of the mobility of these troops.
(iv) The availability of some troops for beach defences.
A vicious circle. To use troops in training for beach defence stops
their training. This prejudices the future." 57.
The Admiralty supported the Jar Office view that it was the East Coast
rather than the South Coast that was the more liable to enemy att2ok. On
12th July, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord, sent
the Prime Ianister a detailed and closely reasoned paper which had been
drawn up by himself and his staff. In calm and. misty weather, the iaval
Staff concluded, '.... it appears probable that a total of some 100,000 men
might reach these shores without being intercepted by naval forces.tt The
First Sea Lord divided this maximum total as to both the enemy ports of
departure arid the points of landing. Up to 62,000, it was believed, might
be directed against the East Coast from Belgian, Dutch and German ports,
'ith another 10,000 being sent against the Shetlands, Iceland end the
Scottish Coast from the norwegian ports. Only 25,000 men, however, were
expected to reach the South Coast, of which most would depart from the Bay
of Biscay ports and a mere 5,000 from the Channel ports, because in the
latter case, "Our air reconnaissance of these harbours is good, arid their
nature and. layout iS such that the enemy could not hope to conceal prepara-
tions for an invasion on any scale, vhether .n big ships or smrll craft."
1evertheless, like Churchill, the Admiralty were somewhat sceptcal as to
the anvaderst real chances:
"These men would no doubt be sufficiently equipped to keep them going
for some days, and possibly weeks, but .... the maintenance of their line
of suoply, unless the German Air Force had overcome both our Air Force and
our iavy, seems practically impossible.
It must be assumed, therefore, that if the enemy undertook this opera-
tion under these conditions, he would do so in the hope that he could make
57. Daraes of Field Yshal Lord Ironside, 9 July 1940, op. cit.
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a quick rush on London, living on the country as he went, and force our
Govement to capitulate." 58.
The Prime Minister, satisfied with the Admiralty's estimate, and
considering that, because the enemy could. not bring heavy weapons with them
and. would. rapidly have their lines of communication to any lodgements
severed., "the invading strength seemed even in July to be well within the
capacity of our rapidly improving Army," circulated both the Admiralty' s
and his own memoranda to the Var Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and to Home
Forces, with a covering note, on 15th July:
"The Chiefs of Staff and Home Defence should consider these papers.
The First Sea Lord's Iiemorandum may be taken as a working basis, although I
personally believe that the Admiralty will in fact be better then their word
and that the invaders' losses in transit would further reduce the scale of
attack, yet the preparations of the land forces should be such as to make
assurance doubly sure. Indeed for the land forces the scale of attack might
'ell be doubled, namely 200,000 men distributed as suggested by tne First
Sea Lord. Our Home Army is already at a strength when it should. be  able to
deal t'ith such an invasion, and its strength is rapidly increasing."
Putting further pressure on General Ironside, he went on to add:
"I should. be very glad if our plans to meet invasion on shore could be
reviewed. on this basis so that the Cabinet may be informed of any modifica-
tions.,'
Winston Churchill then ccncluded. his minute with a statement that was of
some siificance, since it marked the beginnings of his pressure to give a
geter priority to the South Coast:
"It should be borne in r.ind that, although the heaviest attack would
seei lely to fall in the rorth, yat the sovereign importance of London and.
the narrowness of the seas in this quarter make the South the theatre where
the eatest precautions must be taken." 59.
The very next morning, General Ironside himself being away on a three
day tour ci' Home Forces, the Chiefs of Staff suoned the General's own
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Bernard C. T. Paget, to their meeting for
58. CAB 66/9 WP(40)26L; also cOS(40)550, Anriexe II: Invasion, Iemorandum
by the First Sea Lord, 12 July 1940.
59. Churchill, V. S.: op. cit., p. 256; and CAB 66/9 VP(LtO)26Lt; also
COS(40)55 0 : Home Defence, Minute by the Prime Minister and. Minister
of Defence, 15 July 1940.
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questioning on the matters raised in the two papers circulated by the Prime
Minister under his covering minute. Explaining the present dispositions of
Home Forces to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, however, Paget argued for
General Ironside that the request of the Prime Minister in his memoranda to
bring back more formations from the coast into support or reserve for train-
ing in counter-attack, could simply not be met at the moment, because of the
lack of equipment. He emphasized that:
".... while the formations in reserve were 1OC mobile, they were not
complete in artillery. It would be unsound to withdraw further formations
into reserve, and thereby give them a counter-offensive role, until there
were sufficient guns available to give them the necessary fire support."
As to the suggestion that the Command.er-in-Chief should review his disposi-
tions in the light of the figures given in the First Sea Lord's Memoranda,
Paget pointed out that:
",.,. the defences had already been disposed, as far as resources
would permit, to meet a scale of attack of this magnitude. A further re-
distribution of the resources available would not increase the power of the
defence in face of numbers double or treble those given by the Naval Staff,
unless a change in the proportion reaching any one part of the coast could
be foretold."
Having little choice but to accept Lieutenant-General Paget s explanation
of the equipment situation and the dispositions necessitated by this factor,
the Chiefs of Staff could only request that General Ironside be asked to
examine carefully both of the papers "with a view to making certain that the
available troops were disposed to the best advantage." 60. Hearing of this
tane reception to his memoranda, however, the Prime Minister was soon to
take further and more drastic action.
The Chiefs of Staff, meanwhile, noting the very great progress that had
been made on the beach defences of the East Anglian and South East Coasts
during the last month, now began 'looking over their shoulders' to the
defence of the West Coast of igland, especially in view of the recent
deterioration of relations with Eire. On the morning of the previous day,
15th July, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound had raised this question at
the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting and had drawn attention to the fact
that the beach defences of the West Coast "were reported to be backward.".
60. CU 79/5 COS ( 40 )224th:1, 16 July 1940.
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In actual fact, beach defences in this sector were virtually non-existent at
this time, the reason being, as the Committee pointed out, that the 'bottle-
neck' in the construction of them was the rate at which preliminary recon-
naissance for their siting could be carried out and that, quite rightly,
61.the .ast and South Coasts had. received priority".	 At their meeting on
16th July, the Chiefs of Staff also questioned Lieutenant-General Pa€et as
to progress in the construction of beach defences on the South West, West
and North West Coasts. Lieutenant-General Paget replied that, although
"considerable progress t' had been made on the South West Coast, much remained
to be done in the Bristol Channel area and. on the coast of Zales, while in
the lTorth West no beach defences had yet been prepared. He added that now
that the beach defences in the East and South were proceeding well, it
should. be possible to start in earnest on the West Coast beaches, but he
pointed. out that, besides difficulties concerning local labour shortages,
cement supply, wages for the labourers, and the loss of hitherto unaffected
recreational amenities for the public, there were in fact "practically no
troops available to cover the beach defences on the West Coast". The Chiefs
of Staff, nevertheless, thought that troops could always be moved at short
notice to man them once they were built, while a German occupation of
Ireland would increase the threat. The Committee, therefore, agreed that
the Home Defence Executive should be invited to consider the lesser problems
including the question of declaring the West Coast a defended area, and.
instructed that:
".... subject to causing no delay in the construction ol' beach defences
on the East and. South Coasts, work on beach defences cn the West and North
West Coasts should proceed at maximum speed, irres pective of whether troops
could. be made available to man the defences. Priority should. be  given to
those stretches of the beach most likely to offer favourable opportunities
for a landing."
The Chiefs of Staff even went on to discuss the defence requirements of the
Isle of Iian; while, follo'ing the meeting, G.E.. Home Forces not only
issued orders to Western Coand. "to prcceed. forthwith with the beach
defences on the West Coast on similar lines to those nearing completion on
the East and South Coasts", but also sent proposals to Southern Command for
the defence of the Isles of Scilly 62.
61. CLB 79/5 COS(40)222nd:5, 15 July 1940.
62. CLB 79/5 COS(40)224th:1, 16 July 19L0; and WO 166/i: op. cit., July
1940.
- 272 -
Obviously, all this concern cver the West Coast and. its islands could
only result in an immense dissipation of already meagre resources and,
indeed, at a Defence Committee meeting on 19th July, the Chiefs of Staff's
instructions were to suffer the wrath of the Prime Minister. "There would,"
he objected,
".... clearly be no end. to the effort and. material which would have to
be spent if we were to fortify the entire coast all round.. as it really
to be supposed that the enemy could sail an uriescorted expedition from the
western shores of France some 600 miles, and make a landing, not only in
the face of our 1aval forces, but in the very jaws of our air defence?"
Admitting, however, that "a landing in Ireland was a different proposition,
since the arrival of a small force might create a flare-up anong the local
population in support", and that, moreover, "the Irsh coast would be
easier to reach", the Prime Minister went on to insist that the Vest Coast
should depend for its safety "on our Naval and Air Forces, and on our
mobile coluimis". The idea of laying a minefield at sea between Cornwall
and Southern Ireland as also mooted. The Defence Committee, therefore,
agreed that no action should be taken on the provision of beach defences
for the West Coast until the Chiefs of Staff had reconsidered the problem,
and. the Chiefs of Staff consequently were to moderate ther instructions to
a reconend.ation, on 22nd. July, that "defences should be provided on all
vi'lne:able beaches in the vicinity of important ports", priorty being
given to beaches immediately on ether side of any est Coast port where
desperate enemy landings might be made "in order to pinch t out". 
63.
Despite the attention given to the vest Coast, the Chiefs of Staff
held i rth the prevailing view that the main enemy seaborne invasion vould
land. on the Last Coast. In an updated. appreciation by the Joint Intelli-
ence Sub-Cottee of the likely scales of attack which were dLscussed. by
the Chiefs of Staff on 17th July, for example, the Chiefs of Staff agreed
with the J.I.C.'s conclusions that:
"It is considered. that the main seaborne invasion is most likely to
be made betveen The slash and Newhaven, and the areas most l:ely for beach
landings are in the region of Southwold and in East Kent."
63. C..B 69/1 DO(40)2Oth:1, 19 July 1940 ; and. CIB 79/5 COS(40)229th:2,
22 July 1940.
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Simultaneous landings, it was erpected, might occur in both areas "with the
object of a pincer movement on London", the capital naturally being regarded
as "the principal enemy objective", though the industrial I'idlands and. North
could not be ruled out as "other possible objectives" and subsidiary land-
ings might occur almost anywhere. The remainder of the J,10C.'s apprecia-
tion - an assault by up to 15,000 parachutists and. airborne troops landing
in a single day in East Anglia or Kent, followed by five divisions landing
in the first wave by sea, the whole supported by massive air action, limited
naval action, sabotage and various diversions - was similar to the two
appreciations made by the Directors of Intelligence during the previous
month, though the J.I.C. now added on an ominous note that:
"Germany could make available from Norwegian, Dutch, Belgian and
possibly French sources, light craft with a carrying capacity of from 15 to
20 divisions with the necessary equipment." 64.
with so little evidence actually visible to British reconnaissance at
this early stage and a paucity of information emitting from the Continent,
it was hardly surprising that there was so much discussion and debate anong
the politicians and. the higher levels of the British command system as to
the nature of the invasion and. the area to be attacked, while, unbeknown to
the British, positive orders from Fitler for serious invasion preparations
to begin were only given on 16th July. Even when the latter order did.
become known, at least within a very limited circle, it i.las still to be more
than another month before the debate would subside.
IIeanwhile, the most vocal opponent of the Whitehall view, that the main
enemy invasion would be launched against the East Coast, was Lieutenant-
General Sir Llan Brooke, then G.0. 0.-in-C. of Southern Command. Fe was
ecually disenchanted, too, with General Ironside's vie thEt the still
appalling equipment situation prevented the withdrawal of further formations
into the mobile reserves for intensive training in a counter-attacking role,
and. rith the	 plans for a strong coastal 'crust' backed
by successive lengthy linear tstop1fles. To Lt.-Gen. Sir Alan Brooke,
fresh from his recent experiences of the Allied debacle in the face of the
new German 'Blitz1'ieg' tactics on the Western Front, General Ironside's
thinking seemed. little short of disastrous. Comparatively isolated at Ins
GL.. 0L3 79/5 CO3(40)225th:1, 17 July 1940; and CAB 80/15 C0S(40)551 (JIc);
also JIC(40) 1 63: Se2borne and. Airborne Attack on the British Isles:
Scales of Attack, Report by J.I.C., 16 July 1940.
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Wilton LQ., however, from decision making in London, Lt.-Gen. Sir Alan
Brool:e had hitherto had little opportunity to make his views heard. Then,
on 17th July, the same day as the Chiefs of Staff were discussing the
J.I.C.'s latest report and only a day after the Couander-n-Chief, some
Forces, had inspected Southern Command, there came a heaven-sent opportunity
for Lt.-Gen. Sir Alan Brooke to air his views as the Prime Minister himself
paid a visit to his Command. Collecting Churchill after lunch from Gosport,
they attended first an exercise, then drove on a tour of inspection along
the Hampshire and Dorset coasts, finishing up near Wool in the evening.
The two men straightaway established an excellent relationship with each
other. "He was in wonderful spirits and full of offensive plans for next
summer," Lt.-Gen. Sir Alan Brooke Tote ci' Churchill in his diary that
evening. "e had a long talk together, mostly about old days end. his con-
tacts with my two brothers .... of hom he was very fond." 65. They also
discussed the present predicaments of Home Forces, and. Lt.-Gen. Sir Alan
Brooke did not hesitate to give his candid opinions. Churchill later
recalled:
"ill the afternoon I drove with General Brooke, who commanded. this
front. His record stood high. Not only had he fought the decisive flank-
battle near Ypres during the retirement to Durikirk, but he had acç.uitted
himself vth singular firmness and dexterity, in circumstances of unimagin-
able difficulty and confusion, when in command of the new forces we had
sent to Prance during the first three weeks of June.... We were four hours
together in the motor-car on this JL1l afternoon, 19L10, and. we seemed. to be
in agreement on the methods of Home Defence." 66.
The Prime Ilinister's visit was to prove of great siiificance, not
only for Home Forces, but for Britian military decision making at the high-
est levels throughout the remainder of the war. The Secretary of State for
Wax, Anthory Eden, had already proposed that Lt.-Gen. Sir Alan Lrocke should
replace General Ironsde in command ci' Home Forces. Now, followinG his
visit o Southern Command, Churchill gave his full support to this proposal,
and two days later the War Cabinet, meeting at 12.30 p.m., expressed their
agreement to the change. 67.	 message, calling Lt.-Gen. Sir Jan Brooke
immediately to London to see the Secretary of State, was at once sent out
from the Var Office arid reached the G.C. C.-in-C., Southern Command, as he
was eating a sandwich lunch vith his staff and. Lt.-Gen. Auclunleck on the
65. Diaries of Field arsha1 Viscount Alambrooke, 17 July 1940.
66. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., pp. 233-234.
67. C.B 65/8 WM(40)2OBth:3, 19 July 1940.
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southernmost beach of the Isle of ight, where they had been inspecting
defences. Hastily finishing his meal, Lt.-Gen. Sir Llcn Erooke set off
immediately and, travelling mostly by car, reached the 'Jar Office at 7 p.m.;
a few minutes later he was suoned to Anthony Eden's roan where, he recalled:
"I was shown in .... and informed that I was to take over command of
the Home Forces destined to meet the impending invasion at once. 'Tiny'
Ironside was to be created a Field Narshal, given a peerage and retired,
and Gort was to be made .... Inspector of Training." 68.
General Ironside had already seen the Secretary of State t 2.45 p.m.
on this sine day of 19th July, to leain o1 his retirement. 	 en had
informed him that he was to be replaced as Commander-in-Chief, lone rorces,
by Lt.-Gen. Sir Jlan Brooke, because "the Cabinet wished to have someone
with later ezperience of the Var", and that he was to be made a Field
I'Iarshal "in order that the mabter should be placed on a good footng". In
view of the recent criticism of his planning and preparations, the almost
daily exectation of active operations, and the excellent reputation and
fighting record of Lt.-Gen. Sir Llan Brooke, General Ironside had been half-
expecting a change of this nature to be made. Concealing his obvous
disappointment, however, he maintained a calm and unru.ffled erterior. "1
told Lden that he needn't worry and. that I was quite prepared to be
released," he after'rards recalled. "I had done my best." "Liad. so my
military career comes to an end in the middle of a great war," wrote
General Ironsj.d.e philosophically in his diary that evening:
"1 hive had 41 years and. one month's service, and I have reacied. the
very top. I can't complain. (abinets have to make decisonz in t2mes of
stress. :
	 suppos that .inston L:ed doing t, for he :s al'ays
loyal to his frends." bi.
in ns uenors, ,inston Churchill, maced, recalls charmtabiy o2 Geaeral
Ironsmde, who as Coi.ander-mn-Chmef had always to labour to fora hs plans
and correctly dispose hs all too madccuately trained and. e "vDed forma-
tions at a tine then the predicament of the Ermtmsh Lrmy and of the Country
as a ':hole had. never been so desperate, that he accepted his retrement with
"the soldierly diiity vnich on all occasions characterised his actions." 70.
68. Bryant, Arthur: The Thrn of the Tide, 1939-1943, p. 195, Collins,
London, 1957.
69. Diaries of Field Marshal Lord Ironside, 19 July 1940, op. cit.
73. Churchill, v. S.: op. cit., p. 234.
- 276 -
PART III: THE BROO PERIOD: 20th July 1940 - 25th December 1941
CHAPTER 9: A FRESH HLND ON THE HELM
Sir Alan Francis Brooke, now promoted to a Lull General, appeared to be
an excellent choice for the vitally important post of CoTnlnRnder-in-Chief, Home
Forces, at this critical time. At almost 57, he was three years younger than
General Ironside. Always iimni-culate in appearance, punctual and methodical,
General Brooke was a highly professional soldier who had earned a first-class
reputation even before the War. A determined tilsterinan, he had begun his
military career as an artillery subaltern in 1902, after trn1rg at Woolwich.
He had served with distinction throughout the First World War, rising to the
rank of brevet Lieutenant-Colonel. Marked for higher command, he soon rose
to become an instructor at the Staff College, Camberley, and in 1927 studied
at the newly-created Imperial Defence College, which was set up to instruct
promising officers in the techniques of inter-Service co-operation and. the
higher direction of war. His keen interest in new technical developments,
the use of which he frequently pressed upon his often conservatively-minded
seniors, led. him in the 1930's to a succession of important appointments that
gave him a tremendous variety of experience. Becoming in 1939, for a short
while, G.0. C.-in-C. Southern Command, he was sent to France soon after the
outbreak of war as Conmmder of II Corps, part of the first contingent of the
B.E.F., a formation which he transformed during the winter of 1939 from an in-
adequately trained unit into a highly efficient and effective instrument of war.
General Brooke' a most outstanding achievement was undoubtedly - his
excellent conduct of the vital east flank battle during the retreat of the
B.EJ. to Dunkirk late in Nay 1940. By skill, speed and foresight, he managed
to ward off the attacks of the 17 German Divisions released by the Belgian
surrender along a long and exposed flank and successfully to cover the retreat
of the flower of the British Army to the evacuation lines which Lord Gort had
thrown up in the marshes around Dunkirk. It was an achievement that prompted
Sir James Grigg, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War, to comment:
"By almost universal testimony, it was due largely to his skill and
resolution that, not only his own Corps, but the whole B.E.F. escaped
destruction on the retreat." 1.
Captain B. H. Liddell Hart wrote, soon afterwards, that "there is general
agreement that Brooke .... proved the best of the Corps commanders", while
1. Bryant, Arthur: The Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943, p. 16, Collins, London,
1957.
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Churchill recorded that "General Brooke and his II Corps fought a magnificent
battle". 2. within days of his return, he was told to form a new B.E.F., he
was knighted and. once more he departed for the Continent. Instructed to help
save a disintegrating France, however, he quickly found this daunting task
impossible to achieve. The battle in Western France was already lost and he
stayed only long enough to arrange for the successful evacuation of the
136,000 British troops still on French soil. On his return again to England
and after six days' rest at his Hampshire home, he took up his old appointment
once more as GO. C.-in-C. Southern Conmnd on 26th June, remnirig at this
post until he took over as Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, on 20th July.
His almost unrivalled variety of experience, includ.ing that of recent
modern warfare, and his character made him the obvious candidate to succeed
as C.-in-C., Home Forces. General Brooke was an intellectual soldier, with
a keen and penetrating, analytical mind. Raving the ability to absorb and
marshal facts and figures quickly and with ease, he could present his case
at meetings clearly and without the use of notes, while in argument he was
soon to prove that he could be as formidable as Churchill himself, not giving
an inch on principles whatever the pressure. Throughout the retreat to
Dtmktrk he had shown that he could keep his head in a crisis and though his
short performance in Western France received some criticism, especially in
the loss of vehicles and equipment during the over-hasty emba.rkations, this
did not detract from his already high reputation in view of the large number
of troops and guns that had. been saved. One of his contemporaries, Lt.-Gen.
Sir William Pike, then on the staff of III Corps in Western Command, described
him as "the greatest of our generals. An extremely good field commander-.
Very tough .... irascible and. irritated by inefficiency, but entertaining to
talk to .... brilliant." While General Sir Ronald Adam, then G.0. C.-in-C.
Northern Command, recalled that General Brooke was "a philosophical man
likable and. very able." Affectionately known as 'Brookie' by his small number
of intimates, he was, however, feared and respected by many of his subordinate
commanders rather than loved, due to his impatience and even ferocity at
times. Nevertheless, he ejected drnainism and inspired confidence in all he
met and his appointment as C.-in-C. was welcomed in all quarters. 	 Ilaj.Gen.
K. Pownall, Inspector General to the L.D.V., wrote in his diary on 20th July:
2. Liddell Hart Papers: 11/1940/72, Notes for History, 16 July 1940; and
Churchill, W. S.: Vol. II, Their Finest Hour, p. 84, Cassel]., London,
1949.
3. Interviews with Lt-Gen. Sir William G. K. Pike, 18 Aug. 1981, and with
General Sir Ronald Forbes Adam, 27 Feb. 198 0 ; and talk by General Sir
David Fraser on Alaxibrooke as C.I.G.S., 17 Feb. 1981.
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"Yesterday .... came news of Ironside's final succession, an. event that
has been waited for too long.... I look on 	 appointment as G.0.C.
Rome Forces as excellent, and it would have been a mistake to put Gort there.
The latter is a fighting soldier par excellence, but he would have no scope
for his talent at Rome Forces. There is a fearsome problemAof organisation,
which is a flair of Brooke's but certainly not of Gort's."
Inwardly, however, General Brooke was a deeply sensitive and emotional
man. His diaries, which he wrote each day for his wife, contain many entries
that were extreme, temperamental or unfair, but they provided an ideal emo-
tional outlet for the tremendous pressures he often had to endure by day,
whether as a commander in the field in France, as C.-in-C., Home Forces, or
later as C.I.G.S.. Re had no illusions as to the immense importance of the
new appointment he was now ass'imirg at this crucial time, not only for Great
Britain and her Empire, but for the entire free World, and he realized only
too well the dangers to be faced. - the probability of an invasion attempt in
the very near future, the unpreparedness of Britain's defences, the appalling
lack of equipment, the deficiency of training and. battle-worthiness in most
formations in Rome Forces and, above all, the disastrous consequences if he
failed at his job. Following his interview with Anthony Eden on the evening
of 19th July, General Brooke confided to his wife in his diary:
"I find it very hard to realize fully the responsibility that I am
assuming. I only pray to God that I may be capable of carrying out the job.
The idea of failure at this stage of the war is too ghastly to contemplate.
I know that you will be with me in praying to God that he may give me the
necessary strength and guidance." 5.
Unbeknown to General Brooke as he wrote these words, there came a fresh
development the same evening that seemed to confirm that the decision to
appoint him as C.-in-C., Rome Forces, had been the correct one, especially
bearing in mind his belief that an invasion attempt in some form or other
would. almost certainly be made, that it would be directed against the South
Coast rather than the East, and. that the lessons of recent events on the
Western Front decreed that the emphasis of the defence on land should be on
plentiful and highly-trained, motivated and equipped mobile reserves rather
than on an outdated system of static linear defences. Later in the evening
and only a few hours after Hitler had concluded his so-called 'peace offer'
speech in the Eroll Opera House in Berlin, the Prime Minister was handed a
top secret message that had been rushed from the 'Ultra' decoding unit at
4. Diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry R. Pownall, 20 July 1940.
5. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 19 July 1940.
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Bletchley Park where the British, having succeeded in brekirig the German
ciphering machine 'Enigma', had been monitoring enemy radio signals for some
months. Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham, then Chief of the Air Department
of the Secret Intelligence Service (N16), described what had happened:
"In the middle of July, Ultra produced the signal we bad all been
waiting for. It had. evidently been delivered in great secrecy from Hitler's
H.Q. to the Army, Navy and Air Force C.-in-C. 'S. Goering, however, then put
the gist of it on the air to the generals coimnanding his air fleets. In his
signal he stated that, despite her hopeleBs military situation, England
showed no signs of willingness to make peace. Hitler bad therefore decided
to prepare and, if necessary, to carry out a land4ng operation against her.
The operation was to be called 'Sea Lion'." .
This signal provided the first real evidence of the German intention to
invade and though Churchill himself was at first reluctant to accept the
validity of the evidence, having to be persuaded by the experts who pointed
out that the same source, Ultra, bad produced the clinching signal about the
German Knickebein system of guiding bombers to their targets, the question
was henceforth not whether the Germans would invade, but when they would.
come.	 This opinion was already held by General Brooke. Moreover,
although completely uthiown to the British at this time, the signal was in
fact derived directly from Hitler's famous Directive No. 16, issued on 16th
July, which, after stressing the necessity of first achieving air superiority
and. securing the flanks of the invasion corridor by means of minefields,
coastal artillery, diversions, airpower and torpedo sea attacks, went on to
confirm officially General Brooke' s opinion that, not only was the German
Blitz]ieg likely to be as devastating and well-planned as it had been in.
France, but that the onslaught would be launched against the South Coast,
not the East. Directive No. 16 stated:
"The landing will be carried out as a surprise crossing on a broad
front from the neighbourhood of Ramsgate to the area of the west of the Isle
of Wight; some air force units will play the role of artillery.... Prepara-
tions for the entire operation must be completed by the middle of August." 8.
It appeared that General Brooke would be put to the acid, test all too soon.
*	 *	 *
6. Winterbotham, F. W.: The Ultra Secret, p. 41, Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
London, 1974.
7. Lewin, Ronald: Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story, p. 91, Hutchinson,
London, 1978.
8. Trevor-Roper, H. R. (ed.): Hitler's War Directives, 1939-1945, pp. 74-
78, Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1964.
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General Brooke immediately began the task of familiarising himself with
Britain's land. defences. On arriving at his new Eeadquarters at St. Paul's
School, nmersmith, in the afternoon of the following day, 20th July, in a
rather unwelcome blaze of publicity, engineered by the Ministry of Informa-
tion, he discovered that General Ironside had. already left, even t pking his
furniture with him. Nevertheless, General Brooke was very soon able to meet
the staff of G.II.(., Rome Forces, and. make their acquaintance. Of these
the most helpful was undoubtedly Major General Bernard Paget, who had. so
recently been General Ironside's Chief of Staff and who was now to become
General Brooke' a own right-hand man. Paget lost no time in briefing his new
superior. General Brooke recalled of Paget that he:
'.... was thoroughly familiar with all dispositions and able to put me
in the picture. I could not have wished for a more helpful and loyal Chief
of Staff, and am deeply grateful to him for the efficient way in which he
ran the Headquarters." 9.
To familiarise himself with the overall land. defences of the nation and
with a view to implementing the changes that had already begun to form in
his mind, General Brooke took every opportunity over the next few weeks, and.
almost any means of transport available, to visit as many formations and
units as possible of his new command. He later wrote:
"I Bet my progranie of tours so as to cover the whole of the coastline
first, getting a picture in my mind of the ma1n danger points, examing the
defences, visiting units and, above all, meeting commanders of corps, divi-
sions and. brigades. I was Boon able to decide what changes were necessary
in the conmiand of formations." 10.	 -	 -
ThUS, believing that not a moment was to be lost if the defenders were
to cope successfully with the speed and destruction that could be wrought by
even a small armoured attack and beginning with the most vulnerable sectors,
he impatiently conienced by spending the morning of 22nd July with Lieutenant-
General Sir Guy Williams at Eastern Command Headquarters. Early next day he
flew to York to meet Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Adam and his two Corps
Commanders, Holmes and Alexander, for a discussion on the organisation of
the defences of Northern Command, and an inspection of beach defences between
Scarborough and Bridlington. The following day he flew, again from Hendon,
9. Bryant, Arthur: op. cit., p. 197.
10. Autobiographical Notes of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke; and
Bryant, Arthur: op. cit., p. 200.
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to Chester for an inspection of General Sir Robert Gord.on-Finlayson's
Western Command, during which he not only discussed. the defences of the
Liverpool-Birkenhead area and flew in another 'plane to inspect possible
landing-grounds on the Lancashire coast as far north as Preston, but also
motored out to Lieutenant-General Sir James Narshal-Cornwall's III Corps
H.Q. at Whitchurch in Shropshire. Three days later, 27th July, found.
General Brooke on the night-mail train to Edinburgh where he breakfasted
with Lieutenant-Genera]. Sir Robert Carrin,gton, G.O. C.-in-C. Scottish
Command, met the divisional commanders and inspected their formations, and.
returned to London by train that night. On 30th July, General Brooke, con-
tinued his whirlwind tours with a flight to The Wash to inspect 52nd
(Lowland) Division and 18th (East .Anglian) Divisions and to meet their
coTnmanders. This day, too, he also inspected the beach defences from The
Wash to Yarmouth, an inspection he continued on let August with a two-day
tour of beach defences and formations as far south as Southend. Finally, On
7th August, he embarked on a further two-day tour, this time of Lieutenant-
Genera]. 'Bulgy' Thorne's XII Corps area. Working round the coast from the
Isle of Sheppey to Rye on the first day, he continued next day via Hastings,
Eaetbourne and Brighton to beyond Shoreham in Sussex, in fact almost up to
the boundary of his old Southern Command, of which latter area he naturally
already had an intimate knowledge.
Smninrising [us findings, General Brooke was able to report to the
Chiefs of Staff Committee on 5th August that:
"The beach defences along the East and South-East Coasts are well
advanced; those along the South Coast as far as Portland were progressing
well, but little work had. so
 far been done on the West Coast. The defences
in Scotland. .rere not strong, but were more advanced than those in the South-
West of Thgland - an area closer to enemy territory. Work had begun on
defences in the vicinity of the more important West Coast ports." 12.
Thus by 9th August, General Brooke had. been able to gain a good personal
impression of the formations and forward defences along all the most vulner-
able coastlines. He was now able to confirm, by his own observations, many
of the things that had. long been troubling his mind and which he was anxious
to change. In fact, he had already begun to implement his own ideas, long
before his tour of the coastal areas was complete. One of the first things
11. Diaries of Field Marsha]. Viscount Alanbrooke, 22 July - 8 August, 1940.
12. CB 79/5: COS(40)247th:1, 5 August 1940.
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that Genera]. Brooke was determined to change as soon as possible was the
seemingly muddled policy which had. been allowed to develop under his prede-
cessor, as to the employment of mobile artillery and the few, but gradually
increasing numbers of anti-tank guns. "There is considerable divergence
between coinminders and lower formations in the method of employment of the
artillery of the Field Army available for Home defence," wrote General
Brooke in G.E.Q. Artillery Operational Instruction No. 3 issued on 31st July,
less than two weeks after t pking up his new post:
"For example, in certain formations, field and. med.ium artillery is
sited in positions with the dual role of carrying out defensive fire tasks
by observation on beaches and dealing by direct fire with possible landings
in the neighbourhood by parachutists or troop carrying aircraft.
In others, field guns are sited as anti-tank beach defence guns, while
in certain cases the majority of the available mobile artillery is held in
mobile reserve."
General Brooke also found a similar divergence of policy with regard to the
employment of mobile arid static anti-tank guns. "In some formations," he
continued, "the majority are sited for the defence of the G.H.Q. zone of
'Stops'. In others, almost all available anti-tank guns have been sited
for the defence of beaches." 13.
This contradictory state of affairs had been allowed to develop un-
checked during the six weeks that had passed since General Ironside's G.H..
Operational Instruction No. 3 had emphasized the importance of a linear
defence in great depth, laying down that the majority of the availa'ble -
static anti-tank guns were to be sited on the G.H.. line with the remainder
being used for beach defence, whilst also stressing that those guns with
sufficient mobility were to be included in mobile columns. General
Ironside's instructions bad, of course, been written at a time, 15th June,
when the forward defences had been very weak, an attack was daily considered
irrmiinent and it was considered desperately necessary that immediate defen-
sive positions should be established to cover London, the industrial heart-
land and the greater part of land in case even a small hostile landing
proved initially successful, as then seemed all too likely. In the haste of
the moment, therefore, a situation had unintentionally developed whereby
static anti-tank guns were minIy sited for the defence of the rearward
zones or 'stops', while the role of static anti-tank defence of the beaches
13. wO 166/1: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, G.LQ. Home Forces, July 1940,
Appendix K: G.H.. Artillery Operational Instruction No. 3, 31 July
1940.
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was largely being fulfilled by a significant proportion of the potentially
mobile field artillery.
General Brooke clearly felt that this state of affairs could not be
allowed to continue unchecked ally longer. Prom his series of visits to the
coast, he was encouraged by the fact that the beach and. other forward de-
fences, especially in the physical obstruction of the beach exits and of the
beaches themselves, had by now become much stronger. After his inspection
of coastal defenceB between Scarborough and Bridlington in Northern Comnnds
on 23rd July, he had. noted that "a lot of good work has been done there,"
while following his tour of the East .Anglian Coast, too, he noted that the
fortification of the beaches was "getting on well", though a few days later,
on 7th August, he was to be less satisfied with the defences of East Kent
where he found that the "Ramsgate salient still requires more work on sea
defences." 14. Nevertheless, he felt confident enough to write on 31st July:
"Ding the six weeks since the above Instruction [of 15 June] was
issued, a material change has taken place in that our beach and. other
forward. defences have become much stronger. Consequently, there is now
every probability of being able to prevent a seaborne attack getting a
footing on land.. Even should an attack have an initial success, it will
certainly be destroyed before it has penetrated far." 15.
General Brooke's last statement was probably still somewhat over-
optimistic at a time that was less than two months after the Dunkirk
evacuation. Pessimistic statements in an Operational Instruction, however,
would only be harafuJ. to morale. Nevertheless, it was true that significant
progress had. been made in only a very short space of time. What he saw as
a much improved situation then, led General Brooke to issue new instructions
as to the deployment of artillery and anti-tank guns. "Field and. medium
artillery," he ruled, "should be employed as such, making full use of their
range, shell power and such mobility as is possible." In this, their proper
role, they were "to be employed for the support of infantry either in posi-
tion with lines laid out and. defensive fire tasks allotted, or disposed with
alternative reinforcing positions reconnoitred." Only in very exceptional
cases, when there were no other weapons available, were field guns permitted
to be employed in a purely anti-tank role. Heavy artillery, as of course
was always the case due to their lack of mobility, would. have to be rea&y-
sited in emplaced or field. positions with telephone lines laid out, but,
14. Diaries of Field Marsha]. Viscount Alanbrooke, 23 July - 7 August 1940.
15. WO 166/i: op. cit., July 1940, Appendix K: op. cit., 31 July 1940.
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taking advantage of their longer range, would have their defensive fire
tasks allocated to likely landing places either by sea or air, rather than
to direct support of the infantry. Static anti-tank guns were also to be
employed to better advantage. Rather than being spread along the 'stop...
lines', often a great way inland from the coast, they were to be sited,
wherever possible, in defended localities, either far forward as part of the
beach defences, thereby releasing the greatest possible number of potentially
mobile guns for more suitable tasks, or concentrated at centres of communica-
tion or astride the min avenues of approach inland. Finally, the mobile
anti-tank guns thus released were to be employed with the mobile reserves
with alternative positions reconnoitred and prepared in rearward zones,
though General Brooke realised that due to the lack of static weapons and
the need to cover all the most vulnerable beaches with anti-tank fire, "it
may be necessary in some cases to employ these weapons in a static role." 16.
These instructions were but the first that General Brooke was to issue
as he unhesitatingly began to impose his own ideas concerning the nature of
the land. defences of the nation. During the very first of his visits, to
Eastern Command on 22nd July, he "discovered that much work and. energy was
being expended on an extensive system of rear defence, comprising an anti-
tank ditch and pill-boxes, running roughly parallel to the coast and situated
well inland." This was, of course, the still incomplete G.H.Q. line covering
London and the Midlands that General Ironsid.e had. ordered to be constructed
in June, behind which the enemy was to be held until the central G.R..
Reserves could be moved up for a counter-attack. General Ironsid.e!s conven-
tional approach of a linear defence in great depth, which had already
received more than its fair share of criticism over the past few weeks, was
now instantly d.iscard.ed by General Brooke. "This static rear-line," he was
later to write,
".... did not fall in with my conception.... To start with, we had not
got sufficient forces to man this line, even if we had wanted to do so. To
my mind our defence should be of a far more mobile and offensive nature. I
visualised a light line of defence along the beaches, to hamper and delay
landings to the maximum, and in rear highly mobile forces trained to immediate
aggressive action intended to concentrate and attack any landings before they
had time to become too well established. I was also relying on heavy air-
attacks on the points of landing...." 17.
16. ibid.
17. Autobiographical Notes of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke; arid
Bryant, Arthur: op. cit., pp. 197-198.
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General Brooke lost no time in mking this policy of swift offence,
with the mobile reserves placed well forward near the coast, 1aion to his
colleagues. He already knew, too, that in this matter he would enjoy
Winston Churchill's wholehearted support and confidence, since his views co-
incid.ed closely with the more practical side of the Prime Minister's rather
romantically named 'Leopards'. On 6 August, he attended a Conference in the
Army Council Room at the War Office, at which the C.I.G.S., General Dill,
and all the G.O. C.-in-C. Commands were present. "Mobile offensive action,"
he told them,
"... mast be the basis of our defence. The idea of linear defence
must be stamped out; what is required to meet the dual threat of seaborne
and airborne attack is all-round defence in depth with the maximum number of
troops trained and disposed for a rapid counter-offensive.
Armoured. formations should be employed in the van of the attack with the 1
object of creating situations which could be exploited by motorised infantry." 8.
General Brooke's policies, however, would still take some considerable
time to be implemented fully. There was still a very great deal to be done
before the British Army at home could be fully confident of resisting success-
fully any attempt at invasion. At this important Conference, General Brooke
then went on to list "the most serious defects", which he urged, "must be
remedied." Despite the motley collection of troop-carrying vehicles obtained
from civilian sources, a higher standard. of motor mobility was still required,
as was a higher standard of foot mobility involving a higher degree of fit-
ness. The General also placed great emphasis on training. "Bolder methods,"
he advocated, "mast be used in trnrig," with less time being spent on
individual trinirig and. more on training formations at brigade and battalion
level. "The middle piece officer," he declared, "was the weak link. His
training was all important." All the mobile Brigade Groups must be trained
offensively and a higher standard was needed in the use of anti-tank weapons
of all tipes with more demonstrations and. practice firing. It was, however,
the trirring of the existing twenty-two infantry divisions (excluding the
four currently in G.R.. Reserve) that must, General Brooke concluded,
receive "the first priority". The advanced training of the new Independent
Brigades to be formed, which were intended to be of a lower category, "could
not be attempted until the existing field formations were trained." 19.
18. WO 166/i: op. cit., August, Appendix A: )anutes of a I4eeting of G.0.
C.-in-C. Commands, 6 August 1940.
19. ibid.
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The sometimes appalling state of triinmg of the latter formations had
indeed already been amply demonstrated to Genera]. Brooke during his series
of visits to the coastal areas. In Scotland on 27th July, for example, he
had found the 46th (N. Midland and. W. Riding) Division "in a lamentably
backward state of trdning, barely fit to do platoon trn1ig and deficient
of officers", while 9th (Scottish) Division, which was in fact broken up
and merged into 51st (Highland) Division just a few days later, was "in
much the same state" as the 46th Division. Even in East Anglia on 1st & 2nd.
August, he noted that the 'front-line' 55th (w. Lancs.) Division in Suffolk
and the 15th (Scottish) Division in Essex, though essentially good, both
required "a great deal more training", while in the Kent salient on 7th Aug.
he was displeased enough to record that the still partially trained 1 at
London Division was in addition wrongly deployed to man a "sandwich of
linear defences instead of [disposed for] active counter-offensive." 20.
General Brooke had had good cause to report to the Chiefs of Staff Coimnittee
on 5th August, the day before the Army Conference, that:
"The general state of tr p ining in formations of the field army was
backward. Half of the twenty-two divisions had done little collective
trn'ng as they had been handicapped by lack of equipment, by duties in
connection with protection of Vulnerable Points and by continuous work on
beach and other defences. Although some of these divisions might be fit to
operate in Brigade Groups, they were not yet suitable for employment in a
mobile role, as they were completely untrained in motorised movements."
He was able to add, however, that "arrangements for improving facilities and
opportunities for the collective training of these backward divisions had
already been put in hand," although it was the state of their equipment and.
vehicles, despite additions, that still remained the most serious hindrance
to training. "Four division," General Brooke told the Chiefs of Staff that
day, "were almost fully equipped," while "eight more were fairly well
equipped." The remainder, though, "were deficient in many important items",
while the lack of certain types of transport was particularly affecting
training for mobile operations.
"There was a serious deficiency in unit transport, in spite of the fact
that all available vehicles of a suitable type had been requisitioned. This
type of vehicle was, however, coming forward in fair numbers from the 'trade'
and the position would improve. Formations were now well supplied with
troop-carrying vehicles of the charabanc type." 21.
20. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 27 July - 7 August 1940.
21. CAB 79/5: COS (40)247th:1, 5 August 1940.
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The guard.ing of Vulnerable Points still reTnn ned a serious handicap to
trinirig. Despite a great improvement in the Spring as to the numbers of
troops, especially those of the Field. Army, that were employed in this
unproductive, though essential, task, the situation had rapidly worsened
again since the Dunkrk evacuation had brought the reality of an invasion
much closer and. as the number of establishments to be guarded continued. to
increase. "Headquarters, Home Forces," Genera]. Brooke had. reported to the
Chiefs of Staffs on 5th Aug.,
	
been swamped with demands for troops to
protect Vulnerable Points; aerodromes in particular absorbed large numbers
of the sub-units of the Field Army." He hoped that the establishment of a
new One Nan Committee, working under the direction of the War Office and. in
close co-operation with the Home Defence Executive, "would go far to reliev-
ing Home Forces of this crippling commitment." 22. The full extent of the
problem and. its consequent effect on training, however, is better revealed
in a letter to the War Office .jritten by General Brooke five days later,
when he complained:
"At the present time some 41,000 Home Defence troops and 17,000 troops
of the Field Army are employed. on the guarding of Vulnerable Points in this
country.
There are some 375 LA.F. aerodromes, R.D.F. stations and Fuel Depots
for which guards are required, amounting at present to approTim2.tely
25,000 troops of which 10,000 are troops of the Field Army.
The Vulnerable Points listed before the War by the Vulnerable Point
Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence are being afforded.
military protection. There are in addition many hundreds of Vulnerable
Points (exclusive of aerodromes) in which the defence Services and the -
civil authorities are interested and. for which guards have been provided,
and. increasingly demands are being made. An additional list of points has
been drawn up by the Key Points Intelligence Branch of the Ministry of Home
Security, totalling 2,800 points, chiefly factories and. railways.
It is clearly impracticable to guard all these points and. I hope that
Lieutenant-General Barker in his new capacity as Adviser on Vulnerable
Points will be able to reduce very materially the numbers at present on the
list for guarding .... a large increase in the number of Home Defence
Battalions is necessary and I consider that steps should be taken to find.
this personnel, even if some form of compulsory service in the higher age
groups is required.." 23.
Such indeed was the scale of the problem that on 23rd. August the War
Cabinet agreed to the Prime lvlinister t s suggestion that Lieutenant-General
22. ibid..
23. WO 166/i: op. cit., August 1940, Appendix B: C.-in-C.'s Letter to
the War Office (Under-Secretary of State), 10 August 1940.
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Barker should be made directly responsible to himself in lus capacity as
Minister of Defence, rather than to the War Office. 	 This was clearly
a step forward since direct pressure by the Prime Minister could. now be
bronglit to bear on the situation; nevertheless, the burden on the Field
Army of supplying guards for the rapidly increasing numbers of Vulnerable
Points was likely to become an even heavier one, with all its detrimental
effects on training.
There was also a further and. related. problem where the growing number
of R.A.F. aerodromes was concerned.. This was the question of whether the
ground defence at such establishments should. be  an R.A.F. or an Army
responsibility. At the present time they were a joint responsibility, a
situation which was likely to lead to considerable local confusion in the
event of an enemy attack, especially if the attack were a surprise one by
parachute troops. Originally, R.A.F. aerodromes had been guarded. only by
local guards provided. by the Army. With the invasion of Holland, these had.
been supplemented by further Army troops supplied. with a generous proportion
of automatic weapons to counter parachutists, but due to the large number
of claims for protection against parachutists from other interests and. to
the demands of the B.E.P., General Kirke had ruled that the comparatively
few trained troops available should be employed for maximum efficiency as
counter-attack formations, so positioned as to arrive within two or three
hours of an alarm. As the invasion threat increased, therefore, the R.A.F.
had been left to find their own means of supplementing the local Army troops
actually on guard at the aerodromes and this they did. by arming some 19,000
airmen with rifles, by organising those R.A.P. personnel solely on local
defence duties into bodies called. R.A.F. Station Defence Forces and by
equipping them with open lorries carrying Brens to enable them to hunt down
parachutists landing in the vicinity. 25. Then on 12th July General Ironsid.e
had. laid down in G.H.. Operational Instruction No. 10 that the responsibi-
lity for the station defence of an aerodrome, which included the initiation
of schemes for defence works and. obstructions and the co-ordination, after
approval by the local military conimarider, of the defence of the station,
should lie with R.A.F. Station Commanders at the R.A.F. aerodromes.
Finally, a joint Report by General Taylor and Air Conmiod.ore Sanders (Air
Ministry), which had. been instigated by General Ironsid.e, recommended that
the Army should. ideally have single responsibility for the defence of
24 CAB 65/8: WII(40 ) 233rd.:2, 23 Aug. 1940.
25. Collier, Basil: History of the Second World. War: The Defn of the
United. Kingdom, p. 143, E.M.S.0., London, 1957; and
CAB 79/6: COs(40 )2Sl st : 1 , 27 Aug. 19t0.
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aerodromes. General :Brooke was to have good. reason to complain to the
Chiefs of Staff on 2 September of "certain difficulties which existed in
the command of the ground. defence of aerodromes", since a typical R.AOF.
aerodrome might have available for defence both R.A.F. and Army forces,
plus R.E. personnel and. A.D.G.B. detachments, under the command of the
R.A.P. Station Coimnnder who was in practice fully occupied with R.A.F.
matters, while, in addition, "there was the unavoidable complication of the
unit which was allotted for counter-attack purposes, belonging to a field
,,26.formation.	 A meeting on the following day, 3rd September, between
representatives of the War Office, the Air Ministry and Home Forces was
expected to resolve the problem, but beyond recommend.ing that an experienced
Army officer should be appointed as a Permanent Local Defence Commander arid
Defence Adviser to the Station Conminder at each station, left the vital
question of whether the provision of guards should. be an Army or an R.A.F.
commitment still open to further discussions. Though in the meantime the
Army had already begun raising, organising and training 60,000 young soldiers
specifically for the purpose of guarding all aerodromes, with greatest
emphasis naturally on protecting R.A.F. Fighter Stations in the vulnerable
South East, the system of divided responsibility was to reinin unresolved
until the end of November, well after the iimnediate threat of invasion had
passed, when the Chiefs of Staff finally approved an agreement between the
Army and. the Air Council that the provision of personnel for the local
defence of aerod.romes should be, at least "in principle", an Army commitment. 27
The problems concerned with guarding Vulnerable Points and aerodromes
were not to be the only distractions to Home Forces from the vital task of
training. At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on 9th Sept., General Brooke
was to draw attention to the demands on Home Forces for personnel to be used
for such diverse activities as hop-picking and for working the generators
required to provide artificial smoke-screens1 Again, General Brooke had to
remind the Chiefs of Staff that "the training was backward and it was most
undesirable that troops should be used. for any non-military purposes"o
Though the use of troops for the former activity was forbidden outright by
26. CAB 79/6: COS(40)290th:1, 2 Sept. 1940.
27. CAB 80/18: COS(40)705: Commirnd of Ground. Forces at Aerodrouies: Record
of a Meeting of the War Office, Air Ministry and. Home Forces on Thxes. 3
Sept. 1940; & Annexe, 4 Sept. 1940; CAB 79/6: COS(40 )298th:3, 6 Sept.
1940; CAB 79/7: COS(40)354th:1, 21 Oct. 1940; CAB 80/23: COS(40)957:
Defence of Aerodromes: Report by the Sub-Committee on the Defence of
Aerodromes, 20 Nov. 1940; & CAB 79/8: COS(40)409th:1, 29 Nov. 1940.
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the Prime Minister, some 5,000 men still had to be found to man the equipment
to produce the latter. 28. Eventually these were found by the War Office
from troops of a low med.ical category, but by then the 'Blitz' had begun and.
repeated calls were being made on the troops of Home Forces for assistance
in clearing streets of air raid debris, for shoring up buildings and. for
clearing comrm,nications generally in the London area. 29. It would. seem
that there would. be
 no end to the distractions from tririing for the already
overstretched formations of Home Forces.
Despite these extra and unwanted burdens on Home Forces, however, the
most serious impediment to training remned. simply that of providing the
arms, vehicles and other equipment necessary to enable the troops to fight
the enemy effectively. Though General Brooke had painted an alarming picture
of the state of equipment in the field formations of Rome Forces to the
Chiefs of Staff on 5th August, there had. nevertheless been considerable
additions since the desperate days of June, while August was to see further
important improvements to the situation. Following the opening of the German
offensive on the Western Front, French and. British appeals to the United
States had. resulted in the prompt release by the Americans of a great
quantity of arms from their reserves held since the First World. War. It had
been intended. to split these with the French on a 50-50 basis, but on the
fall of France all French orders had been made over to Britain. The first
convoy of nearly 250,000 rifles and 300 field. guns had. safely reached British
ports on 9th July, their despatch, transport, unloading, reception and distri-
bution being hurried along at every stage by urgent minutes from the Prime
Minister. "I have asked the Admiralty to make very special arrangements for
bringing in your rifle convoys," he had written to the Secretary of State for
War two days beforehand,
".... At least 100,000 ought to reach the troops that very night, or in
the small hours of the following morning. Special trains should be used. to
distribute them and. the aunition according to a plan worked out beforehand
exactly, and directed from the landing-port by some high officer thoroughly
acquainted with it. It would. seem likely that you would. etirphasise early
distribution to the coastal districts, so that all the Home Guard. in the
danger areas should be the first served."
And. next day, he wrote to General Ismay:
28. CAB 79/6: COS(40 )302nd:1, 9 Sept. 1940.
29. CAB 79/7: COS(40)329th:1 and. COS(40)330th:3, 30 Sept. 1940.
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"Have any steps been taken to load, the later portions of American
ammunition, rifles and guns upon faster ships than was the case last time?
What are the ships in which the latest consigunents are being packed, and
what are their speeds? Will you kindly ascertain this from the Admiralty." " S
On 17th July there came another valuable addition to Home Forces in the form
of the arrival finally of the eight regular British battalions withdrawn
from India, while on 31 Bt July a second convoy from America reached Britain
with a further 200,000 rifles and more field guns. Churchill wrote later,
somewhat optimistically, "By the end of July we were an armed nation, so
far as parachute or airborne landings were concerned. We had. become a
'hornets' nest'." 31. The rifles, in actual fact, were old Model 1903
Springfield .300 types with only about fifty cartridges apiece. Neverthe-
less, this well-made and. accurate rifle, once thoroughly degreased and
painted with a broad red stripe near the muzzle to signify the different
ammunition required, was rapidly distributed to arm a large portion of the
Home Guard, thus allowing the much needed 300,000 British .303 Lee Thiuield
rifles already issued to the Home Guard to be, albeit reluctantly, trazis-
ferred to the growing formations of the Regular Army. Only ten rounds,
however, of the American .300 ammunition could safely be issued to the
Home Guard and there was no source of manufacture of the American cartridge
in Britain. Even so, the American rifles were an invaluable acquisition.
As for the field guns, these proved to be the American produced
version of the ancient French 75mm. N 1897 field gun. Though outraiiged by
more modern designs, it was still a viable weapon with a high rate,, of fire
and the Americans had. introduced the split trail carriage in place of the
original pole trail, and. pneumatic tyres for motor traction to replace the
original spoked wheels. These guns, moreover, arrived with 1,000 rounds
of ammunition apiece, enough for a few weeks' fighting, and though the
ammunition was also old and would require re-conditioning, it was good
enough for an emergency. Churchill later recalled., glowingly:
30. CAB 65/8: WM(40)199th : 6 , 10 July 1940; and Churchill, W. S.: op. cit.
p. 237.
31. CAB 67/7: wP(40)286: Weekly Rsum No. 47 of the Naval, Military and.
Air Situation from 12.00 Noon, July 18, to 12 Noon, July 25, 1940,
26 July 1940; and Churchill, W.S.: op. cit., p. 238.
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the 'seventy-fives' .... some fastidious experts presently turned.
their noses up. There were no limbers and. no immediate means of procuring
more ammunition. Mixed. calibres complicate operations. But I would have
none of this, and during all 1940 and 1941 these nine hundred 'seventy-
fives' were a great addition to our military strength for Home Defence.
Arrangements were devised and. men were drilled to run them up on planks
into lorries for movement. When you are fighting for existence, any cannon
is better than no cannon at all, and. the French 'seventy-five', although
out-dated by the British 25 pounder and. the German field-gun howitzer, was
still a splendid weapon." 32.
Further convoys of arms were to reach Britain from America during
August and by the end. of the month the total of Springfield rifles sent
over had reached. 535,000, with a further 200,000-250,000 under negotiation.
Some 820 75mm. N 1897 field guns had by then arrived., together with 20,000
ground and 2,600 tank machine-guns and. some 60,000 Thompson sub-machine
guns or 'tommy guns' as they were known to the troops. A large number of
these weapons had already been issued to the troops, though the different
calibres and limited. ammunition of the small arms meant these could only
be issued to the Home Guard or to fixed defensive points, though the
Thompsons at first m- ' nly went to the newly formed Commnd.o Units.
Moreover, on 19th August the War Cabinet were told that discussions with
President Roosevelt had resulted in an agreement with the Americans to
supply the first of an eventual 50 old American destroyers, begiriiing in a
few days, while it was also hoped that 20 motor torpedo boats, 10 large
flying boats and 150-200 aircraft might also soon be procured.
From the arms factories in Britain, too, a steady and slowly increas-
ing flow of modern arms of all types was reaching the troops. Non-stop
production throughout June, July and August had, despite the priority given
to the defence of Britain against the accelerating German aerial attack,
managed. to bring about an impressive improvement in the weaponry and equip-
ment of Home Forces. "Since the beginning of June," Herbert Morrison, the
Minister of Supply, wrote encouragingly in a report drafted in the midd.le
of August, "the supply of arms for the Army, which was desperately low two
months ago, has greatly improved. Today," he went on, "the Army is much
better supplied., though its steel clothing is a somewhat patchwork affair."
32. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 238.
33. CAB 66/il: WP(40 )339: The Munitions Situation: Memorandum by the
Minister of Supply, 29 Aug. 1940.
34. CAB 65/8: WN(40)230th:8, 19 Augu.st 1940.
- 293 -
The number of field guns in the hands of the troops in Britain had. increased
from about 600 (110 18 pdrs., 195 4.5" and 295 25 pdrs. & 13/25 pars.) (See
Appendix 6.), at the begirinthg of June, or only 20% of establishment, to
over 1,600 or 5 of the initial equipment requ.ired by all the infantry and
armoured formations, and Corps and. Army troops in the country (including the
formations' ordnance stores), by early August. This addition of about 1,000
field guns in only ten weeks was no mean achievement, though only just over
half of these, 275 new 25 pars. and. 250 converted 18/25 pars. in June and.
July, were supplied from the factories, the reTnainng 475 guns being made up
of some 280 repaired 4.5" howitzers and 65 repaired 18 par. field guns
dating from the First World War, and about 130 more field guns, mostly
18/25 pars., returned from Western france later in June. To this grand
total of 175 18 pars., 475 4.5" howitzers and 950 25 par. and 18/25 pars. by
early August, would be a further 122 new 25 pars. and perhaps 50 more
converted 18/25 par. field guns produced during the month, while the issue
of the 820 old 75 mm. H 1897 field guns due from America by the end of
August, should they all prove to be in good condition, was expected to bring
the formations of Home Forces to over 80% of their ina.tia3. establishment.
The ammunition supply situation for these field guns had, the Minister
reported, also undergone considerable improvement. In most cases there was
enough iunition now for a few weeks fighting, by early August, with 1,300
rounds per gun available for the 18 pars. and a similar figure available for
the 25 pars. and. 18/25 pars., though the 4.5" howitzers had only 312 rounds
per gun. In addition there were now over 250 mobile medium and heav3r guns
with the troops, compared with about 140 in early June, though virtually all
of these were refurbished guns surviving from the last War and none were in
current production. These were mostly ancient 6" howitzer mediums, newly
provided with pneumatic tyres and. with about 730 rounds apiece, plus a hand-
ful of old. 60 par. med.iums converted. to take the 4" shell and a few 9.2"
howitzer heavy guns. Though a limited number of guns, especially 6" howit-
zers, still remained in the country awaiting refurbishment, no new production
of medium or heavy guns for the Army was expected until the following year. 36
The anti-tank gun position had shown less improvement, the number of
2 par. anti-tank guns in the hands of the troops having risen from about
35. CAB 66/li: WP(40)339: The Munitions Situation: Memorandum by the
Minister of Supply, 29 August 1940; and CAB 70/2: DC(S)(40)4: The
Munitions Situation on let June 1940: Memorandum by Director General of
Prograimnes in the Ministry of Supply, 14 June 1940.
36. ibid.
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120 at the beginning of Juiie, or a mere 4% of the initial establishment, to
only 580 or 22c/ of the initial establishment of Home Forces by the second
week in August. Production, which amounted to 202 deliveries during July,
was actually to fall during August to about 150 due to a lack of gun carri-
ages, while it was expected that the excess guns would soon be used up by
the accelerating tank programme. The small numbers of ex-Naval guns mounted
on lorries, moreover, and the very limited anti-tank ability of the ex-
American 75 x. N 1897 field guns, which were in any case primarily desig-
nated for an artillery role, did not greatly help matters and the troops,
therefore, still largely lacked an effective means to stop enemy tanks.
Nevertheless, General Brooke's newly-imposed policy of concentrating all
available mobile anti-tank guxis with the Reserves was expected to go some
way towards at least making the best possible use of the relatively few guns
available; the supply of solid shot ammunition, at about 180 rounds per gun,
was satisfactory for an anti-tank gun, and. the troops now had. twice the
quantity (over 9,000, or more than. 51% of initial establishment) of •55tt
Boys anti-tank rifles than were available to them in early June, though
ammunition for the latter worked out at only 100 rounds per rifle instead of
the authorised scale of 340 rounds, which was a serious shortage indeed.
Other weapons, too, were reaching the troops in steadily increasing
numbers by the middle of August. The number of Bren light machine-guns with
the troops had. doubled since early June to about 18,000 or over 53% of
initial establishment and most formations now had. over half their quota of
machine-gun carriers. The output from the factories of Vickers he.vy -
machine-guns and. of Mills hand-grenades remi ned satisfactory, though the
troops were still somewhat short of both these weapons. Revolvers were in
short supply, though it was hoped partially to relieve this shortage by
supplies from America. More serious problems, however, had occurred with
the supply of mortars and their ammunition. Stocks with the troops of 2"
mortars had risen from about 3,100 on 7th June to only 3,393 on 1st Aug., due
to holdups partly caused by the design of a better bomb fuse. Even so, with
an ideal establishment of an infantry division standing at 108 x 2" mortars
plus a further 15 in base reserve, the stock position was actually exception-
ally strong in. relation to most other equipment. The production of both the
37. CAB 66/li: WP(40)339: op. cit., 29 August 1940; CAB 70/i: DC(S)(40)
i4th:2, 6 August 1940; and CAB 70/2: DC(S)(40)37: Anti-Tank Guns:
Report by Minister of Supply, 5 August 1940.
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2" mortars and the heavier 3" mortars (stocks of the latter having risen from
261 on 7th June to only 445 on 1st August, working out at less than 5% of
an infantry division's initial, establishment of 36 x 3" mortars plus three
in base reserve) had, in fact, been deliberately reduced for the time being
in favour of other urgent work and to allow the production of mortar bombs
for both types to catch up, there being, on let Aug., a mere 38 LE. rounds
per 2" mortar and 83 H.E. rounds per 3M mortar as against the estimated 515
and 410 respectively needed for two months of fighting. 38
With the notable exception of anti-tank guns and. 3" mortars, therefore,
the initial equipment in the hands of the fighting formations had. by the
second week in August mostly exceeded the halfway mark and in many cases
stocks had doubled since early June, though aunition supplies remained very
low in some cases. Virtually the only weapon with which the troops were
fully equipped, however, was that most important of persona]. weapons, the
rifle. Even here, however, there were potential problems. In mid-July there
were 1,023,000 service rifles (of .303" calibre) in the hands of the troops
at home, plus another 75,000 in central and. command depots which were largely
issued to the recruit intake for the second half of July. A further 65,000
rifles were under repair in mid-July, of which some 40,000 were expected to
be issued by the end of August. Since production of new .303" rifles in
Britain only amounted. to between 2,000 and 3,000 a week from B.S.A., however,
until new factories came into production at the end of the year, it was clear
that by the middle of August the continuing flow of recruits for the Army at
home and to A.D.G.B., making a monthly demand of perhaps around 80,000 rifles,
not to mention overseas demands, would absorb all stocks of British rifles.
This potentially very serious situation was in fact only averted by the
timely arrival of the half million or so American .300" rifles which, to-
gether with the 75,000 Ross rifles from Canada, allowed the release of some
300,000 .303" Service rifles from the Home Guard. to the Army. As it happened,
this release was just enough to see Home Forces into the autui and safely
through the invasion scare of 1940. Supplies, moreover, of .303" aunition
were just as tight, the Defence Committee (Supply) hearing on 6th August that:
"On the accepted basis of a requirement of six million rounds per divi-
sion per month for active service, the Army had stocks which will last it for
only six weeks." 39.
38. CAB 70/2: DC(S)(40)9: Production of 2" and. 3" Mortars: Report by
Ministry of Supply, 21 June 1940; and CAB 70/2 DC(S)(4 0)57: ibid.,
31 August 1940.
39. CAB 70/1: DC(S)(40)8th:2, 15 July 1940; DC(S)(40)l4th:4, 6 August 1940;
and. CAB 70/2: DC(S)(40)22: Rifles: Statement by the Ministry of Supply,
14 July 1940.
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Even here, however, the situation had improved, General Brooke reporting to
the Chiefs of Staff on 12th August:
".... small arms ammunition held. by units was in no case more than 5%
below the authorised. scale, but there were no local reserves. Reserves of
ammunition were treated in the same way as reserves of fighting troops;
that is, they would be available for issue to whatever sector was in danger
of running out. The general feeling that there was a shortage of small arms
ammunition had been created by the stringent restrictions on the use of
small arms ammunition for training purposes. It had been possible recently
to increase the training scale very considerably and this should have a
reassuring psychological effect on the man in the front line." 40.
Finally, the tank situation of Home Forces had also undergone a con-
siderable improvement by the first half of August. Compared with the 330
light and 'light wheeled' tanks and. 74 Infantry tanks actually in the hands of
the troops on 10th June, there were on 4th Aug., less than two months later,
no less than 395 light and 'light wheeled' tanks, 173 Cruiser tanks and 189
Infantry tanks with the fighting formations of Home Forces, giving a grand
total of 757, compared with only 404 with units on 10th June, an increase of
353 tanks. (See Appendices 7 & 10.) By the middle of August the total of
tanks with the fighting units was to exceed the 800 mark, double the number
available in early June. Priority for issue of these tanks, moreover, had
gone to the formations that would be most heavily involved in the counter-
attack role if the Germans were to land in force on the coasts of South East
England, those of 1st Armoured Division and 1st Army Tank Brigade in G.R..
Reserve under the recently formed VII Corps. By early August both these
formations were complete in Cruiser and light tanks, and in Infantiy tanks
respectively, although both formations were at a reduced establishment of
two battalions per brigade, and priority had shifted to re-arming 2nd Armoured.
Division in IV Corps with Cruiser tanks and arming 21 st Army Tank Brigade with
Infantry tanks, in G.E.ç. Reserve north of London and in Southern Command
Reserve respectively. ( See Appendix 10 & Map 9.) Herbert Morrison, report-
ing on the munitions situation in the middle of the month, however, was not
over-enthusiastic about the progress of the tank programme and reminded the
War Cabinet that the numbers of tanks, artillery and other weapons in Britain
were still "trifling" compared with the quantity of arms that Germany now
possessed, not to mention the additional weapons she had captured and those
of her ally, Italy. He wrote:
40. CAB 79/6: COS(40)260th:2, 12 August 1940.
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"The output of light tanks in the past two months has been small in
relation to the losses in France, as production of these types has been
slowed down. But the output of Cruiser and Infantry tanks has a little more
than replaced the losses of these types. The stock at home represents about
two thirds of the required establis1ent of the light variety, but the 400
tanks of the heavier type are a very modest fraction of the War Office
Programme." 41.
Despite this and. other deficiencies, Herbert Morrison felt able oonfi-
dently to conclude in his report:
,,•• taken as a whole, the arming of our troops at home has immensely
improved. For this we have to thank the energy which mngers arid workers
alike put into their war stroke when the crisis came in factories throughout
the country; the fortunate fact that the orders placed before and at the
outbreak of war were beginning to inaterialise in April and. Nay and could be
speeded up; the promptness of the ordnance authorities in find.ing and
furbishing up all kinds of old equipment; and. last, but by no means least,
the promptness of the americans in turning out arid shipping a quite substan-
tial armament which had survived. from the last war."
Ending on a warning, he added., however:
".... we cannot relax for one moment our effort to bring forward every
gun, rifle or round of ammunition that we can lay our hands on during the
next few months..... if invasion comes we must, by hook or by crook, prevent
Hitler from gaining a sufficient foothold to enable him to turn on the tap
of his vast resources." 42.
Herbert Morrison was also to add that "the state of the equipment of
our armies in the Middle East .... must give rise to anxiety." In fact,
even before he had. finished compiling his report, this last consideration
had. already dealt a heavy blow to the carefully hoarded strength of Home
Forces. General Wavell, facing sri inmririent invasion of Egypt from the
Italian armies massed in Libya, had flown to London to seek urgent reinforce-
ments, especially armour. On 10th August, General Brooke was suioned to a
conference with the Secretary of State for War, the C.I.G.S. and General
Wavell, arid as a result General Dill, with Anthony Eden's ardent approval,
wrote to the Prime Minister that the War Office was arranging to send to the
Middle East at the earliest possible date a force of over 150 light, Cruiser
and Infantry tanks, together with 48 x 2 pdr. anti-tank guns, 20 x Bofors
light A.A. guns, 48 x 25 pdr. field guns, 500 Bren guns arid. 250 anti-tank
rifles, plus the necessary axnxnunition and personnel. Some air reinforcements
41. CAB 66/11: WP(40)339: The Munitions Situation: Memorandi by the
Minister of Supply, 29 August 1940.
42. ibid..
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had. already been sent and. it was now decided to re-arm with modern aircraft
as many squadrons as possible in the Middle East. The Army reinforcements
were to start as soon as they could. be  loaded and., in fact, departed around
2lst/22nd Aug., arriving some six weeks later. Churchill received the news
from Dill with enthusiasm, even pressing the Admiralty hard, though un-
successfully, for a direct convoy through the Mediterranean instead of the
safer route around the Cape. The chance to fight the Axis power in the
Middle East, the only viable field of engagement at this time, appealed
strongly to the puguacious instinct of the Prime Minister, despite the
obvious risks of stripping the country of so many precious weapons and
trained men at such a critical time. It was an act of high courage, "an
intensely brave decision," according to Sir Arthur Bryant. Churchill was
characteristically eloquent about it: "No time was lost. The decision to
give this blood-transfusion while we braced ourselves to meet a mortal
danger was at once awful and right. No one faltered." 43" in fact,
General Brooke, still far from confident of his ill-equipped. troops' ability
to repel invasion and still facing the u.tniost difficulties in building up
his mobile reserves, had serious reservations, both as to the diversion of
resources and knowing at the time that the tank reinforcements "constituted
a large proportion of the total of my armoured. forces."
In the event, with the reinforcements arriving in time to enable
General O'Connor's Desert Army to win sweeping victories over the superior
Italian forces during the winter of 1940-41 and with the failure of the
expected invasion of Britain to materialise, General Brooke's reservations
were to prove unjustified. Nevertheless, if the flow of information from
'Ultra', the British intelligence unit which was distributing the Thiigzna
deciphered messages from the cryptanalysts at Bletchley Park, is taken into
account, then the cracial decision made on 10th August becomes easier to
understand..
Ever since the moment in Mid-July when Churchill had finlly accepted
that the German preparations for invasion, code-named 'Sea	 were
definitely afoot, the British had begun an intensive surveillance that was
43. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., pp. 378-379; Butler, J. R. M. (ed.):
Grand Strategy, Vol. II, September 1939 - June 1941, p. 308, H.M.S.0.
London, 1957; and Parkinson, Roger: The Auk: Auchinleck, Victor at
Als'm1n, pp. 165-166, Grenada, London, 1977.
44. Fraser, David.: Alanbrooke, p. 186, Collins, London, 1982; and.
Bryant, Arthur: op. cit., p. 205,
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to continue for many anxious months. In this 'Ultra' was to serve through-
out as "an md.ispensable monitor". The relevant signals deciphered at
Bletchley during the invasion period, however, came almost entirely from
the Luftwaffe, despite the fact that the German plan involved a].]. three
services. In his book, 'Ultra Goes to War', Ronald Lewin explains why:
"German naval. cyphers remained unbroken until 1941. The German army
was notably secure in its use of Enigma arid anyway had the land-lines of
Western Europe available. But the air force was not only in action, fight
-ing a daily battle: so fax as Sea Lion was concerned, the Luftwaffe was
involved in every aspect of the operation. As preparations proceeded apace,
therefore, an immense amount of signal traffic passed over the Luftwaffe's
radio circuits which contained invaluable information not just about the
German ar force, but about arrangements being made by the army arid navy as
well." 45.
The Enigma ciphers of the Luftwaffe provided a fertile field for Ultra.
It was not to provide vital details on either the quantity of shipping about
to be assembled in the Channel ports or on the question of where the Germans
were intending to make their landfall, nor did. it give invasion dates, yet,
by early Augi.ist, its owing mastery of the Luftwaffe's order of battle had
enabled it to assess the scale of the threatened onslaught and to warn that
it appeared to be imminent. 46. AJeay prolific signals from Goering had.
included orders for his troop-carrying aircraft to practise landing on
narrow runways which would simulate roads, while another important siial
told of Hitler's order to the German Amy and Air Force to co-operate in
setting up special terminals at airfields for the quick loading and turn-
around of aircraft, so as to air-lift quickly across the Channel not only
parachute and. air-landing troops, but supplies and arms as well. Then on
1st August, Ultra picked up Goering's significant order to the Luftwaffe "to
overcome the British Air Force with all means at its disposal as soon as
possible....", while by 8th August the Luftwaffe attacks on shipping and
ports, that had commenced as early as 10th July, were indeed becoming
noticeably heavier.
By 10th Aug., when the decision was made to reinforce the NiddJ.e East
from the resources of Home Forces, therefore, it was quite clear to the
British Chiefs of Staff from all the evidence that an all-out German air
offensive was likely to begin within the next few days. It was also
45. Lewin, Ronald: op. cit., p. 91.
46. Calvocoressi, Peter: Top Secret Ultra, p. 72, Cassell, London, 1980.
47. Winterbotham, F. W.: op. cit., pp. 42-43.
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correctly believed that its preliminary aim was likely to be the destruction
of the R.A.F., especially Fighter Command, so that the Germans could. achieve
the air superiority deemed necessary for a successful invasion. Ultra,
however, had also revealed significant evidence that all was not well in the
German camp. Pirstly, it had. helped to reveal, that the Germans were working
to a very tight schedule indeed.. Group Captain F. W. Winterbotham of N 16
later wrote:
"Prom my many secret sources of information .... it seemed certain that
Hitler would. attack Russia in the East in the spring of 1941 and if he
wanted the 'Sea Lion' affair mopped up in time to redeploy his main forces
in the East, he must start his invasion by around. mid. September at the
latest. It didn't give him much time."
Secondly, "there were signals showing disaeement between the .àrmy and the
Navy as to how the vast requirements of ships for the seaborne transport was
to be met," and. thirdly, despite the efforts of aerial and naval reconnaiss-
ance, there was as yet no concrete evidence of shipping concentrations in
the Channel ports. In spite of the tight timetable, therefore, it appeared
from the evidence that there was an apparent lack of urgency which, compared
with the feverish efforts of the Luftwaffe to get their vast air fleets up
to peak strength and. readiness, pointed to a certain reluctance and even
lack of commitment by the army and the navy, as well as an obvious inability
of the latter two services to co-operate, both with each other and with
Goering's Luftwaffe. 48. The signs were that it would be several weeks more
before the preparations of the German army and the navy were fully complete,
vital weeks in which the tanks and other weapons now to be taken from Home
Forces could. be adequately replaced by new production from the factories.
Churchill, too, could not have left General Wavell without reinforcements,
since the Italian threat to North and. East Africa was now severe and. "the
need to reinforce these battle fronts was hardly less urgent than the need
for victory at home." 	 Moreover, even if the expected German air offen-
sive were to begin on the morrow, it would. take a few weeks at least for the
Luftwaffe to wear down the fighter strength of the R.A.F. to an extent that
a seaborne invasion would. be feasible. Winterbotham continues: '....
it was obvious that the main emphasis was still on the operations of the
Luftwaffe .... the air battle was going to be the decisive factor. It
48. ibid.
49. Calvocoressi, Peter: op. cit., pp. 72-73.
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was a hopeful sign and I think everyone, including the Prime Minister,
felt that, if we could. withstand Goering's efforts to elm1nAte the R.A.F.,
Eit].er would. probably give up the idea altogether." 50.
In fact, despite General Brooke's reservations, the reinforcements
which departed for the Middle East towards the end. of August did not greatly
detract from the effective front-line strength of Rome Forces in the areas
which were most vulnerable of all, in the South-East and East Anglia. The
50 Infantry tanks of 7 R.T.R. had, in fact, been training in Scotland since
13th July and, though formerly part of let Army Tank Brigade, their dispatch
did. not alter the strength of the latter formation in the South-East, which
remained at 27 llc I and 73 Nk II Matilda Infantry tanks. (See Appendices
10 arid ii.) The 52 Cruiser tanks of 2 R.T.R. were indeed taken from 1st
Armoured. Division, but were immediately replaced in the Division's 3rd
Armoured Brigade by the fully equipped 3 R.T.R. from War Office control.
The 1st Armoured Division was thus kept up to a two battalion strength in
Cruiser tanks. Of the front-line formations, therefore, only 20th Armoured
Brigade, also under 1st Armoured Division, lost out since its sole light
tank regiment was removed about this time, probably to replace 3rd (Kings
Own) Hussars (52 Vickers light tanks) which was sent overseas from 1st
Armoured Brigade in 2nd Armoured Division. By late August, there still
remained two fully equipped battalions of Infantry tanks with 1st Army Tank
Brigade and two Cruiser battalions plus one 'light wheeled' tank regiment
with 1st Armoured Division in G.LQ. Reserve to the south of London, arid no
less than six light tank regiments (one re-equipping with Cruisers-) in 2nd.
Armoured Division in G.R.Q.. Reserve north of London, a net loss to these
important formations of only one regiment of light tanks. Indeed, perhaps
a greater loss to the formations in reserve at home was not the tank forma-
tions, but the single regiment of 48 invaluable 2 pdr. anti-tank guns, a
much more difficult item to replace quickly.
*	 *	 *
In the absence of firm evidence pointing to any one area of the British
Isles, there still remained the difficult question as to which sector of
coast and. in what strength the Germans would attack. Although the Chiefs of
50. Winterbotham, F. W.: op. cit., pp. 42-43.
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Staff spent a good deal of time in late July and early August discussing the
reinforcement of the small garrisons in the Orlmey and Shetland Islands, and.
the threat to these important islands and. to the remote North of Scotland by
airborne and perhaps even seaborne attack or raids from the German forces in
Norway, it was soon realised, quite correctly as it turned out, that the
German activity in Norwegian ports and aerodromes was unlikely to be any-
thing more serious than a diversion. The Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless, in
view of the importance of the Shetlands as a base for air reconnaissance
over Scandinavia and Iceland and for the fighter protection of convoys around
the North of Scotland, as well as because of their proximity to Scapa Flow
and the virtual impossibility of their reinforcement in the event of a larger
attack against Northern Scotland, decided on 9th Aug. to send small reinforce-
ments, including an extra infantry battalion, to the Islands "as a matter of
urgency." 51. General Brooke, too, was informed the sane day of the possibil-
ity that a maximum of 20,500 German airborne troops might be landed within
the space of three days to seize aerod.romes in Scotland north of the River
Tay, which, combined with heavy air attack on Scapa Flow, might be "an
essential prelimrnry to an invasion of this country", and was asked to
consider "whether any re-distribution of his forces was required". 52. such
a high scale of attack on such a relatively remote area, in fact, seemed all
too real at the time, especially when, as on 13th Aug., he was informed that
"the Admiralty had received accurate information that the Germans in Norway
had embarked on the night of the 11th and that they expected invasion in the
north," General Brooke was receiving such a continuous flow of often wildly
exaggerated or totally erroneous rumours and reports through G.H.QI from all
quarters.
A possible German invasion of Ireland still loomed large in the minds
of both the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet. Negotiations with the
neutral Irish Government, led by Prime Ninister Eamon De Valera, had finally
broken down on 6th July, and. on 19th July Neville Chamberlain had had to
report to the War Cabinet that;
51. CAB 79/13: COS(40 )258th:2, 9 August 1940; and. CAB 79/ 1 3 : COS(40)
264th:1, 14 August 1940.
52. CAB 79/1 3: C0S(40)258th:2, 9 August 1940; and CAB 80/16: COS(40)
6ii(JIC): PoBsibility of a German Airborne Landing in Northern Scotland
with a View to the Neutralising of Fleet Bases in the North as a
Prelindnary to the Invasion of England, 7 August 1940.
53. Diaries of Field. ?Iarshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 13 August 1940.
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"It was evident that the atmosphere between this country and. Eire had.
greatly deteriorated in recent weeks, m-inly on account of suspicions enter-
tained. in Eire that we planned to occupy that country by force at an early
date." 54
British refusal to supply arms and munitions to the Irish Army so as to
enable it to fight the Germans more effectively and articles in the British
press commenting on the folly of 	 neutrality had also been contri-
butory factors in adding to the atmosphere of d.istrust and suspicion now
existing between the two countries. Private conversations, nevertheless,
continued between De Valera and Britain's representative in Dublin, Sir
John Naffey, and these had. gone some way to remove the suspicions. Accord-
ing to a letter from Naffey, De Valera had said. to him:
"Why will you not trust us? If you think we might attack the North,
I say with all emphasis we will never do that. No solution can come by
force. There we must now wait and let the solution come with time and.
patience.
If you think the I.R.A. will get the arms, I can assure you that we
have no fifth column today. There is no danger in that quarter.
Give us help with arms and we will fight the Germans as only Irishmen
in their own country can fight. There is no doubt on which side my sympa-
thies lie. Nowadays some people joke about my becoming pro-British. The
cause I am urging on you is in the best interest of my country and that is
what matters most to me." 55
Sir John Maffey's seemingly favourable response from De Valera per- -
suaded the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Viscount Caldecote, who
was worried too that the deterioration in relations might jeopard.ise the
"secret understanding" with the Irish that "in the event of a serious inva-
sion, they will resist the enemy and call upon us for aid," to suggest to
the War Cabinet on 22nd July that a public statement he made "to the effect
that we had no intention of sending our forces into Eire without a request
from their Government", that action should be taken to damp down the press
campaii and that a limited amount of military equipment should. be  supplied.
to Ireland. 56. The War Cabinet indeed approved the last two suggestions
and. four days later authorised. the Secretary of State to supply to Ireland
a very limited amount of military equipment, including some artillery, L.A.
54. CAB 65/8: WM(40)208th:6, 19 July 1940.
55. CAB 66/10: WP(40)274: Relations with Eire: Nemorand.um by the
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Annexel: Letter from Sir
John Maffey to the United Kingdom, 17 July 1940.
56. CAB 65/8: WM(40)209th:9, 22 July 1940; and CAB 66/10: WP(40)274:
Relations with Eire: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Domtn1on
Affairs, 17 July 1940.
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guns, Bren carriers, anti-tank rifles, Bren guns, explosives and. the
necessary ainition (actually a very tiny amount, compared with the arms
consignment sent to the Middle East in the middle of August), although
with reservations since it was felt:
"There was clearly some risk in supplying equipment to Eire and. it
might well be argued that the best way to induce Eire's co-operation was
to withhold all supplies of equipment. Nevertheless, the general view of
the War Cabinet was that it was right to take the risk involved." 57.
To Viscount Caldecote's suggestion that a public statement be made as to
British military intentions regarding Ireland, however, the War Cabinet
had. to say no, partly because such a statement might be "liable to a
different interpretation tt , but also because, un1aiown to Viscount Caldecote
until this meeting, the Chiefs of Staff, meeting earlier on this same
morning of 22nd July, had in fact discussed the very thing that the state-
ment was intended to deny, namely an immediate occupation by British
troops from lUster of aeenstown, or alternatively Berehaven and the
Shannon estuary, for use as a naval base. Fortunately, the Chiefs of
Staff had rejected the idea, put forward in an aide-memoire by the Joint
Planning Sub-Committee which is closed, significantly, until 1991, on the
grounds that:
"])esirable as the possession of a base in South-West Ireland un-
doubtedly is, the seizure of such a base might well precipitate the
hostility of Ireland. on a large scale and play into the hands of the
Germans. Unless, therefore, we were prepared to occupy the wholeof
Eire, and. to accept the political consequences, it would be inadvisable
to establish a base at Queenstown or elsewhere without the co-operation
of the Irish." 58.
Other more immediate and. pressing problems were to occupy the minds
of the Chiefs of Staff during the months of August arid September, yet the
possibility of an attempted German invasion of Ireland., which remained
"only weakly defended by Irish troops", could not be forgotten, in view
of the danger that Ireland might be used. as a base for air and sea attacks
on the vital supply lines to Britain's Western ports or for raids or
larger landings on the long and. vulnerable West Coast. The Chiefs of
57. CAB 65/8: WM(40)213rd:11, 26 July 1940; and CAB 66/10: WP(40)285:
Equipment for Eire: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War,
25 July 1940.
58. CAB 65/8: WM(40 )209th:9, 22 July 1940; and CAB 79/5: COS(40)229th:2,
22 July 1940.
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Staff were to report on 4th September in an appreciation of future strategy
drawn up for the consideration of the War Cabinet:
"In her present attitude, Eire constitutes a serious liability.
Although the Government of Eire would probably call instantly for our help
in the event of a German attack on Irish territory, they would undoubtedly
resist any attempt on our part to land forces in Eire in advance of a
Geririan attack.... At present it is clear that Eire is determined to mri-
ta.in her neutrality at all costs and will not permit British forces to
enter the country, unless the enemy had. previously invaded it. In view of
the time factor involved, we must retain forces in Northern Ireland and in
the United Kingdom ready for immediate entry into Eire at the moment the
Eire Government are prepared to permit our entry - both to deny bases to
the enemy arid to occupy them for our own use." 9•
The military dispositions put into effect during June, therefore,
were to stand essentially unchanged during the following tbree months,
although the 3rd. (Regular) Division, earmarked to back up the Royal Marine
Brigade stationed at Nilford Haven, which was to seize a bridgehead in
Southern Ireland if it became necessary, had been moved to Bristol from
West Sussex as early as 11th July.
Concern about yet another extremity of the British Isles, however,
albeit a very minor one, surfaced at a War Cabinet meeting on 30th August,
following a small scale air-raid that had created "considerable panic"
among the local population. This was the Isles of Scilly, very small and
with negligible military value, yet the Prime Minister insisted that the
islands "zmist be held at all costs" and that "all necessary reinforcement
60.	 -
of men arid materials must rapidly be made available." 	 The Chiefs of
Staff, asked to consider their reinforcement, decided in consultation with
General Brooke (whose forces had. oust suffered a considerable reduction in
strength due to the dispatch of reinforcements to the Middle East) that
"it was better to prevent the enemy landing on the Islands than having to
evict them" and., bearing in mind that "political considerations made some
reinforcement necessary", they consented to send a second of the new Inde-
pendent Companies to reinforce the Independent Company already stationed
there and currently undergoing Commando training. The War Cabinet, duly
reassured, approved this necessarily small reinforcement on 3rd September. 6-i.
59, CAB 66/il: WP(40)362: Also coS(40)683: Future Strategy: Apprecia-
tion by the COS Committee, 4 September 1940.
60. CAB 65/8: WN(40 )238th:3, 30 August 1940.
61. CAB 79/6: COS(40)287th:1, 30 August 1940; CAB 79/6: COS(40)290th:i,
2 September 1940; and CAB 65/9: WM(40 )240th:3, 3 September 1940.
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The focus of attention in late July and. indeed through most of Augu.st,
nevertheless, quite rightly remained, on the threat to East nglia and. the
South East of England posed by the German military and air force build-up,
although the question of which of these two areas would bear the brunt of
the expected. German assault, in the absence of any concrete evidence of a
German naval build-up, at least in the Channel ports, still reined. a
matter of debate.
The greater weight of opinion in higher circles at this time still
favoured East .Anglia as being the area where the Germans would launch
their main effort, although the security of the South East, with the
formation of VII Corps by General Ironsid.e on 19th July, had. nevertheless
been considerably improved. Churchill later wrote, "It will be notea. tnat
my advisors and I deemed the east coast more likely to be attacked during
July arid Augu.st than the south coast. tt Although Hitler's Directive No. 16
of 16th July had clearly stated. that the German invasion would be launched
across the Channel against the South Coast and that, in fact, the Germans
"never had any hope or intention" of moving an army by sea in large trans-
ports from either the Baltic arid. North Sea ports or from the Biscay ports,
none of this precise information was Imon to the British in 1940, even
t1igh Ultra. Churchill stoutly maintained after the War, therefore, that
he and his advisors were nevertheless correct. He continued:
"This does not mean that in choosing the south coast as their target
they were thinking rightly and we wrongly. The east coast invasion was by
far the more formidable if the enemy had had the means to attempt it.
There could., of course, be no south coast invasion unless or until the
necessary shipping had. passed. southwards through the Straights of Dover
and. had. been assembled. in the French Channel ports. Of this, during July,
there was no sjgn." 62.
Peter Fleming, in his book 'Invasion 1940', coents on the British view,
"held with tenacity and. abandoned. with reluctance", that prevailed. at this
time:
"Their error was not induced by the cunning of the Germans, whose
intermittent attempts to deceive their intended. victim were puerile. The
fact of the matter was that, until the beginning of September, the British
lacked., and were in the circumstances almost bound. to lack, any evidence
as to where the blow would. fall." 63.
62. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., pp. 254-255.
63. Fleming, Peter: Invasion 190, p. 169, Rupert Hart-Davis, London,
1957.
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In actual fact there had been some evidence pointing to the South
Coast, which had been reported to the War Cabinet in their Weekly Situation
Report, as early as 19th July:
"Air reconnaissance on 16 July showed a considerable number of barges
at Cherbourg, Trouville, Le Eavre and. Honfleur.
A Bomber Comaand aircraft reported 200-300 barges in the canal between
Armentieres and. IIerville at 05.51 on 16 July." 64.
With the lack, however, of any further evidence from this quarter during
the subsequent few weeks, the War Cabinet quickly put this down to normal
barge movements, although actually the Germans were probably already begin-
ning to collect together the local shipping. The next report on 26th July,
possibly pointing towards an invasion of the East Coast, was to the War
Cabinet much more believable:
"There are indications that many fresh troops are arriving in Holland
and. that Belgium, especially Brussels, is full of troops, of which a high
proportion are Luftwaffe." 65.
This was closely followed by a red herring when, on 31st July, the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Viscount Halifax, told the War
Cabinet that:
".... our .1mbassador at .Angora had reported that the German Military
Attache had stated. that the invasion of Great Britain had. been postponed
until the first week of August, and. that he intended. to follow eveiits. On
27July our ambassador reported. that that German Military Attach6 had. left
Instanbul on the 26th, ostensibly for Belgrade." 66.
The Chiefs of Staff, nevertheless, agreed later the same day to the exten-
sion of air reconnaissance to cover certain inland. areas by night where it
was believed that German troop concentrations might be located. These
reconn.aissances would. supplement the aerial photographic recorinaissances
that already gave regular coverage of the Continental coast between
64. CAB 66/9: WP(40)264: also COS(40)554 : Weekly Resuin No. 46 of the
Naval, Military and Air Situation, 19 July 1940.
65. CAB 67/7: WP(40)286 : also cOS(40)575 : Weekly Resum No. 47 of the
Naval, Military and. Air Situation, 26 July 1940.
66. CAB 65/8: WM(40)216th:1, 31 July 1940.
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Statlandet, in the Shetland Narrows, and Brest. 67 &tensive reconnaiss-
ance, however, over the next few days yielded little. On 5th August, the
Chiefs of Staff aeed. "that there were no new developments which pointed
to an iimnediate invasion of this country", while on 8th Aug. the War Cabinet
heard that the usual reconnaissanoes had been flown "without yielding any
definite results, save that there were more ships than usual at Emden and
40-50 seaplane troop carriers in the Zuider Zee." 8.
This last piece of intelligence, if it meant anything siuficant at
all, again pointed towards an attempt against the East Coast, at least as
the War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and their various advisors, still
chose to believe. If they reflected that both Julius Caesar and the Duke of
Normandy had used the shortest route to the South East, they dismissed. the
thought, being more iiifluenced, perhaps, by the uictinna.]. accounts of the
generation immediately prior to the First World War, such as Erskine
Childers's classic GRiddle of the Sands', all of which had. described a
sudden sweep across the North Sea onto the open, gently shelving beaches
of East Anglia with its equally open and gently undulating hinterland that
would. by 1940 be so suitable for the fast mechanical warfare that the
Germans excelled in. The South East and South Coasts, whose beaches were
mostly flanked or dominated by cliffs or overlooked by escarpments of down-
land. and. whose interior, especially in Kent and Sussex, was iitin1y of a
very close and. intricate nature with many hedgerows, woods, narrow lanes
and steep slopes, seemed somehow much less likely. The 'tank country' of
East Anglia, in short, seemed to the British, with their a.11 too recent
experience of the German Blitzkrieg, to be far more suitable for the
German's devastating methods of modem warfare than the 'infantry country'
of the South East, and t1ule both areas had similar vital ports that had
to be captured to sustain and. supply a major landing, only East .Anglia
appeared eminently suitable for the conception that the British had.
recently formed of a secretly prepared vast armada of special landing-craft,
which could. disgorge tanks, guns and motor vehicles in eat numbers in an
initial landing over open beaches. 69.
67. CAB 79/5: COS(40)241st:1, 31 July 1940.
68. CAB 79/5: COS(40)248th:1, 5 Aiigast 1940; and CAB 65/8: WM(40)222nd:1,
8 August 1940.
69. Longinate, Norman: If Britain Ead Fallen, pp. 60-61, B.B.C. & Hutchinson,
London, 1972.
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The most powerful factor in favour of the East Coast rem2ined. until
the end. of August, however, th continuing lack of evidence produced. by
aerial photographic reconnaissance on shipping concentrations in potential
invasion bases. This negative evidence took two forms. Firstly, although
longer sorties enlarged their field of vision, the adequacy of such recon-
naissance naturally decreased with distance and the North German and Baltic
ports, threatening the East Coast south of The Wash if they threatened any-
thing, remained at best a doubtful factor, while, secondly, from the ports
nearest the South East, which were the most easily and therefore the most
fully covered by aerial reconnaissance, there remained no evidence of
unusual German shipping activity. Moreover, the British, who had. been
energetically preparing to repel an attack since the middle of Iiay,
naturally assumed. that Hitler's arrangements to launch an invasion had at
the very least kept pace with their own arrangements to defeat it:
"After the first shock of alarm had passed, there were many who
thought that Hitler might lose his nerve; none suspected that he had not
made up his mind. Prudently, but mistakenly, they credited him with deep-
laid. plans, concerted long in advance of his opportunity; and. when, as
July went and August came, they saw in the ports nearest to their shores
no signs of those plans being implemented, it was natural to assume that
they were maturing in bases beyond the effective scope of the R.A.P.'s
reconnaissance. All this strengthened their forebodings about the east
coast." 70.
Ultra, too, only provided negative evidence on this vital cueston of
where the blow would fall. Deciphering at Bletchley in this period was
primarily of Luftwaffe signals and, although this was to give vital help-
in winning the battle for supremacy in the air and in helping the staff
of Rome Forces, the Invasion Warning Sub-Conittee and other bodies, in
building up a cumulative picture of what was actually happening on the
other side of the Channel, it did. not give information on any plans which
may have been broadcast on the radio nets of the German army and navy
(where for amphibious operations they were most likely to be found),
becanse their ciphers were still largely or vhol].y unbreakable. lioreover,
while Hitler's general intention to invade was widely lmown and. the
British were able to pick up local details of their preparations which
appeared repea;ed.ly to confirm this overall intention, the most secret
matters, including the intended front of the invasion, were naturally
70. Fleming, Peter: op. cit., pp. 170-171.
- 310 -
reserved for high level conferences and. communications by secure land-line. 71.
The actual German plans for the landing, therefore, remained unknown to the
British.
Only General Brooke disagreed with the general view that the main
German effort would be launched against the East Coast. Ris warnings, how-
ever, continued to go unheeded, since they were not yet backed up by positive
evidence gleaned from the Germans by any of the usual or even secret sources
of intelligence, but were derived rather from his own recent experience as
G.0. C.-in-C. Southern Command, where he had seen at first hand. the vulner-
abilities of the very long South Coast. These he saw again on his tour of
the Kent and Sussex coasts on 7th-8th Aug., and yet again on 13th August when
he toured coastal defences between Emouth and Weyniouth, this time in company
with the Prime Minister himself who later recalled that, "About the end of
the first week in August, General Brooke .... pointed out that the threat of
invasion was developing on the south coast as much as on the east." 72.
Although General Brooke was soon, in fact, to be proved right by events, he
still failed at this time fully to convince the Prime Minister.
71. Lewin, Ronald: op. cit., p. 94.
72. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 262.
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CHAPTER 10: TEE invia0Pfl THREAT
Other questions connected with the invasion problem were worrying both
the Chiefs of Staff and. the War Cabinet during late July and early August.
Bearing in mind the Admiralty's estimate on 12th July of 100,000 men that
might reach British shores without being interrupted by the Royal Navy, an
estimate subsequently doubled by the Prime Ninister, &id the Germans have
adequate shipping for such an attempt? The question was asked by Churchill
in a minute written on 20th July, in wh.ich he recalled that "a very con-
siderable" effort was required by merchant shipping to sustain, over a very
short distance, an invasion of Norway by 100,000 troops. The Joint Intelli-
gence Sub-Coimnittee, considering the matter at the request of the Chiefs of
Staff over the next few days, pointed. out that although the amount of
shipping, due to the greater distances and much heavier casualties the
Germans would expect to suffer at the hands of the Royal Navy and the R.A.P.
in an invasion of Britain, would be much greater than in the Norwegian
invasion, this had to be balanced against the possibility that the initial
assault might be largely carried in small craft and by air, instead of in
the larger troop transports. Whether the Germans (of which 50,000 would be
used in diversions and the remMnng 150,000 mzi-inly against the East Coast)
would attempt to land adequate supplies to last for a minimum of 14 days
purely in the first wave or would attempt to sustain a successful lodgement
by rtmnng a ferry service between captured ports in Britain and their own
ports, concluded the J.I.C. in a detailed report approved by the Chiefs of
Staff on 29th July, "the actual shipping required for an invasion would not
be a limiting factor". 1 • Would the Germans attack under cover of an
extensive smoke screen designed to conceal an invasion fleet under passage?
Despite the vagaries of the tide, wind, time of day, the considerable
resources required to produce such a screen at sea, the hindrance to the
Germans' own shipping and its supporting aircraft and the much greater
likelihood of the Germans' use of darlaiess or conditions of low visibility,
the J.I.C. nevertheless suggested that the possibilities of such an attack
"cannot be ignored" and the Chiefs of Staff, too, agreed that precautions
should be talcen. 2.
1. CAB 80/15, COS(40)566 (SIC), also JIC(40)188 : Amount of Shipping
Required to Sustain a German Invasion of the British Isles: Note by
the JIC, & AnnexeA 22 July 1940; CAB 80/15, COS(40)575 (SIC), also
JIC(40 ) 188 revise : ibid., 26 July 1940; CAB 79/5, COS(40)238th:1,
29 July 1940.
2. CAB 80/15, COS(40)562 (SIC), also JIC(40)186 : Use of Smoke in an
Invasion of Great Britain: Report by the SIC, 20 July 194 0 & CAB 70/5,
cOS(40)232nd: 3, 24 July 1940.
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Questions relating to the Home Front were more the concern of the War
Cabinet. The role of the civil population, of the Civil Defence and. of the
Police in the event of invasion were constant subjects for discussion,
although the principle that the actual fighting should be left to the three
Services and the Home Guard and that no civilian, unless a member of the
latter forces, should be authorised to use lethal weapons, was firmly
adhered to. Future Army requirements under the 'Fifty-Five Division Pro-
gran3me, including new armoured. divisions and new army tank brigades
planned for the next year, and the question of the relative priority of
production of various weapons of war (fighters, bombers and tr-ining air-
craft, their instruments and. equipment, A.A. equipment especially :Bofors,
small arms and aznnunition, bombs and component parts to all these, still
tiking priority over tank production) were among the other issues discussed,
clearly showing that once the immediate invasion threat was past they had
every intention of going on and winning the War. Even some complacency on
the invasion question was displayed at a War Cabinet meeting on 2nd. August,
when the Chiefs of Staff were asked to advise whether the military situa?-
tion permitted the removal of the ban on visitors to towns in the defended
areas of the coast, with the exception of the Sheringham to Folkestone
sector which was felt to be particularly exposed to the threat of invasion,
by means of swarms of small boats emerging from the Dutch harbours, and.
from which some 60% of the population had already left by voluntary evacua-
tion or by special arrangements for children and the elderly.
This latter suggestion, discussed. at a Chiefs of Staff meetin on 5th
August at which the C.-in-C. Home Forces was present, horrified General
Brooke. Only partial measures had been taken to stimulate voluntary
evacuation along the rem&inder of the East and South Coasts, apart from an
evacuation of school children from the South Coast, and. in both of these
defended and. therefore sensitive areas the only restriction on the normal
movement of the civil population was the ban on visitors. Even this re-
striction, according to General Sir William Bartholomew, Chief of the Civil
Defence Operational Staff, had somewhat surprisingly never been applied in
the Brighton to Southsea sector on the South Coast. "If visitors were to
be admitted freely to these areas," objected General Brooke,
3. CAB 65/8, 'WM(40)218th: 4, 2 August 1940.
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".... they would, be at liberty to study the details of the beaches and.
other defences, an undesirable state of affairs.... There would be a con-
siderable risk of casualties to visitors from contact with beach mines;
there had already been a number of accidents to troops. The raising of the
ban of admission ... might have a moat unfortunate psychological effect
throughout the country. The civilian population and the army would. inter-.
pret such action as implying, contrary to the recent announcement by the
Prime Minister, that the danger of invasion was less in'm4r'ent and. there
would in consequence be a general relaxation of precautions."
It appeared "illogical," he continued,
"to retain the ban on towns between Sherineh s m and Folkestone and to lift
it upon adjacent East and South Coast towns where the threat of invasion
seemed just as great." 4.
The Chief a of Staff readily agreed and. a report on these lines subsequently
dissuaded the War Cabinet from removing the ban. This incident, however,
reflected the degree of complacency that was creeping into a civilian popu-
lation that had. been alerted. to an invasion since Nay and was already
slipping back into large population centres such as London. A G'erman
leaflet raid over Hampshire and Somerset on 1st August, dropping English
texts of Hitler's 19th July speech to the Reichatag, had been treated
almost as something of a joke, while on 3rd August, the beg1nnng of a Bank
Holiday weekend, the Prime Minister had to issue a warning against "the
slightest relaxation of vigilance". The greatest test, though, was yet to
come. As for the matter of the absence of a ban on visitors in the
Brighton-Southsea sector, this was referred to the Home Defence Executive,
since "the canalizing of holiday traffic on the roads and railways leading
to this part of the coast presented potential military dangers".
Then there were also the matters of the overall connd of, and co-
operation between, the three Services and the role of those three Services
in the event of an invasion. The idea of a supreme comrnmder wielding
authority over all the branches of Home Defence had been firmly rejected by
the Chiefs of Staff early in July on the grounds that, even if the right
man were chosen for this great responsibility, he would need the help of an
integrated staff, the creation of which would "superimpose a cumbersome and
top-heavy incubus" on the existing staffs of the fighting services. Such a
4. CAB 79/5, COS(40 )247th: 1 , 5 August 1940.
5. CLB 65/8 , wI'1(40)222nd:5, 8 August 1940, & CAB 79/5, COS(40)247th:1,
5 August 1940.
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re-organisation, too, would mean the disruption of the existing established
system at a critical time for the survival of the Nation. The Admiralty,
the Air Ministry and. General Brooke, as C.-in-C. Home Forces under the
overall direction of the War Office, therefore continued to control their
respective Coimnan&, with General Brooke being given control of all troops
in Great Britain and Northern Ireland (except Anti-Aircraft Command) if an
invasion occurred. The system of liaison officers at the higher formations
of Rome Forces, complemented by senior naval and air officers at G.K. Q.
ITmnmeremith, to keep General Brooke in touch with the other Services, the
Advanced E.Q. of Home Forces near the Cabinet War Room, to give him a close
link with the Government and Chiefs of Staff once the invasion had started,
and the links between the naval and. air branches of maritime defence via
the various Area Combined H.Q.'s and. the C.-in-C. Coastal Command, were all
inntathed throughout the invasion crisis of 1940, although the Chiefs of
Staff certainly felt on 24th July that the machinery for the coortinz-tion
of action taken by the three Services on receipt of already-pooled invasion
intelligence could be improved somewl:iat. 6. General Brooke in particular,
however, continued to remain unhappy about the existing arrangements for
the overall command. and co-operation between the three fighting Services,
especially about the division of authority. Re later wrote:
"There was, however, one point above all others that constituted a
grave danger in the defensive organisation of this country; there was no
form of combined Command over the three Services. And yet their roles were
intimately locked together.... There were far too many Commanders....
There was no co-ord.inating head of this mass of Commanders beyond the
Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Admiralty, the Air Ministry and War
Office.
It was a highly dangerous organisation; had an invasion developed, I
fear that Churchill would have attempted as Defence Minister to co-orate
the action of these various Commands. This would have been wrong and highly
dangerous, with his impulsive nature and tendency to arrive at decisions
through a process of intuition, as opposed to 'logical approach'.... Re
held periodic Conferences of Commanders-in-Chief, which were attended by
all the Coastal Naval Commanders-in-Chief .... thus giving the Naval side
too great a preponderance in these discussions when the Army was represented
by one member and the LA.F. by three." 7.
On 26th July General Brooke attended a Chiefs of Staff meeting on the
role of the three operations]. Commands of the R.A.F. in the event of an
6. Collier, Basil: History of the Second World War: The Defence of the
United Kingdom, p. 145., K.M.S.0., London, 1957; & CAB 79/5, COS(40)
232nth1, 24 July 1940.
7. Antobiographical Notes of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, Vol. IV,
pp. 229-230.
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invasion, although the discussion amounted in fact to an appreciation of the
probable form and order of an invasion or raid. and an indication of the
action to be taken by all three Services. Recognising that the Gernms had
to secure a virtual air supremacy so as to secure their sea coiriminications
before a full-scale invasion could even get under way, the Air Staff min-
tamed that the first phase of operations would. be a large scale air offen-
sive against all aspects of the British fighter defence, an offensive to be
countered by Fighter Coimiunti in the air, while Coastal and Bomber Comnand.s
concentrated on locating and. bombing respectively any massed enemy troops or
shipping, whether in harbour or at sea. Enemy aerodromea, her aircraft
industry, oil targets and communications would continue to be bombed at this
stage. This first phase was likely to be accompanied by heavy enemy air
attacks on the Royal Navy and its bases, especially on the destroyer and
small ship flotillas off the East and. South East coasts. Any German use of
airborne or air-landing troops at any stage of the operations could only be
countered by Fighter Command; but once the German invasion by sea had begun,
Bomber Command would really come into its own, strflring at the enemy trans-
port vessels at sea and at any enemy troop concentrations that had. landed,
all the while protected in the air as far as possible by the fighters, whose
other and primary task would be to protect the Royal Naval forces, small or
large, which were to operate against the German flanks. In this last
instance, the fighters' priority target would be the enemy dive bombers that
had already proved to be such a serious threat to the activities of the Navy.
Coastal Command throughout was to concentrate on its primary role of recon-
naissance, supplementing this with attacks with bombs or torpedoes -on enemy
transport ships wherever possible. It was the provision of the "fighter
umbrella" for the protection of the Navy, however, that worried General
Brooke most. With the fighters thus employed, "Our own troops defending the
bridgehead would have to rely on their own weapons and on measures of passive
defence when attacked by dive bombers." Both these troops and those of the
reserve formations moving up to counter-attack, General Brooke argued, would
therefore need the protection of plentiful mobile light L.A. units, which
would have to be allocated without delay so as to give them adequate time to
train properly with the troops they were to protect. Such protection, more-
over, it was pointed out, would only be gained at present at the expense of
the light L.A. protection of, amongst other thtllgs, the R.A.F.'s aerodromes. 8.
8. CAB 79/5, COS(40)235th:1, & Annexe, 26 July 1940.
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General Brooke clearly remsdned unhappy about this Bituation. Re confided.
to his d.iary that same evening:
"I came away feeling less confident as to our powers of avoiding an
invasion. The attitude of representatives of the Naval Comm2nder brought
out very clearly the fact that the Navy now realizes fully that its posi-
tion on the sea has been seriously undermined by the advent of aircraft.
Sea supremacy is no longer what it was, and in the face of strong bomber
forces can no longer ensure the safety of this island against invasion.
This throws a much heavier task on the Army." 9'
In complete contrast to Churchill, who confidently believed that the
Royal Navy "invariably undertook the apparently impossible without a
moment's heBitation whenever the situation so demanded", General Brooke
also harboured other misgivings about the Navy' s ability to redace the
pressure on the Army if invasion occurred. He later wrote:
"I soon discovered that the Rome Fleet, in the event of an invasion,
had little intention of comirg further south than The Wash. As destroyers
were also being drawn off to protect Western Approaches, the naval defence
in the Chprinel and southern waters did not appear to be .... able to offer
the required interference With German landing operations. On the other
hand, the Admiralty and naval comriders were inclined to criticize freely
Army dispositions.... Had I listened to these criticisms I should have had
to employ practically the whole of my forces solely for the defence of
naval bases by concentrating men on the beaches in their vicinity." 10.
General Brooke was, of course, exaggerating. The C.-in-C. Rome Fleet,
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Forbes, in view of the recent losses to
the strength of the Rome Fleet off Norway, at Dunkirk and to the PIed.iter-
ranean theatre of operations, combined with an overestimation of the
strength of the German Navy by the Admiralty, indeed had strong misgivings
about stationing his heavier ships away from Scapa Flow and was greatly
worried about rising shipping losses in the North West Approaches,
Britain's vital supply line from North America. Re had, however, been
informed by the Admiralty at the beginning of July that the task of repel-
ling an invasion was to take priority over the safeguarding of Britain'B
supply lifeline, at least for the time being, and consequently the Naval
Commcind covering the North Sea and C}umnel had been strengthened by
cruisers and some further smaller ships dispersed at the various pOrtB by
Admiralty order. The prevention of a knock-out blow clearly had to take
9. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 26 July 1940.
10. Autobiographical Notes of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, Vol. IV,
pp. 229-230.
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priority over the prospect of a Blow strangulation. The Admiralty, never-
theless, recognized that the premature diversion of too many destroyers
from the Atlantic might have very serious results and forbid the Navy's
capital ships to venture into the southern part of the North Sea until the
enemy's heavy ships had done so. 	 As in the cases of both the Army and.
the R.A.P., it was the old. story of vitally important, but conflicting,
demands on inadequate or limited. resources, at a time when a major mistake
could. have lost the War for Britain.
Just a few days later, on 7th August, the Prime Minister himself sub-
mitted an important memorandum on defence against invasion to the Chiefs of
Staff Conmiittee. His own view on the role of the three Services in the
event of invasion was clearly outlined:
"Our first line of defence against invasion must be as ever the
enemy's ports. Air recorrni-issance, submarine watching, and other means of
obtMr 4 g information should be followed. by resolute attacks with al]. our
forces available and suitable upon any concentrations of enemy shipping.
Our second line of defence is the vigilant patrolling of the sea to
intercept any invading expedition, and to destroy it in transit.
Our third line is the counterattack upon the enemy when he makes any
landfall, and particularly while he is engaged. in the act of landing. This
attack, which has long been ready from the sea, must be reinforced, by air
action; and. both sea and. air attacks must be continued so that it becomes
impossible for the invader to nourish his lodgements.
The land defences and the Home Army are mst-intained primarily for the
purpose of nRki n the enemy come in such large numbers as to afford a -
proper target to the sea and air forces above mentioned, and to make
hostile preparations and movements noticeable to air and other forms of
recormzisaance." 12.
One of hurchi a chief concerns in this memorandum, however, was
again the question of where the invasion blow would fall and the relative
vulnerability of the various Bectors of coast. The Prime Minister was well
aware of the "immense coat in war energy" and the disadvantages of trying
to defend the whole coastline of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, over
2,000 miles in length, of which over 800 miles were assailable, a frontage
11. Butler, J. H. N. (ed..): History of the Second World. War: Grand
Strategy, Vol. II, pp. 280-281, R.M.S.O., London, 1957; & Roskill,
Captain S. W.: History of the Second World War: The War At Sea,
Vol.1, Chapter XIII, H.M.S.0., London, 1954.
12. CAB 66/10, WP(40)3197 also COS(40) 604 Revise , Annexe I: Defence
Against Invasion: Note by the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence,
5 August 1940.
- 318 -
twice as long as the combined French, British and Belgian forces had. failed
to hold. in Nay. True, the Germans could not hope to attack this vast
circumference simultaneously, yet the extent of their fighter range still
meant they could cover a landfall or landfalla made on any beach between
The Wash and the Bristol Channel. His own Chief of Staff, Major General
Hastings 'Pug' Ismay, who accompanied Churchill on many of his frequent
visits to the threatened areas, later recalled:
"Prom time to time Churchill would suggest to a coinmsnder that the
defence of such and such an area ought to be strengthened. The cotnmimder
would wholeheartedly agree, but point out that this could only be done by
weakening some other equally important sector. Churchill used. to say that
he felt like a man trying to go to sleep on a very cold night with a
blanket which was too small for him. If his feet were covered, his
shoulders would get cold; and if he pulled up the blanket to cover his
shoulders, some other part of his bo&y had to suffer." 13.
The sector from The Wash round to Dover, the Prime Minister still
believed, would be the most threatened. Besides the Germans here having
the advantage of the narrow seas, "this sector of the coast front is also
nearest to the supreme enemy objective, London" • 14. Certainly Dover, as
Major General Ismay recalled, ".... exercised a particular attraction for
him .... it seemed certain to be in the 	 area'." 15. Not only
this, but the second most important sector in the Prime Minister's estima-
tion was that from the Cromarty Firth to The Wash, again on the East Coast.
"The Tyne," he wrote in his memorandum, "must be regarded as the second
major objective after London, for here (and. to a lesser extent at the Tees)
grevious dmRge could be done by an invader or large-scale raider in a
short time." On this sector, however, he added that not only were all
harbours and inlets defended both from the sea and from the rear, but the
sea and air conditions were more favourable to the defender than to the
southward, while the defenders should be able "to counter-attack in
superior force within twenty-four hours". 16.
13. Ismay, General the Lord: Memoirs, p. 186, Heineincmn, London, 1960.
14. CAB 66/10, WP(40)319, also COS(40)604 Revise : op. cit.
15. Ismay, General the Lord: op. cit., p. 186.
16. CAB 66/10, WP(40)319, also COS(40)604 Revise : op. cit.
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Despite General Brooke's warnings to the contrary, however, Churchill
still believed that "the sector from Dover to Land's End is far less
menaced", at least so long as the Navy and R.A.F. could prevent any mass of
shipping or escorting warships from passing into the French Chffi%nnel ports.
Doubling the Admiralty's 12th July estimate of only 5,000 Ger"' attacking
this wide area from the ChRnnel ports (though omitting the 20,000 that the
Admiralty had estimated might be sent from the distant Bay of Biscay ports),
he went on, "It should be poBsible to make good arrangements for speedy
counter-attack in superior numbers, and at the same time to achieve large
economies of force on this southern sector, in which the beach troops should
be at their minimum and the mobile reserves at their mriTmm, These mobile
reserves must be available to move to the south-eastern sectors at short
notice." Significantly, however, he added, "Evidently this situation can be
judged only from week to week." 17.
As for the remlnng areas, Churchill quite rightly considered these to
be the least vulnerable to invasion. The long sea journey for any enemy
expedition from Western France or from Norway, the vulnerability of any such
expedition to the larger ships of the Royal Navy and equally to superior air-
power in these, and. the distance of any'lodgements from any significant
objectives, made any enemy landing in the sectors from North Cornwall round
to the Cromarty Firth extremely unlikely. The local protection of the West
Coast ports from the sea and land.ward side should suffice, with a much
longer period allowed for counter-attack, together with the proposed mine-
field from Cornwall to Ireland. "Should we, for instance, care to -send
twelve thousand men unescorted in merchant ships to land on the Norwegian
coast, or in the Skagerrak and Kattegat, in face of superior sea-power and
air-power? It would be thought madness." Raids or diversions would be the
most serious enemy activity expected. The Prime Minister then went on to
assign a relative scale of danger for the various coastal sectors: a figure
of five for The Wash to Dover sector, three for Cromarty Firth to The Wash,
one and a half from Dover to Land' a End, the sector which the Germans were
in fact preparing to attack, and. a mere fraction for West and. Northern
coastlines.
The Prime Minister's appreciation was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff
on 12th August. General Brooke, also present at this meeting, pointed out
that the figures in the memorandum were based min1y on the scales of
seaborne attack, whereas the actual distribution of the defence took into
17. ibid.
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account the threat from airborne attack as well. The Prime Minister had
also omitted the possible threat from the ports of the Bay of Biscay.
Nevertheless, he continued, scaling up the Prime Minister's proportional
figures aM equating them with the actual distribution of the twenty-six
formed divisions, infantry arid. arxnoured, presently deployed for the defence
of inzd'i1 and Britain, he had found. that, with only a few exceptions, the
resulting figures "tallied almost exactly" with the latter. Eight and a
half divisions were deployed in the Cromarty Firth to The Wash sector in
the middle of August (see Nap 9), compared with the Prime Minister' a theo-
retical figure of seven and a half. A total of fifteen divisions (inc].ud-
jug two armoured) were, in fact, deployed between The Wash and Cornwall.
Of these, six, including two in reserve (in IV Corps), were deployed to the
north of the Thames, with a seventh around Dover itself, while a further
five, including one in Southern Conimind Reserve, covered the coastline
between Dover and Cornwall. The remiiinthg three, those of VII Corps, were
in reserve to the south of the Thames and. could intervene if necessary
either in the Dover promontQry or along the South Coast as far westward as
Hampshire. This compared with the Prime Minister's theoretical estimate of
twelve and a half for The Wash to Dover sector, but only four and a quarter
for the long Dover to Cornwall sector, a total of sixteen and three-
quarters. As General Brooke pointed out, the actual and theoretical total
figures for these two sectors taken together differed "only slightly", but
the higher emphasis on The Wash to Dover sector by the Prime Minister again
showed Churchill's concern for the safety of the East Anglian Coast and the
Dover promontary, and his comparative lack of worry about the South Coast.
General Brooke, however, continued to m-4ntain his opposite view, a
view that can readily be demonstrated by comparing the Prime Minister's
theoretical figures with General Brooke' a actual dispositions. General
Brooke, nevertheless, felt he had to justify this difference to the Chiefs
of Staff, especially since they themselves tended to favour the East Coast
sector. The fact that the South Coast defences were "slightly in excess of
those theoretically required", he explained, was "due largely to the threat
of airborne invasion". Moreover, "as the South Coast could also be brought
under the German fighter 	 and was within twelve hourB' sea voyage
of hostile territory, it would seem sound to over-insure slightly on this
part of the coast". The threat of airborne attack, too, he mentioned, also
applied to the long Western and remote Northern coastlines where two and a
half divisions were deployed, compared with the one and three-quarters of
the Prime Minister's estimate, while the uncertainty regarding the security
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of the Irish Republic could not be totally ignored. Finally, he explained,
the figure of twenty-Bix divisions on which his calculations had. been based
"did not allow for semi-trained troops which were not yet suitable for
employment in a counter-offensive role, and had therefore not been pulled.
back from the beaches". Nor, indeed, he might have added, did they include
the various independent brigades and brigade-groups which were deployed for
Home Defence in addition to the formed divisions. 18.
The Chiefs of Staff, happy with General Brooke's appreciation, sub-
mitted a report very much along the Commrnder-in-Chief' s lines to the Prime
Ninister the very next day. They did state in their report, however, their
opinion that, "We may seem at present to be slightly over-insured along the
South Coast," although they repeated General Brooke's justification for
this. 19. In actual fact, however, in view of the powerful German forces
massing opposite this sector on the far side of the English Channel, they
were heavily under-insured. Five divisions stretched along a very long
South Coast, even if rapidly reinforced by the three divisions of VII Corps,
was i reality a very precarious situation. The reason why this alarming
situation was allowed to occur, however, remi ned, simply the continuing
lack of evidence of any enemy concentration of shipping in the Channel
ports.
*	 *	 *
The various sources of intelligence, including aerial photo-reconnaiss-
ance, continued to yield but little in this respect. The Chiefs of Staff
were by now becoming seriously worried. On 12th August, they agreed that:
".... the continued lack of Service Intelligence from enemy occupied
countries .... was a cause of grave concern.... We had now been 'blind'
for two months on troop and naval movements within enemy occupied territory
and there was little evidence to show any prospect of improvement in the
near future." 20.
The Directors of Intelligence were asked to look at methods of obtaining
"more satisfactory" Service Intelligence.
18. CAB 79/6, COS(40)260th:2, 12 August 1940.
19. CAB 66/10, WP(40)319, AnneII: Defence Against Invasion: Note by
Chiefs of Staff, 13 August 1940.
20. CAB 79/6, COS(40)261st:1, 12 August 1940.
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Next day, however, saw a new development as the struggle in the air
began in earnest. The Germans' much vaunted 'Eagle Day', though no siirprise
to the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff who had long been warned of
its linence through 'Ultra', opened with heavy and co-orM ted attacks on
airfields, radar stations and other important targets in the South East and
South. Could this indicate a German assault by sea on this sector?
Certainly a report coming in to G.K.(. Rome Forces that Austrian mountain
divisions, fully equipped for climbing the Kentish and. Sussex c].iffB, had
been seen in the Pas dc Calais area, seemed to General Brooke to support
this view, although another report, seemingly just as reliable, indicated
that a German invasion force in Norway had actually already embarked. 21.
The latter report, possibly a ruse, was soon proved to be false, but it
temporarily diverted the Chiefs of Staff's attention from events in Southern
England. That same night came fresh evidence suggesting an invasion or a
feint against the North. The War Cabinet heard the following day, the 14th,
as widespread German air attacks on airfields continued, that:
".... reports had been received from the Police that forty-five para-
chutes had been found, apparently abandoned by enemy parachutists, in
various districts in Scotland, Derbyshire, Staffordshire and. Yorh i re. In
one case a box with maps and. instructions was said to have been found. Two
parachutists were reported to have been captured, one in civilian clothIng." 22.
The widest publicity, the War Cabinet decided, should be given to these
landings of enemy parachutists, if confirmed, in order to enlist the help of
the civilian population. 	 -	 - -
This parachute scare, too, soon turned out to be nothing more than a
poor attempt by the Germans to undermine British morale. It had. been closely
followed by a transmission from the German run 'New British Broadcasting
Station' to the effect that the first contingent of German parachutists had
landed in Britain, that the equipment found included maps and. written
instructions and. that the landings had caused much anxiety in the districts
concerned. Further transmissions by the N.B.B.S. over the next few clays
tried to exploit the ruse, attempting to play on British fears about para-
chutists and. Fifth Columnists. The British were not convinced, however.
21. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 13 August 1940.
22. C.A3 65/8 , WM(40)226th:2, 14 August 1940.
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The absence of tracks in the dew and standi.ng corn from the supposedly occu-
pied parachutes was just one of several things that gave the game away. 23.
Although NSB.B.S. broadcasts on the subject continued until 20th August, the
War Cabinet had heard as early as the 15th that:
"At least eighty parachutes had been discovered, but there was no evi-
dence that any parachutists had descended with them. The report that two
parachutists had been apprehended was untrue." 24.
The 15th August also saw the heaviest enemy air attacks so far, on air-
fields arid other targets, not only on the South and South East, but on the
North East from Norway as well. Mach inige was caused at Lympne, Hawking,
Martlesham, Driffield, Middle Wallop arid at Croydon, where a number of
civilian casualties were suffered, while the air battles were intense. -The
The attacks on airfields and. the accompanying struggle in the air continued
in the South and South East on the 16th, with Tangmere being especially
badly hit. "The recent activities of the German Air Force," the War Cabinet
heard that day, "suggest the operi(rig phase of an attempt to gain air super-
iority by a process of exhausting our fighter defences. This policy is not
proving successful, and the German Air Force have suffered heavy casualties
...." The War Cabinet also heard that day from their Resume of the past
events that:
"Information during this period points to the continuation of prepara-
tions for invasion. It is probable, however, that the Gerrnins will not
finally decide upon invasion until the results of the present air attacks
upon the United Kingdom have been appreciated." 25. 	 -
The War Cabinet were un1iowingly correct in that, although Hitler had in
fact set 15th September as the date for the commencement of Operation Sea
Lion, as early as 31st July at the Berghof conference, his final decision
to invade would depend on the result of the air battles now taking place
over Southern England.
The heavy air activity of the last week was followed by a lull on 17th
August, but co-ordinated and heavy air attacks on airfields in the South and
23. F]en'lng, Peter: Invasion 1940, pp. 1 27- 1 30 , Rupert Hart Davis, London,
1957.
24. CAB 65/8, WM(40)228th:3, 15 August 1940.
25. CAB 66/10, WP(40)317, also COS(40 ) 633 : Weekly Resuixi6 No. 50,
16 August 1940.
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South East were resumed on the 18th, canaing much daiage at lenley and at
Poling radar station. Then, seemingly exhausted by their efforts, there was
little enemy air activity for the next five days. Was thiB the calm before
the storm? Still there was no evidence of German shipping concentrating in
the ChRnnel ports, yet the respite led to a fresh spate of rumours and
speculation about German intentions. On 19th August, for example, the War
Cabinet were seriously worried by reports that had been allowed to appear in
some of that morning's newspapers to the effect that:
".... five divisions of troops were said to be massed on the French
beaches opposite the South East Coast, ready to embark f9r an attempted
invasion and that they had been bombed by the R.A.F.." 2o.
On 22nd August a new German weapon began operating against the vulner-
able South East corner of the glish coastline. Having fired a number of
ranging shots over the past ten days, enemy heavy artillery batteries placed
on and around Cap Gris Nez now began a prolonged bombardment of Dover, a
development accompanied by boasts by the German propaganda radio of their
intent to land in the area. The War Cabinet and the Chiefs of Staff, however,
saw this new development as an attempt by the Germans to close the Straits of
Dover to British shipping. The German firing, though, soon proved to be slow
and interm.ttent, while the guns, at their maximum range, were not very
accurate. The firing was answered, moreover, by British heavy artillery
batteries.
"Our own heavies had been manufactured in 1918, when Churchill was -
Minister of Munitions, and had., on his insistence, been carefully m1r'tained
ever since. It was on his orders that they had been installed at Dover as a
counter to the German heavies at Calais and Cap Gris Nez. It is doubtful
whether these monsters had any significant practical effect, but they were
good for the morale of their respective sides. It is consoling to a man who
iB under bombardment to know that his enemy is catching it too." 27.
The long range artillery activity, however, was still not definitive
evidence for an invasion. "No serious threat of invasion yet exists from
the Netherlands, French or south-west Norwegian ports," reported the Inva-
sion Warning Sub-Committee, one of Beveral intelligence bodies, to the
ChiefB of Staff the next day. "This is evidenced by the lack of shipping
26. CA 65/8 , WM(40 )230th:6 , 19 August 1940.
27. Ismay, General the Lord: op. cit., p. 186.
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concentrations on these coasts." The same story was told. to the War
Cabinet the same day in their latest Weekly Resuin. 28.
The following day, 24th August, saw a new phase in the air battle.
The heavy and systematic daylight attacks on airfields in the South, South
East and Essex were resumed, combined with Grerinan fighter sweeps and
bombing attacks on ports and aircraft factories. Harassing attacks were
also continued on industrial targets, conmxunications and military establish-
ments. The development that marked this as a new phase, lasting until 6th
September, was the begirmirig of heavy night attacks. To these the R.A.P.
in 1940 had almost no answer. Birmingiwn and the Midland towns, Plymouth,
Liverpool-Birkenhead, Swansea, Bristol and other ports and industrial towns
all suffered, and on 5th and. 6th September the London docks received the
serious attention of the German bombers for the first time. In the day
-light battles, the R.A.F. fighters, fighting desperately and at their most
stretched, just minged to hold their own as losses mounted on both sides
and the strain of continuous combat began to take its toll.
The 26th August saw a long discussion by the Chiefs of Staff on the
latest reports concerning German preparations. Very little mention was
made of the South East, however, the Chiefs of Staff ersnnining in detail
instead the threat from other, less likely, directions. Recent German
troop movements along the coast of Norway might indicate preparations for
an operation against Scotland or even Iceland, but more worrying were
reports of German recorin-i ssance aircraft tkthg "a great interest" in -
aerodromes in the extreme South West of England. Certain aerodromes had
been visited "two and three times daily" by enemy recormd-ssance aircraft.
The Germans might be contemplating a diversion in the area to draw British
forces away from South East England. A report, moreover, had been received
through the Military Attache, Washington, of a German plan:
".... to land a force from rubber motor boats in South West England,
with the object of cutting off Devon and Cornwall and then advancing up the
Severn basin and down the Thames basin, thus cutting off the South of
lingland."
The Coixmiander-in-Chief, Home Forces, had not surprisingly regarded this
rather unlikely report as "unreliable", but the Chiefs of Staff nevertheless
28. Fleming, Peter: op. cit., p. 1 73; and. CAB 66/li, WP(40)334
also COS(40)656 : Weekly Resumé No. 51, 23 August 1940.
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instructed, that he should inform the Committee of what arrangements he had
made to replace the Narine Brigade, that had recently been removed from the
Plymouth area, and of "his general dispositions to meet any attempted enemy
attacks iining at a diversion in that area." 29.
"There are three ways," the Chiefs of Staff stated on 29th August
during a discussion of the existing strategical situation, "in which Germany
might break the resistance of the United Kingdom." Of these, invasion, even
at this late hour, was still considered to be the Germans' least likely
option, after unrestricted air attack aimed at breaking public morale and
crippling British industry, and the starvation of the country by attacks on
the ports and. the shipping lifelines. Although admitting that an attempt to
invade the country was "possible", they reTn1ned "confident of our ability
to resist it successfully". They continued:
"It could only have a reasonable chance of success under favourable
weather conditions and after air superiority had been established. Favour-
able weather conditions cannot be counted on after the middle of September
and little time now remn for gin1ng air superiority before the weather
breaks. The chances of success have now receded, and the effects of a
failure would be so great, that we think the enemy is more likely to con-
centrate her efforts against this country in naval and air attacks on our
shipping and ports, combined with air attacks on industry and morale. This,
indeed., is already being done, although not yet on the maximum scale. The
effects of German attacks so far show no sign of producing serious results."
"At the same time," the Chiefs of Staff nevertheless added, "Germany will no
doubt complete all her preparations for the invasion of the United Ri-ngdom
if she considers that conditions are suitable." The Chiefs of Staff's doubts
on the matter of an attempt at invasion contrasted strangely with Churchill's
apparent certainty. Referring to the Ultra scoop of 19th July, which had
provided the first firm evidence of the Germans' intent to invade, he later
wrote:
"Our excellent Intelligence confirmed that the operation 'Sea Lion' had
been definitely ordered by Hitler and. was in active preparation. It seemed
certain that the man was going to try." 31.
29. CAB 79/6, COS(40)280th:1, 26 August 1940.
30. CAB 79/6, COS(40)285th:1, 29 August 1940.
31. Churchill, W. S.: Vol. II, Their Finest Hour, p. 261, Cassell, London,
1949.
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Where, then, were the expected German concentratioflB of invasion ship-
ping, and on which sector of the British coastline did they indicate that
the main attack might fall? Until 28th August there had been very little
positive evidence, but later that day air photographs were developed that
showed 40 to 50 merchant ships at Kiel and 350 large motor launches at
aden, which had not been there a fortnight earlier. This was a new and
unusual feature, but it might 3.ndicate an attempt against the East Coast
and was no evidence of any threat to the South East. The Invasion Warning
Sub-Committee were certainly unimpressed. The merchant ships at Kie]. were
quite possibly held up there by "suspected mining or other temporary re-
strictions", while "some simple explanation in connection with canal or
other water traffic" might explain the presence of the possible invasion
craft at Emden, though the Committee admitted that there may be some signi-
ficance. Indeed, it was noted on 30th August that only 300 craft were
present at nden and further decreases were to be noticed by air recoiini a-
sance visits to the port on 3rd and 5th September. 32.
Where were these craft heading for? At first it was not known. Other
reports were now begirrnirg to come in. It was known that certain types of
German shipping had been recalled to the German Baltic ports and it was
learned from secret sources that German troops had been carrying out
embarkation exercises in these ports. It was noted, too, that the Stulca
short-range dive bomber aircraft, which had been withdrawn from the air
battle over England on 18th August so as to conserve their strength, were
now being moved to forward. aerodromes in the Pas de Calais area, presumably
in preparation for re-deployment against this country, while 160 long-range
bomber aircraft also were being transferred from Norway to Belgium, prob-
ably as a result of the losses inflicted on Luftflotte 5 on 15th August
during their abortive raid on the North East Coast. The aircraft movements
alone, however, were no proof of a seaborne invasion attempt. On 30th
August a possible threat from a new direction was indicated when air recon-
naissance Bpotted an assembly of requisitioned fishing boats at Brest.
The Chiefs of Staff maintained their confidence, despite this growing
evidence that something was afoot. "The security of the United Kingdom is
absolutely vital, and must be our primary consideration," they stated on
32. CAB 80/18, COS(40)721(JIC), also JIC(40)273 : Possible German Attack
against the U.K.: Report by the JIC, 7 Sept. 194 0; & Fleming, Peter:
op. cit., p. 173.	 -
33. CAB 80/18, COS(40)721(JIC), also JIC(4 0)273 ; op. cit.
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31st August, although, "we do not underrate the grave threat with which we
are faced, in view of our numerical inferiority in the air and Germany' B
occupation of the Continental seaboard." 	 The German shelling across
the Straits of Dover, too, occupied m"ch of their attention. Experiments
were undertaken to devise a klaxon born warning system that would sound to
give about a minute's warning from observation of the flashes along the
French coast of the arrival of the shells. A series of strongly worded
memoranda from the Prime Minister hastened the placing of further long-
range heavy guns in the Dover area. "It would not seem unreasonable that
the enemy should attempt gradually to master the Dover promontary, and to
commrid the Chmnel at its narrowest point," was Churchill's fear:
"This would be a natural prelim1nctry to invasion. It would give occa-
sion for continual fighting with our Air Force in the hope of exhausting
them by numbers. It would tend to drive our warships from the Channel
bases. The concentration of many batterieB on the French coast must be
expected. What are we doing in defence of the Dover promontary by heavy
artillery? •... We must insist upon mint 1nir superior artillery posi-
tions on the Dover promontary, no matter what form of attack they are
exposed to. We have to fight for commsmd of the Straights by artillery, to
destroy the enemy's batteries, and to multiply and fortify our own." 3.
On 3rd September, all the guns on shore in the Dover area were placed under
Army control, but, while additional British guns were installed from this
time onward, the numbers emplaced in 1940 were to rems'-l-n markedly fewer
than the numbers installed by the Germ n . Most guns on both sides of the
Channel, however, were only mounted for defensive purposes (i.e. to cover
ports and beaches and to support counter-attacks) or were mt4n1y uaed
against shipping targets to little effect, and even the longest-ranged guns
would have proved to be very inaccurate if used solely for a counter-
battery role. The large target of Dover, nevertheless, was to be engaged
by the German guns no less than six times at irregular intervals during
September, the heaviest attack being on 9th September when over 150 shells
were fired.. The bombardment was replied to by the sole British gun so far
emplaced, a 14" naval guix, that could reach all the way across the Channel,
while on the night of 29th/3Oth September the monitor LM.S. Erebus, with
two 15" guns, was to carry out a retalitory bombardment of Calais. 36.
34. CAB 79/6, COS(40)289th:1, 31 August 1940.
35. CAB 80/17, cos(40)669: German Coastal Batteries: Annexel: Prime
Minister to General Ismay for the COS Committee, 27 August 1940.
36. CAB 79/6, COS(40)292nd:2, 3 Sept. 1940; & Churchill, W. S.: op. cit.,
pp. 238-245.
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Reports of concentrations of small enemy shipping were by now coining
in steadily. On 1 at and 2nd September, air reoonndssance flights reported
large numbers of barges building up in the Dutch estuaries and the Ter
Neusen-Ghent-Bruges-Ostend Canals. The speed at which concentrations of
barges accumulated was noted as being most marked.. At Hanaweert on the 1st,
for example, the numbers of barges had increased by 85 in only 24 hours.
Furthermore, concentrations of motor transport and of anInhinl tion stores
were observed at the mouths of the cnIs at Ghent and Bruges, which indi-
cated that the barges were loading. 	 Even at this late stage, the area
of these concentrations still indicated that East Anglia or perhaps the
Dover promontary was the target area. No enemy shipping in any quantity
had yet been observed passing through the Straits of Dover. The latest
news, however, was beginning to worry both the Chiefs of Staff and. the War
Cabinet. "The indications pointing to invasion had never been more posi-
tive than they were at the present time," stated the First Sea Lord at a
War Cabinet meeting on 2nd September, and the Secretary of State for War
had wholeheartedly agreed. "The use of barges and small fisi:iing craft,"
moreover, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, believed, was "out of the
question" during the winter months and. they would most likely be used before
the 21st September when the possibility of equinoctial gales made the
weather thereafter extremely uncertain. The Prime Minister, on the other
hand, was sceptical of an invasion attempt so soon. He regarded fog, which
was more likely in the antumn, as "a great ally to an invader, more especi-
ally as fog was usually accompanied by a calm sea." Nevertheless, despite
the tuiease over growing evidence pointing to invasion, a decision was made
to make provisional shipping arrangements for a further 22,000 troops from
the United Kingdom to be sent as reinforcements to the Middle East towards
the end. of September, by which time the invasion question was expected to
be resolved one way or the other. True, the departure of these 22,000 re-
inforcements, which would comprise the Australian Infantry Force arid the
bulk of the 2nd. New Zealand Division, would be partly balanced by the
11,200 further Canadian troops even this day arriving in the Clyde in six
liners escorted by H.M.S. Revenge, but the War Cabinet even discussed
adMng the entire, though incomplete, 1st Armoured Division, a siiificant
proportion of the armoured strength of General Brooke's GJ.Q. Reserve, to
the proposed convoy. In the event, however, the growing evidence of an
37. caB 1 06/1198 : Air Reconnaissance Reports on Eaemy Barge Concentra-
tions in the Channel Ports, 1-2 Sept. 1940.
- 330 -
lmmi yient invasion and the Prime Minister's fears of an attempt later in the
autumn, caused. the War Cabinet to defer their decision on the latter re- -
in.forcement until not later than 10th September.
"A large scale invasion .... is unlikely," wrote the Prime Minister in
a memorandum on the inuni tions situation the next day, 3rd. September, though
he continued to mrtain that "the danger of invasion will not disappear
with the coining of winter" • 	 me Iuv ion Warning Sub-Cogunittee remained.
equally unimpressed, too, even as fresh reports from air reconn-iasance
flights caine in showing increases of 140 barges since 16th Augu.st at
Terneuzen, of 90 barges since 1st September at the southern end of the
Beveland. Canal, and of 50 barges since 31st August at Ostend.. 40. Unbe]nown
to the British, Hitler had this day issued a definite timetable from his
headquarters, setting the date for the sailing of the invasion fleet as the
20th September and. for the landing as the 21st. Orders for the commencement
of the attack would. be given ten days before it took place, that is, pre-
sumably, on the 11th September. The time delay was calculated. not only to
give the invasion forces time to complete their preparations, but, more
importantly, to give Goering a few more days to achieve the vital necessity
of mastery in the air struggle.
The concentration of barges over the last few days had pointed to a
possible invasion of East Anglia or a deBcent, perhaps, on the Dover promon-
tary. However, there came a siificant and relatively sudden change over
the next three days that at last coivinced the Chiefs of Staff and the War
Cabinet that the threat was to the South Coast or, at least, in Churchill's
words, that "the front to be attacked was altogether different from or addi-
tiona]. to the East Coast, on which the Chiefs of Staff, the Admiralty and. I,
in full agreement, still laid the major emphasis". 41.
This new development began slowly, as did British realization of its
true significance. The first indication of a general south-westerly move-
ment of the barges occurred on 4th September, when self-propelled barges
were spotted moving at speed at sea off Cap Gris Nez. Boulogne and Calais,
38. CAB 65/8 & 15, WM(40 )239th:14, & Confidential Annexi, 2 Sept. 1940.
39. CAB 66/11, WP(40)352: The Munitions Situation: Memorandum by the
Prime Minister, 3 Sept. 1940.
40. Fleming, Peter: op. cit., p. 173.
41. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 261.
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the two ports nearest the hglish coast, however, remsi1ned free of barge
concentrations, while little of note was yet apparent at Durikirk or at ports
wouth of Boulogne. Still the vast majority of barges remIned. in the Bel-
gian and. Dutch canals and. the Dutch estuaries, a oup of 76 being seen that
day off PlnRhin by air reconnaissance. The Chiefs of Staff, though now
rapidly becoming uncomfortably aware of the German preparations, still
refused to believe that the Germans were really serious about invading at
all. "Invasion of the United Kingdom," they declared. on the 4th September,
"would. in any event be an immensely formidable undertk1-ng and is becoming
increasingly so every day .... it is probable that Germany would not attempt
such a gamble in the immediate future unless she felt that no other course
would offer her resui.ts in time." 42.
A build-up in the Belgian seaports was noticed next day. There were
now 100 barges each at Zeebrugge and Ostend., and. 50 motor boatB had now
arrived at the French port of Boulogne. There was also a consequent decrease
in the numbers of barges in the Dutch estuaries and canals, the Terneuzen-
Ghent canal and. at Antwerp, though in fact several hundred barges still
remitined at the very large port of the latter town.	 To the Chiefs of
Staff and especially to the Chief of the Naval Staff, Sir Dudley Pound., who
had. written a memorandum on the subject the previous day, the German barge
concentrations in the Belgian ports on 5th September now indicated an acute
threat, not to East Anglia, but to the Dover promontaxy in particular,
though diversions might occur elsewhere. The Prime Minister had indeed
already drawn the Committee's attention to the security of the peninsula.
and the threat to the important port of Dover and its coxmnand of the
Straits. The heavy German air attacks at this time, moreover, were con-
centrated on the aerodromes of Kent and the Thames estuary during daylight
and could be a prelude to an attempt on this area, while the rapid and
enthusiastic installation by the Germans of the heavy coastal batteries,
which effectively denied the Royal Navy the use of the half of the Straits
nearest Prance, seemed only to amplify the Chiefs of Staff's fear that "the
Dover Area is the one part of the coastline where the full effects of our
naval strength could. not be developed".
42. CAB 66/li, WP(40)362, also cos(40) 683 : Future Strate r: Apprecia-
tion by the COS Committee, 4 Sept. 1940.
43. CAB 66/il, WP(40)361, also coS(40)71 6 : Weekly Resum No. 52, 6 Sept.
1940; & CAB 106/1198: op. cit., 4-5 Sept. 1940.
44. CAB 79/6, COS (40)295th:l, 5 Sept. 1940.
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Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound's carefully reasoned view is
interesting and illustrates well the Naval opinion of where the blow was
likely to fall. His argument was based on the assumption that the Germans,
"as very practical and experienced makers of war, would not undertake any
project which they did not think had at least a reasonable chance of
success." The enemy, therefore, mu.st realize that to undertake any landing
on the East or South Coasts they would. be  courting disaster, since they
"cannot expect even local naval superiority" for the initial landing, nor
could they hope to m4ntain any lodgement, which had to be almost entirely
dependent on seaborne supplies, by protecting the necessary convoys with
continual aircraft attack. Only if, perhaps by a surprise attack, the
Germans could seize Dover and capture its gun defences, reasoned Admiral
Pound, would they be able, by holding both coastlines of the Straights, to
be "in a position largely to deny these waters to our naval forceB." This
done, continued the Admiral, the Germans would be able:
".... to send a stream of craft across from Calais to Dover, with
their tanks, guns and everything they require for a full-scale battle, and
we in the Navy could not do a great deal to interfere because of the shore
guns on both sides, at any rate by day.
All that the country could do then to stop this supply line would be
air attack and we know from experience that this is not enough.
We also know that, with the vast quantities of war material which
Germany possesses today (compared to which our own material, both existing
and prospective, is almost as nothing), if once she could get a solid
footing in this country and even a moderately secure supply line, there
might really be a prospect of an invasion succeeding. All the experience
of the last year has taught us that when material is produced in sufficient
quantity, it is an extremely serious matter for another army which is not
comparably equipped."
"It is consequently a matter of vital importance to hold this part of the
coast," Admiral Pound concluded. Then, referring to the plans of Home
Forces for the land defence of the Win€dom, by now much modified by General
Brooke, he went on:
".... while in other parts of the coast it may be accepted that our
defences on the coast are a 'crust' and the in4n body of resistance will be
found further back, this rule does not apply to the Dover area, which must
be held at all costs, and under no conditions could we accept that the
Germans get Buy footing there at all." 45.
45. CAB 80/18, COS(40)711: Invasion: Vital Importance of the Dover Area:
Memoranda by the CNS, 4 Sept. 1940.
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At the Chiefs of Staff's Meeting on the 5th September, Lieutenant
General Paget, replying on General Brooke ' s behalf to Admiral Pound' a
insistence that Home Forces should be asked "immediately" to consider this
matter "with a view to reinforcements being sent to the Dover area as BOOfl
as possible", emphasized the steps already taken to reinforce the South
East and the Dover garrison. On the Chiefs of Staff's further insistence
that the coast defence artillery at Dover "should be adequately protected
by ground troops", however, General Brooke was in fact to move the New
Zealand Division to East Kent on the very next day. 46.
The Chiefs of Staff were by now keeping a very close eye on develop-
ments on the other side of the Chrmel. Besides eTminir1g the photographic
and other intelligence, they were also becoming ever more azous as to the
correct interpretation of German intentions against the United. Kingdom in
the very near future, whether on land, in the air or at sea. Pull details
of moon and tide conditions and their possible effects on the enemy's plans
were also required. Next morning, on 6th September, a very generalised and.
rather vague report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Coiittee was rejected by
the Chiefs of Staff on these very same grounds. The report had. merely re-
stated that invasion or raids may be attempted. "in the near future"; that
successful invasion depended on German sea or air superiority, neither of
which was iimned.iately obtai ble; that the Germans would, however, employ
their greatest effort in an attempt to secure the necessary air superiority
and that the Germans "having brought to a high pitch of preparedness their
plans for invasion, will not run the risk of a major defeat and consequent
loss of prestige" until that air superiority was achieved.
Although the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed that this report "was
not what was required", the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee was, in fact,
to be correct on all but the first counts. Most notably, although they did
not predict the actual nature of the attack, the Sub-Committee, who had
prepared their report on the 5th, declared that "the public should be warned
to expect an increased scale of air attack in the immediate future".
Sure enough, Lon1on' a docks were bombed that same night for the first time
and were hit again on the night of the 6th, although this was merely a fore-
taste of the devastation yet to come.
46. CAB 79/6, COS(40)295th:1, 5 Sept. 1940.
47. CAB 79/6, COS(40)296th:2, 6 Sept. 1940; & CAB 80/18, COS(40)713(JIC),
also JIC(40)268 : Seaborne Invasion of the United Kingdom: Report by
the JIC, 5 Sept. 1940.
48. ibid.
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Meanwhile, air reconnaissance on 6th September had by now established
"a definite south-westerly movement towards the Channel ports", combined
with a continuation of the decline in numbers of barges seen in the Ditch
canals and estuaries, the Belgian canals, except near the coast, and at
Antwerp.	 For the first time, barges were seen in some numbers in the
French Channel ports. At Dmikirk there were now 134 barges in the harbour
or the approach canal, whilst a convoy of at least 31 more barges were
spotted heading in a westerly direction off the port; at Calais 53 barges
had arrived since the 4th September, of a type very similar to a convoy
seen off Flushing on that date, and at least 14 small steamers were visible
anchored outside the harbour; at Boulogne a total of 61 barges were seen
in harbour, with further small craft moving south outside the port, and at
Le Havre 15 vessels were seen entering the harbour, very likely only part
of a convoy extending out to sea to the north-west. All the barges present
were of a self-propelled type of between 130 and 150 feet in length. More
barges of this type were seen in the Belgian ports; a total of 213, over
100 more than on the previous day, were in or immediately outside the
harbour at Ostend together with 11 small craft and six larger vessels; a
further 60 barges aM 35 motorboats were in the approach ctm1s to Ostend,
while another 100 barges were moored in the canal encircling Bruges. The
Zeebrugge-Ghent-Terneuzen canals, by comparison, were by now almost empty.
As for other areas, there had been a recent reduction of shipping in South-
ern Norwegian ports, but ample shipping for & raid or diversion of perhaps
divisional strength was still present, while there had. been a considerable
increase of shipping at Hamburg and unconfirmed movements of a convoy of
large transports through the Great Belt of Denmark on the 4th or 5th Sept-
ember. 50. The Baltic, as ever, remained a largely imknown factor, as did
the ports of Western France. While the Chiefs of Staff, however, were to
remain largely in touch with these continuing developments, at least one of
their advisory bodies, the Invasion Warning Sub-Committee, was very off
track and, indeed, seemed to disbelieve evidence that was rapidly becoming
almost impossible to interpret wrongly. "There is little evidsime other
other than the movement of small craft towards the Chmnel ports," it cob-
merited on that same day, 6th September, "to show that preparations for
49. CAB 106/11 98 : op. cit., 6 Sept. 1940.
-
50. CAB 80/18, COS(40)721(JIC), also JIC(40)273 : Possible German Action
against the United TUngd.om: Report by the JIC, 7 Sept. 1940.
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invasion of the United in€dom are more advanced than they have been for
some time.... If there is an intention to invade, the expedition is being
held. in readiness in the Baltic or Hamburg. 51 • The Chiefs of Staff,
fortunately, were to place far greater reliance on the reports arid conclu-
sione of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Coumittee.
By Saturday, 7th September, the threat to the South East from the
barges now massing in the Chmnel ports was becoming very obvious. The day,
however, began quietly enough with little more than routine enemy activity
in the air. The Chiefs of Staff with General Brooke, meeting at noon,
remained concerned about possible German intentions, but took no further
action beyond examining a number of recently received telegrams for possible
clues and instructing the Joint Intelligence Sub-Coittee to submit their
revised and far more detailed report to them later in the day. 52.
Shortly after 4 p.m. that day, however, the first signs of another
bomber raid showed on the British radar screens. As the first wave of
about 150 bombers crossed the coast at 4.30 p.m., it soon became obvious
that their target was not the vital sector stations of Fighter Conmismd that
had. been hit so often in the last few weeks, but the oapita]. itself. The
British Lighter defence was caught off balance and the vast majority of the
bombers, followed by a second wave which crossed the coast about 5.20 p.m.,
were able to create widespread devastation and many civilian casualties,
especially in London's docklands and. eastern suburbs.
The Chiefs of Staff saw the attack on London, which had not in fact
been totally unexpected, although the timing could not have been predicted,
as fins]. evidence of a German invasion attempt to be launched in the very
near future. Hitler himself, indeed, had declared his intention of razing
British cities to the ground in revenge for British bomber raids on Berlin,
in a ranting speech at the Sportpalast in Berlin on 4th September. a speech
which had ended with the significant words, "He [Hitler) is coming!" Lt.-
General Paget, representing General Brooke, was summoned urgently from his
inmersmith headquarters to the Chiefs of Staff's afternoon meeting at
5.30 p.m. on the 7th September, even as bombs were raining down on the
capital. Major General Beaumont-Nesbitt, Director of Military Intelligence
51. Fleming, Peter, op. cit., p. 173.
52. CAB 79/6, COS(40)299th:1, 7 Sept. 1940.
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at the War Office, was also called to the meeting to give a detailed snm1i'y
of the very latest intelligence on possible German action against the United
Kingdom as interpreted by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. During the
last two months the Germans had been building up their aerodromes in
Northern Prance and. had prepared gun emplacements in the Calais area. Pour
heavy bomber groups had recently been moved into Northern Prance from Norway
and. the dive bomber formations had. now been moved forward from the areas
which they had occupied during the middle of August, presumably for
refitting following their mauling earlier in the air struggle. The recent
concentration of German air attacks against R.A.P. aerodromes and aircraft
factories was clearly seen as an attempt by the Germans to gain early air
superiority. Reports, too, had. been received that German aircraft had
experimented in the laying of artificial smoke clouds which might be used.
to cover landings or as a diversion, and there were indications that such
preparations would be completed within the next two or three days.
Restrictions, moreover, had. been placed on the movement of civilians in the
coastal areas of Prance and. the Low Countries, and there were even reports
that inhabitants had been withdrawn from the North Coast of Prance so that
their empty houses might be used to conceal concentrations of enemy troops
from roving R.A.P. reconnaissance planes.
As to the possible timing of the German invasion, consideration of
moonlight and tide conditions showed that these would be at their best be-
tween the 8th and 10th September. The most favourable conditions were
believed to be a dark sea passage, half light on arrival and. a rising tide.
The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee's detailed report, in addition, stated
that information had been received from Stockholm of a German expedition to
Iceland; "a diversion of this nature is to be anticipated prior to inva-
sion," they conmiented, while a number of rumours from "secret sources" also
emphasized the likelihood of invasion tki ng place in the first fortnight of
September.	 The advanced state of the various German preparations and.
especially the concentration of barges in the southern North Sea ports
during the last ten days aM the subsequent southward movement of these same
barges during the last three days all tended to support the Sub-Committee' s
53. CA 79/6, COS(40)300th:1, 7 Sept. 1940.
54. CAB 80/18, COS(40)721 (Jic), also JIC(40)273 : Possible German Action
against the United Kingdom: Report by the JIC, 7 Sept. 1940.
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view. Perhaps the most telling intelligence, however, was the news that
leave throughout the German Army was being cancelled on 8th September.
There seemed to be little d.ispute, therefore, as to the timing of the
intended German assault, which was agreed by the Chiefs of Staff to have now
become "imminent". Certainly, General Brooke shared the Chiefs of Staff's
view on this point, although the Prime Minister still preferred his own
opinion that the invasion was more likely to come under cover of fog later
in the autu. "The Chiefs of Staff," he later wrote, "were on the whole of
the opinion that invasion was imminent, while I was sceptical and expressed
a contrary view." 55 on the question of where the invasion would fall,
however, the Chiefs of Staff still preferred to keep their options open,
despite the new evidence pointing to the South or South East Coasts. The
most recent reports, received up to early that same afternoon, the Committee
heard, had shown concentrations of barges totalling some 500 in ports from
Le Havre to Ostend inclusive, with a total carrying capacity of between
50,000 and 60,000 troops with a proportion of their equipment. More self-
propelled barges had moved into the French Channel ports and Ostend, many
apparently from the Ostend-Bruges canal, and more convoys moving in a south-
westerly direction had been spotted at sea. Some 60 small craft were seen
in the canal at Caen alone, while 9 unusual craft that appeared to be rafts
about 50t square, with "remarkable powers of manoeuvre", were seen at or
near Carteret on the west side of the Cherbourg peninsula. Ominously, too,
it was reported that among the many craft iii French ports some were being
fitted to carry the dreaded duel purpose 88 nmi. anti-aircraft and anti-tank
gun, together with their tractors and ample supplies of amizunition. The
handling of the barges in general, moreover, suggested that they were manned
by competent naval crews, while their presence in the Channel ports again
suggested an early date for invasion, since these vulnerable craft would not
be moved unnecessarily to positions so exposed to R.A.P. bombing attacks,
attacks which were not to be long in coming. 56.
On the face of it, the evidence overwhelmingly seemed to point to what
General Brooke had long since warned about, namely a now see mi ngly Imminent
descent on the South or South East Coast. The Chiefs of Staff's attention
55. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 405.
56. CAB 79/6, COS(40)300th:1, 7 Sept. 1940; & CAB 106/1198: op. cit.,
7 Sept. 1940.
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had by now indeed been drawn to this sector, yet at no time did they allow
this threat to rate more than equal to the potential threat they already
envisaged as existing to the East Anglian Coast. They did not forget that,
in the absence of effective seapower, the Germans would almost certrily
use their bomber force, particularly the dive bombers, to cover the actual
crossing and that these aircraft were all too vulnerable to the British
fighters, most especially as the necessary air superiority had not yet been
achieved and therefore had to have strong fighter escorts. Twin-engine
fighters with their greater range were not available in great enough
numbers and had proved to be inferior in quality, too, to the R.A.F.'s
single-engine fighters, so single-engine fighters would have to be used to
escort the bombers and this limited their effective operating range in day-
light to the stretch of coast roughly between The Wash and Southampton. A
number of enemy agents, moreover, had been captured within the last few
days, including one in Northampshire, and three Thitchmen and a German who
had. landed by rowing boat on the coast of Kent. These had. confessed to
being spies and had said they were not to make any contacts in England, but
were to lie low and be ready at any time in the next fortnight to report
not only on the condition of British aerodromes, but also on the movements
of British reserve formations in the area of Ipswich-London-Reading-Oxford,
an area in which there could be British movements as a response as much to
an attack on East Axiglia as to an attack on the South East or South Coasts.
The Chiefs of Staff' a main fear for the safety of the East Anglian
Coast, however, remained, the threat they imagined as existing from, the
North German ports, and in particular from the Baltic, from large ships,
perhaps supplemented by the barges and smaller motor vessels even now mass-
ing in the Belgian ports. They therefore willingly went along with the
Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee's appraisal that:
'tRecent indications are that the most likely areas to be attacked are
from Southwold to Beachy Read. Subsidiary attacks may be expected at other
places, while the main expedition is likely to come from Ramburg or the
Baltic where shipping is known to be available, though no evidence of an
expedition being embarked has yet been obtained.
A Baltic expedition could be launched via the Kiel Canal or the
Skaggerak, and it is considered that reconnai asance of the Heligoland Bight
and Skaggerak is likely to give the earliest warning of such an expedition
and a much needed indication of its point of attack." 58.
57. CAB 79/6, COS(40)300th:1 , 7 Sept. 1940.
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The substance of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee' a conclusions were
reported to the Chiefs of Staff by the Director of Military Intelligence at
the important meeting on 7th September, although he clarified the point
that the miin attack was likely to be carried out by the barges protected
by an air umbrella within the Southwold to Beachy Head sector, rather than
by large ships sailing directly to the East Coast. Nevertheless, in d.is-
cussion the Chiefs of Staff made it clear that they were imhppy about air
recor'nsdssance over the Baltic, which was at present carried out at eight
hourly intervals, since, 'tWe could not afford to give an expedition nearly
eight hours' start from this area." The Air Ministry was instructed to
reduce the intervals as well as to step up night reconni4ssaxice of Dutch,
Belgian and Northern French coasts by using flares, while the Director of
Military Intelligence was also asked to glean what information he could.
from agents about German troop movements and concentrations on the enemy
occupied coastlines, as well as as much information as possible from enemy
agents captured. in Britain.
The upshot of this meeting was that, in view of the acute danger, the
defence forces were told. to stand by "at immediate notice". The Navy was
already at this stage of readiness, while the R.A.F. was at 'alert two'
which envisaged a landing within three days. General Brooke had already
issued the instruction on the previous night that, "Attack is probable
within the next three days." This order had brought Home Forces to eight
hours' notice and the troops, in addition, now 'stood. to' at dawn and. dusk.
The Chiefs of Staff agreed to bring Home Forces to the final state- of
readiness and. noted. that the Commmder-in-Chief, Home Forces, would. "place
troops in the Southern and. Eastern Commands at immediate notice and warn
troops in other Commmds that this action had been taken". 60. The Mini-
stry of Home Security and other Civil departments were to be informed of
the decision and General Brooke, having supervised the final arrangements
at his headquarters, was to issue the fateful codeword. 'Cromwell' later
that evening.
The issue of the final codeword to Home Forces was to bring itB own
problems. It is interesting, however, to note that the instruction was
issued to both Southern and Eastern Commards, that is, not only to forma-
tions along the South and South East Coasts, but also to those in East
59. CAB 79/6, COS(40)300th:1, 7 Sept. 1940.
60. ibid..
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Anglia. This, the most vulnerable part of the East Coast, it seemed., could
still not be neglected. aM valuable formations from Home Forces had. to be
positioned along the coast and in reserve to guard. it, despite the fact
that Hitler, although i known to the British, had. no intention of launching
a major landing in this sector. Peter P]vnlng in 'Invasion 1940' states
that:
"As long as counter-invasion intelligence rems-lied largely a matter of
guesswork, the British tended to guess wrong; but from the moment, in the
last days of August, when a body of relevant evidence began to come their
way, they interpreted it sensibly and got the answer more or less rigiat." 61.
It does remn in doubt whether the Chiefs of Staff and the Prime Minister,
however, despite their attention now being drawn to the South Coast, ever
completely got the answer right or at any time, in September 1940, arrived
at a perfectly correct forecast of the German strate r. Ever since the
shock of the Germans' mMn attack on Prance and the Low Countries in May
1940 coming through the 'impassable' Ard.ennes, the GernhJnR had been expected
by all to do that which was most unexpected., and. British attitudes, in view
of the disastrous consequences of that particular attack for the Allies,
hardly surprisingly, were to change only very slowly.




CHAPTER 11: THE BROOKE PLAL "CROThIELL" A1'D AFPER
While the various aspects of the invasion problem were being debated.
in the highest circles, Genera]. Brooke, in the meantime, had. not been idle
in preparing Home Forces for the expected onslaught. It was a whole month
now since, on 6th August, he had declared to the C.I.G.S. and the assembled
G.O. C.'s-in-C. Command. his intention of making "mobile offensive action"
the basis of his plan for the land defence of the Kingdom and of substituting
a policy of all-round defence in depth, combined with strong and rapidly
moving counter-attacking forces led by tanks and armoured vehicles, to deal
with both seaborne and. airborne enemy landings, in place of General
Ironsid.e's outmoded plans for successive lines of defence set parallel and
often far inland from the coast.
In introducing this 1new' policy, he had received the total backing of
the Prime Minister, whose ideas on the defence of the Nation on land were
very similar to his own. Churchill, indeed, had warned strongly of "the
dangers of being unduly coitted to systems of passive defence" and
strongly emphasized the importance of rapid and vigorous counter-attack in
his memorandum on defence against invasion, submitted to the Chiefs of
Staff Committee the following day, 7th August. "Should the enemy succeed
in landing at various points," the Prime Minister had declared,
"he should be made to suffer as much as possible by local resistance
on the beaches, combined with .... attack from the sea and. the air. This
forces him to use up his ammunition, and confines him to a limited area.
The defence of any part of the coast must be measured not by the forces on
the coast, but by the number of hours within which strong counter-attacks
by mobile troops can be brought to bear upon the landing-places. Such
attacks should be hurled with the utmost speed and fury upon the enemy at
his weakest moment, which is not, as is sometimes suggested, when actually
getting out of his boats, but when sprawled upon the shore with his
communications cut and his supplies running short. It ought to be possible
to concentrate ten thousand. men fully equipped within six hours, and twenty
thousand men within twelve hours, upon any point where a serious lodgement
has been effected."
Then, with a slight twinkle and certainly with General Brooke in mind, he
had added,
"The withholding of the reserves until the full gravity of the attack
is known, is a nice problem for the Home Coixunand." 1.
1. CAB 66/10 wI(40)319; also COS(40)604 (Revise), Annexe I: Defence
Against Invasion: Note by the Prime Minister and. Minister of Defence,
5 August 1940.
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In the Prime Minister's view, there was "no one more capable" than the
man selected to do just this in the event of an invasion, General Brooke. 2.
Even before the Prime Minister's minute and. indeed since the time of
his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, on 20th July, Genera].
Brooke had been thinking along very sitnila.r lines. First, however, he had
to gain the complete confidence not merely of the Prime Minister, but also
of the Chiefs of Staff, as well as of the army commanders now serving under
him, and. his declaration on the 6th August was partly designed to this end..
Before this declaration, in the first days of his appointment he had
received some uncomfortably close questioning on matters of Home Defence by
the Chiefs of Staff. Such questioning had so recently led. to the lack of
confidence that had. caused. General Ironside's replacement. On 26th July,
for example, "some doubt was expressed." by the Chiefs of Staff as to
"whether the first task of the mobile Army reserves would. be  to deal with a
successful landing by airborne troops or to counter-attack a successful
lodgement on the coast." General Brooke, who at this time had. only just
inberited the dispositions of his predecessor and. had had hardly any time
as yet to make his own dispositions, could. only reply that his reserves,
".... were min1y disposed. to afford. protection to important ports and
to counter-attack enemy forces securing a foothold. on the coast in the
vicinity of such ports. As a rule, they were also suitably located. to deal
with airborne landings and. a decision as to which of these tasks was the
most important could. only be made at the time and in the light of events." '
General Brooke had, in fact, already given much thought to countering
any German landings by parachute and glider, which were designed to seize
objectives in advance of land.ings by sea in the most vital areas. One such
area he felt was a particular worry, though surprisingly, in view of its
vulnerability as illustrated by forthcoming developments, it was not the
Dover promontory with its vital port. "I was seriously disturbed.," he
later wrote,
"by the prospect of German airborne landings on the South Downs, to be
carried. out in combination with landings and. destined. to prevent the timely
arrival of my counter-attacking forces. To guard against such an eventu-
ality, mobile forces such as Brocas Burrows' brigade were retained. on the
South Downs, ready to deal at once with any airborne landings." 4
2. Churchill, W. S.: Vol. II, Their Finest Hour, p. 263. Cassell, London,
1949.
3. CAB 79/5 COS (40 )235th: 1 , 26 July 1940.
4. AutobioaphicaJ. Notes of Field. Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, Vol. IV,
pp. 229-230.
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This latter formation was that of the 1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade, formed
in late June and placed on the South Downs by General Ironside. General
Brooke immediately supplemented this lightly armed and armoured brigade
with a motorized formation of regular infantry, recently redesignated as
29th In.fantry Brigade Group. The latter had now completed its equipment
and, together with 31st Infantry Brigade Group which 3oined IV Corps in
G.H.Q. Reserve, had been released to the operational control of Home Forces
on 1st August. Both Infantry Brigade Groups were organised for rapid
counter-attack and were placed directly under Corps control. In the case
of 29th Infantry Brigade Group, the controlling body was the headquarters
of Lieutenant General Thorne's flI Corps and the brigade, helping to fill
the yawning gap in West Sussex left by the departure of Major General
Montgomery's 3rd Division on 11th July (see Naps 8 & 9), was soon hard at
work training for its allotted task of swiftly moving to repel both sea-
borne and airborne enemy landings.
Further anxieties had been aired by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at
the end of July. On 29th July the Committee was worried by a report that
"gun emplacements along the South Coast were in many cases still too
visible and that their camouflage was insufficient". The Air Ministry were
duly asked, in consultation with the War Office and. General Brooke, to
conduct an air reconnaissance of all gun emplacements along the coast with
a view to establishing how well, or badly, these emplacements were con-
cealed from above and from seawards at sea level. 6. Most worrying would
be the extreme vulnerability of any poorly camouflaged emplacements to -
German dive-bombing attacks. Lacking heavy naval vessels for shore bombard-
ment, the Germans were liable to use their dive bombers for subduing the
British coastal defences in the locality of a seaborne landing. The Chiefs
of Staff, as it happened, were quite correct in this reasoning since this
tactic, in fact, featured in the enemy plans for Operation 'Sea Lion'.
As to the effects of enemy dive-bombing attacks on the troops of Home
Forces, in general the Chiefs of Staff agreed at this meeting that "experi-
ence both in Norway and. France had shown that it was the moral rather than
the material effect which was the more damaging to troops". Prom a point
5. WO 166/i: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, G.R.. Home Forces, 1 August
1940.
6. CAB 79/5 COS (40 )238th: 1 , 29 July 1940.
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of view both as to the morale of the defenders and as a deterrent against
the attacking aircraft, experience had also shown that the troops' best
defence was the maintenance of "a continuous stream of anti-aircraft fire".
Heavy, as well as light, anti-aircraft guns should be used. The Chiefs of
Staff considered it "very desirable that all Home Defence troops should. be
inculcated with this doctrine" and it was decided to bring this point to
the notice of both Home Forces and A.D.G.B. and to discover what instruc-
tions had been issued to the troops. 7 In actual fact, General Brooke had
already touched on this subject of defence against dive-bombing attacks
with the Chiefs of Staff only three days previously. At this earlier
meeting he had, in the absence of fighter protection being made available,
asked for plentiful mobile light A.A. units to be allocated to protect Home
Forces, especially those troops designated for a counter-attacking role. 8.
Now, on 29th July, he was to be asked to instruct his troops to maintain
this supposed "continuous stream of anti-aircraft fire" without yet having
been given the means to undertake such a task effectively.
This was clearly a very unsatisfactory state of affairs and. a few days
later, on 5th August, General Brooke was to protest strongly to the Chiefs
of Staff that:
"The serious deficiency in light anti-aircraft units was a cause of
great concern. Experience in France had shown that these units were
necessary on a scale of one regiment of 36 guns per Army Corps. The only
light anti-aircraft guns that could at present be made available for co-
operation with the whole of the Field Army, were four batteries (a total of
48 guns) which would remain in their present locations, but would be
liberated for co-operation with the Field Army when actual invasion seemed
1inIranent.t
All too aware that there were far too few such guns available in the country,
General Brooke urged the Chiefs of Staff to "weigh up very carefully the
relative requirements", since the great majority of these guns were used for
the protection of vital industries.	 A week later he again stressed the
need of light anti-aircraft guns to be allocated as soon as possible to Home
Forces on a strength of one regiment per Army Corps. Alreadr some personnel
were being trained for mining Bofers guns in a mobile role, yet the weapons
themselves were still to remain in their static A.D.G.B. role. Field Army
units deployed for home defence, he declared,
7. ibid.
8. CAB 79/5 COS(40)235th: 1 , 26 July 1940.
9. CAB 79/5 COS(40)247th:1, 5 August 1940.
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would require the co-operation of light anti-aircraft units in
the same way as the B.E.F. had required them, and the time had come when the
importance of protecting factories from low-flying attack would have to be
weighed up against the importance of protecting the troops that protect the
factories from invasion."
The Chiefs of Staff, however, did. nothing beyond asking the Vice Chiefs of
Staff Committee to "consider" the matter with a view to an allocation of
light anti-aircraft guns from future production. 10.
It was not until the 3rd September that the Chiefs of Staff Committee
again discussed this matter. The Vice Chiefs had. suggested. that a monthly
allocation from new production of two batteries (24 guns) be made to Rome
Forces, starting in September, giving a total of four regiments or 144 guns
by the end of February 1941.
	
The Deputy Chiefs of Staff's Anti-Aircraft
Sub Committee, on the other hand, had pointed out the insufficiency of light
and heavy anti-aircraft guns currently with A.D.G.B.. Major General S. C. M.
Archibald from Headquarters, Home Forces, representing General Brooke at
this meeting, again put forward the arguments of Home Forces. The C.-in-C.,
Rome Forces, he said,
wished to emphasize that under present arrangements no anti-
aircraft guns were completely at his disposal and that he was most anxious
that al least some light anti-aircraft guns should be placed under his
command. The success which the enemy had achieved in France could be
largely attributed to the use by the enemy of his dive bombers, and, as a
safeguard against a repetition of a similar experience in the event of
invasion, the C.-in-C., Home Forces, was anxious to press for an allocation
of light anti-aircraft suns on the scale of rising ultimately to two
regiments per Corps." 12.
The pleas of Home Forces, however, continued to be overruled by the
Chiefs of Staff. Discussing the matter, the Chiefs of Staff referred
to a similar plea for anti-aircraft guns made by General Ironside as long
ago as 14th July, which had been rejected for a variety of reasons. It had
been considered then that the conditions regarding the protection of Home
Forces against the attentions of dive bombers were totally different from
the conditions which the B.E.F. had. had. to operate under. The fighter
protection which would be given by A.D.G.B. was considerably stronger and
capable of more efficient control than that which had existed in France.
10. CAB 79/6 COS(40)260th:2, 12 August 1940.
11. CAB 80/17 C0S(40)692: Allocation of A.A. Equipment: Memo by V.C.I.G.S.,
31 August 1940.
12. CAB 79/6 COS(40 )293rd:1, 3 September 1940.
- 346 -
Home Forces were not dependent on semi-advanced bases and their rear areas
would conform in nearly all cases to the areas already defended by the
heavy guns of A.D.G.B.. The B.E.F., moreover, had had to operate without
the advantage of an elaborate and highly organised warning system linked to
a circular air defence, such as existed in Britain under A.D.G.B., and
their flank had been exposed. Home Forces, too, would not really have need
of anti-aircraft guns until the German dive bombers were attacking in force,
a state of affairs that would not be reached until the enemy had established
a firm foothold in this country. The latter, in turn, would not happen
unless the R.A.F. lost command of the air; and the protection of the vital
aircraft factories, fighter stations and R.D.F. stations needed to keep the
R.A.F. fighting effectively, was at present the most important task of the
anti-aircraft defence throughout the country. With the limited numbers of
A.A. guns held by A.D.G.B. even now, the withdrawal of but a few guns from
these vital tasks for use by Home Forces might be fatal and, moreover, would
not satisfy the full air defence requirements of the widespread units of
Home Forces by a long way.
With only so many A.A. guns available, it was most important of all,
the Chiefs of Staff maintained, that all guns should be kept under a single
authority. This was the fundamental conception of A.D.G.B., in that it
provided a defence umbrella for the whole country, under the command of the
A.0. C.-in-C. Fighter Command, Air Chief Narshal Sir Hugh DowxLng, who was
thus in the unique position of viewing the picture of the air defence
requirements of the country as a whole. He was charged with the responsi-
bility for provid.ing, as and when raquired, defence against enemy .ir attack
at whatever point it might be launched and, under existing arrangements, the
whole of the A.A. resources of the country were under his command for this
purpose. This responsibility would. automatically carry with it the provi-
sion of A.A. defence against dive-bombing attacks directed against Home
Forces. Thus, if the circumstances demanded, it would be for the A.0.
C.-in-C. Fighter Command to transfer, at his discretion, such mobile A.A.
equipments as might be necessary for the defence of military forces engaging
the enemy on the beaches or inland. 13.
All in all, the Chiefs of Staff declared at their 3rd September meeting,
13. ibid. and CAB 79/5 C0S(40)221st:1, 14 July 1940.
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".... with the extremely limited resources of anti-aircraft guns at our
disposal, it would be nthinkble that such guns should be withdrawn from
the front line in which they were at present fully engaged, to meet a hypo-
thetical situation of invasion which might never arise." 14.
The Chiefs of Staff, therefore, refused to alter their decision of 14th
July that no heavy or light A.A. guns would be allocated specifically to the
command of Home Forces at the present time. The troops would have to con-
tinue to rely for protection against enemy aircraft on the general umbrella
provided by A.D.G.B. under the single and central control of the A.O. C.-in-
C. Fighter Command. The A.A. protection of the troops would remain an
integral part of the latter's responsibility, although the A.C. C.-in-C. was
"invited to bear in mind, in deploying new light anti-aircraft defences, the
possible requirements of Home Forces". 15.
The matter, though, did not rest there. On 11th September, the C.I.G.S.,
General Dill, succeeded in persuading the Chiefs of Staff Committee to invite
the C.A.S. to erm1ne the possibility of making a few Bofors guns available
to Home Forces for trrririg with field units "as a secondary role to the
defence of vital points", since he felt "no doubt that the enemy would try
to prevent the movement of our reserves by the large-scale use of dive
bombers" and that "the allocation of even a token number of light anti-
aircraft guns would make a considerable difference". 16. The same day,
however, Churchill's War Cabinet also touched on this matter, while discuss-
ing the defence of the Dover promontory, and hearing that General Brooke was
"very anxious to get a regiment of Bofors guns", iumediately proceeded to
authorise a plain directive to the A.O. C.-in-C. Fighter Command to provide
a regiment of 36 Bofors guns for the defence of the troops in the North
Foreland - Dungeness sector of East Kent against attack by low-flying
17.aircraft.
The directive, issued by the Air Ministry on the War Cabinet's behalf
and without any reference to the Chiefs of Staff Corntiittee, not surprisingly
greatly upset Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, who quickly submitted a
formal protest to the Air Ministry against the directive and even went so
far as to point out to the Sub Comin.ittee on the Allocation of Active Air
Defence that "he would find it difficult to exercise his responsibilities if
14. CAB 79/6 COS (40 )293rd:1 , 3 September 1940.
15. ibid. and CAB 79/5 COS(40 )221st:1 , 14 July 1940.
16. CAB 79/6 COS (40 )305th:1 , 11 September 1940.
17. CAB 65/15 WM(40)247th:3, 11 September 1940.
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similar directions were issued in future". The Sub Committee, too, protested
strongly in a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff on 27th September that:
"In order to carry out this direction, it was necessary to withdraw the
guns from places of vital importance.... We feel it right to invite the
attention of the Chiefs of Staff to the implications of this withdrawal of
light anti-aircraft guns with a view to consideration being given to the
cancelling of this direction."
The case of Rarwich caused the Sub Committee the greatest concern:
"In order to find, the 36 guns, it has been necessay to remove the 12
Bofors guns previously deployed at Harwich, and the Admiralty have invited
our attention to the risks which this involves. Two flotillas of destroyers,
a number of corvettes, two flotillas of M.T.B.s and some submarines are at
present based on Harwich for anti-invasion duties. The Admiralty point out
that if, due to the absence of adequate defences against low-flying aircraft,
a destroyer were to be sunk in the harbour, Earwich might be temporarily
blocked; and as Earwich is the only base between Dover and the Humber where
cru.isers and destroyers can re-ammunition and oil, this might have very 18
serious results on our Naval operations, should an invasion be launched."
The Chiefs of Staff, however, probably all too uell aware that the
weight of the Prime Minister was behind the Air Ministry's direction, agreed
the next day that the allocation of the 36 Bofors guns to Home Forces (which
had 'by now been made) should stand and. that the 12 guns withdrawn from
Earwich should be replaced ixnmed.iately from new production. The other guns
taken from A.D.G.B. would be similarly replaced as soon as possible and. the
possibility of a token monthly allocation of new Bofors guns to Home Forces
for training purposes was to be considered. 19. 	 -
After much debate, therefore, General Brooke had. eventually received
the first of the regiments of Bofors guns that he had originally asked for
and the regiment was quite correctly allocated to the particularly vulnerable
sector held by XII Corps, where it would be invaluable in covering the move-
ments of the reserve formations, especially those of VII Corps, in the event
of an enemy invasion of the South East. It would be a very long time, how-
ever, before the allocation of one light anti-aircraft regiment per Army
Corps, let alone the ultimate goal of two regiments per Corps could be made.
18. CB 80/19 COS(40)786; also DCOS(AA)182: Withdrawal of Bofors Guns to
Provide LLA Defences for Home Forces: Memo by the Sub Committee on the
Allocation of Active Air Defences, 27 September 1940.
19. CAB 79/7 COS ( 40 )328th:3, 28 September 1940.
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In the meantime, the movements of reserves within any other Corps area in
the Country would. lack sufficient light anti-aircraft protection. In the
open country of East Anglia, in particular, such vulnerability of reserves,
especially amoured. reserves, to enemy dive bombing might have had. a critical
and. perhaps disastrous effect on possible mobile operations to counter any
enemy attack. In late October, General Brooke was allocated a further
battery of twelve Bofors, but these were granted for the specific purpose of
forming a "travelling circus" of mobile light anti-aircraft guns to afford
some protection, or at least act as a deterrent to enemy aircraft engaged. in
low-level accurate daylight bombing raids on selected towns in the South
East. The guns were to surprise the enemy with concentrated anti-aircraft
fire at places thought to be undefended and the scheme was to have some
20.
success.	 The regular allocation of light anti-aircraft guns to Home
Forces from new production, on the other hand., was to come to little until
the following year. As late as 23rd December, General Brooke complained to
the Chiefs of Staff that he had expected to receive about eight Bofors guns
a month, but had. actually received only two guns over the entire three
months from the end of September. All in all it was a very slow process of
allocation for a piece of military equipment that General Brooke considered.
"vitally important" if the mobile, and especially the aimoured, divisions
"were to play their part in repelling invasion". 21. Bearing in mind the
havoc wrought by Allied ground attack and rocket-firing aircraft on the
German armoured reserves in Normandy later in the War, it can be seen that
General Brooke certainly had. a point.
*	 *	 *
The importance of the formations of Home Forces placed. in mobile
reserve had at no time been lost on the capable mind of the C.-in-C., Home
Forces. One of the Chiefs of Staff's many worries at the end of July had
been,
".... that the permanent road blocks which had been constructed at
various points along the South Coast and elseirhere as obstructions against
invasion might, in certain circumstances, have the opposite effect of acting
as a brake on the passage of our own reinforcements." 22.
20. CAB 79/7 COS(40)348th:1, 14 October 1940; and COS(40 )362nd:1 , 28 Oct.
1940.
21. CAB 79/8 COS(4O)436th:1, 23 December 1940.
22. CAB 79/5 COS (40 ) 2 38th : 1 , 29 July 1940.
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General Brooke, in fact, had already foreseen this possibility and. had, in
the first few days following his accession to the post of 0.-in-C., Home
Forces, taken the necessary steps to ensure that the greater part of these
permanent roadblocks, one of the more unfortunate results of General
Ironside's defensive thinking, should be removed forthwith. The Chiefs of
Staff were quickly reassured that the process of removal was already in
hand. General Brooke later wrote:
"Another form of defence which I found throughout the country and. with
which I was in total disagreement consisted of massive concrete roadblocks
at the entry and exit of most towns and. of many villages. I had suffered
too much from these blocks in France not to realize their crippling effect
on mobility. Our security must depend on the mobility of our reserves, and
we were taking the very best steps to reduce this nobility.... I stopped
any further constructions and instructed existing ones to be removed where
possible." 23.
General Brooke had. also taken prompt action on a further potential
impediment to the smooth passage of the movement of reserves. In the past
two months bridges, notorious choke points to military movements by road at
the best of times, had. been prepared for demolition all over the country,
at first to no easily recoguisable overall plan. In some cases these
bridges additionally carried important telephone and. telegraph lines
essential for P.A.F. and. iaval communications. In response to their concern
over this matter, the Chiefs of Staff were told on 31st July that,
".... Headquarters, Home Forces, were alreac.y taking steps to reduce
the danger of the premature demolition of important bridges, as such action
might easily do more harm than good by restricting the mobility of our
reserves.... rrangements could be made to deviate the cables." 24.
By the 9th August, General Brooke had completed his inspection of the
coastline and was able to concentrate his attention on the formations in
reserve. ".... I discussed the role they 'ere to play in the event of
invasion and inspected units and formations to assess their value in the
event of an attack," he later wrote. 2D. He comuenced that day with an
inspection of that most important formation for counter-attack in the South
East, Lieutenant General IacNaughton's VII or 'Canadian' Corps, comprising
23. Autobiographical Notes of Field Iarshal Viscount AJ.anbrooke; and
Bryant, Arthur, The Thru of the Tide, 1939-1943, p. 198, Casseil,
London, 1957.
24. CAB 79/5 COS(40 )241st:1, 31 July 1940.
25. Bryant, Arthur: op. cit. pp. 200-201.
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1st Armoured. Division, 1st Canadian Division, d New Zealand. Division and.
1st Army Tank Brigade, which was situated in the Surrey area. Still in
G.H.Q,. Reserve with a].]. troops under its commsnd at eight hours' notice to
move, and. with its primary task being to counter-attack and destroy any
enemy forces invadin€ the counties of Surrey, Nent, Sussex or Rampsh.ire as
far as the River Itchen which had escaped the attentions of the troops of
Lieutenant General Thorne's I Corps and Lieutenant General Hontgomery' s V
Corps, VII Corps had received. revised operational instructions on 3rd August.
The latter had divided its area of possible operations into three areas;
that of Kent and. East Sussex, from Sheerness to Beachy Read, which would
necessitate a forward concentration in the area ci' Tonbridge-Staplehurst-
Hawkhurst-Ea.rtfield before offensive operations could. be undertaken; and.
that of the South Dorns from Beachy Read to Littlehampton, and. of the
Portsmouth area from Littlehanpton to linchester, to which the Corps was
detailed to deploy direct from its present location in Surrey. In all cases
contact with the enemy was to be preceded by road moves, with the possible
exception of 1st Army Tank Brigade which mignt be ordered to move by rail.
Parallel road routes, two per division, with alternatives if necessary, had
already been selected, reconnoitred and movements were now being repeatedly
practised so as to avoid confusion and maximise rapid deployment. Starting
points, timing, speeds and. densities of traffic, and. traffic control arrange-
ments, including the necessity of keeping the roads clear of civilian
traffic, had all been worked out with care. 26. Even so, despite all this
preparation and practice by the best equipped and most powerful counter-
attacking force in the Country (at least relatively), General Brooke, having
diacussed "the development of the Corps in .ts 'Rescue Role" with its
commander, soon d.iscovered that there was still much more work on its train-
ing to be done, especially in its battlefield role, as he was soon being
forced to "try to counteract a slow and sticir envelopment" while atching
units ol' the Corps on manoeuvres. 27. He most likely also noted. the unduly
long time it would take VII Corps to deploy it strength for counter-attack
in the event of a German landing in ast Ient. (See Na 9.)
General Brooke was also looking ahead. In a long letter to Sir Edward
Grg, Under Secretary of State for War, submitted next day, 10th August, he
outlined, his proposals for future long-tern policy on home defence. The
26. WO 166: War of 1939-1945 ar Diaries, VII Corps, August 1940 : VII
Corps Operational Instruction No. 3, 3 August 19110.
27. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount .Uanbrooke, 9 .ugast 1940.
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draft of this important letter had already been discussed at the Army
Council Room Conference four days earlier. "Following the collapse of
France and the return of the B.E.F. to the United Kingdom," he wrote,
"our whole attention and energies had to be directed to the reorganisa-
tion and re-equipment of the B.E.F. and to the immediate needs of home
defence.
We are now in a position to look ahead and. to consider a longer term
policy .... which must be largely based under the plans of the Chiefs of
Staff for the future conduct of the war. I hope that it may be found
possible to initiate this policy by the end of October."
Re again emphasized the importance of mobile counter-offensive operations:
"It is not possible to be strong everywhere on the many hundreds of
miles of coastline of Great Britain, and. at the numerous places where the
enemy may attempt to land troops from the air. Reliance, therefore, has to
be placed mainly upon mobile columns trained and equipped to take vigorous
and rapid counter-offensive action against any enemy who may succeed in
setting foot in this country. This role will be undertaken by some of the
existing infantry divisions and the two armoured divisions of the Field Army
in Great Britain."
The divisions other than those in G.R.Q. Reserve, however, still largely
lacked their second-line transport, especially that for troop-carrying, and
third-line transport was only being provided for the armoured divisions.
General Brooke continued,
"All the infantry divisions require to be made up to a degree of
mobility depending on their location, and I estimate that the provision of
troop carrying or coach companies to an average of two such companies per
division will be necessary." 28.
The static defence of the beaches was to take very much a second place
after the counter-attacking forces. As to the infazit'y defending the beaches,
General Brooke continued in his letter,
"The method of providing the static defence of beaches will depend on
the number of units which can be placed at my d.isposa]. in addition to the
existing Field Formations.
It is realized that for a period of two or three months no additional
trained personnel will be available."
28. WO 166/i: op. cit., August 1940, Appendix B: C.-in-C.'e letter to
the War Office, 10 August 1940.
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.1
Subsequently, however, 60 new infantry battalions, already brigaded in groups
of four battalions - 59 Holding Battalions (excluding three Guards and one
machine-gun Holding Battalion), and. 15 Pioneer Battalions, already with
divisions - would have completed their initial training and would be capable
of carrying out an operational role. General Brooke planned to employ as
many of these 134 nev battalions, organised into Independent Brigades of
three, four or even five battalions, depending on the locality in which they
were employed, for the static defence of beaches "in order to relieve the
existing Field Army formations and enable them to train." 29. The new Inde-
pendent Brigades were to be given some sort of provision of R.E., R.A.,
R.A.S.C. and other ancillary units, though, in fact, lack of manpower and
equipment was to mean that by November, when these Independent Brigades were
largely formed into seven (later nine) County Divisions with an establishment
of 10,000 all ranks, instead of the 15,500 allotted to the field divisions,
they actually possessed very little artillery or transport. These proposed
formations of large numbers of low category troops, nevertheless, when ready
were highly suited to guarding the beaches over the winter and into 1941 and
to maintain and camouflage the almost completed beach defences on the most
exposed. coasts. They were to perform a valuable role in releasing the better
troops of Field Army formations from this task, so that they could at last
have a chance of a thorough training in modern mobile warfare. 30.
General Brooke continued to enjoy the wholehearted support of the Prime
Minister in his policy. Winston Churchill was also highly pleased to learn
from the Chiefs of Staff's letter of 13th August, replying to the Prime
Minister's minute on scales of defence against invasion, that:
"The C.-in-C. assures us that the paramount importance of immediate
counter-attack upon the enemy, should he obtain a temporary footing on these
shores, has been impressed on all ranks, and that it is his policy to bring
back divisions into reserve as soon as they are adecuately trained and
equipped for offensive operations."
He noted, in addition, that the Chiefs of Staff found themselves "in complete
agreement" with the Prime Minister's and the C.-in-C., Home Forces's, views
on this matter. 31. Only a few days later, on 23rd August, Churchill was
again stressing the importance of having "as large a proportion as possible
of highly trained troops in mobile reserve", this time to the Secretary of
29. ibid.
30. Collier, Basil: History of the Second World War: The Defence of the
United Kingdom, pp. 229-230, R.M.S.O., London, 1957.
31. CAB 66/10 WP(40)319; also COS(40)604 (Revise): Annexe II: Defence
Against Invasion: Reply by the C.O.S., 13 August 1940.
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State for War at a War Cabinet meeting. Already the Prime Minister wanted
particulars of the progress made with the formation and training of Genera].
Brooke's new battalions, although his enthusiasm most likely got the better
of him when he suggested that the Secretary of State, anthony Eden, "should
consider moving the let Division from the coastal area into mobile reserve".
The Secretary of State undertook that this last point would be considered,
but diplomatically did not add. that troop movements such as this were
entirely at the discretion of the 0.-in-C., Rome Forces. 32.
The success of this policy now being implemented, by General Brooke, as
he had. stated in his letter to the War Office, had wider implications for
the future continuation of the War. The Chiefs of Staff stressed as well
the vital importance of securing the United Kingdom against both invasion
and. air attack, so as to maintain her war effort at the highest level, and
of securing her sea communications with America and the Empire, while main-
taining military and civilian morale, and emphasized its long-term implica-
tions in an appreciation on future strategy on 4th September:
"Defence against invasion employs today a very large number of active
divisions, which are in varying stages of training and equipment. Our
policy must be to improve our static defences and hasten the raising and
training of our Home Defence and Rome Guard units in order to release troops
of the field army. Eventually, as our defences and air power become more
effective, arid as the divisions receive their full equipment, and as the
threat recedes ...., it will be possible to reduce the present number of
divisions on Home Defence duties and employ them else'here.
At the same time, invasion is a contingency in respect of which we
cannot afford to take risks, and to meet it we must always keep a roportion
of active formations in the United Kingdom." 33.
General Brooke, in the meantime, was having to consider more immediate
problems. Certain other points requiring immediate attention were outlined
in his letter of 10th August to the 'bar Office. Some 9,000 newly trained
personnel were required to man the static artillery now in position or in
the course of being installed, either for beach defence or astride the main
avenues of approach inland, so as to release a similar number of personnel
from Field Amy formations who were at present manning these guns, pending
issue to the formations of their proper equipment. 	 rther personnel had. to
be found to guard vulnerable points, especially aerodromes, and. to provide
32. CAB 65/8 WM(40)233rd:2, 23 August 1940.
33. CAB 66/il WP(40)362; also cos(40 ) 683: Future Strategy: appreciation
by the COS Committee, 4 September 1940.
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Home Forces with winter accommodation. Air Force squadrons were required. to
act and. be trained "in full and. intimate co-operation with the Field Army".
He outlined an urgent need. for squadrons of dive bombers to be placed at his
disposal and. for an improved type of tactical reconnaissance aircraft.
Intercommunication between ground and. air needed to be further studied and
"brought to the pitch of efficiency which it appears to have reached in the
German Army". There were also organisational and. administrative matters to
be improved, suchas that of training centres, pioneer and. special units,
the transport, aimnunition, medical and traffic control situation, and the
continued. demands for more staff from headquarters to cope with increasing
paperwork.
One particular area of concern for General Brooke was that of the 'Home
Guard', as they had. been officially renamed on 23rd July, following Winston
Churchill's objection that the word. 'local' in 'Local Defence Volunteers'
was "uninspiring". 	 The new name had been an. obvious improvement. "What
a difference that change made to the esprit de corps of that gallant company
of veterans," the then Major General Ismay later recalled, although Major
General Pownall, Inspector General ol' the Home Guard, was not so compliment-
ary, saying,
"The change of title from Local Defence Volunteers to Home Guard is
purely Winstonian and. is a great nuisance. He could have left things alone.
But 'Home Guard' rolls better off the tongue and makes a better headline." 36.
Numbering over 1,300,000 volunteers by early August, of which about half -
were now armed with rifles, mainly thanks to imerican help, they had at
first received denim overalls as uniforms to replace their original 'L.D.V.'
brassards. With not enough denims to go round., however, the War Cabinet was
forced to authorise the issue of serge battle dress on 14th August and
eventually the whole of the Home Guard were to be issued with battle dress.
But the issue of weapons, uniforms and other scarce equipment to the Home
Guard worried General Brooke. tPr1ority should. now be given to the regular
forces and. steps taken without delay to prevent the diversion of resources
to the Home Guard at the expense of the former," he wrote to Sir Edward
Grigg on 10th August. He also expressed his concern as to their role:
34. WO 166/i: op. cit., August 1940, Appendix B: op. cit., 10 August 1940.
35. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 148.
36. Ismay, General the Lord: Memoirs, p. 187, Heinemanri, London, 1960;
and Diaries of Lieutenant General Sir Henry H. Pownall, 29 July 1940.
37. C	 65/8 WIvi(40)226th:4, 14 August 1940.
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"The role of the Home Guard has been clearly defined as that of local
and static defence on a voluntary, part-time basis; there is, however, at
the present time a strong tendency to go beyond this and. to employ Home Guard
on full time duties prior to invasion, which necessarily involves questions
of pay, administration and transport.
I feel strongly that the original role of the Home Guard should be
adhered. to, that they should not be required to undertake full time duties
except in the case of invasion, nor should they be paid, and. that any Home
Guard who is not otherwise employed and is therefore available for full time
duties should enlist as a soldier into a home defence unit." 38.
Despite his misgivings over some matters, nevertheless, General Brooke
remained, generally happy with the continuing growth and improvement of this
volunteer force. "The Home Guard was making good progress and was co-
operating well with units of the regular army," he had been able to report
to the Chiefs of Staff a few days previously. "It should prove very valuable
in manning strong points in the rear of forward defences."
Major General Henry Pownall as Inspector General, on the other hand, was
more in touch with the everyday problems of organising and equipping the Home
Guard countrywide. Wrestling, especially early on, with "a rare dog's dinner"
of such problems, the groundwork had. none the less been successfully laid by
the end of June. Certain Home Guard officers, "indifferent personnel who got
office by patronage or otherwise in the first instance" and who "now consti-
tute a 'vested interest", the practicalities of providing round-the-clock
protection for the multitude of local 'Vulnerable Points' with a purely part-
time force, local jealousies and. rivalries, the muddles caused by over-hasty
or inefficient distribution of weapons and equipment, arid the chronic lack of
steel helmets and. of small-arms ammunition for training purposes - "We
need five rounds per man just to feel the kick of the rifles" - these were
40.just some of the many problems that abounded at the time.
	 Yet it was the
enthusiasm and good will of the majority that carried the Home Guard forward
and. largely overcame the problems. Major General Pownall wrote towards the
end of July,
"In the main, things are going well, but it all depends on the initia-
tives and capacity of the local people. Where there are failures, it is
local incompetence. Good men have been able, in every instance, to overcome
the admittedly great difficulties in the formation of the L.D.V.. Jnd the
lower one goes down, the greater the enthusiasm, a very healthy sign. That
38. WO 166/1: op. cit., August 1940, Appendix B: op. cit., 10 August 1940.
39. CAB 79/5 COS(40)247th:1, 5 August 1940
40. Diaries of Lieutenant General Sir Henry H. Powna].l, 20 June - 8 July
1940.
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spirit will want keeping up, not only by the provision of equipment, but by
defeating the boredom which may ensue if nothing comes of Hitler's threats.
However, that gentleman may solve the boredom problem at any time. At present
it is well in the background.... But my chief anxiety is lest we get too
large. We are within sight of equipping and arming these people properly in
their present numbers, and the organisation is taking shape well - there is
now established a proper chain of Command, control and ai9ministration. If we
grow too fast, there is a grave risk of disorganisation and. muddle all over
again. I hope very much, and have pressed strongly, that we should expand
only as our equipment resources make it reasonable to do so.... We do not
want to go back to the chaos of a month ago." 41.
Numbers, in fact, grew more slowly during August, although the strength
of the Home Guard had exceeded the 1,500,000 mark by early September. Yet for
all their large numbers, the Home Guard would always be a countrywide force
and have its greatest concentration of units in the urban areas. In the event
of an enemy invasion, only the local Rome Guard units in that particular area
would be involved and if a German invasion came in the South East, for example,
the fighting would be all but over by the time Home Guard units in the South
West, Midlands, North, Wales and Scotland would have a chance to fire a shot.
While in the most rural areas, the Home Guard units might be very widely
spread. Nor, at least in the earlier days, would local Home Guards be much of
a match for Germany's highly trained and battle experienced parachute troopsl
Even so, organised to fight in the vicinity of their homes, they provided a
national network of defended villages, parishes and townships, not unlike the
web of a spider, which would hamper the consolidation of enemy troops landed
from the air and. impede the advance of enemy ground troops wherever in the
country the enemy came whore or advanced inland. Rome Guards would reinforce
the static defences near the coast, would largely man the inland 'stop lines'
now shorn of regular troops by General Brooke, would patrol and give warnings
of enemy airborne landings, would act as local guides to the regular forces,
would help protect vulnerable points against attack or sabotage by Fifth
Coliumiists or enemy airborne troops, and would free regular troops from all
these and many other, manpower-consuming tasks. Used properly, whether fight-
irig from prepared defensive positions, soon also to include 'nodal points' and
'anti-tank islands' inland, whether carrying out surprise attacks and ambushes
against small parties of the enemy, whether acting as observers, guides, scouts
or messengers, or, later on, whether forming local motorized detachments
equipped with motor cars, motorcycles, bicycles or even improvised armoured
cars, the Home Guard would henceforth form a valuable adjunct to the regular
forces.
41. Diaries of Lieutenant General Sir Henry R. Pownall, 20 July 1940.
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The problems would never entirely disappear. John Brophy, author of
'The Home Guard Handbook', one of the Home Guard's first tr pining instruc-
tion books and. of many subsequent publications on the Home Guard, regarded
one of the chief problems as simply being "over-enthusiasm, charging up to
the muzzles of the 'enemy". 42. The problem, too, of the 'status' both of
the Home Guard and. of its officers was a growing one. The voluntary, auxi-
liary, part-time status was not in fact changed until November 1941, when
conscription was introduced to keep the Home Guard up to strength, although
'county' titles, shoulder flashes, cap badges and the first rank badges
were introduced on 3rd August 1940. 	 Major General Pownall noted that
August, however, that,
"The status of officer ranks is a troublesome question and now a very
active one. The relationships between commanders of the Regular (and
Territorial) forces and of the Home Guard needs to be cleared up. It is
being raised everywhere I go, for the Home Guard officers need to know
where they stand."
On 27th August, Major General Pownall recalled that the 'status of officers'
question was dealt with by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons,
but that the outcome was that they were "given no status at all" • Pownall
blamed the "negative attitude of many at the War Office who regarded the
Home Guard as a nuisance". On 2nd September he noted that the problem
still "rages".	 The next day, however, the Prime Minister himself raised
the 'status' question at a meeting ol' the Defence Committee (Operations) at
No. 10 Downing Street. Churchill,
".... stressed the importance of giving the Home Guard a clearly
defined status as part of the authorised and regular forces of the Crown.
If this were done, there would be no danger of the Home Guard being taken
for franc-tireurs. It might be advisable to issue a Royal Proclamation so
that the force would be completely legal. in every respect. Certain points
needed consideration, for example the introduction of ranks for the
officers and of saluting."
The Secretary of State was duly invited to examine the status of the Home
Guard once again, "with a view to regularising the position of this valu-
able force".	 Three days later, on 6th September, the Jar Cabinet heard
42. Liddall Hart Papers: 1/112/35, Letter from John Brophy to BWF.W,
15 August 1940.
43. Longmate, Norman: The Real Dads' Army: The Story of the Home Guard,
p. 45, Arrow, London, 1974.
44. Diaries of Lieutenant General Sir Henry H. Pownall, 27 August and
2 September 1940.
45. CAB 69/1 DO ( 40 )3Oth :2, 3 September 1940.
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that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State "were in consultation as
to the desirability of giving a more regular status to the Home Guard". 46.
By September, too, uaiforms were reaching the Home Guard in quantity,
"such quantity that the Rome Guard complain that they are being choked with
stuff," although there remained a desperate shortage of steel helmets. A
coherent training policy, together with authority for the Home Guard to
take up indoor accommodation for winter drill purposes had. also become a
priority, while later in the month the withdrawal of some 300,000 Service
.303 rifles and their replacement by the .300 American Springfield rifles
and some Browning light automatic rifles created inevitable problems.
Major General Pownall was especially scathing about the training situation:
"The attitude of G.H.Q., Home Forces, towards the Home Guard. has
improved since Brooke's arrival.... The truth now is that G.H.Q., Home
Forces, and the War Office 'don't get on'. This hit the Home Guard parti-
cularly in training matters. G.H.Q. won't let the War Office produce any-
thing in the way of training instructions, whether by official pamphlets or
by guidance through the Press. At the same time G.R.Q. produces nothing
itself, and so nothing happens - except that the Press produce their own
ideas, which are only too apt to be a nuisance. Brooke and Paget are not a
good combination; moreover, Brooke was always 'a 	 for quarrelling with
the formation above him. Paget is not one likely to smooth over this
characteristic. It is a pity." 47.
There is further evidence that Major General Pownall and General Brooke him-
self did not always see eye to eye on Home Guard matters. General Brooke,
who had seen Pownall a few days previously on 17th August, afterwards
commented in his own diary that Major General Pownall' s account of his
activities does "not impress me very much". 48.
Nevertheless, by September, the newly formed battalions of 'Sunday
soldiers', as their critics disparagingly called them, were now integrated
into defence plans for every locality. Most now had. a uniform, even if it
vere only ill-fitting denims, together with caps and boots of odd sizes from
the Army's surplus stocks. Their morale, however, was high. The few months
of waiting since Nay had been put to good use as far as training was con-
cerned with nightly instruction in weapons, patrolling and. fieldcraft, and
46. CAB 65/9 WM(40)344th:4, 6 September 1940.
47. Diaries of Lieutenant General Sir Henry H. Pownall, 2 September and
27 August 1940.
48. Diaries of Field Marshall Viscount Llanbrooke, 17 August 1940.
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platoon or inter-platoon exercises on Sundays; while in the South East and
East .Anglia at least, few Home Guards, whatever their deficiencies in train-
ing or equipment, would. now, thanks largely to the American rifles, have to
confront the German invaders totally unarmed. The Chiefs of Staff heard on
10th September that,
"The Home Guard. was gradually sorting itself out. There was a strong
demand. for instru.ction by members of the Regular Army and the Home Guard
detachments which found themselves alongside the Regular Units rere making
good progress. There was still some unnecessary delay at road. blocks to the
passage of ambulances and rescue parties during air raid warnings, but steps
had been taken to eliminate this trouble." 49.
The changes, now discussed by the Defence Committee arid spurred on by
the Prime Minister, began to take place in November, by which month the
strength of the Home Guard. had risen to 1,700,000 volunteers. Llready at
the end of September, the Home Guard's Inspector General, Major General Henry
Pownall, had been replaced in his post by Major General T. Ralph ('Rusty')
Eastwood, who had hitherto coTnmr1ded the 4th (Regular) Division on the South
Coast. The Home Guard had by now grown far larger than was originally
intended. Much of its strength was within the built-up areas and it was
expected to deal even with enemy tanks. The original concept of it as a
rural-based, small, but widespread force of part-timers, whose function was
principally to cope only with lightly armed airborne troops and fifth column-
ists, was now long outmoded. What amounted to a drastic reorganization,
therefore, was announced. in two speeches by the Under Secretary of State for
War, Sir Edward Grigg, in the House of Commons on 6th and. 19th November.
The Home Guard., "which has hitherto been largely provisional in character,"
was to be given "a firmer and more permanent shape" as befitted. its greatly
increased size and responsibilities, and yet it was intended. not to alter
its voluntary, auxiliary, part-time character. It would., the Ninister
promised, now be given a fixed organisation, though "without too much
formality or what is called red tape". Major General Eastwood. was to be
appointed. as the Home Guard's first Director General, with his own staff at
the War Office, responsible to the C.-in-C., Home Forces, General Brooke.
As Director General, Eastwood had authority to issue orders, unlike Pownall
who as Inspector General could only advise and. had had to suffer orders
issued from the Army Council at the War Office, with all the delay and con-
fusion that had entailed. A full-time officer, receiving an allowance, would
be installed to combine the duties of adjutant and quartermaster in each
49. CAB 79/6 COS(40)304th:1, 10 September 1940.
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battalion. There would be proper arrangements to cover out-of-pocket
expenses, although the Home Guard would rem-in unpaid. The second. great
change announced by Sir Edward Grigg was the introduction into the Home
Guard of proper military ranks, with the granting of coxmn.issions to Home
Guard. officers, who would be entitled to be saluted and called 'sir',
although unlike Regular Army officers they would not have powers of s11Tnmry
punishment. Especially welcome, in view of some of the criticism of the
early appointments of officers, was the appointment of an independent
Selection Board to examine all existing and future officers. The granting
of commissions on the basis of an officer's ability to command the confi-
dence of all ranks, and regardless of political, business or social
affiliations, was greatly to improve the Home Guard's discipline and train-
ing. Finally, to sweeten the pill, the provision of better weapons,
uniforms and training, and a reduction in routine guard duties, was
announced. 50.
The Home Guard, therefore, was to go from strength to strength.
Lieutenant General C. J. E. Auchinleck, G.0. C.-in-C. Southern Command,
believed that, "The Home Guard is capable of playing a great part in the
defence of the country against attack from the air or from the sea." 51.
General Brooke also commented,
"The Germans have developed, a strategy of infiltration which results
in the battlefield not being confined to the front lines of the opposing
forces. To meet this strategy and its accompanying tactics, there must be
a widely dispersed force to take the shock of the enemy's primary .gttacks.
Consequently, the most modern defensive strategy involves just such a force
as the Home Guard and its function is just as important to the orga.tusation
of the defence of a country as the functions of any of the other forces of
the regular army."
The Prime 1'Iinister also believed fully in the value of the Home Guard. "The
Home Guard is as much a part of the Army as is the Grena&ier Guards," was
his comment, and in a speech in the House of Commons on 5th Iioveinber 1940 he
stated,
50. House of Commons speeches by Sir Edward Grigg, 6 and 19 November 1940;
and Longmate, Norman: op. cit., pp. 46 and 57-58.
51. Parkinson, Roger: The Auk: Auchinleck: Victor at Alamein, p. 167,
Granada, London, 1977.
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"A country where every street and every village bristles with loyal,
resolute armed men is a country against which the kind of tactics which
destroyed Dutch resistance .... would prove wholly ineffective. A country
so defended would not be liable to be overthrown by such tactics." 52.
The Home Guard were to be seen in every parish in Britain and. were a
very visible sign of Britain's determination to resist. Using the Home
Guard as a cover, however, was a far smaller and. far more secret organisa-
tion comprising many separate elements. These were the 'stay-behind parties'
or 'Auxiliary Units', established by Colonel Gubbins in the dark days of
June 1940 following the evacuation from Dunkirk. Organised nominally into
three battalions covering Scotland, Northern and Southern England, and
wearing Home Guard uniform to disguise their activities (though never
formally enrolled in the Home Guard and therefore unprotected by the Geneva
Convention), they comprised poachers, gamekeepers, fishing and shooting
ghillies, stalkers, farmers and farm labourers, tin and coal miners, ex-Boy
Scouts, hikers, mountaineers, market gardeners, fishermen, and even parsons,
physicians, local council officials, blacksmiths, hoteliers or publicans.
They ranged in age from their early 'teens to their 70's. Comion to all,
however, was their local knowledge, their ability to blend where necessary
into the countryside around them and their ability to keep a secret, live
rough and go on fighting until they had won or were killed. Like the
officers hand-picked to train them, they had to be men with initiative who
liked working independently. Selected individually and carefully vetted
before being thoroughly trained, the men of each Auxiliary Unit patrol of
perhaps 13 men built their own well-camouflaged underground hideout and
stocked it well with arms, aimunition and explosives, often of the avery -
latest type, and food. The Auxiliary Units were given top priority in the
issue of such items as Thompson sub-machine guns newly arrived from America,
snipers' rifles with telescopic sights and silencers, the newly developed
'plastic' explosive, 'time pencils delayed action-firing svitches, sticky
bombs and Fairbairn Coando daggers.
The Auxiliary Units were to function as 	 very oiin Resistance
network and by the time of the 'Cromwell' crisis of September they were
already well established in the areas inland from Britain's coasts up to a
distance of 30 miles inland, especially in the South East and East Anglia,
but also in the South West, South Wales and along the Lincoinshire, North-
East and Scottish coastlines. If the Germans invaded any part of Britain,
52. CAB 106/1189: Home Guard: Simmry Report prepared for US War Dept. by
J. K. Howard arid H. Wendell Endicott, pp. 6 arid 10, June 1941.
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all Auxiliary Unit members in the area were to disappear immediately from
their homes and move into their hideouts. They would then wait quietly below
ground until the Germans had occupied their area or simply by-passed it,
before coming out to attack. After each attack, the Resistance would quietly
disappear again. At no time during the enemy occupation irould they ever have
returned to their homes or have tried to communicate with their families.
Their task would be to cause as imich disruption in the enemy rear areas as
was possible by attacking houses used as German headquarters or comnrunication
centres, fuel and ammunition dumps, supply dumps, bridges, roads, railways or
airfields captured and used. by the Germans, and a host of other targets, thus
forcing the enemy to divert valuable troops to guard them in numbers far
greater than the 5,000 or so volunteers who were eventually to make up the
Auxiliary Units. By the end of 1940, some 300 hideouts were alrea&y in use
and. the number was to rise to over 1,000 hideouts later in the War.
How long each Auxiliary Unit patrol would actually have lasted in
practice is a moot point. Many would undoubtedly have been eliminated by the
Germans after only one attack, or within a few days or weeks at the most.
They would lack communication and co-ordination between cells and the
civilian population was bound to suffer ruthless German reprisals. Their
loosely-knit coTrm't8nd structure and the emphasis on each cell remaining as
independent as possible of any other cell, however, would also have been the
greatest strength of the British Resistance, and they would. almost certainly
have sparked off other unofficial Resistance activity in the enemy-occupied
areas and even organised such activity. In David Lampe's words, "The less
each individual patrol knew of the activities of its neighbours, tile better.
As long as a single patrol functioned, the last ditch would not have been
crossed." While Peter Fleming, who himself set up the Kentish and Sussex
Auxiliary Units in General Thorne's )U1 Corps area, later 'rote of the
Auxiliary Units:
".... within a bridgehead under heavy counter-attack, its diversionary
activities would have had a value wholly disproportionate to the number of
guerrillas involved. It is difficult to find fault with Churchill's estimate
of Auxiliary Units as 'a useful addition to the regular forces'." 53.
More unorthodox still were some of the activitIes of the Petroleum War-
fare Department. Set up in June under Geoffrey Lloyd, Secretary of State for
53. Lampe, David: The Last Ditch: The Secrets of the Nationwide British
Resistance Organisation and the Nazi Plans for the OccuDatlon of Brit
1940-1944, pp. 66-73, Cassell, London, 1968; and Fleming, Peter:
Invasion 1940, pp. 267-273, Rupert Hart Davis, London, 1957.
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Petroleum, acting in collaboration with Lord. H-iikey, Chancellor of the Duchy
of Lancaster, and. drawing on the resources of the petroleum industry, the
Department aimed to use surplus oil stocks that would otherwise have been
destroyed to deny their use by the invader, as positive weapons of war. The
desperate shortage of conventional anti-tank weapons following Dunkirk,
combined with the general sense of urgency had created a climate very favour-
able to such new suggestions and, couunencing in July, a great number of
experiments, some successful and others unspectacular (or even highly spec-
tacular) failures, were carried out to this end. The development of a simple
catapult capable of throwing petrol grenades, certain types of flame protect-
ors,	 ships', 'fire	 and fire-sprays by means of underground pipes
both designed to deny to the enemy the use of airfields, were quickly
abandoned., but experiments with mobile units, petrol sprays from road blocks
or buildings, various types of flame-thrower, buried 'petrol mines', fire
scrs offshore or on beaches by means of concealed pipes, petrol bombs, and
with petrol guns or mortars were continued into the autuni and even into 1941,
although most were finally found to be impracticable. Attempts to 'set the
sea on fire', however, did provide impressive propaganda, if little else.
The most successful and practical weapons, nevertheless, were the various
means to flood a road quickly with petrol from concealed pipes on the
approach of enemy vehicles, these	 flame traps' then being ignited by
'fougasses' or later on by automatic electrical ignition or
remote control; and 'flame fougasses', groups of 40 gallon drums of oil
buried in roadside banks, in concrete or in mounds of earth and sandbags, the
burning mixture being propelled with considerable force by charges 9f powder
and ammonal across or down a road at points where enemy vehicles might be
expected to slow down. The last two devices had most potential where roads
ran through defiles and where sites could not easily be by-passed by vehicles,
such as in the North and South Dovns areas of Kent and Sussex. By the end of
July, thirty 'static flame traps' had. been supplied to 1st London Division in
East Kent, rising to some 200 sets issued to Eastern, Southern and Scottish
Coands by the end of 1940, while some 4,000 'flame fou,gasses' or 'barrel
flame traps' reached Commands by the winter, mostly for operation by the
Home Guard. By the end of 1940, some 400 'Home Guard flame
	
were
also to be issued.
54. CAB 63/170-173: The Hmtkey Papers: Flame Warfare: Petrol and Oil
Devices, July 1940 - Feb. 1941; CAB 82/5 DCOS(4 0 )91, 99 & 101,
Memoranda on Use of Burning Oil for Defensive and. Offensive Purposes,
29 June and 8 August 1940; CAB 79/13 COS(40)261st:2, 12 August 1940;
and Collier, Basil: op. cit., pp. 133-134.
- 365 -
Even more unorthodox methods of repelling invasion were, hardly surpris-
ingly, never adopted at all, despite their undoubted ingenuity. A memoranda
dated 2nd. September 1940 from Admiral-of-the-Fleet Sir Roger Keyes, Director
of Combined Operations, was passed to General Brooke. It read as follows:
"It has been suggested to me that loud speakers might be installed. in
large numbers along the Thiglish coast at points favourable for an invading
force; these loud speakers being equipped with gramophone records carrying
a record in German tailing the German landing craft to return to their bases
as the invasion is off. The basis of the idea is the German characteristic
of inherent obedience to orders; and it is suggested. that even if the plan
is not - as it will not be - completely successful, it should cause a great
deal of confusion and may well upset the smooth working of their plans.
The contents of the gramophone records should., of course, be guarded with
special secrecy." 55.
General Brooke's comments on this interesting idea, unfortunately, remain
unrecorded!
*	 *	 *
General Brooke's min hope of repelling the expected invasion continued
to lie in the mobile reserves of the Regular Army. On 9th August he had
even been relieved of operational responsibility for the Or1ieys and Shet-
lands at his own request, so as to be able to concentrate his attentions
more on the defence of mainland. Britain. Despite various meetings and
discussions on such matters as the Home Guard, reinforcements to the I1iddle
East, details of Bomber Commnd co-operation in the event of an invasion and
of the training of the divisions at home between 10th and 17th August, and a
tour, partly by air in his slow, uriescorted Flamingo, of the coastal defences
of Lincoinshire, Yorkshire and Tyneside on 15th and 16th August, General
Brooke now began to implement sigu.ificazit changes in the dispositions of his
reserve formations.
The main G.LQ. Reserves of VII and IV Corps had hitherto been held, in
accordance with the plan of General Ironside, in the rear of the main G.H..
Stop Line, where, far inland from the East .Anglian, South East and South
coasts, it was originally planned that the main battle for the defence of
London and the industrial Nidlands would be fought. This desperate plan,
conceived. in June and. early July when only sandbags and concrete were in
55. DEFE 2/807: Nemoranda from 'R.K.', Director of Combined Operations, to
C.-in-C., Home Forces, 2 September 1940.
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plentiful supply, was by now long outmoded, yet still these reserve Corps,
now boasting greatly increased numbers of tanks, artillery and. other weapons
and. eqiupment and. thoroughly organised. for rapid counter-attack, were situated
almost entirely in precisely the same locations as in the middle of July when
General Ironside was still in command of Home Forces. Already Genera]. Brooke
had ordered that work on the main G.LQ. Line and. the smaller 'stop lines'
between this and the coast should henceforth be limited only to the creation
of 'nodal points', desied for all-round defence to protect key points such
as road junctions and centres of communication, and that these should be
manned by the Home Guard and by Regular troops only in the event of their
becoming the actual front line, their garrisons in the meantime being with-
drawn to strengthen the local mobile reserves. 56.
There now existed in mid August, therefore, something of a void,
especially in East nglia and to some extent in Kent, rhereby the thin screen
of troops manning the beach and. coastal defences could. rely only on quick
reinforcement from the regular troops in local mobile reserve, placed a short
distance inland, the G.H.. Reserves hiving to move great distances before
being able to be in a position to intervene effectively in the battle. This
was a situation which would give the enemy, in the event of a major seaborne
invasion, in all likelihood, a cru.shingly decisive advantage in the first day
or two of military operations. It would enable the Germans to overwhelm the
beach defences, beat off local counter-attacks and establish themselves
firmly ashore with their anti-tank guns backed by infantry, tanks and artill-
ery, ready to repel the attacks of the British G.R.Q. Reserves, when the
latter, inevitably delayed by German air attack and perhaps also by German
airborne troops, eventually arrived at the battlefeld. The changes that
General Brooke was to introduce were greatly to improve this unsatisfactory
situation, yet one cannot but bear in mind, a note by Captain Liddell Eart,
vritten even after the Broo1e plan had been fully inrlemented:
"In view ol' the muddles, delays and confusion that I saw in big anti-
invasion exercises, even in the early months of 1941, I think it likely that
they might have broken down altogether if the invasion had come as early as
1940, and the Germans might have advanced a lot further without being
checked. In one of these big exercises early in 1941, in Southern Command,
the 'invaders' had to be kept marking time on the beaches for 48 hours
because the leading counter-attack division did not even arrive on the scene
until the second day, and. did not manage to mount even a small counter- -
attack, with a few battalions and a few batteries, until late on the second
56. WO 166: War of 1939-1945 War Diaries, Eastern Command, 10 August 1940;
and. Southern Command, 9 and 15 August 1940; and Collier, Basil: op.cit.
p. 144.
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day, while the first co-ordinated attack of the lead.ing counter-attack
division did not take place until far into the third day. The 'invaders'
could have pushed many miles inland by that tine if they had been allowed
to do so and. have thrown the whole of our counter-attack into paralysed
confusion." 57.
The essence of the Brooke plan was to close the whole defence layout up
nearer the coast. The decisive battle, General Brooke now intended, was to
take place as far forward as possible, either in the immediate vicinity of
the coast or, at the worst, a short distance inland. Near the coast the
local mobile reserves, strengthened by the withdrawal of Regular troops from
the beaches, were to be placed. 1thin closer striking distance of the prob-
able landing areas. Iore important, however, was the repositioning of part
of the G.H.. Reserves especially within IV Corps. Here the 2nd Armoured
Division, hitherto situated in the Northamptonshire area, so as to cover both
the Lincoinshire and East nglian areas, was brought forward. on l6th/l7th
Augast into East Anglia itself, being newly positioned. in the area Newmarket -
Saffron Walden - Royston - Cambridge. This was a very sensible move. The
2nd. Armoured Division, consisting of 1st and 22nd Armoured. Brigades and 2nd.
Support Group, was now well placed to counter-attack any enemy landing which
might occur between the Thames estuary and The Wash. It would still have
some distance to travel to reach the coast, but almost half the distance it
would previously have had to move, while the open country of rnid-.Anglia
provided an excellent training ound in the meantime. The Lincolnshire
coast was far less vulnerable and, in any case, ably guarded by the experi-
enced 1st (Regular) Division under Lieutenant General the Hon. H. R. L. G.
Alexander's I Corps in Northern Command. Other moves were also soon to take
place, but "ith one exception not until early September. (See IIaps 9 and. 10.)
On 21st August, General Brooke visited the headquarters of IV Corps,
which was itself being brought for%ard from Guilsborou&h House near North-
ampton to Latinier House, Chesham in Buckinghamshire, while an advanced head-
quarters was being established at lTewsells Rouse, Barkay, near Royston in
Hertfordshire. After discussing the employment of IV Coros with Lieutenant
General F. P. Noswortby, he was taken to see an exercise by its constituent
parts: 2nd .Armoured Division under its newly appointed commander, Najor
General 'Rollie' Charrington (rho had recently replaced Najor General J. C.
Tilly), 43rd. (Wessex) Division under Hajor General R. V. Pollock end 31st
Infantry Brigade Group under Brigadier H. Lathaii. The day apparently went
well, but General Brooke was not yet happy with the dispositions of IV Corps.
57. Liddell Hart Papers: 1/292/1776, Some Notes and Queries on 'Hitler
Invades' by C. S. Forester, p. 58, 1959.
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In the meantime, General Brooke had authorised. one other move of some
significance on 16th August, that of 15 Brigade of the 5th (Regular) Division
from near Perth northward. to Runtly in Aberdeenshire, where it came under the
temporary command of Major General Alan Cunningham' s 51 st (Highland) Division
which had itself been rebuilt to incorporate the former second-line Terri-
torial 9th (Highland) Division earlier in the month. This move to reinforce
the still reorgan.isin.g 51st (Highland) Division was also made in response to
the despatch of reinforcements by Scottish Command to the garrison ci' the
Orkney and Shet].and Islands, following the alarm on the night of l3th/l4th
August when it had. been reported that "German embarkation along the whole of
the Norwegian coast had started". The report, if true, was most likely
merely a German exercise in progress, yet it did have the effect of slightly
shifting the point of balance of Scottish Command's forces away from the
South and of further stretching its already meagre resources. Such, indeed,
was General Brooke's concern for the safety of Northern Scotland that he
spent the whole of 27th and 28th August inspecting beach and. aero&rome
defences there at a time when it was becoming clearer that the main battle
might be fought much further south.
The formations in reserve, however, remained General Brooke's greatest
concern, his attention now turning to some of the formations still in the
process of equipping or re-equipping. On 24th August he visited. Salisbury
Plain to inspect 21st Army Tank Brigade at West Lavington, which now had some
46 Matilda II Infantry Tanks and 33 of the new Infantry Tank Mark III Valen-
tine tanks, with more being added almost daily (see Appendix ii), but which
was still only just over half its intended establishment of 150 Infantry
Tanks; and 2nd. Armoured Brigade at Warminster, together with several infantry
battalions. The 2nd. Armoured Brigade, temporarily detached from its parent
1st Armoured Division for re-equipment follo .!ing its losses in France, he
found to be in a sorry state, with training progressing well, but with still
only a miscellaneous collection of largely obsolete tani:s instead of its
proper establishment of Cruiser tanks, because priority in their issue was
at present with 2nd Armoured Division. On 30th August he paid a visit to
South Wales to see a signal exercise by 2nd London Division and then on 31st
Augu.st, General Brooke, in his oun words,
"Proceeded to Aldershot to inspect the New Zealand Division, and. was
very much impressed with the units I saw. They will be a great loss to Home
Forces when they go tthe Division was earmarked as an early reinforcement to
the Middle East] and a great gain to the Middle East."
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Finally, as the German barges collected in the Channel ports, he visited
Major Genera]. J. A. K. Gammell's 3rd. (Regular) Division in Southern Command
in the Somerset area on 4th September, following this with a tour of London's
defences on the 5th and. a visit to 1st Armoured Division in Surrey on 6th
58.September.
General Brooke had constantly to make minor but siüficant adjustments
to his forces at this time as new points of vulnerability were revealed, as
the moves within Scottish Command had. already illustrated. his visits on
4th and. 5th September, indeed, were not without good. reason. At the begin-
ning of September the 1st and 2nd Royal Marine Brigades at Plymouth departed.
for operations overseas. This immediately weakened General forces
in the South West. On 2nd. September, therefore, at a meeting of the Chiefs
of Staff, he,
tt••• outlined the arrangements he had made to replace the Irarine
Brigades in South West England. In effect these arrangements shifted. the
centre of gravity of his forces towards the South and. South West." 59.
General Brooke's answer had. been to authorise the movement of 9 Brigade of
3rd (Regular) Division from Tetbury in Gloucestershire, to Tiverton in Devon,
as well as its 8 Brigade from near Cheltenhazn, Gloucestershire, to Blagdon
in Somerset; the Division's 7 Guards Brigade remained at Bruton, Somerset,
and. its divisional headquarters at Lackharn House near Chippenhazn, Wiltshire.
The 3rd (Regular) Division was also placed under the command of Lieutenant
General H. E. Franklyn's VIII Corps. (See Nap 10.) It ras a sound move,
since the vastly overstretched 48th (South Midland) Dvison in South Devon
could not hope to do more than delay an enemy incursion unless supported and
the very well trained and equipped 3rd (Regular) Division, until recently
coanded by the then Major General B. L. Montgomery, uras one of the finest
and best prepared formations in the country. Fully mobile and organised for
rapid movement, this Division was ideal for its intended. role of counter-
attacking any enemy forces not dealt with either by 48th (South ITidland)
Division and. 70 Independent Brigade in Devon under VIII Corps, or by 50th
(Iorthumbrian) Division under V Corps in Dorset. The 3rd (Regular) Division,
therefore, was a boon to the defence of the South West, thich in the last
58. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 10 August - 15 September
1940; and. WO 166/i: op. cit., 13-17 August 1940.
59. CB 79/6 COS(40)290th:1, 2 September 1940.
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resort, under the now outdated Ironside Plan, would have otherwise had to
give up Cornwall and much of Devon and Somerset end. conduct its main defen-
sive battle from so-called Taunton 'stop-line'.
The westward movement of 3rd. (?egular) Division, however, had. the effect
of removing, except for the incomplete armoured forces on Salisbury Plain,
the formerly strong reserve available to Southern Command. A dangerous weak-
ness now existed along the South Coast, at least for a few lays. (See Map 10.)
The coia.nder of V Corps, whose 50th (Northumbrian) Division and 4th
(Regular) Division guarded this long stretch of coastline from the Devon to the
Sussex borders, including the Isle of Wight and. the important Portsmouth -
Southampton area, however, was a rising star, none other than the dynamic and
outspoken Lieutenant General B. L. Montgomery, who has his on tale to tell
of his influence on the plan already being implemented. by General Brooke:
"In July 1940 I was promoted to comaand the V Corps and from that time
begins my real influence on the training of the Army then in England. By
this I mean that the V Corps gave a lead in these matters which had. reper-
cussions far beyond the corps area of Rainpshire and Dorset....
I found myself in disagreement with the general approach to the problem
of the defence of Britain and refused to apply it in my corps area, and later
in the South-Eastern Army. The accepted doctrine was that every inch of the
coastline must be defended. strongly, the defence being based. on concrete
pill-boxes and. entrenchments orx a linear basis all along the coastline.
There was no depth in the defensive layout or fe y troops available for
counter-attack. Inland, stoplines' were being dug all over England; when
I asked. what troops were available to man the stoplines, I could. get no clear
answer. There were no troops.
My approach was different. I pulled the troops back from the beaches
and held them ready in compact bodies in rear, poised. for counter-attack and
for offensive action against the invaders. After a sea crossing, troops
would not feel too well and would. be  suffering from reaction; that is the
time to attack and throw the invader back into the sea.
On the beaches themselves all I would allo r was a screen ol' lightly
equipped troops, with good coanications and sufficient firepower to upset
any landing and cause it to pause.
My whole soul revolted. against allowing troops to get into trenches and.
become 'Naginot-minded'; any offensive action would. then be out of the
cuestion, and. once the linear defensive system was pierced it would all
disintegrate. My idea of the defence was that it must be like a spider's
web; wherever the Germans went they must encounter fresh troops who would
first subject them to heavy fire and would then attack them.
I rebelled against the 'scorched earth' policy rhich had. advocates in
\ihitehall; their reasoning was -that as the Germans advanced. inland. towards
London, so we would burn and. destroy the countrysd.e as ye retreated. I said
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we would not retreat, nor rould the Germans advance inland. Thus confidence
in our ability to defeat the Germans was built up, at any rate in the area
under my conniand." 60.
This, in fact, together vth the hard. and thorough training of the
troops at all levels, the ruthless weeding out of the more elderly and
incompetent officers and. the instillation of a sense of urgency, offensive
eagerness and optimism in the Rome Forces (though athout Iontgomery's
't cular emphasis on fitness) was precisely General Brooke's approach as
uell. A plan relying on mobile offensive action to be successful, however,
had to have the means to achieve that mobility and despte eat improve-
ments in the equipment situation since June, this uas still lacking. The
Uar Cabinet, discussing the question of priority production especially of
aircraft on 6th September, referred also to the large demands for the
production of vehicles for the Army and heard the Secretary of State for
1ar report:
that only five divisions had. their first line transport complete.
The Army realised that they would have to do with make-shift vehicles for
the second-line transport, but if make-shift vehicles uere used for the
first-line transport, the divisions so equipped could not operate across
country." 61.
There were certain areas of vital importance where the idea of stop
lines' could not even now be totally abandoned. Chief among these were the
approaches to London and in the defences of the capital. Whether the Germans
landed in East Anglia or the South East, London was bound to be their main
objective ultimately. The Prime Minister was as well aware as General Brooke
of the enormous importance of holding the capital. In a minute to the Chiefs
of Staff on the use of heavy artillery batteries to deny the enemy the use of
ports and landing beaches and to support counter-attacks, on 30th August, he
wrote,
"I should like also to be informed of the real lines of defence drawn
up between Dover and London, and Harwich and London. Now that the coast is
finished, there is no reason why we should not develop these lines (which
should in no way distract us from the principle of vehement counter_attack).t62
60. Montgomery, Field Marshal The Viscount of Alamein: Memoirs, pp. 70 and
74-75, Collins, London, 1958.
61. C.B 65/9 WM(40)244th:6, 6 September 1940.
62. CAB 80/17 COS(40)685: German Coast Batteries: Letter from the Prime
Minister to the COS, 30 August 1940.
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General Brooke also felt that the defences of London against enemy ground
attack were still not adequate and an inspection of the innermost ring of
defences a few days later seemed to confirm his view. Later that day, 5th
September, having discussed. the matter with the G.O.C. London Lrea, he wrote,
"Spent the day with Bertie Brooke going round London defences....
Defences on north-east, east and south-east satisfactory, but in southern
sector still below standard." 63.
The defences of the capital itself were one thing. The restarting of
work on the 'stoplines' on the north-east and south-east approaches to
London, however, was quite another. General Brooke quite rightly, in view
of the lessons of the recent campaign in France, refused to countenance
this beyond the fortification of carefully selected 'nodal points', the
strongest of which were soon to be designated 'anti-tank islands'. His
view was to some extent shared by Sir .kukland Geddes, Regional Commissioner
for South East England, the sector guarded by Lieutenant General 'BuJ.gy'
Thorne's XII Corps. As the struggle in the air reached its climax on 15th
September, Geddes wrote,
"Clearly, if we cannot hold them in the air, they will invade and our
soldiers frighten me. This new a.rmoured warfare seems to have got them
guessing. As I see it you can only stop mobile armour vith armour, but
they seem to think that a steel shield carried on a tracked vehicle is the
only armour. I have been trying to push into BuJ.gy the conception that
concrete is also armour and that the dashing movements of relatively small
numbers of men in tanks, which have destroyed France, can be prevented if
we create static armour at nodal points to limit their movements until
troops from the interior (if there are any in the interior) can arrive to
push them into the sea. The idea o± 'stoplines' seems to me to be futile
.... if I were in command, I should armour the nodal points in our network
of roads and hang on in these armoured points to the local end.. Special
arrangements must be made for the civilians in them, but that I can do.
To armour nodal points seems to me the best thing we can do until
mobile armour can be created. Tank forces are silly things to be conquered
by. The answer to machines is always the same brains and. energy." 64.
Static 'nodal points', though, however well chosen and well fortified,
could only hope to delay an enemy armou.red thrust. Inevitably they would
eventually be either captured with the aid of the Germans' supporting infan-
try and artillery, however long this might take, or be bypassed. General
63. Diaries of Field Narshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 5 September 1940.
64. Liddell Hart Papers: 1/311/lid, Stray Notes on N.ilitary Points 1940-
1942 by Lord Geddes, 15 September 1940.
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Brooke, therefore, continued to concentrate his attention primarily on the
"troops from the interior", the counter-attack forces on thich the successful
defeat of any enemy lodgement ultimately depended. (Although, quite conceiv-
ably, an enemy force with its passage inland blocked by static defences might
also be forced to surrender if the Royal Navy effectively cut its coniuxunica-
tions by sea and thus prevented its re-supply.)
Between 6th and 12th September, General Brooke carried out a second
series of movements among his reserve formations. Firstly, on 6th September,
Iajor General B. Freybergts 2nd New Zealand Division of 5th and 7th New
Zealand Brigade Groups and. a composite unit named 'Ial1force' was moved
forward to the Naidstone-Ashford area, together with 5 R.T.R. from 1st
Amoured Division. The New Zealanders' planned move overseas was postponed
in view of the now obvious threat from the German occupied Channel ports and
they were instead placed, with 5
	
Cruiser tanks, under command of
I Corps. Their task was to counter-attack, using interior lines,
any enemy invasion force not contained by Liardet's 1st London Division in
the seemingly very vulnerable Dover promontory or Schreiberts 45th (West
Country) Division in the area of Roinney Marsh. The move was made in direct
response to the Chiefs of Staff's concern about the safety of the Dover
promontory, as expressed at their meeting only the previous day, and. was
undoubtedly a wise placement by General Brooke in view of the comparatively
long time it would take units of VII Corps to deploy in this area if an
emergency arose. Secondly, on the same day, 126 Brigade ci' 42nd (East
Lancashire) Division, now reorgan.ised. as a mobile Brigade Group of all arms,
was moved from Holme' s X in Northern Command to the Oxford area and added to
PT Corps to strengthen the G.LQ. Reserves. From its ne; central position
it could be rushed to reinforce either the forces on the South Coast or in
East nglia, or even be moved to the South East. 65. (See hap 10.)
It was at this point tnat a new development arose. "..11 reports look
like invasion getting nearer. Shi ps collecting, dive-bombers being concen-
trated, parachutists captured, also four Dutc1en on the coast," wrote
General Brooke on 7th September and, after describing in his diary his busy
day, he added, "Finally dined with Bertie after sending out order for
'Cromwell' State of Readiness in Eastern and Southern Commands." 66.
65. WO 166/i: op. cit., 6 Sept. 1940.
66. Diaries of Field Narshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 7 September 1940.
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Home Forces were already at eight hours' notice to move, with the
troops in addition 'standing to' at dawn and dusk. That afternoon, even as
the German bombers had switched their attentions from the R.A.F.'s air-
fields to the capital itself, the Chiefs of Staff had decided to bring Home
Forces to their final state of readiness. This involved issuing the code-
word,	 signifying " j inmediate action" as detailed in G.H.Q.
Operational Instruction No. 1 issued by the previous C.-in-C., Home Forces,
General Ironside, as long ago as 5th June. On its receipt, troops "would
take up battle stations, teleaph lines essential for operational purposes
will be taken over and. all liaison officers will take up their duties". 67.
Unfortunately not only was there no intermediate stage between eight hours'
notice' and 'immediate action', but it was soon to be discovered that the
system had. in many cases not been properly explained to the formations and.
units that had come under the command. of Home Forces since the Operational
Instruction had been issued.
The signal, 'Cromwell', was sent out from St. 	 School, T pmmer-
smith, at seven minutes past eight o'clock that evening of 7th September by
Brigadier Swayne, Deputy Chief of Staff at G.L., Home Porces. According
to Brigadier Swayne's own recollection, he authorized the despatch of the
signal "on his own responsibility before the outcome of the meeting of the
Chiefs of Staff was Iciown to him and on the assumption that neither of his
superiors was available for consultation". 8. This claim, however, does
seem rather suspect. Certainly his immediate superior, Lieutenant General
Paget, had. represented the C.-in-0., Home Forces, at the Chiefs of Staff's
meeting at 5.30 p.m. and. had not yet returned. General Brooke, on the
other hand, had attended the Chiefs of Staff's earlier meeting at 12 noon,
but had then returned to St. Paul's where he discussed the expansion of the
armoured forces during the afternoon. The decision at the Chiefs of Staff's
later meeting, that the Commander-in-Chief ras to issue the signal for
immediate notice, must have been communicated to General Drooke, present at
St. Paul's School, well before 8.00 p.m. that evening, giving him ample
time to make the final preparations. General Brooke's ovn diary gives no
hint that the signal was issued without his personal authorization,
although Brigadier Swayne, most likely acting on General ookes specific
instructions, probably saw the signal was sent out correctly from G.E.(.,
67. CAB 79/6 COS ( 40 ) 300th : 1 , 7 September 1940; and 'ITO 166/i: op. cit.,
June 1940: Appendix B: GHQ, Operational Instruction 110. 1, 5 June
1 9z1.0.
68. Collier, Basil: op. cit., p. 223.
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Home Forces. Rumours that the Government had been throun into confusion on
this Saturday night and had issued 'Cromwell' as a panic measure, and
Churchill's own claim that the Chiefs of Staff were unaware "that the deci-
sive codeword 'Cromwell' had been used", 
69. 
are equa:J.ly unfounded in view
of the Chiefs of Staff's carefully considered conclusion based on the
available evidence for the -Timinnence of invasion, not on the sudden begin-
ning of the 'Blitz' on London, and in view of the next meeting of the War
Cabinet not taking place, as was established practice, until the Monday
following the weekend, while the various ministers and officials functioned
as normal.
Vhatever the controversy surrounding its issue, the signal 'Cromwell'
was sent out to Southern and Eastern Commands, to the London Lrea and to the
Headquarters of IV Corps, VII Corps and 126 Brigade Group in G.H.Q. Reserve,
and was in addition repeated to all other Commands for information only.
Thirtherniore, all leave was stopped for Home Forces personnel, although those
already on leave were not yet recalled. Also that evening the Australian
Infantry force in Wiltshire, hitherto under War Office control pending their
despatch to the Middle East, was placed under the command of Home Forces who
70.
were to allocate the force to Southern Command's control the next day.
The Australians, very eager though only two brigades strong, were to become
Southern Command's new mobile reserve, partly filling the gap left by the
3rd (Regular) Division's departure to the West Country a few days before,
although even with their addition the long South Coast still remained fairly
vulnerable. (See Nap 10.)
Receipt of the codeword. 'Cromwell' that Saturday night, meanwhile, had
caused mi.ich excitement and confusion, although in some cases it seems to
have ta1en some four hours to reach troops on the coast. By this late hour,
many headquarters were sparsely manned, many senior officers being on week-
end leave. The night-duty officers with the field formations were often
junior officers with little experience. Such were the changes since 5th
June, that few knew what 'Cromwell' really meant. To some it meant nothing
at all, while to the ma3ority who received it, it was believed to signify
that an invasion was actually in progress. In addition, not all the forces
in Western, Northern and Scottish Commands realised that tne codeword had
had been sent to them for information only and not for action. 
71. The
69. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 276.
70. WO 166/1: op. cit., 7-8 September 1940.
71. Fleming, Peter: op. cit., p. 281.
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German bombers, moreover, had returned for a third time that day, at 8.20
p.m., to feed the fires now raging in London, especially in the dockland
area. As darkness came, the bombers, now unimpeded by the R.A.F.'s fighters
and with British night-fighting techniques arid. equipment in its infancy,
continued their activities until 4.30 a.m. on Sunday, 8th September.
The heavy raids on London only added to the confusion caused by the
'Cromwell' alert. In some areas the Home Guard, though unarare of the
content of the message, were quickly aware of the situation and. responded
with gnsto. Church bells vere rung by Home Guard commanders on their own
initiative to call out their men, thereby giving the impression that enemy
parachutists were already descending on the countryside and that German E-
boats were approaching the coast under cover of night. These and. other
rumours, including reports that enemy parachutists had actually landed, all
added to the prevailing atmosphere of expectancy. In many places roadblocks
were closed, some telephone exchanges were taken over by the military or
refused to accept non-official calls, and in Eastern Command several bridges
in one sector were demolished by the Royal Engineers, while near Louth in
Lincolnshire three Guards officers of I Guards Brigade ere unfortunately
killed by landxnines laid in the road along which they were driving. In
other areas all remained quiet and. the warning was virtually ignored, since
the recipients were unaware of its meaning. 72.
In an attempt to halt the confusion a second signal left G.H.QS, Home
Forces, at 10.45 a.m. on the Sunday, stressing to Western, Northern, Scottish
and. Aldershot Commands that 'Cromwell' had been for their information only
and not for action. This signal was crdered by General Broo].:e, who had
arrived at his office that morning to find '.... further indications of
impending invasion. Everrthing pointed to Kent and East ..4nglia as the two
most threatened points." 	 General Brooke also issued instructions as to
the intermediate stages by which the vigilance of Home Forces could be
increased without declaring an invasion imirnnent and, in addition, he made
it clear that even on receipt of 'Cromvell' the Home Guard vere not to be
called out except for special tasks; whilst church bells were only to be
rung on the order of a Home Guard who had seen as many as twenty-five
parachutists landing. They were not to be rung because other bells had been
heard. or for any other reason. A previously planned move of the New Zealand
Division back to Ald.ershot was also held in abeyance.
72. ibid., pp. 281-282.
73. Diaries of Field IarshaJ. Viscount Alanbrooke, 8 September 1940.
74. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 276; and 1O 166/1: op. cit., 8 Sept.
19 LO.
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Rumours that morning, hardly surprisingly, continued to abound. The
most widespread of these was that the Germans had launched. an attempted
invasion the previous night, but that their forces had. been cut to pieces
in passage by the Royal Navy and the R.A.F., many of their sold.iers being
drowned or burnt to death in patches of sea covered with flaming oil.
During the previous month the corpses of some 36 German soldiers had indeed
been washed up at scattered points along the coast between Great Yarmouth
and Cornwall, but the most probable explanation of these was that the
Germans had been practising emba.rkations in barges along the French coast
and. that some of these had. been sunk either by British bombing or by bad
weather. This incident, nevertheless, combined. with the opening of the
'Blackpool Front' on 5th September as the R.A.F.'s bombers began bombing
the enemy barge concentrations in the French and Belgian Channel ports by
night, an action clearly visible from the Kentish cliffs, and taken together
with the excitements of the previous night, all appeared to give substance
to the story of a failed enemy invasion attempt. This story was to persist
until after the War. No mention of the German corpses or of the 'Cromwell'
alert was made in the newspapers or in Parliament at the time despite all
the speculation, nor was the belief shared by the British Government, the
Chiefs of Staff or the other authorities with access to the air reconnais-
sance reports, but the story was never officially denied, at least until
after the War was over. Churchill later explained that,
"We took no steps to contradict such tales, which spread. freely
through the occupied. countries in a wildly exaggerated form and. gave un.ich
encouragement to the oppressed. populations."	 -
As to the 'Croim.rell' incident, he merely added.,
"It served as a useful tonic and rehearsal for all concerned."
That evening of 8th September, General Brooke again called in at his
headquarters, still believing that invasion was iinent. is apprehensions
are recorded in his diary:
".... all reports still point to the probability of an invasion start-
ing between the 8th and. 10th of this month.... I wish I had more completely
trained formations under my orders. B.it for the present there is nothing to
be done but to trust God and. pray for Ris help and guidance." 76.
*	 *	 *
75. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., pp. 275-276.
76. Dares of Field Karshal Vscount Llanbrooke, 8 Septe2ber 19z1.C.
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'Cromwell' alert on the night of 7th/8th September 1940 marked the
climax of the invasion scare for Britain's Home Forces. 'Cromwell' was to
remain in force until 12 noon on 19th September, but from 11.00 p.m. on 8th
September the degree of alert was reduced from ':tiiiate notice' to four
notice to move for all formations and units in G.E.C.. Reserve,
although the troops of Southern and. Eastern Commands and of London Area were
to remain at action stations for the whole twelve day period.. With the
final cancellation of 'Cromwell', mainly because of its unacceptable effects
on the Army's training and its unpopular repercussions on the leave roster,
a new form of alert was introduced. The four hours' notice instruction for
G.LQ. Reserve was also cancelled on 19th September aS the new system came
into force.
The details of the new stages of alert for the .±rny were outlined in a
message from G.R.., Home Forces, to the headquarters of all Commands and
of IV and VII Corps. The instruction, issued on 18th September and intended
to come into effect from noon on the 19th, was also repeated for information
to the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, the Home Defence Executive and to H.Q.
British Troops in Ireland. This time the instruction, siied by Brigadier
Swayne on General Brooke' s behalf, was given with clarity and was explained
in full detail. The unfortunate lessons of the night of 7th/8th September
had been fully learned. The controversial codeword 'Cromwell' was cancelled,
but it was still considered that "the risk of invasion has not diminished
and is not likely to do so for some time to come". The message went on:
"It is therefore necessary to maintain an adequate state of readiness
over this period whilst allowing certain facilities for training and avoid.-
ing undue stress and consequent staleness .... the following state of
readiness will be maintained by all troops of the Field Army. Beaches will
be patrolled during the hours of dar1iess and troops nh stand to at dawn;
in foggy weather very active patrolling will be carried out and sentry
posts will be increased as necessary. Defences will be nnned on scales to
be laid down by G.0. C.-in-C.s. Home Guards will NOT be called out except
for special purposes.... Seven days leave for five per cent at a time of
cfficers and O.R.s will be reinstituted...."
Finally, the modified form of alert was described:
"For a further state of readiness the term 'CROI'LIELL' will NOT be used,
but the message 'STAND TO' may be sent out, indicating conditions particu-
larly favourable for an invasion. On receipt of this message, troops will
come to a complete state of readiness, but the Home Guard will NOT be called
out except for special purposes as ordered by G.O. C.-in-C.s.
For a full scale state of readiness including the calling out of the
Home Guard, the message 'ACTION STATIONS' will be sent out, indicating the
_?70_
iiediate threat of invasion. On receipt of this message, further leave
will not be granted, but personnel on leave will NOT be recalled by Commands.
Orders for the return of such personnel from leave will be issued by [G.Lc.J
ROFOR.. Necessary telephone and telegraph lines will be taken up.
After issue of 'ACTION STATIONS' further instructions as to standing
down of Home Guard will be issued by HOFOR. as situation develops.
Nessages 'STA}tD TO' or 'ACTION ST.TIONS' will be addressed only to
those who are to take action. To others they will be repeated for informa-
tion only." 77.
As it happened, only three days later, on 22nd September, conditions
were again judged to be favourable for invasion and the first stage of the
new alert, 'Stand To', was issued, this time without any of the mishap and
confusion that had attended the issue of 'Cromwell'. 'Stand To' was then
cancelled on the following day, never to be re-issued, and leave was again
reopened. The possibility of a German attack during the autumn, however,
perhaps under cover of fog or d.arlmess could even now not be discounted and
the cancellation of 'Stand To' on 23rd September was therefore accompanied
by a stern warning message from General Brooke:
".... the Commander-in-Chief directs that measures are taken to ensure
that guards and sentries are at all times on the alert, that patrolling
during the hours of darkness and. in fog on the South and. East coasts is
active and that arrangements exist and. are frequently tested to ensure that
a state of readiness to meet invasion can rapidly become operative. He
hopes that within these limitations, training will be energetically
continued." 78.
Tension, in the meantime, had remained high, both in the twelve days
following the eventful night of the 7th/Bth September and during the follow-
ing four days until the cancellation of 'Stand To' on the 23rd September and
even beyond. The heavy enemy air attacks on London continued both by day
and night. On the 9th September there were heavy daylight air attacks on
Greater London by over 200 enemy bombers. Lively air corabats had occurred
over Kent and the south west suburbs of London, resulting in the loss of 28
enemy aircraft to the R.A.F.'s 19 fighters. At the War Cabinet's meeting
that day, General Brooks urged that "in view of the advanced state of the
eflemy s preparations for invasion" and the acute danger from enemy bombing
77. WO 166/1: op. cit., 8 and 19 September 1940; and September 1940
Appendix D: Cancellation of 'CROINELL': 'STAI'D TO' and 'ACTION STATIONS'
to replace it, 18 September 1940.
78. WO 166/1: op. cit.: Appendix E: 'STLND TO' cancelled and Leave
Reopened, 23 September 1940.
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if an invasion occurred. in the South East, the compulso_'y evacuation of all
but essential civilians from the towns along the coast from P2msgate to
Brighton (both inclusive) and from four inland. towns, should be immediately
implemented. The Cabinet, however, declared that "the time available did
not permit of the adoption of a compulsory evacuation scheine"and. refused to
apply any scheme of evacuation to Brighton "having regard to the fact that
accommodation and transport would not be available for the large numbers of
people concerned". It did agree, none the less, to extend the stimulation
of voluntary evacuation of the non-essential civilian population of the 19
East Coast towns between Great Yarmouth and Polkestone, put into operation
on 3rd July, that had. successfully reduced the population of these towns by
some 405, to include the South Coast towns from New Romney to Newhaven and
the inland towns of Canterbury and Ashford in Kent, plus Ipswich and Col-
chester in East nglia. The War Cabinet also specified that the extension
of voluntary evacuation should be merely a temporary measure and, so that
the general public would not be alarmed, no mention of it should appear in
the national newspapers.
General Brooke had had more success with the Chiefs of Staff that day
than with the War Cabinet. At a meeting earlier that morning he had per-
suaded the Chiefs of Staff to defer until 17th September a decision on the
despatch of further reinforcements to the Middle East. These were to
consist of the Australian Infantry Force (18,000 men), the 2nd New Zealand
Division (22,000 men), two Cruiser tank battalions and various support
units, all very crucial forces if Home Forces were expected to repel
successfully an invasion. The reinforcements were urgently required in
Egypt, where an Italian invasion was now imininent, and :ere originally due
to be withdrawn from Home Forces on the 15th for sailing on the 25th Sept-
ember. The Chiefs of Staff, fortunately, had agreed that "in view of the
critical situation that now existed in the United Kingdom, it would be
unwise to send troops out of the country" and duly recommended to the Prime
Kinister that the departure of the Middle East convoy should be delayed one
week and instead sail on 3rd October.
The troops earmarked as reinforcements to the Middle East, however,
would still have to be withdrawn from their immediate operational role with
Home Forces about ten days before their convoy sailed. This would now be
around 23rd. September, still far too soon for General Brooke who remained
79. CLB 65/9 WM(40)345th:7, 9 September 1940.
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"strongly opposed." to these troops, "particularly the Cruiser tank batta].-
ions", leaving the country at tius critical time. The Chiefs of Staff, on
the other hand., had to take a much wider strategic view of the whole war
situation and rated the security of the Middle East as being second only to
that of the United Kingdom. "The problem is one of balancing risks," they
realised. They also believed that the days up to the 13th September would.
be the most dangerous period for invasion. "After the 13th September, tt the
Chiefs of Staff declared, "the conditions for invasion ill be less favour-
able." 80.
The 10th September saw only minor German bombing raids by daylight,
but Greater London was to continue to suffer raids by an average of 160
enemy bombers per night for almost 68 consecutive nights from 7th September
until 13th November. Opposed at night only by relatively ineffective night
fighters and A.A. batteries, these raids, combined with the more intermitt-
ent and far more costly daylight raids on London during September, were to
result in many civilian casualties and cause wide areas of devastation in
many parts of the capital. The bombing of London, however, did not have
any serious effect on Britain's war effort. It removed. the threat to the
vital sector stations end the consequent strain on Fighter Command,
while the stress upon the Luftwaffe pilots was only increased as continuous
operations and mounting losses began to take their toll.
hcross the Channel, reports from British air reconn_rrce st.11
showed many small enemy vessels to be moving in a southwesterly direction,
especially by night, and entering the ports of Ostend, Dunlirk, Calais and
Bouloie. Nany more barges were visible at Flushing, Ln Terp, in the Dutch
estuaries and the Belgian canals, although the nuibers in these had declined
in favour of the Channel ports. Yet more small craft could be seen in the
smaller Channel ports such as Zeebrugge, Gravelines, :toles and Dieppe,
while larger merchantmen were vzble at Le Havre and. in the Dutch ports
and estuaries. On 11th September, 5 German destroyers, 9 torpedo bcets and
8 minesweepers were seen to have arrived at Cherbourg, while other light
naval units were seen in the other French, Belgian and Dutch ports or
escorting convoys of barges or small merchant vessels at sea. A close eye,
too, was still being kept on the North German ports, where a continuing
decrease of shipping was evident, and on the ports of \Testern France and of
Southern Norway, where little enemy shipping activity could be discerned.
80. CAB 79/6 COS(40)30id:1, and AnneeI, 9 September 1940.
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By 17th September there were no less than 625 barges and about 30 merchant
vessels at .Antwerp, plus 25 more barges at Terneuzen, and 145 barges and. 18
merchant vessels or coasters at Flushing. In the Channel ports there were
250 barges at Ostend; 140 at Dunkirk, with 80 more barges in the ad3oining
canals; 266 barges at Calais; 150 barges, 20 merchant vessels and. 60
small craft (rising to 230 barges, 29 merchant vessels and over 250 small
craft on 18th September) at BouJ.oe; 7 merchant vessels and 44 small
craft at Dieppe; while 205 barges, 52 merchant vessels and 130 small craft
were counted at the larger port of Le Havre. By 17th 3eptember, more
German light naval units were visible, especially at Le Eavre where 15
torDedo boats, 17 patrol craft and 14 minesweepers were seen, and at
Cherbourg there were now 4 destroyers and 15 torpedo boats, plus another 20
merchant vessels. British aerial reconnaissance over western French ports,
on the other hand, continued to yield little of note, except at Brest where
some 30 merchant vessels and 50 small craft were visible on 18th September,
together with 65 mysterious "small rafts of unusual shape" moored. offshore
81.
nearby.
The continuing build-up of enemy invasion shipping up to 18th September,
combined with the heavy German air attacks on London both by day and at
night, convinced General Brooke that an invasion would very soon materialise.
The frequent entries in his diary during this tense period give ample
evidence of his worries. "Still no invasion today," he rote on 10th Sept-
ember, "I wonder whether he will do anything during the next few days?";
arid on the following day,
"Evidence of impending invasion has been accumulating all day, more
ships moving west down the Channel, intercepted cypher inessa€es, etc.. It
is still possible that it may be a bluff to hide some other stroke. The
next day or two are bound to be very critical." 82.
The Prime Ninister also felt that the point of crisis in the invasion
build-up was fast approaching. t the War Cabinet meeting at 12.30 p.m. on
11th September, Churchill drew the attention of his ministers to the con-
tinuing westward movement of the enemy convoys down the French coast, "A
powerful armada was thus being deployed along the coasts of Prance opposite
this country." By now, British bombers were attacking the barge concentra-
tions by night, while the Royal Navy were mounting spoiling operations with
81. COS 106/1198: Air Reconnaissance Reports on Barge Concentrations in
the Channel Ports, 8-18 September 1940.
82. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Llanbrooke, 10-11 September 1940.
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cruisers and destroyers also at night. On the previous night two British
destroyers and. an escort vessel had. successfully fired. on enemy trawlers
and barges off Ostend, although proposed bombardments of Calais and Boulogrie
on the nights of 8th and. 9th September had. been abortive. Frequent sweeping
operations off the French coast by destroyers and torpedo boats were, in
fact, to prove more successful during September than naval bombardments of
the Channel ports, which necessitated risking valuable rarships close in-
shore. "The argument of the naval authorities," Churchill declared, "was
that if we were to send our ships to attack these concentrations of barges
and merchant vessels along the French coast, we might well tb.row away
forces which would be invaluable to us if these barges and merchant ships
attempted to cross the Channel." The previous night Churchill had had a
conference with the First Lord, the Secretary of State for War and their
advisors as to how the Navy could best be used to counter invasion. On
13th September the battleships 'Nelson' and 'Hood' were to be moved from
Scapa Flow to join the 'Rodney', which was already at Rosyth. The 'Revenge'
had. already been ordered to Plymouth, while the system of air reconnaissance
patrols by Coastal Conmand, now involving the equivalent of 19 sq.uad.rons,
instead of 15 as in early suer, was being further improved so as to
incr.se the chances of detecting enemy forces in the Channel. Mining
operations outside the French ports had also been undertaken. 83.
The Prime Minister's chief concern, however, remained the defence of
the Kent promontory, '.... the vital stretch of coastline ras from the North
Poreland to Dungeness," he declared, 	 -
"If the enemy should succeed in getting lodgements of troops ashore on
this coast, and could capture the guns deployed there, they would have not
only a bridgehead, but a sheltered passageway coanded by the coast defence
guns from both sides of the Channel."
Churchill proposed various steps for strengthening this essential strip of
coastline, including the intensive fortification of gun positions, the
making over to the C.-in-C., Home Forces, of the highly trained 'Special
Companies' (forerunners of the later t Commandos), some of vhich could be
employed in this sector, and the deployment of a regiment of Bofors guns to
help protect the troops from attacks by low-flying enemy aircraft. Anthony
Eden, Secretary of State for War, added at this point that he had. seen
83. CAB 65/9 and 65/15 WM(40)247th:3; and Confidential innexe, 11 Sept.
1940 ; and Collier, Basil: op. cit., pp. 224-226.
- 364 -
General Brooke that morning with Genera]. Dill. General Brooke, on learning
- as he put it - that the Prime Minister "had. been somewhat disturbed" by an
Admiralty paper concerning the security of the guns mounted in the vicinity
of Dover and. that he "proposed to visit that sector ci' the coast tomorrow",
had explained to Eden and Dill the problems to be overcome in the defence of
the area. The C.-in-C., Home Forces, as Eden now reported to the Prime
Minister, had pointed out,
•••• that the extension of German shipping dovn the Channel gave him a
longer front to defend. Nevertheless, he agreed with the vital need for
protecting the North Foreland-Dungeness sector. He uaz most grateful that
the Special Companies were to be under his command. He would employ some of
them in this sector, but he did not propose to move the Companies now at
Hyde and Rye.... He preferred. to keep the armoured troops and the New
Zealand troops in the Naid.stone area, as this point was the best for inter-
nal conmiunication to either Dover or Dungeness."
Despite his concern over the defence of the Dover promontory, however,
Churchill was to conclude the War Cabinet's meeting that day with an opti-
mistic and prophetic remark. Thinking aloud, he considered,
".... it was by no means impossible that the Germans would in the end
decide not to launch an attack on this country, because they were unable to
obtain the domination over our fighter force." 84.
Later that afternoon the German bombers again returned to bomb London
and. also Southampton. They were vigorously opposed. by the R.A.F.'s figtiter
squadrons now operating in pairs and acting against a more concentrated
target. Of about 250 German aircraft penetrating Kent, only 100 bombers
reached London, but 29 R.A.F. fighters were lost compared with only 25 of
the raiders, although the operational strength ol' Fighter Command remained.
high. The German losses were naturally much exag;erted by the British press
at the time and the true figures as given here were not revealed until after
the War. Churchill, nevertheless, remained optimistic. "This effort of the
Germans to secure daylight mastery of the air over Thagland is of course the
crux of the whole War," he declared. in a broadcast to the nation that day,
11th September. "So far it has failed conspicuously. It has cost them very
dear, and we have felt stronger, and actually are a good deal stronger, than
uhen the hard. fighting began in July." Describing the German preparations
across the Channel, however, he went on, ".... but no one should blind. himself
to the fact that a heavy full-scale invasion of this island is being prepared
8. CAB 65/9 and. 65/15: op . cit.; and Diaries of Field Mirshal Viscount
hlanbrooke, 11 September 1q40.
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vith all the usual German thoroughness and method, and that it may be launched
now - upon g1and, upon Scotlnd, or upon Ireland, or upon all three."
The Prime Minister concluded,
"If the invasion is to be tried at all, it does not seem that it can be
long delayed. The weather may break at any time.... Therefore we mast regard
the next week or so as a very important period in our history. It ranks with
the days when the Spanish Armada was approaching the Chan.Liel, and Drake was
finishing his game of bowls; or when Nelson stood bet-een us and Napoleon's
C-rand Army at BouJ.ogne...." 8.
The Chiefs of Staff, in the meantime, were discussing a report that a
German mountain division was located in the Brest area and. was believed to
be practising cliff climbing:
".... it might be the German intention to attemDt to capture a suitable
beach by landing parachute troops on the top of neighbouring cliffs and
formations of . mountain division at the cliff foot during suitable tide
conditions." 80.
Might these specially trained troops be employed in the cliff areas of the
Dover promontory, or perhaps on the flanks of an enemy invasion force, or as
a diversionary effort, possibly much further westward along the South Coast?
Across the Channel, and entirely unimown to the Chiefs of Staff until after
the War, the Germans had. by now virtually completed their preparations to
land. in force along a fifty mile front from Hythe in East Ient to Newhaven
jn East Sussex. 'Sea Lion', although postponed at the iavy's request from
the 15th September to 21st September, now required only Hitler's word for
operations to coence on the latter date. Since the German Navy, though,
needed ten days to complete its nazardous but indis pensable mine-sweeping
and mine-laying programme, it was essential that Hitler's order or directive
either confirming the date of invasion as the 21st, or Dostponing it, was
issued on 11th September. Hitler, however, now began to iaver and postponed
his final decision until 14th September. Gambling on a British collapse
following the intensive bombing of London, he now only araied nexs from
Goering of German victory in the air.
Only minor German air raids by daylight followed on 12th September, as
General Brooke toured forward defensive positions in the Dungeness and Dover
areas in company with the Prime Minister, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley
85. Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., pp. 290-291.
66. CAB 79/6 cos(40)306th:1, 11 September 1940.
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Pound, the Rt. Hon. A. V. Alexander (First Lord. of the .Ldiniralty), Genera].
Dill and. Ma3or General Ismay. "P.M. wanted. to watch air-fight, but there
was none to see...." wrote Genera]. Brooke that night. The poor weather of
the 12th continued. until late next day, 13th September, and. again only minor
German air raids weie experienced. during the daytime, although the nightly
bombing of London continued as usual. "Everything looks like an invasion
starting tomorrow from the Thames to Plymouth," General Brooke confided to
his diary, "I wonder whether ye shall be hard at it by this time tomorrow
evening?" 87.
On 13th September, Mussolini's much vaunted offensive into Egypt from
Libya began. Pressure on Home Forces to send. further reinforcements to the
hard-pressed and grossly outnumbered. British forces in the Middle East
would only increase. That night, for the first time, following smaller
nightly raids from 5th September and earlier fairly ineffectual attacks on
German shipping, airfields and industrial and communications targets in an
attempt to delay the enemy build-up in July and August, the whole night's
effort of Bomber Command was devoted to the Channel ports and the massed
barge and shipping concentrations in them. A total of 91 sorties were
flon by Bomber Command that night and some 80 barges were reported to be
sunk or damaged at Ostend alone.
Next morning, 14th September, the Chiefs of Staff considered a worry-
ing paper on the possibility that German airborne troops, "lightly equipped
with gangster guns and. grenades", might be landed by parachute in and
around London in an attempt to isolate the capita]. and paralyse the central
machinery of Government by seizing key points in the centre of London,
including Whitehall. "Such an attempt might well be attempted by way of
surprise even before local ar superiority had. been obtained," this memo-
randa, drawn up by the Joint Intelligence Sub Committee, alarmingly stated.
The paper did point out, however, that a maximum of 20,000 enemy parachut-
ists would inevitably be expected to suffer heavy casualtes in such an
operation and could not hope to land simultaneously of effectively to
isolate London, nor would they be likely to land in compact bodies within
Central London. They could not be supported by glider-borne troops there
or in the immediate outskirts because of the presence of the balloon
barrage, although gliders could be landed in the open spaces around London,
87. Diaries of Field. Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 12-13 September 1940.
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perhaps at dawn. The Chiefs of Staff were worried enough to require the
presence of Lieutenant General Paget from G.H.., Home Forces, and. of
Lieutenant General Sir Bertram Sergison-Brooke, G.0.C. London Area, who told.
them that,
".... in addition to his central reserve of regular battalions he had
a number of mobile detachments of approximately 250 men arranged around
London. Their primary task was to deal with airborne landings. Of the Home
Guard in London approximately 80,000 were available and not required for
guarding Vulnerable Points."
He added, however, that, "depending on the time of the day or night at which
they were required, it would take from five to twelve hours to call up the
Home Guard" and that he had "only twelve guns of working types", although
Lieutenant General Paget said that Home Forces would "endeavour to locate
more artillery in the London area" • At the same meeting, ir Chief I'Iarshal
Sir Cyril Newall asked Paget to reassure the C.-in-C., Rome Forces, that
"the primary task of the bomber force was antl-invasion, but that it was
necessary to divert some aircraft for raids on Berlin". 88.
That afternoon the German bombers again attempted to reach Greater
London, but were mostly forced to turn back by the R.A.F. fighters, 14 aero-
planes being lost on either side, while Hitler once more postponed his final
decision on 'Sea Lion' for another three days at a summit conference in
back
Berlin. This, in effect, PushedLtxle date for the invasion to commence from
24th September to the 27th, a very late date and oust outside the period of
19th to 26th September that the German Naval Staff had deemed suitable from
the point of view of tides. Preparations, nevertheless, were to be continued
and air attacks on London intensified. "Ominous quiet!" ote General Brooke
on the evening of the 14th, following a visit to 31 Independent Brigade Group
in G.E.. Reserve during the day, "Have Germans completed their preparations
for invasion? Are they giving their air force a last brush and wash up?
ill he start tomorrow, or is it all a bluff to pin troops down in this
country while he prepares to help Italy to invade Egypt....?" 89. After dark
German bombers again hit London, thile the British bombers were also active,
almost 180 sorties being mounted against the Channel ports.
*	 *	 *
88. CA 79/6 COS(40)309th:1, 14 September 1940; and CAB 60/18 COS(40)740
(JIC); also JIC(40)283: Airborne Attack on London: liemoranda by the
JIC, 13 September 1940.
89. Diaries of Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 14 September l9LtO.
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While events in the air and on both sides of the Channel rapidly un-
folded and as the invasion crisis came to a head, General Brooke was Tnk1T1g
full use of the short time available to him to put the final touches to the
disposition of the formations and units under his command, that would virtu-
ally complete his immediate plans for the defence of the country on land.
Continuing his policy of moving the formations of G.H.Q,. Reserve nearer
to the most threatened areas of coastline, following the excitement of the
night of 7th/8th September, he began next day by moving 130 Infantry Brigade
of 43rd (essex) Division from Harpenden in Hertford.shire, forward to Great
Dunmow in Essex. Nos, with two of its three brigades situated in North-West
Essex (129 Infantry Brigade was at Newport, Essex) and only its 128 Infantry
Brigade and Divisional Readquarters placed further back in North Hertford-
shire (near Hitchin and at Watton at Stone, near Hertford., respectively),
Na3or General R. V. Pollok's 43rd (Wessex) Division was more able to inter-
vene quickly to use its mobile infantry in a counter-attacking role in the
southern part of East Jnglia. Also wi.thin IV Corps, on 9th September,
General Brooke brought forward 31 Infantry Brigade Group from its central
position inland near Oxford, to the position 3ust vacated by 130 Infantry
Brigade at Rarpenden. 90. At Harpenden this Brigade Group was now well
placed to support 43rd (\essex) Division in operations in East Anglia. It
could move in a counter-attacking role in the event of enemy forces approach-
ing North London or could. even be moved southwards into Surrey if VII Corps
became committed against a German invasion of the South East. In all, these
moves had the effect of further strengthening IV Corps's ability to counter-
attack effectively in Last .nglia. (See Yap 10.) 	 -
The bulk of IV Corps was now positioned for counter-attack in Last
knglia, while VII Corps was siilaxly positioned in the South East. Shoild
either cf these forces become fully coitted in t:eir respective areas,
however, with their formitions and units becoming tired by action and
perhaps mauled by losses, t would then become necessary to bring forward
further fresh formations to help from a new reserve. At this stage, General
Brooke foresaw that a serious problem might develop. Should the invasion
come, say, in the South East, VII Corps was likely to be committed fairly
rapidly to oppose it and fresh troops from G.H.. Reserve would. have to be
brought down from East Lnglia or even from Northern Command. On the other
hand, if the German invasion came in East Anglia, troops from VII Corps
might have to move to the north of London. Either way, the troops would
-
90. \:O 166/i: op. cit., 6-9 September 1940; nd .ppendix h.: Location List
1o. 4, 11 September 1940.
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have to move through the vast labyrinth of London or even be transported
across the Thames Estuary and either would be a most extraordinarily diffi-
cult operation, especially if, as in France, they were under constant air
attack, while the rubble strewn streets of the capital were likely to be
further blocked with rubble from the continuing enemy bombing. Only the
routes to the west of London, where roads and bridges over the Thames were
plentiful and there was less air raid. damage, offered relatively easy
passage to the north-south or south-north movement of reserve formations.
Time would be needed, however, to effect such movements and even more time
to assemble the troops for the counter-attack when they arrived after a
lengthy journey at their destination. Already, General Brooke's predecessor
as C.-in-C., B:ome Forces, had laid down that Lieutenant General Sir Guy
William's extensive Eastern Command, extending from Sussex to The Wash and
effectively split in two by London and the Thames, was to be divided in the
event of an invasion between the G.O. 0.-in-C., Eastern Command, and
Lieutenant General Thorne presently commanding XII Corps in the South East,
the two Lieutenant Generals each taking charge of the battle, respectively,
in East Anglia and in the South East. "This front," General Brooke agreed,
cut in two by the River Thames, "comprised the main danger area from the
point of view of invasion, and was much too extensive for one man to control."
"I did not like it from the start," he wrote later and he was to divide off
the part of it south of the Thames and London Area to create a new South
Eastern Command (also including the former Aldershot Comand) on 21st Feb.
-ruary 1941. 91. In the meantime, besides the physical barriers between the
two halves of Eastern Command might be added a command problem in the event
of invasion that could further hinder the smooth transfer of the G.H..
Reserves across the River Thames.
General Brooke's temporary solution to both these problems was to form
a new G.Lç. Reserve which, situated in the South Midlands astride the River
Thames and nominally part of IV Corps, could. intervene as a central mass of
manoeuvre (so lacking in France in May-June 1940) either in support of the
G.E.. Reserve formations now placed in East Anglia, or in support of those
in the South East; or it could intervene, if necessary, in the Hampshire-
Dorset sector of Southern Command. A start nad already been made on 6th
September when 126 Brigade Group of 42nd (East Lancashire) Division was
moved from Northern Command to the 'Oxford Area' (actually near Chelteitham
in Glouestershire, at first). Now on 9th September, 125 Brigade Group and
91. Bryant, Arthur: op. cit., p. 198; and WO 166/1: op. cit., 21 February
1941.
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Divisional Headquarters were moved to the Newbury-Read.mg-Kingsclere area,
and the next day 127 Brigade Group, also part of 42nd (East Lancashire)
Division, was moved to a position 3ust east of Oxford. Finally, on 12th
September, 126 Brigade Group was brought forward from Gloucestershire to
the Renley-Maidenhead-Pangboi.u'ne area. (See Nap 10.) Comparatively well
equipped, with unusually plentiful transport and its constituent Brigade
Groups of all arms well desigued for rapid movement, td (East Lancashire)
Division was ideally suited to its new role. "A good division which will
require a good deal more training," General Brooke wrote after an inspec-
tion on 17th September. 92. His central mass of manoeuvre, however, was
still only a single division strong. (See Map 10.)
Apart from the repositioning and strengthening of the G.H.. Reserves,
General Brooke's other main area of concern during September remained the
security of the Dover promontory. "It is that narrow neck of sea that
constitutes a danger point now that he [the enemy] has all his shipping
assembled on the French coast opposite to it," he wrote on 25th September.
On 10th September, following General Brooke's successful meeting with the
Chiefs of Staff on the previous day, G.H.Q. Home Forces announced that the
move of the New Zealand Division back to Aldershot from the Naidstone area
"will not take place before 19th September", while the embarkation of the
Australian Infantry Force in Wiltshire was similarly postponed. On the same
day, Commands were warned "to take precautions against the surprise scaling
of cliffs by the Germans"; 'hile the following day, 11th September, saw
eight of the ne.Tly formed 'Independent Companies' and seven of the new
units placed under the operational control of G.H.., H6me Forces.
Of these, 4, 8 and 9 Independent Companies and 5 and 6 Commando were moved
to Eastern Conand "to be used exclusively to provide additional security
for guns in the Dover area". On 12th September, VII Corpc as strengthened
by the addition of 44 R.T.R. from 21st Army Tank Brigade on Salisbury Plain,
its 50 'Matilda' Mk. II Infantry tan_ks being moved to Reanill, Surrey, to
provide a third tank battalion for 1 Army Tank Brigade, 'rhich had lost its
7 R.T,L as a reinforcement to the Middle East during August. 	 By the
15th September, 1 Army Tank Brigade could boast a total of 153 'Matilda'
Infantry tanks, although 27 were still the older machine-gun armed Mk. I
variant. (See Appendix 12.)
92. WO 166/i: op. cit., 6-12 September, 1940; and Diaries of Field Marshal
Viscount Alanbrooke, 17 September 1940.
93. Diaries of Field I'Iarshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 25 September 1940.
94. WO 166/i: op. cit., 10-12 September 1940.
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A few days later yet more reinforcements were to be despatched. by
General Brooke to the Dover area, as on 24th September, 31 Infantry Brigade
Group was moved from Hertfordshire to Ham Street, south of Ashlord, Kent,
and placed under command of 45th (ilest Country) Division. The following
day saw 4 Cheshires, a machine-gun battalion, being moved from Northern
Command to Dover to strengthen the local defences, while the New Zealanders'
departure from the Maid.stone area to Aldershot in preparation for shipment
abroad was, in fact, to be further delayed until 3rd November. Finally, on
29th September, orders were issued for the move of 2nd .Lrmoured Brigade,
which had hitherto been re-equipping with Cruiser tan±zs on Salisbury Plain,
to near Rindhead in Surrey where it would again come under command of its
parent 1st Armoured Division.	 By the end of September, 1st Armoured
Division was to consist temporarily of 2nd and. 3rd Armoured Brigades com-
prising a total of 125 Cruiser and 23 light tanks, and 20th Arinoured Brigade
with its 64 'light wneeled' tanks and now 9 Infantry tanks, probably the new
Valentines, and 1st Support Group. (See Appendix 13.) General Brooce, how-
ever, still felt that the bulk of VII Corps in Surrey, although well placed
to be moved if necessary to embark on counter-attacks towards the long
Sussex Coast and. even as far as to the Vale of Kent, was situated foo far
to the west to intervene quickly in the Dover promontory and that, despite
the most recent reinforcements, this sector remained very vulnerable. "To
make the position in the South East of England reasonably secure," he told
the Chiefs of Staff on 30th September, "another Corps of tvo divisions would
be needed," while as late as 16th October, following a visit to 1st London
Division in the Ramsgate-Deal sector, he wrote,
"The more I look at that salient the more I dislike it. Ve are defi-
nitely too weak there, but I have nothing else to add to that part without
depleting other fronts dangerously." 96.
3-
By the latter part of September, therefore, Home Forces were as ready
as they 'ould ever be during 1940 to resist the expected German invasion.
Although the general layout of the forces did not appear at a glance to be
much different from the dispositions that General Brooke had inherited from
General Ironside in July, there had in fact been many changes along the
95. 'iO 166/i: op. cit., 24-29 September 1940.
96. 0kB 79/7 COS(40 )329th:i, 30 September 1940; and Diaries of Field
I'arshal Viscount Alanbrooke, 16 Octcber 1940.
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lines of General Brooke's thinking that are not apparent from a simple study
of the maps. (See Maps 8-10.) Along the East and South Coasts of England,
from Northumberland to Cornwall, were still ranged the same twelve infantry
divisions, one motor machine-gun brigade and. one independent infantry
brigade, as had been there in July, with only the addition of 29 Infantry
Brigade Group in West Sussex and the movement of a second Motor Machine-Gun
Brigade to the Northumberland coast. The difference no was that, instead
of being spread along the coast, the units making up these formations were
largely grouped for counter-attack a short way inland, leaving only a thin
screen of non-field troops and Home Guard to defend the coastline, though
vital ports such as Dover iere, of course, more heavily garrisoned. Corps
and Command reserves inland from the East and South Coasts had been increased
from the three or four infantry divisions available in mid-July to five
infantry divisions, an infantry brigade group and tro az'moured or tank
brigades, as a result of General Brooke's policy of moving mobile reserves
nearer to the threatened coasts, especially in East Anglia and the South
East. Finally, the G.H.(. Reserves of IV and. VII Corps were still situated
respectively to the north and south of London, from 4uch positions they
could command the shortest routes to the capital. They had been slightly
strengthened, and in the case of IV Corps had. been brought forward a con-
siderable distance nearer the most vulnerable coasts, and they were by now
better practised in their allotted role. To supplement the passing of
orders by field telephone and Post Office lines at the disposal of Home
Forces, units had been issued with civilian wireless sets, and. an Army
broadcasting station had been set up to disseminate authentic information
and thus counter false reports that might be spread by enemy agents.
rtillery and anti-tank guns, moreover, were more effectively deployed;
movement-constricting permanent roadblocks had been demolished and, most
importantly, the almost purely defensive thinking encouraged by the 'coastal
cru.st' and 'stopline' phase of June and early July had. by now been largely
abandoned. There had also been a siuficant movement of formations,
especially during September when the German preparations in the Channel
ports became clearly visible to British air reconnaissance, to provide
better protection to the South and South East Coasts. Churchill, although
he somewhat exaggerated the ability of IV Corps to intervene quickly to the
south of the River Thames, later wrote,
"Thus in the last half of September we were able to bring into action
on the south coast front, including Dover, sixteen divisions of high
quality, of which three were armoured divisions or their equivalent in
brigades, all of which were additional to the local coastal defence and.
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could come into action with great speed against any invasion landing. This
provided us with a punch or series of punches which General Brooke was well
poised to deliver as might be required; and. no one more capable." 97.
General Brooke's dispositions of Home Forces to counter invasion
appeared to be well thought out and quite satisfactory for the task expected
of them, although General Brooke would naturally have preferred to have
stronger forces at his disposal. The morale, too, of Home Forces was high
and there would have been a grim determination to resist any German in-
cursion. The British rmy has traditionally fought ell in defence and.
against an invasion of their om country, Home Forces would undoubtedly have
put up the best fight of winch it Tas capable. By September, the Army had
almost fully recovered from its defeat in France and Belgium. Its morale
had survived that defeat, as had. most of its manpower, and. since then a
thorough reorganization had. taken place. A good deal of the equipment lost
at Dunkirk or lacking vith the formations that did not go to France had been
made up with new production or had been brought over from nerica. The Home
Guard., likewise, now largely bore arms of some sort and was already by
September proving to be a valuable supplement to Home Forces; while during
the last two months the combination of a new and respected commander, of
high ability and reputation, and his insistence on rapid. counter-attack, had
further lightened the morale and offensive spirit of the field army.
Had the Germans launched their carefully prepared invaaion of South
East ngland, Operation 'Sea Lion', in September 1940 as planned, could the
troops of Home Forces have successfully defended and. contained the German
forces and then counter-attacked and. driven them into the sea? LU depended
ultimately on the air battle; if the invasion had gone ahead a this time
vthout the Germans achieving the air superiority over South East Eniand
needed. to contain the actvties of tne Poyal Havy from operating against
their sea communications from the flanks, to neutralize the coastal defences
by dive-bombing and to support the invading armies, then Home Forces would
in all likelihood have succeeded in defeating even quite large pockets of
German invaders as, in some disorganization and with their supplies soon cut
to a trickle, they attempted to expand their beachheads and advance inland.
Had the German Airforce, however, perhaps by continuing ts attacks on the
vita], sector stations and on the British radar installations,
succeeded in achieving air superiority over South East England, thus severely
97. Churchill, . S.: op. cit., pp. 262-263.
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curtailing the activities of the Royal Navy against their supply lines and.
allowing a constant flow of supplies and. reinforcements to reach the first
wave of the invading forces, then could the troops of Rome Forces have coped.
successfully?
I suumiaxy of the available evid.ence suggests that, in the latter case,
Home Forces would, even by September, still be very hard put indeed to
defend the country successfully. "If the Battle of BrLta.tn had been lost
the physical occupation of Britain would have presented no serious
-	
•.	 98.aifficulty, the then Ma3or General Ismay later vro e. 	 where remained
several grave defects in the Brtsh Army at home. General Drooke's policy
for defence depended upon rapid and. audacious counter-attacks on enemy
lodgements, but both the means and to a large extent the ability of the
troops to achieve this with success were still fundamentally lacking in
September 1940.
The means of both effective defence and counter-attack, the equipment
situation, had vastly improved since the days following the Dunkirk evacua-
tion, during which Admiral Sir Francis Pridham, President of the Ordnance
Board, had been greeted by one of the generals of Home Forces at a staff
nneing with the words, "Admiral, if you cannot prevent the Germans from
landing on the coasts of Lincoinshire and Yorkshire, they would be able to
cut through the country and. be in Liverpool in forty-eht hours; I have 00
insufficient weapons with which to slow them down, let alone stop them." '
Yet much vital equipment was still in short supply by September. Of General
Brooke's twenty-seven infantry divisions, only four were fully eqiápped and
less than half had sufficient frst-line transport. Host divisons still
acked around 25 of their proper complement of artillery, many of these
being ageing pieces, and as much as 75 of their prope2 comolement of anti-
tonk guns. There ere still shortages of Bren light machine-guns, anti-
tank rifles, mortars and Bren Carriers, and most especally of light anti-
aircraft guns to protect the troops from enemy air attack, plus a lack of
wrelesses and. all manner of other equipment. The total number of tan-ks in
the hands of the fighting troops on 15th September stood. at 748, but of
these only the 154 Cruisers and. 197 Ik. II and ?!k. III :nfantry tanks had
the 2 pdr. gun and. were thus an equal match for the Germans' medium tanks.
98. Ismay, General the Lord.: op. cit., p. 182.
99. Prid.ham Papers, 'iy 1':emoirs', p. 186; and. Barclay, G. St. J.: Their
Finest Hour, p. 13, ieid.enfeld & ricolson, London, 1977.
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The remainder, including 306 ill-armoured light tanks and 64 heavy armoured
cars, carried only a machine-gun, while the hundreds of open-topped Humber-
ette and Beaverette improvised 'Ironsides' and hastily armoured lorries
were clearly no match for virtually any German tank and \Tere vulnerable to
even the lightest German ant-ank l'e pons. Even by the end of September,
there were only 179 Cruisers and 238 I. II and III Infantry tanks out of a
total of 826 tanks with the troops and most armoured. formations remained
only partially equipped. (See ..ppendices 12 and 13.) General Brooke's
forces, therefore, were still short of the mobility and offensive power
that would give tnem a conforable prospect of success 	 the Germans had
landed a substantial armoured force. True, the best formations were now
poised to intervene quickly in the battle should the Germans land. in the
South East or even in East J_iglia, but it was still necessary to concentrate
rapidly in forward areas to throw back any serious chaLlenge, for in a
battle on anything like ecual terms the enemy Tere likely to win, while
outside the most threatened. sectors any German landings iould have to be
contained by local garrisons, vhich could expect no imediate help from the
general reserve and would. depend on the Royal Navy and the R.A.P. to cut
off enemy reinforcements and supplies.
Secondly, the ability of the troops of Rome Forces to perform effective
counter-attacks was still largely lacking by September 1940, again despite
recent progress. There was still much training to be done, and. indeed much
of the coming winter was to be devoted to this end, but !nad.equate training
and experience of modern mobile warfare were for the tine being toremain
as serious and outstanding wealmesses. Many lessons cre not to be learnt
until the bitter experiences of the desert fighting of 19.1-42 had been
fully absorbed, including vital lessons concerning the close co-operation
of all arms - armour, infantry, artillery, anti-tank g'ms and air support.
The direction and co-ordination of larger formatons, too, still left
much to be desired. If the Germans had landed in Seiember 1940, General
Brooke, short on experience but uith more than nearly all of the senior
commanders at this time, was likely to have handled the battle in Zngland
as ell as he had his Corps in Prance, especially since the actual area of
operations would have been in a relatively small area. Re would. also have
been ably assisted by two other very good and experienced soldiers, lus
Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Paget, ".ble, cheery and never down-
hearted", as General Sir Ronald. Adam described him, and the popular Guards
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officer, Lieutenant-General Thorne, who would have had. actual control of the
100.
battle in South East ngland. 	 Nany other senior commanders, however,
such as Lieutenant-Genera]. Sir Guy :'illiazns command.ing Eastern Command, were
elderly and had had no experience of modern warfare, while many of the
divisiona]. and brigade commanders in Home Forces were also soon to be
retired or replaced.
Sir Aukiand Gedd.es, Regional Commissioner for South ast England,
writing on 25th September 1940, was to point out that, like the problems of
ecuipment, training and command would take some time yet fully to resolve.
"The rmy worries me most," ne confided,
"Its supply positlon is bad. Its tanks are puerile and all the evils I
foresaw in a rongly timed application of conscription are coming home to
roost. You oust cannot make an army on a system that takes twenty years to
mature in twenty months. The ranks have too many youngsters and as the
older classes come in they are the juniors - the same vill be true with the
officers. I don't see how the Lrmy can get itself riit before 1943. If we
had had conscription from 1918 to 1959 all would have been veil, but as we
had not we should have done as in 1914, got a mixed. age bag of keen men to
start the new units and then have applied conscription - too much planning,
too little thinking. These second-line Territorial Divsons are quite
pathetic in their incompetence.
Thank God, the R.A.P. has not got direct conscription; they will pull
us through until the Lxmy is ready to fight, say 1943. Its a long hard
pull, but we shall do it, if our gargantiari bureaucracy can be suffused with
the breath of life." 101.
General Brooke's own doubts as to the ability of Hor.e Forces to repel
the expected invasion vere outlined in his diary, his only outlet for such
doubts, on 15th September 1940, the date which, in fact, vas to prove the
tirning point in the invasion crds and which ras later to become 1iown as
'Battle of Britain Day'. "Still no move on the part o the Germans....,' he
;'rote that evening,
"The suspense of vating is very trying, especialy when one is fan.liar
'ith the weaiess of one's defences. Cir coastline .s oust twice tne length
of the front that we and the French rere holding in Prance with about eigflty
diviiOfls and the Kaginot Line. Eere we have twenty-t'-o ivisons [in
Thgland] of which only about half can be looked upon as in any way fit for
any form of mobile operations. Thank God the spirit s now good and tne
100. Interview with General Sir Ronald Forbes Idan, formerly G.0. C.-in-C.,
Thrthern Coand, 27 February 1980.
101. Liddell Hart Papers: 1/311/lib, Lord Geddes PaDers, 25 September 1C.
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defeatist opinions expressed after Dunkirk are nov no longer prevalent. But
I wish I could have six months more to finish equipping and training the
forces under my coimnd. A responsibility such as that of the defence of
this country under existing conditions is one that weighs on one like a ton
of bricks, and it is hard at times to retain the hopeful and confident
exterior which is so essential to retain the confidence of those under one
and to guard against their having any doubts as regards final success." 102.
General Brooke subsequently noted, hoiever, that,
"It should not be thought that I considered our DOSltlCfl a hopeless one.
..., Far from it. Ve should certainly have had a desperce struggle and
the future might well have hung in the balance, but I felt that, given a
fair share of the fortunes of war, ye should certainly succeed in finally
defending these shores."
'Jhile '.'inston Churchill later vrote,
"1 have often wondered, however, what would have hapDened if tvo hundred
thousand German storm troops had. actually established themselves ashore.
The massacre would have been on both sides grim and grea. There would have
been neither mercy nor quarter. They would have used Terror, and we were
prepared to go to all lengths. I intended to use the slogan, 'You can always
take one with you.' .... But none of these emotions vas put to the proof.
Far out on the grey waters of the North Sea and the Charnel coursed and
patrolled the faithful, eager flotillas, peering through the night. Righ in
the air soared the fighter pilots, or waited serene at a moment's notice
around their excellent machines. This was a time when ii was equally good
to live or die." 103.
102. Diaries of Field arsbal Viscount Alanbrooke, 15 September 1940.
103. Autobiographical Notes of Field Narshal Viscount Alanbrooke; and
Churchill, W. S.: op. cit., p. 246.
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ILOGU
The projected German invasion of Britain was never to take place.
The plans made by General Brooke and his subordinate command.ers, as well as
the extensive preparations made by Eome Forces, were never, fortunately, to
be tested in battle.
Sunday, 15th SeDtember, proved to be both the crux of the Battle of
Britain and, in effect, the date of demise for Operation 'Sea Lion'. That
day Goering's Luftiaffe launched its supreme effort to achieve ar superi-
ority over South ast ngland, but to no avail. The 'Big Wing' formations
of the R.A.P.'s iTO. 12 Group, long advocated by its commander, Air Vice-
arshal Trafford Legh-Iallory, came to the aid of the hard pressed fighter
squadrons of Air 7ice-Iiaxshal Ieith 	 No. 11 Group to score a notable
success against t\To major German bombing raids on London. No less than 185
German planes ere claimed to be shot down in these and two smaller actions
that Sunday for the loss of 26 R.A.F. fighters. Even though the German
losses were subsequently discovered to be only 60, the appearance of large
numbers of British fighters shattered the illusion created by the Germans'
own propaganda that they had all but won the air battle and convinced them
finally that the air superiority deemed necessary for the launch of
Operation 'Sea Lion' could not now be achieved before flitler took his final
decision on whether or not to invade. On the night of 15th September too,
the R.A.F.'s Bomber Command attacked in strength enemy shipping in the
ports from Bouloe to .Lntwerp, inflicting particularly heavy losses in the
latter. Tvo nights later 8 barges were claimed to be sunk or damaged at
Dunkrk alone. Ey 19th September the cumulative losses of German barges
were believed to total over 200, or more than 1O of the total number of
invasion barges avaable to the Germans, while the disruptive factor to
the detaed enem DiflS was even greater. :ne Germans were certain th:t
their preDaratlons --ere i rell aorn to Eritsr. air reconnaissance and they
1iew also that the Royal iavy remained intact and. increasingy active in
the Channel and. stLl ha its main units in reserve further afield. n
addition, vith 'Sea Lion' now planned to Commence on 27th September, the
Germans were realzing that this date lay perilously close to the beginning
of the equinoxal gales predicted for the end of the month and they had
calculated that t would ta:e eleven days just to land the whole of the
first rave of nine infantry divisions.
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Therefore, on 17th September, Hitler, whose thoughts had already
turned towards tne East, postponed Operation 'Sea Lion', although it was
not until 12th October that he gave orders that the invasion should be
delayed until the following spring and that the elaborate apparatus of
invasion should, in the meantime, be dismantled as unobtrusively as
possible. In .Lpril 194.1, however, cane Hitler's invasion of Yugoslavia and
Greece, closely followed by the German invasion of Crete in which its elite
parachute forces, so lmDortant a feature in any future planning to invade
the United iingdom, suffered heavy losses. The late spring of l9Ltl, too,
saw the enormous build-up of German and .xis forces for the invasion of the
Soviet Union and, from 22nd June that year, Hitler's armies were far too
embroiled in the vast, long and very costly Russian campaign to be extrica-
ted for any repetition of 'Sea Lion'. In July 1941, in fact, Operation
'Sea Lion' was postponed by Hitler until the spring of 1942, by which time
he expected the campaign in Russia to be completed. This proved a vain
hope, however, and on 13th Febraary 1942 Admiral Raeder had his final
interview with Hitler on 'Sea Lion' and persuaded him to agree to a
complete stand-down on the project.
In Britain, in the meantime, Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff had
learned through 'Ultra' of Hitler's first long-term postponement of ODera-
tion 'Sea Lion' on 17th September 1940, on the very sane day as Hitler's
decision had been made. The significant clue vas the receipt of a sial
that morning that Hitler had authorized the dismantling of the equipment
specially installed on Belgian and Dutch aerodromes for the loadin and.
quick turn-round of the supply of troop-carrying aircraft that the Germans
had intended to use in the invas.on. Without this eauipment, the British
Intelligence staff realized the German invasion could not take place. Kext
day came further indications that 'Sea Lion' had been cancelled as R....'.
reconnaissance noted the first small decreases in the numbers of bE'rges in
the Channel ports of Flushing, Ostend, Dunkirk and Oalais, although the
dispersal was at first due more to the necesslty of presenting a more
difficult target for the British bombers and appearances were, in fact,
kept up as far as possible for almost another month. Goering, too, tried.
to keep up the pressure by mounting intermittent daylight raids on Greater
London and Britain's aircraft factories in late September, with further
minor raids, mainly by fighter-bombers heavily escorted by fighters, during
periods of better weather throughout October, while at night the relentless
bombing of London continued until late in the autumn. As for General
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Brooke, he kept Home Forces on full alert until 23rd September, with only
a short break, and, despite being party to the evidence from 'Ultra', he
continued almost daily to expect a German attempt at invasion to take place
until mid-October, although he too became increasingly sceptical as the
weeks passed. The Chiefs of Staff continued to be cautious and d.id not
lose sight of the possibility of an attempted invasion during the autumn in
conditions of fog or weather of low visibility, while the Prime 1Irnister,
careful to prevent an over-confident attitude from growing, warned the War
Cabinet as late as 15th October that "it would be premature to suppose that
the danger of invasion had passed". 1.
It was not until the end of October, with weather conditions rapidly
worsening, that the immediate danger of invasion was finally believed to
have dnainished, although worries concerning a possible German seizure of
Ireland vere to continue. Only then, coencing on 27th October, were a
whole seres of pre-planned moves put into effect for the troops of Home
Forces. The aim was to withdraw the bulk of the field formations for
intensive winter training in proper training areas, whilst replacing these
with only the minimum number of formations to cover the vulnerable coast-
lines of the South Last and East Anglia and thus provide securlty over the
winter months. Only then, too, were further strong reinforcements sent to
the Iliddle Last, while the Royal Naval destroyers could at last largely be
returned to their vtal role of protecting Britain's lifeline across the
tlantc.
Space precludes the extension of this study to exine ant-invesion
planning and. preparations in the spring of 19i11 and 1942, and even ip to
the end of 1 44 when the Home Guard were finally stood doim, alter having
helped to Drovlde security in Brtain during the build-up to and 2olloving
the D-Da;r andings in iorriandy, as well as performing a myriad of oLher
useful tasl:s. Suffice it to say that the formations of Fome Forces vere
comparativel: far better organized, trained and equipped to fight a nodern
war against any invader by the spring of 1941, and even more so by the
spring of 1942, than they were during September 1940. The number of tanks
available in the hands of the troops, for exanple, had doubled by Iay 19-1
and tripled by flay 19i12, while in the air the number of R.A.F. fighters had.
similarly greatly increased.
1. CB 65/9 VIi(40)271st:2, 15 October 1940.
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"Personally, on purely military grun" Winston Churchill as later
to coinent darkly,
should not have been averse from a German attempt at the invasion
of Britain in the spring or simmier of l9ztl. I believed that the enemy
would suffer the most terrific defeat and. slaughter that any country had
ever sustained in a specific military enterprise.t'
Re continued, however,
"But for that very reason I was not so simple as to expect it to
happen. In rar, vhat you don't dislike is not usually what the enemy does.
Still, in the conduct of a long struggle, when time seemed for a year or
two on our side, and. mighty allies might be gained, I thanked God that the
supreme ordeal vs to be spared our people." 2.




British plsrining and. preparations to resist invasion on land during
the period September 1939 to September 1940, despite the convenient divi-
sion in the text between the three successive Commnders-in-Chief, Home
Forces, mast be viewed as a continuously evolving and developing process.
It represented a direct reaction to the threat that was believed by the
War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and the military commanders in the field
to have existed at the time, even though the actual threat, at least up
until the end of August and. during September 1940, was in fact fairly
mn.imi General Kirke's 'Julius Caesar' Plan, conceived in the antumn of
1939, presented sensible contingency planning against a possible threat
from the North German ports and by April 1940 from Southern Norway as well,
albeit with the most slender of resources at the disposal of Home Forces.
Following the rapid and devastating events of Nay 1940 on the Continent,
the same plan was drastically revised. It had incorporated into it the
formations of the B.E.F. saved in the 'miracle' of the Dunkirk evacuation,
minus most of their equipment, and then it suffered from the results of
the abortive scheme to establish a second B.E.F. in Western France as,
during June and July, it effectively became the 'Ironside Plan' with the
imposition of General	 somewhat over-defensive and outmoded
ideas. This period, too, saw a desperate race to secure the protection of
the British mainland against what was judged to have become an immediate
and. dangerous threat. As it transpired, however, the real threat of an
invasion by the Germans did not materialize until September 1940, by which
time the defence plan had been given a much more offensive natureby
General Brooke and Home Forces had become a far better equipped and pre-
pared ar, although still possessing many serious deficiencies.
Further, in spite of the enormous British effort as regards anti-
invasion planning and preparations on land. during the summer and early
antuma of 1940, it was not the growth in strength of Home Forces that
deterred the Germans from going ahead with their planned invasion in Sept.
1940; they rein1ned supremely confident of victory in any land battle on
more-or-less equal terms, even against the most resolute defence. It was
instead their failure to secure mastery of the air before the onset of the
aatumn weather, a failure which also meant that British Naval supremacy in
the English Chuinel could not be seriously challenged. British pliming
and preparations to resist invasion on land, in all their many aspects,
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can in no way, therefore, be said to have been the decisive factor in
preventing a German invasion in September 1940.
British planning and preparations for the expected. land battle for the
possession of the British Isles were, in the event, never put to the acid
test by a full-scale German invasion, nor were they even tested on a local
level by an enemy raid of any size. Yet the British could never have per-
mitted a complete reliance on air and sea power alone; if these first two
lines of defence had. failed, there would then only have been the ill-
equipped and often partially trained troops of Home Forces between the
Germans and complete victory for the Axis powers. Only in the latter
situation, would the ability of Home Forces to repel the invader have been
of decisive importance. Its vital contribution to the overall mosaic of
the defence of the United Kingdom, which took the form of a giant combined
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